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For more than 70 years, significant disparities have been persistently reported 
regarding mental health trends and the England’s Black, Asian and minority ethnic 
(BAME) population. Today, these disparities are generally accepted as inequality, 
acknowledging that BAME status often carries social disadvantages that can 
materialise in mental health contexts. The current Covid-19 pandemic and global 
rise of anti-racism protests have brought such issues into sharp relief. Despite the 
State’s declared ambition to decrease rates of mental health issues/distress, little 
has been implemented at a national level to address BAME mental health inequality. 
This thesis considers what policy-makers of future national strategies might learn 
from people from BAME backgrounds experiencing mental health issues/distress.  
Taking a critical realist perspective and responding to gaps in the literature informing 
policy, I move away from a focus on in-patient experiences. Employing a pan 
ethnicity and mental health issue/distress sampling approach, I conduct an in-depth 
exploration of the testimonies of seven participants at various intersectional 
locations within the BAME mental health space. Semi-structured interviews and 
unstructured ethnographic conversations over an 18 month period enabled 
participants to foreground the issues they felt were most pressing to discussions of 
mental health. The length of individual engagements and locations were continually 
adapted to meet the needs and wishes of participants.   
This thesis explores the topic of BAME mental health inequality in three key ways: 
how the issue is defined; determinants of inequality in a mental health context; and 
interactions with mental health support services. These themes align with issues 
raised by participants and the way that policy makers often consider health 
inequality, whilst also providing opportunities to engage with more critical 
perspectives that challenge epistemological and ontological assumptions.  
Within these top-level themes, multiple sub-themes emerge. I found these broadly 
aligned with those in the critical literature. Primarily that racism and migratory 
experiences are factors in mental health issues/distress for many people. However, 
participants also placed greater emphasis on wider social inequalities and 
intersectional experiences than is generally represented. Though concerns differed 
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according to participants’ intersectional locations, they were present in all 
testimonies. In particular, the experience of poverty was continually raised as a key 
aggravating factor in mental health issues/distress, as was having to engage with 
processes that re-traumatise so as to receive support. This re-traumatisation often 
related to people’s intersectional locations. Additionally, this research found a strong 
indications that experiences of disability and their psychological impacts warrant 
further investigation. 
Using my findings to enable decision-makers to better align national policy with the 
lived experiences here presented, I suggest conceptualising BAME mental health 
inequalities as a ‘wicked problem’. This is with a view to engendering an 
understanding of the issue that encompasses the diversity of perspectives relevant 
to this population group, and a greater acknowledgement of the interconnecting and 
‘open’ systems at play when developing policy responses. Additionally, I promote 
the employment of an intersectional lens to enrich understandings of how these 
systems interact to produce and maintain such imparity.  
I conclude by offering the conceptual tools of the ‘wicked’ problem and 
intersectionality as a means of enabling policymakers to move beyond the ‘cheapest 
kind of understanding’ in policy making. Without embracing these concepts within 
policy making in this topic area, it is unlikely that more that minor improvements will 
be possible. Embracing these provides an opportunity to build services better suited 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It's like I've always been offered the (.) you know, the cheapest kind of 
(.) understanding. 
Satch (participant), 2017 
----- 
Intersectionality is real and it’s vital that policy recognises this so services 
at a grass roots level are meeting the needs of all communities instead 
of putting us in tick boxes. As a black British disabled woman I experience 
the constant lack of services to meet my needs as they are not formed 
on the basis of intersectionality but on just whatever can be met… 
Julie J Charles (founder of ENC), 2020 
 
Health inequalities experienced by British, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) 
populations in the UK are currently at the forefront of public debate (Allwood and 
Bell, 2020; Nazroo and Bhui, 2020; PHE, 2020; Royal College of Nursing, 2020; The 
Kings Fund, 2020; Women’s Budget Group, 2020). This results largely from the 
disproportionate negative impact that the Covid-19 pandemic has had on this 
population grouping in America and the UK, together with the rise of Black Lives 
Matter (BLM). This movement demands change in regards to structural and 
institutional racism, and the violence and murders that accompany such oppression. 
The movement’s quick adoption in the UK following this latest uprising demonstrates 
that many people in Britain feel that similar issues of violence and significant 
inequality of a historic and systemic nature are present here also. Indeed, the recent 
Lammy review reports that there ‘is greater disproportionality in the number of Black 
people in prisons here than in the United States’ (Ministry of Justice, 2017, p.3). A 
further significant area in which such violence is felt and egregious inequalities 
manifest is that of mental health. These inequalities include both disproportionate 
risk of (diagnosis of) mental health issues and inequalities of service performance 
for BAME populations.  
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The State has been informed of the persistent and significant nature of BAME 
mental health inequalities for several decades now (Blofeld et al., 2003; CAAPC, 
2016; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a; Ritchie et al., 1994; NIMHE, 
2003; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b; Department of Health, 2009). 
Over this time, some national-level measures have been implemented to address 
this. However, trends indicating inequality remain steadfast with some signs of a 
worsening of the issue even prior to Covid-19; including increases in risk of 
(diagnosis of) mental health issues/distress and worsening access to support for 
migrants (Choucan and Nazroo, 2020; Halvorsrud et al., 2019; Kalathil et al., 2011, 
p.16). As a proportion of the UK’s population, BAME groupings have not only grown, 
but are changing in demographics (Cabinet Office, 2017; Government Office for 
Science, 2013). For example, the last two decades have seen the arrival of sizable 
migrant groupings from the Middle-East (i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan) and of white 
racialised peoples (i.e. Polish). Additionally, traditional associations in the UK 
between being ‘British’ and being ‘white’ become increasingly non-sensical given 
the growing 2nd and 3rd generation ‘migrant’ population and the number of people of 
mixed heritage. Such trends together with recent events add both to the importance 
and urgency of intervening in this area of inequality at the State level. Efforts to 
address this issue at the national level in England currently focus only on inequalities 
transpiring within the mental health service system, a scope that I argue is far too 
narrow to effect improvement. With the current political and economic climate set to 
worsen this area of inequality, my thesis offers important insights that support 
existing calls for change. 
This research therefore explores the mental health inequality reported to persistently 
impact people of BAME backgrounds. In particular, I consider what policymakers of 
future national-level strategies might learn from the lived experiences of people 
located at the intersection of mental health issues/distress and BAME 
status/backgrounds. Exploration of this topic has required a cross-disciplinary 
approach, engaging me in research and theory ranging from medical discourses 
such as epidemiology and psychiatry, to works emerging from more sociological and 
critical traditions (i.e. critical race theory and disability studies). Taking an cross-
disciplinary approach not only deepens my own understanding, but enables me to 
better critique dominant discourses and understand the perspectives of participants. 
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Approaching this from a critical realist perspective, I recognise the multiplicity of 
perspectives and variety of forms of phenomena involved in this complex social 
issue. Further, I acknowledge that the concepts of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘mental 
health’ emerge from and operate within phenomena and systems that are in 
continual flux; shaping and being shaped by each other (see Appendix 1). Core to 
this research, then, is my endeavour to find ways that public policy might develop a 
cohesive strategy to address this area of inequality that allows for the diversity, 
complexity and fluidity inherent in the issue.  
Much of the literature considering this area of inequality focuses on the experiences 
of people deemed to have ‘severe mental illness’ (SMI) and/or are in psychiatric 
wards. In this study, I therefore seek to fill a relative gap in the literature regarding 
the experiences of people with long-term mental health issues/distress who live in 
the community. Participants in this research predominantly experience mental 
health issues/distress classified within medical discourses as common mental 
disorders (CMDs). Several participants, however, reject this terminology, leading 
me to use ‘mental health issues/distress’ when not adopting terms specific to 
particular participants. In this study, I use the term ‘BAME’ due to its common usage 
across disciplines relevant to this topic area and its inclusion of all racialised peoples 
and ethnic minorities in England. The decision to include white minorities results in 
part from evidence indicating disproportionately increased risk of mental health 
issues/distress among Irish, Polish and 2nd/3rd generation migrants. I further use the 
term ‘grouping’ to reinforce the constructed and problematic natures of ‘race’ and 
ethnicity (see Appendix 1). I focus on England because this is where my study has 
taken place, the experiences of participants are of English services, (recognising 
that health policy is devolved). However, I note that much of the literature speaks to 
the whole of the UK. As such my own language in chapter 3 reflects this. Finally, I 
address gaps in the literature regarding the documenting of lived experiences that 
explicitly acknowledge intersectionality. Intersectionality refers to discrimination and 
oppression specific to people who carry multiple marginalised or stigmatised 
‘identity-markers’; i.e. female, lesbian, mentally ill, disabled, black (see p.22-25 for 
more information). Though intersectionality theory has circulated in equality 
movements and scholarship around racism for some decades (Collins and Bilge, 
2016), it is only now emerging in the UK BAME mental health inequality literature. 
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1 Why this topic for this researcher?  
I came to this topic through my work prior to beginning this PhD. With a career in 
central government as a policy-maker, primarily in relation to disability issues, I was 




 disabled people are not a 
homogenous group. Treating disabled people as such therefore further marginalises 
many already marginalised people.  failure by policy-makers and 
service providers to properly address the needs of intersectional disabled people 
meant that many went without the support or opportunities that they should have. 
My own recognition of the importance of addressing intersectional issues in this 
sphere grew when my role changed and I became the UK’s international 
representative for domestic disability issues.      
 
 
 In 2017 I took the UK Government through its first periodic review 
of the UK implementation of the United Nations Convention for the Rights of Persons 






 Where diversity was considered, this tended to be diversity of impairment 




Convinced further of the need for more research of an intersectional nature, I 
considered issues that had been raised by the CRPD committee and those 
highlighted to me by stakeholders. Whilst able to identify as white British, my 
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background is multi-cultural and includes first-hand experience of migration in both 
childhood and young adulthood. I was therefore particularly interested in issues 
impacting people with mixed or ‘minority’ cultural identities. Within the policy sphere 
consideration of people with cross-cultural and migratory backgrounds usually 
means exploring the needs of people categorised as BAME. I therefore approached 
Julie J Charles (a disability advocate) who highlighted the need for more research 
regarding the intersection of disability and BAME status/background. Her 
observation in 2016/7 is mirrored in one she offered me earlier this year (see 
Appendix 2), following the events of Covid-19 and the rise of anti-racism movements 
in the UK. Together with staff from her organisation, the Equalities National Council 
(ENC), I narrowed the focus of this research from disability generally to mental 
health. Not only did mental health seem to staff at the ENC to be the most pressing 
issue for many of their clientele, but issues pertaining to this intersection had also 
been raised in the CRPD examinations’ concluding observations (UN CRPD, 2017, 
pp.6–7). Further, I confess a highly personal interest in mental health 
issues/distress, particularly within the context of mixed cultural backgrounds and 
migration. Within this, it was felt that this work should retain a pan-minority ethnicity 
and pan-‘race’ approach (see p.28). 
My work in the civil service had prepared me well for working in consultation and (to 
some degree) in collaboration with partners. However, it had also conditioned me to 
consider the political and economic context that work was being undertaken in at 
every stage; including the initial stages where the issue is defined (the ‘scoping’ 
stage). Though it is important to undertake such work at some point, these factors 
often set the parameters within which policy development takes place, as opposed 
to being an important consideration amongst several. Through this research I grew 
to realise that, important though these factors are, using them at the start of research 
to delineate the scope of the work is potentially harmful to the outcome. Particularly 
when the focus of work relates to marginalised peoples and groups. This is because 
it sets the work in contexts that make most sense to those in more dominant 
positions within our society. This dynamic risks reinforces existing marginalising 
practices by asking those marginalised to meet the subject matter from the 
perspective of the more dominant. Aware of the adverse psychological impact of 
marginalisation, and adamant that this research would not replicate such 
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experiences, I needed to adapt my approach to prioritise understandings of 
phenomena emerging from those with lived experience. Only then could I consider 
how mainstream or dominant elements in society might be altered to meet them in 
their intersectional locations. Whilst my research question was developed primarily 
as a result of conversations with participants, my own journey through this research 
is reflected in its framing:  
What might policymakers addressing BAME mental health inequality 
learn from the lived experiences of people located at the intersection 
of BAME background and mental health issues/distress? 
To explore this, it is worth understanding what strategies have been implemented 
to date in England at the national-level by the State 
2 BAME mental health inequality in national strategies for England 
In public health policy, consideration of health inequalities generally means 
reviewing two broad areas of interest:  
● prevention, which considers causation, incidence and prevalence of ill-
health; and  
● service provision, with the focus being on service outcomes and service 
user/survivor experiences.  
Whilst different definitions of ‘health inequality’ exist (see Appendix 3), those within 
UK public health policy generally take this approach. The State has employed the 
terminology of mental health inequalities in relation to disparities reported in 
incidence of mental health issues/distress and service outcomes for some decades 
now. Recognition of BAME mental health inequalities by the State took place around 
the late 1990’s/early 2000’s, emerging from decades of social change in relation to 
both racism and approaches to mental health (see Appendix 4). This period saw 
possibly the greatest focussed attention that the issue has ever received in the UK 
- with the possible exception of recent months. Not only was there a significant 
increase in epidemiological research as a result of improvements to data, but 
several inquiries into the treatment of Black people in mental health services were 
widely reported on. Such reports sat in the wider context of the Stephen Lawrence 
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inquiry, which provided the State’s eventual admission of institutional racism in the 
police and judicial systems.  
In response to calls for action, the State commissioned two reports to investigate 
why there were persistent disparities for BAME populations in the mental health 
context (NIMHE, 2003; Department of Health, 2003). In 2005, the Delivering Race 
Equality (DRE) programme was instigated. It’s remit was defined as providing ‘a 
coherent programme of work for achieving equality of access, experience and 
outcomes for BME mental health service users’ (Department of Health, 2005, p.3). 
This programme involved initiatives such as increasing engagement with BAME 
community groups, delivering race awareness training to staff in mental health 
services and improvements to data collection to better enable improvements to 
services. Though some interesting and insightful work took place at the community 
level through this programme, it had little - or no - impact on the issue at the national 
level (Department of Health, 2009). Ending around 2010, the DRE programme 
produced a document which included lessons learnt which was provided to 
policymakers. In this, the programme highlighted the need to recognise the diversity 
of this population grouping and the fact that people of BAME backgrounds have 
multiple aspects to their identity (ibid, p.6). (See Appendix 5 for more information).  
In the last decade, there has been a move away from focused action to address 
BAME mental health inequalities. Instead, discussions have centred more on 
general increases in the demand for mental health services or on the mental health 
inequalities experienced by young people and older people with dementia (NHS 
England, 2019b; NHS England, 2019a). Furthermore, mainstreaming approaches 
to equality issues following the introduction of the Equality Act 2010 (EQ10) have 
seen issues of inequality rolled into general mental health and health strategies 
(Department of Health, 2011b; HM Government, 2010; NHS England, 2019b). The 
last national-level strategy to consider mental health inequalities among 
marginalised groups was ‘No Health without Mental Health’ (NHMH), published in 
2011. This strategy included a chapter on mental health inequalities which 
considered ‘inequality’ as they effected groups defined by any of seven protected 
characteristics in EQ10. Though this strategy stressed that people are not defined 
by one aspect of their identity and can experience multiple disadvantage, it failed 
entirely to address the ways that these multiple disadvantages might interconnect 
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and impact on each other. Further, issues considered relevant to BAME mental 
health inequalities were limited to a number of policies addressed primarily at 
service experiences. These consisted of improving data collection, building better 
relationships between mental health services and BAME community groups, and 
implementing a few measures specific to tackling racism and the lack of ethnic 
diversity among staff (see Appendix 6). 
No measures were included to address the prevention of reported increased 
incidence of mental health issues/distress among BAME populations. This was 
despite the State acknowledging epidemiological trends as reflections of ‘actual’ 
illness and accepting causal explanations for mental health inequality that stem from 
increased exposure to wider social inequalities (Department of Health, 2011b, p.57). 
It should be noted that this policy was implemented simultaneously to the State’s 
implementation of austerity measures that saw substantial decreases in real-term 
budgets in public services (Docherty and Thornicroft, 2015; Fernández et al., 2013; 
Reeves et al., 2013, p.434). Such pressures on budgets, in the context of increased 
demand for mental health services and wider austerity measures, have necessarily 
impacted on the delivery of support and the ability of many services to accommodate 
for the needs of a diverse population (Beresford, 2013; Mattheys, 2015; Stuckler et 
al., 2017, p.19; Thomas, 2016, p.459; Thomas et al., 2018, p.1). 
This, together with a strategy that barely started to address the complex issues 
involved in BAME mental health inequality, have undoubtedly contributed to the lack 
of any substantial improvements to either epidemiological or service-related trends 
(Cabinet Office, 2017, pp.49–50; Mental Health Taskforce, 2016; Department for 
Health and Social Care, 2018b). Indeed, leading scholars in this field all but omit the 
NHMH in their analyses of State strategies to address BAME mental health 
inequality (Choucan and Nazroo, 2020; Fernando, 2017, c.6; Glasby and Tew, 
2015, pp.176–180; Sewell, 2014; Sewell, 2018), focusing still today on the DRE 
programme. A recent report stated that ‘Since 2010, there has been no targeted 
national policy aimed at improving mental health care for BME communities’, adding 
that  ‘campaigning groups have expressed concern that mental health services lack 
a sense of strategic direction for reducing inequalities in BME mental health’ 
(CAAPC, 2016, p.76); indicating the severe limitations of measures in the NHMH to 
address BAME mental health inequality. 
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To date there is no update to the NHMH (2011). Instead changes to mental health 
services are included in the NHS long-term plan (2019). Though this strategy also 
encompasses the State’s position on health inequality, not a single mention is made 
in this strategy in relation to BAME mental health inequality. Rather, inequalities 
experienced by BAME groupings are raised in relation to specific physical health 
issues, such as obesity, diabetes and maternity health. However a government 
commissioned independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA83) 
highlights several issues relating to BAME mental health inequalities within the 
context of mental health services and the Act (Department for Health and Social 
Care, 2018b, p.10). Additionally, it provided an admission of the existence of racism 
at the structural and institutional levels within mental health care: 
So we have to accept the painful reality of the impact of that combination 
of unconscious bias, structural and institutional racism, which is visible 
across society, also applies in mental health care. (Department for Health 
and Social Care, 2018b, pp.10–11) 
Despite acknowledging institutional racism within policing and the judiciary, the 
State has yet to acknowledge this within the health and social care system (see 
Appendix 5), though it does accept interpersonal racism (Department of Health, 
2005, p.22). I happened to be in the office of one of my gateway organisations – 
Nilaari - on the day that this review was published. The impact that such a statement 
made cannot be under-estimated; a literal roar of joy went up in the office at this 
declaration. However, I remain conscious that the review has also received 
significant criticism by leading scholars in the field (Fernando, 2018; Nazroo, 2019, 
p.2). For example, Nazroo writes that:  
although the review bravely raises questions of racism and 
discrimination, simply naming the problem doesn’t lead to an effective 
understanding of its nature, nor identify ways to address it. Indeed, the 
review does nothing meaningful to consider how racism within mental 
health services might be addressed. (Nazroo, 2019) 
It is now nearing two years since the review was published and the State is yet to 
publish its full response. In an email response to my enquiry on the topic, the 
Department of Health and Social care stated that it would publish a:  
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…White Paper [in response to the review] as soon as it is possible to do 
so. The Government will consult publicly on its proposals and will bring 
forward a Bill to amend the Act when parliamentary time allows. These 
reforms will be supported by improvements to crisis and community 
mental health services through the NHS Long Term Plan and its 
increased investment (see Appendix 7) 
In the meantime, it has accepted several recommendations pertaining to BAME 
mental health inequality. This includes a commitment to addressing the 
disproportionate numbers of people from BAME backgrounds detained under the 
MHA (1983) (Parkin and Powell, 2020, p.13). Further, the NHS has committed to 
implementing a Patient and Carer Race Equality Framework (PCREF) (NHS 
England, 2019c) – an initiative proposed in the review by the Mental Health Act 
Review African and Caribbean Group, led by Dr Dyer who is herself a Black service 
user/survivor. Currently being trialled in two locations, the framework is positioned 
as a tool to support the implementation of a ‘Patient and Carer Race Equality 
Standards’ and ongoing work to increase workforce race equality (NHS England, 
2015). 
Though the PCREF focuses specifically on service outcomes and experiences, one 
initiative does go beyond this; the development of a methodology to determine the 
percentage of people from particular BAME groupings ‘that should be represented 
in services’ (Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a, p.59) (emphasis 
added). This measure begins to speak to my own calls in this thesis for policy to 
continually critically examines assumptions used to define BAME mental health 
inequality. The PCREF further commits to the delivery of a ‘patient and carer rated 
tool’ to increase the voices of BAME service users/survivors in services (ibid); 
aligning with my own call for policymakers to take seriously and learn from lived 
experience. One further set of actions taken by the State, albeit not specifically to 
address BAME mental health inequality, has been to develop 280 workstreams 
across gov that will work towards improving mental health generally. Whilst by the 
State’s own admission there is need to align these work-strands together 
strategically, this signals an awareness of the impact that wider State policies have 
on mental health issues in the population (Govconnect, 2019). 
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3 Enriching policy responses to BAME mental health inequality 
As previously highlighted, the DRE and any actions included in the NHMH have 
failed to produce any lasting impact at the national level, though some important 
learning outcomes did fall from the DRE. Chiefly, the need for: improved 
disaggregated data; closer working between health care commissioners/providers 
and the BAME voluntary sector/community; increased diversity awareness among 
healthcare staff; and the need to design policies and services that accommodate for 
the diversity and range of needs among BAME groupings (see Appendix 5). Though 
the NHMH clearly used these as a basis for its own approach, it often did so poorly. 
Perhaps of most importance to this thesis is the way in which it adopted the ‘single 
equalities’ approach advocated by the DRE programme. By this I mean that it 
acknowledged multiple disadvantage without addressing the ways in which these 
interact and present. Further critiques include the persistently narrow scope of 
strategies specific to BAME mental health inequality, which continues to focus on 
service outcomes and experiences without measures to address wider social 
inequalities as they impact on BAME groupings. Finally, calls often centre on the 
need to address institutional racism in all of its forms (Nazroo et al., 2019; Williams, 
2014). 
In this thesis, I observe problems pertaining to the three core elements that make 
up public health policy: 1) defining the policy issue; 2) addressing determinants of 
mental health issues/distress; and 3) addressing problems within support services. 
I reflect on all three elements in relation to how they impact on BAME mental health 
inequality. Influenced by scholars from a range of disciplines2 that emphasise the 
importance of lived experience and the alternative epistemologies that can arise 
from these, together with a critical realist perspective, this thesis focuses on what 
might be learnt from people from BAME backgrounds with lived experience of long-
term mental health issues. In line with the advice of staff at the ENC and Nilaari, this 
research intended from the start to fill a gap in the research by sampling for and 
being attentive to intersectional experiences. Thus, whilst testimony comes from a 
small sample of 7 main participants, all provide important insights from different 
intersectional locations within the broad category of ‘BAME’.  
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates the need to engage with people with relevant 
lived experiences at all stages of policy development, including the stage at which 
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the ‘problem’ is defined and scoped. The operationalisation of impoverished 
understandings at the point of scoping enables crucial areas of inequality to remain 
unexplored and unaddressed. Further, close examination of testimony provided 
from a place of lived experience at the intersection of – at a minimum - BAME 
backgrounds and mental health issues/distress demonstrates that consideration of 
multiple discriminations in an additive manner are simply inadequate to the needs 
of people within this grouping. I have found instead that recognising the 
interconnected and intersectional ways in which people from BAME backgrounds 
experience mental health and wider social inequalities is vital for any future strategy. 
As a result, I conclude this thesis by proposing two heuristics that would – if properly 
implemented and given the appropriate support by Ministers - support policy-makers 
to significantly enrich their responses to BAME mental health inequality. These are: 
the conceptualisation of an issue as a ‘wicked problem’, and an operationalisation 
of intersectionality theory.  
Social issues must have several traits to be considered a ‘wicked problem’ (see 
Appendix 8). First, the issue must be one whereby there is no single definition of the 
issue, due to a multiplicity of perspectives which all have their own internally 
coherent understandings. The implication from a policy perspective being that if 
there is no one definition of the issue, it is highly unlikely that there is a single 
‘solution’. Indeed, ‘wicked problems’ are understood as those for which finding a 
‘solution’ is highly unlikely, shifting focus on to the development of policy 
‘resolutions’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973); the term I adopt is ‘responses’. Another 
reason that ‘wicked problems’ are understood as not having solutions relate to their 
second core characteristic; that of existing within networks of ‘open’ systems. ‘Open’ 
systems refer to the systems that give rise to phenomena being influenced and 
influencing other systems and phenomena such that they cannot be fully understood 
in isolation from their context. In a policy context, this means that the development 
of any responses to ‘wicked problems’ must take an approach that considers wider 
determinants. The findings in this thesis support an articulation of BAME mental 
health inequality as a ‘wicked problem’, and give weight to my proposition of this as 
a heuristic that might improve policy-making in this space. My employment of 
intersectionality theory further supports such an articulation of this issue, 
demonstrating the ‘open’ nature of systems of oppression and the need to recognise 
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and address experiences arising from this. In addition to highlighting specific 
experiential phenomena missed when intersectionality is ignored, I also discuss how 
integrating an intersectional approach into policy-making would support a richer 
response to BAME mental health inequality.   
4 Overview of the thesis 
Chapter 2 - Methodology: My methodology chapter sets out the reasons why I have 
adopted a critical realist perspective in this cross-disciplinary study, and how this 
has influenced my methodology and methods. I provide an overview of 
intersectionality theory, highlighting how it fits with a critical realist perspective and 
describing its application in this thesis. Finally, I discuss decisions made in 
conducting this research, with a particular focus on ethical issues encountered and 
the ways that I adapted approaches to meet the needs/wishes of participants. 
Chapter 3 - Literature review: The structure of my literature review mirrors the key 
concerns in public policy regarding health inequalities. I begin with the definition of 
the issue, setting out the evidence suggestive of an inequality. Applying a critical 
lens, I explore some of the assumptions underpinning dominant interpretations of 
such data. I then consider issues pertaining to incidence, prevalence, and 
prevention by considering key aetiological hypothesis proposed in relation to BAME 
mental health inequality. Finally, I explore research regarding inequalities found in 
service provision. This provides a structure broadly paralleled through my findings 
and discussion chapter, as it better enables me to reflect on this area from the 
perspective of a policy-maker. 
Chapter 4 - Findings 1: The first of my findings chapters, I here explore participants 
perspectives on mental health terminology and determinants. Drawing out the 
similarities and differences in their perspectives, I demonstrate how participants’ 
terminological and aetiological choices are influenced by a range of lived 
experiences, including those of discrimination and oppression.   
Chapter 5 - Findings 2: In this second findings chapter I consider testimony in 
relation to participants’ interactions with the State and its agencies in relation to 
mental health issues. Whilst the focus remains on mental health and related 
services, experiences with other State services clearly influence participants’ views 
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of services provided. However, most influential seems to be the particular social 
stratification and intersectional locations of participants. 
Chapter 6 - Discussion: In this chapter I explore how the literature and my own 
findings map across each other in relation to the three areas of consideration in 
health inequality policy; defining the issue; prevention; and service performance. A 
number of gaps in the literature are identified, and evidence grows that supports the 
need for: reconsideration of fundamental assumptions within mental health 
discourses; greater operationalisation of a conceptualisation of the issue as 
operating in open systems; acceptance of important role that racism, 
intersectionality and other forms of oppression play in BAME mental health 
inequality. 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion: My conclusion provides a brief overview of the main themes 
emerging from my discussion, and how these support my proposal that State 
responses to BAME mental health inequality would benefit from the adoption of two 
heuristics; the concept of the ‘wicked problem’, and an intersectionality lens. I set 
out why it is that I believe these tools could support policy-makers to bring richer 
understandings to their policy-making practices. In addition, I highlight several gaps 




Chapter 2: Methodology 
I’m going to sign any letter you want me to sign, anything. I, whatever is 
in my conversation today, our conversation been, and I know that you 
recording, eh I want them to (.) As much as you can, you push it as, 




Peter: …their interest is to sit there and to intellectualise things and hide 
behind that curtain. You know. 
Stéphanie: What, academics? Do you think? 
Peter: I think so, a lot of the time that’s what happens you know. There’s 
too much of that sort of thing, intellectualisation, you know, rather than 
just dealing with the actual thing. 
Peter, 2018 
My intention has always been to be led by participants in terms of the direction of 
this research. However, I was aware of my own particular interest in epistemological 
injustices experienced by marginalised peoples; these being injustices resulting 
from a denial of their knowledges (Dotson, 2014; Pohlhaus, 2012). Participants, 
however, wanted an output focused on issues of a more tangible and political 
nature. This is clear in the above quote from Mahdi, a young Afghan man, when he 
expresses that he is happy to sign anything if it means stories like his get really 
heard and really understood. Working with participants, I also became aware of the 
need to avoid too much ‘intellectualisation (.) rather than just dealing with the actual 
thing’; i.e. the ‘actual’ issues impacting directly on the lives of people at this 
intersection. These desires were echoed by the gateway organisations supporting 
this work: Equality National Council (London); and Nilaari (Bristol). Two ambitions 
emerged:  
1. To elevate testimonies from the intersections of BAME status and mental 
health issues/distress; and  
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2. To have the potential to inform relevant policy.  
Recognising the importance of enabling participants to influence the direction of 
research in studies with emancipatory aims (Brydon-Miller and Tolman, 1997, 
pp.806–807), I settled on the more politically focused research question and the sub 
questions in Box 1. This research question also capitalises on my own previous 
experience of working in central government as a policymaker, albeit not in public 
health policy. My experience provides me with insights into both the reality of policy-
making processes currently and some of the different ways in which evidence is 
used to inform decisions. I therefore set about producing research that retains the 
complexity and diversity of participant’s testimonies, whilst providing findings that 
enable the application of richer understandings to policy responses at the national 
level. As such I pay attention to the similarities and differences in participants’ 
experiences, with the intention of highlighting how these might influence future 
policy development. My application of intersectionalality theory has been 
instrumental in enabling me to do this.  
As discussed in my introduction, the nature of both policymaking and this subject 
area has required me to take a cross-disciplinary approach. Cross-disciplinary 
works and qualitative research more generally are increasingly being generated in 
relation to this topic. However, critical and mental health service user/survivor 
Box 1 – Research questions 
What might policymakers addressing BAME mental health inequality learn from 
the lived experiences of people located in the effected population?  
Sub questions: 
1. What indicates that BAME mental health inequality exists in England? 
2. What is the current national policy approach to this public health issue?  
3. What indicates limitations or problems with the current approach? 
4. What are the lived experiences and perceptions of participants 
regarding: 
a. mental health issues/distress, both at a personal and general 
level? 
b. mental health services and the policies that influence them? 
5. What similarities and differences emerge from participant’s testimonies? 
6. What experiences emerge from participants’ intersectional locations? 
7. Where does the current policy approach address or fail to address 
issues raised in participant testimonies? 
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researchers note that there is a continued ‘failure to incorporate non-medical 
approaches into mental health services' policy, practice and research’; partly 
because ‘these distinct communities of discourse [medical and user-led research] 
generate distinct forms of knowledge’ (Middleton, 2013, p.11). This situation seems 
to remain despite calls from many academics and activists for more diversity in the 
evidence considered in policy-making (Beresford and Carr, 2018; Davidson et al., 
2015, p.53; NICE, 2007, p.17; Papadopoulos, 2006, p.82; Sweeney et al., 2009; 
Sweeney, 2013; Willen et al., 2011, p.333).  
In 2009/2010, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) set up a review 
of their own practices around evidence-based decisions. Having for decades 
elevated research within positivist paradigms and positioning meta-analysis as the 
most effective and reliable evidence on which to base its decisions, there was 
increasing recognition that this came at a significant cost for public health issues of 
a highly social nature. The review found that ‘the evidence which derives from 
traditional public health seldom departs from its principal explanatory tool being 
pathological outcomes at the individual level.’, which was problematic because ‘the 
patterns of health and disease are… social facts which require a social explanation 
above and beyond individuals aggregated together’ (Kelly et al., 2010, p.1060). This 
review did much to encourage the inclusion of more non-positivist research and 
application of theory in public health decision-making, creating more space for 
cross-disciplinary works such as this to influence public health policymaking.  
This methodology chapter therefore explains how I have - through my theoretical 
lens, methodological approach and research design - set out to address 
policymakers who have to work across disciplinary boundaries, without 
compromising on the following three principles I have adopted as a researcher with 
emancipatory aims to:  
 remain grounded in and honour the complex and diverse lived experiences 
of participants; 
 avoid replicating marginalisation experienced by participants elsewhere in 
their lives; and  




Part A – Enabling research that can really listen 
Designing research that speaks across discourses in a way that promotes action 
whilst also challenging some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
within dominant discourses is, itself a challenge. Yet retaining a critical perspective 
in the context of mental health discourses is vital for work of an emancipatory – or 
anti-oppressive (Wilson and Beresford, 2000) - nature. Since the State really began 
to intervene in this area of life in the mid 1800’s, biological and bio-genetic models 
of mental health have dominated (Granshaw and Porter, 1989; Porter, 1987, p.109; 
Rogers and Pilgrim, 2001, p.46). This medicalised approach, governed by positivist 
and post-positivist paradigms, has been helpful in advancing some aims of a social 
justice nature. For example, by providing justifications for placing duties on the State 
to support people experiencing mental health issues/distress, and furthering the 
development of some treatments that help some people.  
However, such approaches when operationalised universally and unproblematically 
can excerpt oppression and violence; particularly on people situated in marginalised 
social locations. This is particularly the case for those intersectionally located 
wherein mental health plays a part. First, intersectionally located people have faced 
historical silencing, ignored by both dominant majority groups and identity politics 
movements. Secondly, the unproblematised application of mental health-related 
concepts around the loss of mental capacity provides the only means in the UK by 
which people can have the entirety of their agency legally stripped away (Mental 
Health Act, 1983; Mental Capacity Act, 2005).  
Mental health service user/survivor researchers have also highlighted how such 
oppressions can occur in research conducted within a strong positivist medical 
paradigm (Liegghio, 2013, p.123; Menzies et al., 2013, p.8; Sweeney, 2013, p.5; 
Telford and Faulkner, 2004, p.553). Issues include: 
individual psychiatrists, clinical researchers ask[ing] the wrong questions 
that lead them to wrong, irrelevant or damaging conclusions. They try 
scientifically to observe, but they fail to understand… (Russo, 2009, 
p.173) 
Russo here highlights that these researchers fail to move outside of their own frames 
of reference, inhibiting them from understanding the perspectives of service 
19 
 
users/survivors. Critical and user/survivor-led discourses have therefore undertaken 
to provide alternatives to overly-medicalised approaches born of positivist traditions; 
sometimes reflecting on how critical approaches from different discourses might 
come together (Goodley and Lawthom, 2005, c.1). 
In this vein, a number of social models of mental health have developed, focusing 
on interactions between mental health experiences and discourses and the social 
world (see Appendix 9). For example, the hermeneutical model focuses on how 
‘normalcy’ is pathologized, whilst the social reaction/response model explores 
stigma and discrimination in the context of mental health (Davidson et al., 2015, c.3; 
Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, c.1). Whilst extremely valuable in critiquing mental health 
discourses and practices, these particular models provide relatively narrow and 
distinct directions for research, rendering them inappropriate for this research. In 
contrast, social constructionist and social realist models refer more to particular 
ontological and epistemological stances with broader possibilities of application 
regarding topic areas. The social constructionist position, broadly speaking, sits in 
opposition to the positivist paradigm. In its strictest form, it rejects the possibility of 
universal truth claims, maintaining that all knowledge is socially constructed and 
therefore relative. Radically challenging dominant narratives at both the ontological 
and epistemological levels, this has enabled the ‘unmasking’ of oppressive concepts 
that have been naturalised (held as existing independently of social constructs) 
within positivist paradigms.  
However, the approach holds two limitations of importance for this research. First, 
its denial of any non-socially constructed phenomena reduces mental health 
issues/distress to nothing more than ‘a by-product of the activity of mental health 
professionals’ (Pilgrim and Bentall, 1999, p.261). This is potentially dangerous as it 
risks denying some people their lived experiences of particular forms of mental 
health issues/distress, thus reinforcing marginalisation experienced outside of this 
research. I note that many social constructionists actually hold much more nuanced 
views regarding the ontology of such phenomena (i.e. Hacking, 2000), views that I 
would argue begin to align with those held by critical realists. Secondly, the strong 
constructionist position leads not only to a tendency to focus on discourses rather 
than ‘social realities’, but also produces theories that cannot be applied in order to 
design practice or policy.  
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While social constructionism problematises concepts and illuminates the structures 
from which they emerge, it provides no means by which to judge alternatives for 
practical application. The social constructionist position insists on a relativism that 
provides no basis on which to make such judgements. Where scholars have tried, 
such efforts have often led to the privileging of one standpoint over another; i.e. that 
of lived experience over expertise (Cruickshank, 2012, pp.78–79). Such privileging 
leads to an internal incoherence that may damage the credibility of such work when 
considered across discourses, particularly within the politically charged context of 
policy. Further, an inability to make judgements regarding truth claims and to 
positively apply theories and knowledge uncovered is particularly problematic for 
research seeking to enrich and change policy approaches.  
Critical realism provides an alternative that navigates ‘this false binary opposition 
between positivism and relativism’, which has ‘problematic implications for practice-
based disciplines’, seeking instead ‘to develop a non-positivist notion of knowledge 
being positively applied.’ (ibid, p.71). It does this in part by stratifying phenomena 
with seemingly different ontologies; namely ‘actual phenomena’ existing separately 
to human social constructs, and that of the social world (i.e. the phenomena itself – 
not just the meanings attached to it – are socially constructed). Though its account 
of actual phenomena may at first seem a replication of positivism, there are some 
important differences.  
First, though critical realism acknowledges that there is phenomena that exists 
separate to humans, it still views these as operating in multiple systems which 
interact, shaping and being shaped by each other (Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998, p.5; 
Cruickshank, 2012, p.73). Such systems are sometimes referred to as open 
systems; indeed, this is what I mean by the term. In contrast, positivist accounts 
often situate phenomena as operating in closed and universal systems. Secondly, 
critical realism holds that knowledge regarding phenomena is never more than a 
‘theory of knowledge’; it is always ‘provisional and fallible’ (Gorski, 2013, p.659). 
Whilst positivist positions allow for their theories to be fallible, they do not allow for 
them to be provisional in the sense meant here. Here, ‘provisionality’ stems not only 
from possible fallibility, but also links back to the view that phenomena – even actual 
phenomena – operate in open systems.  
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A critical realist critique of positivist research is that it is too narrowly focused on 
‘theories of knowledge’, leading to an oversight in building ‘theories of reality’ 
(Cruickshank, 2012, p.73). Reality - in the critical realist paradigm - is:  
constituted not only by experiences and the course of actual events, but 
also by structures, powers mechanisms and tendencies - by aspects of 
reality that underpin, generate and facilitate the actual phenomena that 
we may experience... (Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998, p.5) 
Thus, theories of knowledge must inform and be informed by theories of reality; both 
being interlinked through the open systems in which they operate. Reality, 
conceived in this way, is therefore ‘both multi-dimensional and stratified and also 
open and differentiated...' (ibid, p.5). The stratification of phenomena provides the 
basis for critical realism’s epistemological relativism; i.e. recognising differences in 
the ontology of certain phenomena as produced and emerging from different 
frameworks enables greater understanding (Cruickshank, 2012; Gorski, 2013, 
p.659). This not only enables critique of dominant narratives, but also critical 
realism’s ability to hold multiple accounts of reality as of equal merit. Meanwhile, its 
insistence that some phenomena is not entirely socially constructed enables a 
resistance to judgemental relativism without jeopardising the coherence of the 
critical realist position. By this I mean that whilst all perspectives can be held as 
having some merit and speaking to some aspect of reality, there is a means by 
which to elevate some theories over others. This is by their coherence with the 
actual phenomenon in question. Thus, theories of knowledge and reality can be 
advanced and applied, as long as they are continually understood to be provisional 
and fallible.  
For these reasons I adopt a critical realist approach to investigate of BAME mental 
health inequalities. This topic is one in which the ontological nature of the 
phenomena observed is still hotly contested, being potentially subject to category 
error/fallacy fallacies (see p.58 and 60) and containing experiences of multiple 
and/or mixed ontological natures (Hacking, 2000, pp.117–119). Further, it is a field 
in which the denial of multiple ‘realities’ propagates the inequality I seek to explore. 
This theoretical framework therefore enables the positive application of 
‘knowledges’ that are continually problematised through critique that contributes to 
the development of multi-dimensional and non-static theories of reality. As Archer 
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(1995) suggests, critical realist approaches can inform policy reforms by providing 
postpositivist yet scientific accounts of how issues operate in society and 
institutions; scientific accounts that (importantly) avoid employing the sort of 
dogmatism or cultural imperialism that more positivist approaches risk (Pilgrim and 
Bentall, 1999). Finally, it is my view, that this position begins to support arguments 
made in intersectional theory for the elevation of lived experience in works 
constructing theories of reality on the topic of inequalities. 
1 Integrating intersectionality theory  
Intersectionality theory seeks to better understand experiences of discrimination and 
oppression that people who carry multiple marginalised identity-markers endure. 
Identity-markers confer status vis-à-vis those differently categorised, shaped and 
mediated as they are by the social, historical and (importantly) political contexts from 
which they emerge and operate in. Whilst identity-markers play an important role in 
intersectionality theory, intersectionality should not be understood as the study of 
identity. Rather, it is the study of power dynamics enacted on people and peoples 
as a result of the multiple identity-markers they may carry, and the vulnerabilities to 
oppression and discrimination that these enable (Southbank Centre, 2016). It 
elevates the lived experiences of marginalised people by giving voice to the different 
experiences arising from intersectional locations (i.e. Black woman, disabled gay 
man). By ‘different’, I mean that oppression experienced from specific intersectional 
locations manifests otherwise to how it might arise from only one marginalised 
identity-marker (Crenshaw, 1989; Crenshaw, 1991; Collins, 1990; Collins and Bilge, 
2016). This acknowledgement of the different forms of discrimination and 
oppression emerging from intersectional locations is a core tenant of 
intersectionality theory. 
Intersectionality theory puts lived experience as front and centre, acknowledging 
that a persons’ marginalised positionality provides insights into certain phenomena 
that is more hidden to people in privileged or dominant positions. Explicitly 
acknowledging the privileging of knowledge born of lived experience within 
intersectional projects, Collins (2019) addresses possible criticisms of 
intersectionality being constructed on anecdotes when she states that the ‘truth of 
each survivor can be disputed, but the truth of the pattern itself can no longer be 
denied.’ (Collins, 2019, p.288). This statement recognises both the value inherent 
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in knowledges seeped in lived experiences, whilst acknowledging the need for more 
generalisable data to drive change; both social and at the epistemic level. Situating 
intersectional research as ‘resistance knowledge projects’, she describes a space 
in academia for intersectionality that enables the emergence of multiple 
perspectives that can be brought together through dialogue to critique dominant 
epistemic discourses and to challenge the practices that fall from them.   
This type of approach has brought leading intersectional theorists to promote 
intersectionality as ‘an analytical tool to capture and engage contextual dynamics of 
power’ (Cho et al., 2013, p.788). Rejecting single-issue approaches to research (i,e. 
only focusing on ‘race’ or dis/ability), Cho et al. (2013) situate intersectionality as ‘a 
gathering place for open-ended investigations of the overlapping and conflicting 
dynamics of race, gender, class, sexuality, nation, and other inequalities’. 
Intersectionality research explicitly acknowledges that systems of oppression do not 
operate in silos, but rather take the form of systems of a more ‘open’ nature. One 
form of oppression maintains and influences the ways in which others emerge, and 
vice versa. Developed from examination of experiences of systemic discrimination 
at the individual, group and systemic levels, the: 
value of intersectionality approaches to social analysis is that they include 
virtually the entire social and institutional context in the problem 
formulation, and thus represent an important analytical resource for 
framing the complexity of the disproportionality problem. (Mccall and 
Skrtic, 2009, p.7) 
This more wholistic approach to issues of ‘disproportionality’ and inequality positions 
intersectionality theory as a powerful heuristic for critical inquiry. However, 
intersectionality theorists stress that such work must remain grounded in the lived 
experiences of such phenomena, highlighting the symbiotic relationship between 
such critical inquiry and praxis in this space (Cho et al., 2013, p.786; Collins and 
Bilge, 2016, c.2). Praxis in intersectionality is understood as ‘rooted in the 
experiences and struggles of disenfranchised people’ (Collins and Bilge, 2016, 
p.36). Through the interplay between critical inquiry and praxis, intersectionality 
provides a means of considering not only how open systems operate and exert 
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themselves on peoples according to their intersectional locations, but also how this 
transpires in the individual’s lived experience.    
The generation of new knowledge, gathered with anti-oppressive aims and an eye 
to the political contexts from which they emerged, holds promise for researchers 
and policymakers like myself, who engage in work relating to persistent social 
inequalities. Indeed, this potential was crystallised for me when reading several 
papers in the fields of disability studies and education, whereby the employment of 
an intersectional lens brought forth significant issues in widespread education 
practices (Erevelles and Minear, 2010; Liasidou, 2016; Staunaes, 2003; Wilson et 
al., 2006). In the last decade, several attempts have been made to translate 
intersectionality theory into policymaking frameworks (Coll-Planas and Solà-
Morales, 2019; Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011). One of the most developed to date 
is the intersectionality-based policy analysis framework (IBPA), which sets out 8 
principles to guide inquiry and 12 questions for policymakers to answer as part of 
their problem formulation and settlement development (Hankivsky et al., 2014). 
Though there are some practical issues with the IBPA (e.g. assuming high levels of 
resource and a level of political will for radical critique that is rarely present), it does 
demonstrate the potential that intersectionality offers by way of a framework to guide 
the scoping of ‘wicked’ problems (see Annex 8) and development of policy 
responses grounded in lived experience.  
Within the public health context, just as the need for social theory in research and 
policy-making relating to health inequality was being increasingly recognised around 
2010 (see p17), so too was the need for approaches capable of addressing wider 
social inequalities (Marmot et al., 2010; Metzl, 2012; Metzl and Hansen, 2014). 
Advocates of intersectional approaches today build on this (Gkiouleka et al., 2018; 
Hankivsky and Christoffersen, 2008; Heard et al., 2020; Iyer et al., 2008; 
Kapilashrami et al., 2015). For example, by emphasising the theory’s ability to 
facilitate an ‘understanding of health inequalities beyond the purely socioeconomic 
by addressing the multiple layers of privilege and disadvantage’ (Gkiouleka et al., 
2018, p.92). Further, though rooted in the lived experiences of people living the 
health inequality in question, intersectional approaches promote a ‘focus on social 
dynamics rather than social categories, recognising that experiences of advantage 
and disadvantage reflect the exercise of power across social institutions.’ 
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(Kapilashrami et al., 2015, p.288). Thus, analysis of the role of privilege and 
disadvantage within health inequality is enabled at the individual, institutional and 
systemic levels. This is of particular relevance to the topic of BAME mental health 
inequality, an area of healthcare in which systemic and institutional racism - in all of 
its possible intersectional guises - has been repeatedly denied at the institutional 
and systemic level by the State.  
This research, therefore, adopts an intersectional lens which I feel enhances the 
theoretical framework provided by critical realism in the context of this topic. This 
lens has greatly influenced the methodology I have adopted, causing me to align 
more closely with critical ethnographic approaches that also engage in the 
exploration of individuals’ experiences within the context of wider power dynamics. 
It has also influenced specific choices regarding methods; for example, my 
approach to sampling (see p.29-30) and a layer of data analysis specifically aimed 
at identifying intersectional experiences and dynamics (see p.43). This, as chapters 
4 to 7 demonstrate, has enabled aspects of participants’ experiences to emerge that 
I may otherwise have failed to recognise.  
2 A critical, anti-oppressive methodology 
Madison (2019, p.21) suggests that ‘critical theory finds its method in critical 
ethnography’. In seeking to translate the critical realist position and intersectional 
theory into my methodology and research design, I adopt a critical ethnographic 
approach that seeks participant collaboration wherever possible. This is with a view 
to gathering rich data based on lived experiences relevant to the topic, and 
maximising the emergence of both congruences and challenges to dominant 
‘theories of knowledge’ regarding BAME mental health inequalities. Critical 
ethnography emerged in response, Noblit (2003) claims, to two needs. First, from 
critical theorists’ need for a methodology enabling empirical research that aligns with 
the philosophical premises and aims of critical theory. Secondly, to save interpretive 
ethnography from being ‘relegated to the status of a “micro” theory’ as a result of its 
relativist position (Noblit, 2003, p.182). As with traditional ethnography, critical 
ethnography focuses on the social meanings, values, structures, and activities 
within particular settings or ‘fields’ of human interaction (Brewer, 2000, p.11; 
Madison, 2019, p.3). In addition, critical ethnography adopting a critical realist 
approach provides a ‘reflexive methodology where material structures and 
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ecological systems in fact and in truth exist’ (Madison, 2019, p.18). This enables the 
researcher to go beyond simply describing ‘what is’, beginning to reflect on ‘what 
could be’, with often emancipatory aims.  
Critical ethnographers challenge truth claims and ‘taken-for-granted’ ways of 
thinking, whilst maintaining a practice that gives primacy to lived experiences and 
provides a basis for driving social change. This might ‘range from modest rethinking 
of comfortable thoughts to more direct engagement that includes political activism’ 
(Thomas, 1993, p.17). Thus, where conventional ethnographers may stop at 
providing rich descriptive data of a community, critical ethnographers seek to 
understand the hidden structures and power dynamics that contribute to the current 
state. This enables contextualised accounts of multiple lived experiences illuminated 
through rich descriptions. It is through such understandings that the critical 
ethnographer is able to consider ‘what could be’, developing alternative ‘theories of 
knowledge’ applicable in settings such as healthcare and related policymaking 
(Bransford, 2006; Cook, 2005, p.132; Oladele et al., 2012, p.17).  
This does, however, necessitate that the critical ethnographer takes up a position 
with regards to the data they seek to represent. If a vision of ‘what could be’ is 
proposed to effect change, then the researcher cannot remain in a state of 
judgmental relativism. It requires developing ‘theories of knowledge’ that, whilst 
grounded in data reflective of actual phenomena, are nonetheless influenced by the 
positionality of the researcher as much as (or more than) the researched. As such, 
‘good ethnography is not limited to knowledge or information about others “out there” 
but expands the definition to include stories about oneself’, whilst remaining careful 
not to inadvertently dominate over the testimonies of research participants (Tracy, 
2010, p.842).  
As a researcher exploring certain intersectional experiences from a critical 
paradigm, self-reflexivity requires more than simply reflecting on internal responses 
to events and people encountered. It requires consideration of my own ‘location’ 
within the social categories that impact on and marginalise participants in our society 
(Madison, 2019, p.44; Maynard, 2002; Sholock, 2012, p.704; Tracy, 2010, p.842; 
Wilson, 2006, p.205). This location impacts not only my ‘worldview’ and how I 
interpret data, but also the power dynamics between myself and participants. For 
example, I am white and British, exposing me to white privilege and shielding me 
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from the racism experienced by many participants in this research. I am also, 
however, a second-generation migrant with experience of immigration as a child. 
This provides me with first hand insights regarding migration experiences and 
having a mixed cultural upbringing; experiences relevant to most participants in one 
way or another. I further recognise that these experiences influence how I engaged 
with participants and, therefore, the direction of some parts of our conversations. In 
this way I recognise how myself and participants ‘mutually influence the other’ 
(Bransford, 2006, p.179) in the production of the theories of knowledge and reality 
that emerge in this thesis.  
Simply recognising one’s own positionality, however, is not adequate. Particularly 
the case in research seeking to better understand how certain intersectional 
locations interact with mental health issues/distress, such that indicators of 
inequality emerge at the population level. Noblit (2003, p185) warns that: 
critical ethnographers must explicitly consider how their own acts of 
studying and representing people and situations are acts of domination 
even as critical ethnographers reveal the same in what they study. 
As such, critical ethnography is called to ‘turn its value orientation and 
epistemological understandings back on itself’ (ibid, p.185). Essentially, explicit and 
transparent self-reflexivity is required. In the context of a critical realist approach, 
this involves researchers refusing to negate their existence and positionality and 
‘reflecting upon the data as a partial account of specific and context bond [bound] 
truths and realities’ (Madison, 2019, p.18). This is all the more important when 
engaged in research that hopes to inform future policy approaches that directly 
impact on marginalised people. 
Additional efforts to remain actively self-reflexive therefore include:   
 being transparent with participants about my own positionality and relevant 
experiences (or lack thereof);  
 consciously providing spaces to discuss how my positionality might impact 
my interpretations and representations of their testimonies;  
 discussing findings with participants throughout the research process; and  
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 being candid in my writing about how my positionality has influenced 
decisions taken.  
Additionally, Thomas (1993, p.21-22) suggests distinguishing between value-free 
and value-laden ‘facts’. Value-free ‘facts’ relate to ‘actual phenomena’ of Bhaskar, 
and would be purely descriptive in nature. Value-laden ‘facts’, in contrast, express 
an interpretation of phenomena. Thomas further suggests that this distinction be 
made explicit to the reader by only using the word ‘is’ for value-free facts and using 
‘ought’ for value-laden ones. Whilst this is fairly limited in terms of self-reflexivity in 
writing, it provides a continual prompt for the researcher to ‘check-in’ with 
themselves. 
3 Defining my research focus and participant sample 
As alluded to in my introductory chapter, my gateway organisations significantly 
influenced the scope of this work. Both being BAME led organisations, with one also 
being a disability-user led organisation, I asked for their steers on how I might narrow 
down my project. Through our discussions, it became clear that they felt a pan-
ethnicity and pan mental health approach would be most useful. It was hoped that 
this would draw out similarities across BAME groupings in the marginalising 
experiences that staff members felt contributed to BAME mental health 
issues/distress inequality. I was further encouraged by staff to consider the role of 
intersectional locations in participants’ experiences, with the relative dearth of 
intersectional studies in this field being pointed out to me. I was keen to both help 
fill this gap and explore how multiple systems of oppression might be congregating 
to create mental health inequalities amongst England’s BAME populations.  
Though taking a pan-mental health approach, I did decide to focus on experiences 
of people living ‘in the community’. This is because there is already significant 
emphasis on experiences within psychiatric wards in the BAME mental health 
inequality space, as well as a focus predominantly on people labelled as having 
Severe Mental Illness (Wilson, 2006, p.198). Further, conscious of the controversy 
regarding mental health diagnosis and labels, I did not ask participants for the 
diagnoses that they had been provided. Influenced by social models of disability 
(Barnes et al., 2013; Davis, 1995; Roulstone et al., 2013; Shakespeare, 2017), I 
decided that the particulars of a mental health diagnosis were of little importance in 
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this research. Not coming from a clinical background, I am not interested in defining 
the ontological basis for mental health issues, but in exploring factors in the social 
world that contribute to mental health inequalities. As such, labels that made some 
participants deeply uncomfortable were not enforced, with the focus turning instead 
to the actual experiences of such issues/distress and participant perceptions of 
these.   
Whilst these decisions did little to narrow the scope of the research, they did align 
with my own preferences. I, too, had a desire to explore the differences and 
similarities in experiences across ethnic groupings and mental health diagnoses, 
rather than focus in on the way this phenomenon was unfolding in just one minority 
ethnic grouping. This predilection no doubt reveals my fascination in how dominant 
English society and the navigation of this by people of mixed and minority ethnicity 
impacts on mental health issues/distress; a learning borne of my own experiences 
of learning to navigate English culture and fuelled further by trends highlighted in 
my introduction.  
Working through my gateway organisations to take this approach forward, I 
employed a two-part purposeful sampling approach. First, selecting homogenously 
to ensure that participants were indeed of BAME background with lived experience 
of mental health issues/distress. Then working through this group to apply a 
maximum variation sampling approach to ensure a diversity of intersectional 
locations represented within my target participant group (Palinkas et al., 2015, p.18). 
The idea being that by ‘maximizing differences’, I would increase the probability of 
‘collect[ing] different and varied data bearing on a category, while yet finding 
strategic similarities among the groups' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.56). Whilst I 
wanted to ensure a sample group that enabled exploration across minority ethnic 
groupings, mental health diagnoses and intersectional locations, I did not want to 
do so at the cost of gathering rich data. I recognised the unfeasibility of seeking to 
chart experiences from all possible intersectional locations within the target 
participant group.  
I also acknowledged the near impossibility of achieving theoretical saturation of the 
sort promoted in grounded theory; i.e. the collection of data until ‘no new properties 
of the pattern [that form theoretical categories developed] emerge’ (Glaser, 2001, 
p.191). As such, I limited the number of participants to between 6-8; a number that 
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I felt would be manageable whilst also allowing a significant range of locations and 
experiences (Guetterman, 2015, p.17). Ultimately, 7 people’s testimonies formed 
the core of this study; their BAME backgrounds, experiences of mental health 
issues/distress and intersectional locations are outlined on p94. Supplementing for 
losses in the diversity of intersectional locations possible through a wider sample 
size, I engaged 9 staff members working within or alongside my gateway 
organisations in one-off 1-2-1 semi-structured interviews, and several more in team 
meetings. With a variety of relevant lived experiences themselves, and all being of 
BAME backgrounds (Appendix 13), they provided me with an invaluable backdrop. 
I used this not only to help me contextualise non-staff participant testimonies, but 
also in a number of other ways that I discuss later in this chapter. 
This freed me to seek out rich, in-depth data with a small number of core 
participants; the sort of data often missing from evidence from positivist paradigms 
that is prioritised in public-health policymaking (Cruickshank, 2012, p.74; Kelly et al., 
2010, p.1058; Pawson, 2006, c.3). Pawson (2006, p.43) – in highlighting the need 
for non-positivist, rich data to influence such policymaking – points out why a 
reliance on meta-analysis in particular is problematic in the context of public health 
issues of more social natures. Namely, that the level of simplification and 
aggregation involved - while producing highly replicable results – also produces 
findings likely to be ‘artificial and misleading’ (ibid, p.43). One way in which results 
might become misleading, for example, is the reduction of ‘similarity’ to ‘sameness’ 
(Fricker, 1999, p.201). By this I mean that experiences are simplified such that the 
congruences of experience are valued above the differences, distorting descriptions 
of the ‘actual thing’ and their social realities. Whilst replicability might be the correct 
approach for decisions such as choosing between drug therapies, it is less 
appropriate to issues situated more in the ‘social’ than ‘natural’ world. 
Part B – Stepping in front of the intellectual curtain: conducting research 
The above section sets out the theoretical and methodological perspectives that 
underpin this work, and the scope of the study itself. Throughout, I highlight how 
such approaches support this research to build on the body of methodologically 
diverse evidence required to enrich public health policy responses. I now discuss 
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the specifics of my research design and issues that occurred when I stepped out 
from ‘behind the intellectual curtain’ and into the field, as Peter might say.  
4 Finding my ethnographic ‘place’ 
I decided to pursue a research design using more traditional ethnographic methods; 
i.e. taking up opportunities to better understand participants’ social realities through 
‘hanging out’ when possible, in addition to semi-structured interviews and 
ethnographic conversations. The idea being that ‘hanging out’ might enable me 
insights into the social context in which participants live. For example, meeting Satch 
in various locations exposed me to some of the dynamics he experiences with other 
people in his locality that would otherwise have been invisible to me. Or spending a 
little time with Samaiya in her home provided insights about how interconnected the 
daily lives of her extended family are.  
Participants in this research do not occupy a shared ‘place’ in terms of a unified 
community or geographical locations in any meaningful way, however all resided in 
parts of large cities (London and Bristol) with high levels of minority ethnic density. 
Not having a tangible ‘field sites’ that would enable me to ‘enter and spend time 
within the grounded day-to-day, embodied actions, of a field site’ of a given social 
world (Madison, 2019, pp.3–4), I had to reconceptualise ‘place’. Wolcott provides 
interesting insight in this regard. He suggests that ‘In place of place’ (Wolcott, 1999, 
p.25), ethnographic works are increasingly emphasising particular problems which 
then provide ‘place’. In the context of BAME mental health inequality, then, ‘place’ 
becomes the intersectional locations that arise when people are socially stratified 
according to ‘race’, ethnicity and mental health. ‘Place’ is found in the intersectional 
locations of multiple, disparate individuals in UK society.  As such, the ‘sites’ of my 
fieldwork were dictated by my participants and consisted of the places that were 
meaningful to them. Yet, even with this decided, further barriers limited my ability to 
engage in ‘sustained hanging around’ (Charmaz, 2013, p.35). For example, 
participants’ availability. Some chose not to engage with me on an ongoing basis 
and two participants that did were inhibited from meeting with me for extended 
periods due to hospitalisation. Further, I was mindful of creating dependencies on 
me by a small number of participants that might have proved harmful if I later could 
not continue to provide such support (see section 6).     
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When we were able to ‘hang out’ or meet, then, I invited participants to suggest the 
locations for our ethnographic conversations. Suggestions proved insightful. For 
example, Mahdi tended to choose to meet in parks. As his testimony alludes, parks 
are one of the few spaces in which he finds peace. Satch asked to be taken to a 
part of Bristol that he loves and feels a sense of belonging, but that his physical ill-
health prevents him from visiting alone. There was one café/bar in particular where 
Satch felt very at home. On several occasions however, this location was shut and 
we had to find an alternative café. The hunt for an alternative café was extremely 
revealing to me. For whilst I was looking for places that might offer a degree of 
privacy, Satch was focused on finding somewhere that wasn’t ‘too white’. Satch 
explained his discomfort in places where he was the only or one of a few non-white 
people. A further consideration that only emerged later, was Satch’s discomfort in 
spaces that were too middle-class: 
Fieldnote with Satch: Satch started getting visible uncomfortable and 
energy suddenly dropped. To avoid talking about the mental health stuff, 
he diverted discussion to unusual stories about dancing. But I think the 
café was also too fancy; when we left he spoke about it not being the fault 
of the people there but it feeling a bit too snooty. 
Observing Satch’s responses to and negotiations of place impressed on me his 
acute awareness of his intersectional location and how this impacts both his 
behaviour and his sense of wellbeing.  
Another way in which I tried to access participants’ social realities was by following 
their recommendations for music, books and videos to watch. For Satch, music and 
music scenes play a pivotal role in his sense of identity and belonging. The café we 
would always try to go to, for example, is below a community space that hosted 
many a gig in which he participated. One particular album that he recommended – 
‘Distant relatives’ by Damian Marley and Nas - provided me with insights into the 
Black diaspora and Rastafarian culture that inform his sense of belonging. This 
means of trying to access participants’ social realities was particularly important with 
regards to Peter, whom I predominantly met at the offices of one of my gateway 
organisations. Peter shared the titles of books and links to videos that have informed 
his views regarding mental health issues/distress. For example, links to a lecture by 
Dr. Joy DeGruy on post-traumatic slave disorder and books such as ‘The Spectrum’ 
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by Dean Ornish M.D. These sources provided an additional platform through which 
to explore Peter’s perspectives and informed our future ethnographic conversations.  
5 Gathering data  
As Thomas (1993, p.41) notes, ‘Good ethnography requires flexibility’. This flexibility 
was required not only in relation to the sites in which data collection occurred, but 
also in my approach to interviews and ethnographic conversations. As previously 
alluded, I wanted to start from a position of openness, allowing participants to direct 
the research within the topic of mental health issues/distress. This was not only due 
to standard practices among emancipatory and participatory research, but also 
because: 
Being too directive poses hazards when interviewing chronically ill 
people. The overly-directive researcher can cut off the most interesting 
leads and rich data. Further, the researcher may load assumptions into 
the questions without being aware of doing so. (Charmaz, 1990, p.1167)  
With my three guiding principles in mind, Charmaz’s reflections together with an 
initial false-start when employing an interview script, I moved more towards the use 
of ‘topic guides’ (see Appendix 10). These enabled me to more systematically cover 
key issues whilst ‘allowing the flexibility to pursue the detail that is salient to each 
individual participant’ (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003, p.115) This approach proved 
invaluable as a range of issues did indeed emerge that may not have appeared on 
any interview schedule prepared from my own positionality. For example, housing 
issues or rivalries across and within specific communities.  
Further, it allowed the flexibility required as a result of the individual needs of 
participants (Mirfin-Veitch et al., 2018, pp.367–368). Early in my fieldwork, I 
recognised that decisions to maximise variation among participants meant working 
with people with diverse needs and levels of knowledge and education. For 
example, whilst several participants were able to engage in the topic at quite a high 
theoretical level, others were less able or interested in doing so. Samaiya, for 
example, was unsure what ‘marginalisation’ meant whilst Mya provided an insightful 
summary of what ‘intersectionality’ means and Peter expounded notions of 
intergenerational racism. Additionally, there was diversity in intellectual and 
cognitive capabilities across participants. Satch and Andeep highlighted substance 
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misuse or medications as impacting their cognitive abilities and Samaiya self-reports 
as having significant learning difficulties. Samaiya’s learning difficulties are the 
reason why her sister is present and participates in our discussion. This is the only 
interview where an additional person was present and resulted from Samaiya’s own 
request. 
Several participants also highlight experiencing issues with memory and 
concentration as a result of health issues or distress. For example, Peter reported 
difficulties remembering what we had discussed in previous conversations, relating 
this to memory and concentration issues experienced more generally. This, 
however, did not significantly impact on our conversations. It just meant that I would 
provide a relatively detailed account of our previous conversation before we picked 
up again; a process I too found helpful, as our meetings were often months apart. 
More evident to me as a researcher were the memory and concentration issues 
experienced by Satch. Satch later told me that a recent neurological scan had 
revealed damage to nerve endings as a result of substance misuse that account for 
his memory issues. Satch’s memory and concentration issues were, through much 
of this data collection period, significantly aggravated by his heightened distress 
which often expressed itself through an anxious state. I learnt that, with Satch, I 
needed to adopt a different approach than I had with other participants. Instead of 
long in-depth ethnographic conversations every few months, we would meet once 
or twice a month and speak for around 30 minutes before Satch would become tired 
or struggle to remain on topic. I also learnt to distinguish between the days when it 
was best to let him speak on whatever topic he needed to (asking permission to 
record when the topic discussed was relevant), and when I might inject topics into 
the conversations. The subsequent flexibility in approaches taken are visible in 
Appendix 10.  
Data collection using semi-structured and ethnographic conversations was an 
iterative process for me. Borrowing from grounded theory methods (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2013), I considered the topics emerging from across 
participants - revisiting or raising these in the next round of ethnographic 
conversations. Issues prioritised were those emerging across multiple participants, 
or those that seemed of particular importance to one or two. For example, only two 
participants raised the issue of racism without my prompting. I then raised this with 
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other participants, who spoke on the subject if it resonated with them. As not all 
participants ended up working with me on a continuous basis, I began interviews by 
providing an open platform. If the person then raised a topic that had been raised 
elsewhere, I prompted them to speak more on the issue. If certain issues raised by 
other participants had not been covered and the person was coming to the end of 
their own stream of thoughts, I would raise these. In this way, I was able to garner 
views on many of the topics raised across most participant and compare responses. 
I was also aware that I was working in a cross-cultural setting in which I did not have 
an in-depth knowledge of the various cultures I would be encountering. I felt it likely 
that topics of importance could remain hidden as a result of my being an outsider 
culturally (Alim, 2004). To mitigate against this, I paid attention to what was not said 
as well as to what was (Tracy, 2010, p.843) and remained alert to possible 
misunderstandings due to cultural and intersectional differences (Maynard, 2002, 
p.37). For example, I was conscious that several participants had not spoken to me 
about the role of religion and/or spirituality, and reflected that this might be linked to 
assumptions about my own beliefs in this secular society. Where I felt there may be 
a gap like this, I raised the issues in later ethnographic conversations with core 
participants and interviews with staff members. Further, I arranged to present 
anonymised and amalgamated initial findings to staff in their team meetings. These 
discussions were of enormous support. On several occasions they led to helpful 
insights on areas of importance to several participants that had not been raised by 
participants themselves. For example, several staff members joined me in my 
surprise that cultural clashes had not featured more highly in the first round of 
interviews and conversations with participants. In their experience, these areas were 
significant factors in the difficulties that this BAME populations faces. Taking this 
insight into my next round of ethnographic conversations with participants, I was 
able to garner important information that might otherwise have remained hidden.   
Conscious also of the impact that power dynamics might have on the testimonies 
offered, I adopted a demeanour that I hoped would encourage dialogue that 
welcomed ‘both difference and unity, both agreement and disagreement’ (Madison, 
2019, p.17). For example, the below is an excerpt from my conversation with Mya.  
She had stated the importance of mental health diagnosis, and I responded by 
expressing my alternative view in the following way: 
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Years ago, I was unwell. Definitely I feel that I was unwell. But I absolutely 
refused the doctor to give me a diagnosis. So, for me there’s a real 
conflict there, of talking about it as being illness or not. So, I was just 
curious hearing you talk about it.  
Whilst my discomfort with diagnostic practices around mental health issues/distress 
are clearly expressed, I did so in a manner that did not undermine Mya’s own beliefs. 
This was no doubt helped by my openness regarding my own past experiences such 
that I was situated as something of an insider researcher. However, I took similar 
approaches to challenge views on topics on which I was clearly an outsider 
researcher. For example, challenging Mahdi’s claim that ‘because of these 
foreigners, this country’s kind of messed up.’ This is not a view that I share and I 
was surprised when Mahdi expressed this being a foreigner to the UK himself. 
Through challenge and further discussion, Mahdi expanded that he did not apply 
this view universally. This discussion ultimately provided insights into the ways in 
which Mahdi felt migrant people were being divided into worthy and unworthy of 
support, and how he had internalised these views. Disagreement was thus situated 
as unproblematic and enabled non-threatening ‘confrontations’ (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009, p.156) that, when combined with ensuring that the platform 
remained primarily for the participant to speak, encouraged further self-reflection on 
the part of the participant and researcher. It also later enabled me to provide written 
accounts of such views where I might state my own (contradictory) view without 
feeling I was committing a deep betrayal of a particular participant (Newkirk, 1996, 
p.7). Further, this dynamic was also a means of explicitly acknowledging the inter-
subjectivity of the sorts of ‘theories of knowledge’ and reality being discussed 
(Simmons, 2017, p.7). 
Useful though this dynamic was, it had its limitations. Though it facilitated checking 
my interpretations of statements and positions articulated, it was not helpful in 
validating claims themselves. As a researcher engaged in anti-oppressive work, I 
started from a position of giving full credibility to participants’ testimonies. This does 
not mean I did not question the coherence of or express surprise at some of the 
experiences and views relayed. However, as just discussed, most of these issues 
were able to be resolved through dialogue without putting the participant’s testimony 
in any doubt. This is particularly important in the mental health context due to the 
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common experience of testimonial smothering that people labelled as ‘mentally ill’ 
often endure (Tate, 2019; Mental Health Act, 1983).  
However, two participants did, on specific occasion, give me concern regarding the 
credibility of parts of their testimonies. In our first interview, Samantha stated quite 
openly that, in her interactions with mental healthcare workers, she would ‘make 
sarcastic comments just like I'm doing to you.’ This was a means of keeping the staff 
at a distance. Following a telephone conversation held months after, I noted in a 
fieldnote that Samantha told me that ‘she was hit on the head and knocked out and 
robbed going into her apartment and there’s now a hole that needs fixing 
somewhere… the police don’t know who did it (I think but not entirely clear)’. I was 
concerned, but the story was not particularly cohesive. In our following conversation, 
she told me that her and her friends were laughing because she had been ‘sarcastic’ 
with me. Working with Samantha over an extended period proved invaluable, for I 
was able to return to her with accounts that – in less playful moods – she would 
clarify or correct. More difficult was deciding how to treat an account of events that 
Satch gave shortly following a second attempt at dying during this research period. 
These accounts were made at a point when I was just checking in to see how he 
was. We later met with his support worker, a lady that Satch trusted and valued very 
much. When Satch went to the bathroom, I asked her about these incidents out of 
concern. She informed me that these events had not taken place. Given the 
distressing context within which these comments were made and the trust that Satch 
himself placed in this support worker (who he had known for around 15 years), I 
decided not to ask him about these again for research purposes. 
6 Ethical issues: Navigating power dynamics and friendship 
Considerations of an ethical nature have informed decisions I have made at every 
stage of this research, as I hope is evident throughout this chapter; from choices 
about theoretical frameworks, (whereby those chosen were done so in part due to 
their emancipatory potential), to approaches taken to analyse and write-up my 
findings (see sections 7-8). In this, I have gone beyond simply meeting the 
requirements of regulatory/procedural ethics set out in my ethics approval plan (see 
Appendix 11), immersing myself in a continual self-reflexive ‘ethics in practice’ 
(Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). ‘Ethics in practice’ essentially acknowledges that 
ethical dilemmas occur throughout qualitative research and often demand 
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immediate responses from researchers that have not been foreseen. In this vein. I 
augmented an standard informed consent process (see consent forms, Appendix 
12), by engaging in a ‘process consent’ (Ellis, 2007, p.23) approach whereby I 
checked at various stages of the research that participants were content for me to 
continue collecting and using their testimony. 
I also adopted a relational ethics approach. Relational ethicists view ethical 
practices as necessarily requiring researchers to ‘acknowledge our interpersonal 
bonds to others, and take responsibility for actions and their consequences’ (ibid, 
p.3). Acknowledging that ‘ethics in practice’ in research with other people is 
inevitably ‘a relational and dialogic encounter with participants’ (Barker and 
Macleod, 2018, p.185), it accommodates for the fact that participants bring their own 
interpretations and expectations of what is ‘ethical’ behaviour. Further, it 
acknowledges the importance of considering context and systemic power dynamics 
as researchers navigate ethical dilemmas (Routledge, 2004, p.86). As such, the 
ways that a researcher responds to ethical dilemmas that arise through interactions 
with participants cannot follow a strict set of rules without risking harm in the form of 
ignoring the participants’ own agency. Indeed, I took the position that attending to 
participants’ views in this respect was an important means for me to ensure that I 
acknowledged and respected their agency within this work. This approach to ethical 
dilemmas proved invaluable, as issues did occur as relationships with some 
participants developed and evolved that required careful handling (Banks and 
Brydon-Miller, 2018; Mnyaka and Macleod, 2018, p.134; Stevenson and Lawthom, 
2017, para.18). Not least because, just as Barker (2018) describes taking place 
during her own doctoral research, several participants in this study ‘invited me into 
a relationship in which they asked me to see them, hear them, attend to them, and 
acknowledge them as fellow human beings’, as opposed to ‘research participants 
whose only value existed in the responses they offered’ (Barker and Macleod, 2018, 
p.184) to my questions.  
Whilst I did all I could to ensure that participants remained conscious that I was 
meeting with them in my capacity as a researcher, Satch, Samantha and Mahdi 
would refer to me as ‘mate’ or ‘friend’. Satch also affectionately referred to me as 
‘kid’, having children of his own that are roughly my age. Several considerations 
prohibited me from correcting or challenging them in these instances, though I was 
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careful not to reciprocate such proclamations. Primarily, this seemed to me to be 
evidence of my success in breaking down power imbalances that elevate the 
researcher at the expense of participants. In efforts to create spaces that enabled 
‘unimpaired self-presentation by participants… characterised by mutuality of 
expectations rather than one-sided norms’ (Crotty, 1998, p.143), I had intentionally 
cultivated an informal, discursive tone. I wanted participants to feel comfortable 
challenging incorrect assumptions or interpretations I made, whether as a result of 
language barriers, ignorance or of my own privileged epistemic position (Medina, 
2013, pp.5–13). It is also true that none of these participants would have accepted 
a dynamic in which they felt there was not such a balance. An insistence on 
maintaining formal researcher/participant boundaries would have damaged our 
interactions, curtailing the richness of data collected. But most importantly, I did not 
want to risk behaving in ways that would reflect marginalising experiences that had 
occurred elsewhere.  
Speaking with staff in my gateway organisations ahead of meeting participants, they 
highlighted to me the negative view that many of their clients have of Western 
notions of ‘professionalism’; i.e. the distanced approaches pertaining to ‘objectivity’ 
encouraged in practices of western medicine and bureaucracy. Among their client 
base, this did not often connote fairness and competence, but was instead a display 
of disdain and a lack of humanity. Staff highlighted how this form of ‘professionalism’ 
could be quite alienating (see Appendix 13). For example, James - a Black man with 
prior lived experience of mental health issues/distress - described how this 
Eurocentric version of professionalism continues to impact negatively on him even 
though he is now part of the workforce: 
I have to be a different person in my work place. …There's protocol and 
policies you have to follow and even a code of behaviour, so I can never 
go in there and start doing things I would like to do, like going ‘yes mate’. 
You've got to hold yourself back. And / it's about professionalism, which 
I consider / specialists sometimes can be a middle-class white order and 
/ got to work within these constructs. 
Views such as this impressed on me the importance of recognising that 
‘relationships are constructed around an abstruse framework of previous 
interactions with others.’ (Levinson, 2010, p.195). Adopting the demeanour of a 
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‘distanced professional’ may have met with criteria within certain research 
paradigms and gained ethics approval more swiftly. However, I did not feel I could, 
in good conscience, risk resembling interactions that participants have had with 
professionals when accessing the support they needed from the State and its 
agencies.  
In navigating the intricacies of these relationships and maintaining the ethical 
integrity of this research, my adoption of a relational ethics approach proved 
invaluable. It provided me with access to a community of researchers and their 
experiences as I took steps to walk the tightrope of being friendly, developing actual 
friendships and enabling a dependency on me that I would be unlikely to be able to 
sustain, whilst trying to remain flexible enough to meet the needs of participants. 
Such steps included being explicit about when we were doing work related to the 
research or not, making a show of using the dictaphone or taking notes. If issues of 
interest to my research came up in the margins of data collection, I would later ask 
permission to draw on this for the research. This was particularly important with 
Mahdi, Satch and Samantha due to the affection they expressed towards me. For 
whilst I did feel a genuine sense of connection with them all, I was conscious that – 
for them – this may have more to do with their intense sense of isolation than me as 
a person. As Charmaz (2013, p.72) notes, ‘Marginalized people, particularly those 
who are isolated, may want more time rather than less’. Having carefully considered 
the potential emotional demands that might be placed on me and my own ability to 
meet these (Tillmann-Healy, 2003, p.740), I did not want to exploit this situation only 
to later let them down.  
Despite the steps I took, I was at times called upon to provide more support than 
was appropriate in my role as a researcher. If participants did overstep boundaries 
by making more demands on me than I was able to fulfil, I used these opportunities 
to restate the limits of what I could provide to them. However, enforcing strict 
boundaries was not always appropriate within the paradigm of more relational ethics 
approaches (Banks and Brydon-Miller, 2018, pp.16–17). For example, in a state of 
significant anxiety and following a suicide attempt, Satch asked me to take forward 
his applications for welfare and organise his medical appointments. I replied that as 
a student I was not best placed to do this for him, but that I would be happy to meet 
for a coffee the next day instead. 
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Another example involves Mahdi. Meeting to engage in a further ethnographic 
conversation, Mahdi began telling me about his current state of heartbreak before 
we had begun to audio record our discussion. Apologising for talking so much, he 
confided that he just needed to speak to a woman about his emotions; he did not 
feel he could speak to his male friends about such things. As his mother and aunts 
had been killed in war, he had turned to me. As a result, I took no audio recordings, 
focussing instead on providing an empathetic ear. However, on this occasion and 
because of the relevance of his testimony to this research, when Mahdi was more 
emotionally stable, I did ask his permission to draw on this conversation; a request 
which he agreed to. Finding that ‘an (apparently innocuous) follow-up interview’ has 
become something more akin ‘a therapy session’ (Miller, 2017, p.83) is a 
phenomenon reported by other researchers working in similar fields. Whilst not 
attempting to replicate counselling sessions, (for which I have no training), I was 
aware that the choices I made to adopt informal, dialogical approaches might 
encourage interactions of a therapeutic nature (Birch and Miller, 2000, p.199). 
Indeed, in one interview with a staff member, she spoke of a bereavement which 
she then admitted to not having spoken of to anyone else previously. This moment 
was incredibly intimate and emotional for us both. My decision to engage in some 
limited actions that exceeded the norms of research professionalism were further 
supported by the view that ‘any project is actually based on a complex mosaic of 
interactions in which approaches towards ethical guidelines become fluid and 
variable.’ (Levinson, 2010, p.194) I – like others before me - prioritised humanity and 
ethical responsibility to the participant (Barker and Macleod, 2018, p.185; Guillemin 
and Gillam, 2004, p.265; Newkirk, 1996, p.14) over strict, universally applied 
boundaries.  
7 Coding and Analysis 
Some might argue that the flexibility adopted throughout this research jeopardises 
the legitimacy of my findings. Arguably, the way in which I applied my methods 
leaves room for criticism regarding the systematic nature of my approach. I would 
argue that, though flexible, I remained systematic through the use of topic guides 
and by undertaking an iterative approach to data collection. This systematic 
handling of data is further reinforced by my approach to analysis and the steps taken 
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to assure authenticity and credibility in the final stages of this work. It is this that I 
now discuss.  
When I came to analyse data collected, I realised that I had amassed a sizable data 
set of very rich testimonies. I had not yet written my literature review chapter - though 
I had done some of the reading - in an effort to ensure my coding was guided 
primarily by participants’ testimonies rather than by the themes I would organise the 
literature review around. Knowing that I would take a largely inductive thematic 
approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.12), I began the process of identifying the top 
three topics occurring in each participant’s testimony. This process was guided by 
most participants’ desires for a focus on the more political and practical issues that 
inform their experiences and perceptions of mental health issues/distress. I then 
compared these lists of top issues across participants; 11 main issues emerged (see 
Appendix 14). I then consulted participants where possible and staff at the gateway 
organisations regarding this list. They seemed content with both the findings and 
where I had placed emphasis.  
I found that these issues could be broadly divided into experiences and 
understandings of mental health, and how interactions with social structures and 
systems impact on people’s mental health issues/distress. This provided the 
structure for my findings’ chapters and, subsequently, my literature review chapter. 
By happy coincidence (or perhaps the unconscious influence of the literature I had 
already read), I later found that these two topic headings mapped well against the 
priorities of public health policy regarding inequalities; albeit with some substantial 
expansion of these priorities. As outlined in my introduction, policy considerations 
of mental health inequalities can generally be divided into ‘prevention’ and ‘service 
outcomes’. Consideration of ‘prevention’ often involves not only trends relating to 
‘illness’ rates, but also what triggers these; i.e. aetiological hypotheses. Research 
considering ‘service outcomes and experiences’ includes management data related 
to pathways to care and treatment, and research into health-seeking behaviours. 
Epidemiological trends and their accompanying aetiological hypotheses mapped 
well against participants’ experiences and perceptions of mental health 
issues/distress. And consideration of ‘service outcomes and experiences’ mapped 
relatively well against interactions with social structures impacting mental health if 
expanded beyond mental health services. Codes that did not, however, map across 
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were those relating to competition and divisions across participant groups. On 
reflection, I decided not to focus on these issues in depth; whilst inevitably important, 
I do not feel that I collected data of adequate depth to be truly insightful in this space. 
Further, participants’ preferences for a more political focus encouraged me to pay 
greater attention to the role of interactions with the State. However, I recognise this 
as a gap worthy of greater investigation in any further research projects. 
I conducted a series of final interviews with participants, and then began a more 
detailed round of analysis, this time implementing a two-part initial coding process 
(Charmaz, 2013, p.113). I rejected coding by word or line due to English not being 
the first language of all participants, instead coding by considering the event, 
process or emotion being described in segments of data. I then compiled the codes 
from across participants’ testimonies into a spreadsheet to consider which issues 
were raised by the most participants. Considering frequency per participant instead 
of per interview counterbalanced the possible weighting issues of having conducted 
considerably more interviews with some participants than others. The spreadsheet 
enabled the development of broader themes that highlighted similarities in 
experience, whilst the codes underpinning them illustrated the diversity within. I 
undertook the same two-stage process with interviews from staff members, noting 
where codes matched or were in addition to those generated through participants’ 
testimonies. This served as a means of supporting decisions I made regarding the 
most important points to include in this thesis, and enabled me to use staff interviews 
in my discussion chapter to further enrich understandings developed. This process 
resulted in the emergence of the themes and sub-themes presented in Table 1, 
which I used as a structure within NVIVO to locate and group exemplar extracts. 
A third round of coding took a more deductive approach in that I explicitly drew on 
intersectional theory to guide me in seeking out experiences specific to participants’ 
socially stratified and marginal locations. This included being attentive to issues that 
were raised/engaged with by only one or two participants as a result of the 
particularities of their intersectional location. For example, the ways in which Mahdi’s 
marriage compounded the lack of State support provided to people awaiting refugee 
status. Whilst these would not generate themes in and of themselves, they provided 
diversity within themes and helped to draw out the power dynamics at play. In this 
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way, I used intersectionality to further highlight changes required at the systemic 
level to drive social change (Collins, 2019, p.2).   
Table 1: Themes 
Master Themes Sub-themes Outline 
Understandings of 




 Definitions of 
mental health 
inequality.  
Explores how BAME mental health 
inequality is defined by different 
parties, and how perspectives and 
terminology employed reflects 
situatedness. 
 Determinants of 
mental health. 
Considers the place of biological 
and socio-cultural factors in BAME 
mental health inequality, and 
existing protective factors. 






Considers issues and barriers in 
primary care and diagnostic 
practices. 




Examines behaviours and 
practices in services, and views 
regarding treatment options and 
how they are delivered. 
 Calls for change Proposals for how the mental 
health of BAME populations and 
relevant services can be improved. 
 
8 Legitimacy, writing up and representation 
I sought legitimacy through authenticity and credibility rather than by appealing to 
replicability. As such, ensuring that my representations of participant testimonies 
aligned with their intended meanings was crucial. To this end, I used thick 
description that remained close to the data, providing verbatim accounts wherever 
possible and avoiding high levels of inference (Silverman, 2013, p.299). As such, 
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my interpretations ‘account for the complex specificity and circumstantiality’ (Tracy, 
2010, p.843) within the data. In addition, this enabled me to present interpretations 
of participants’ testimonies within the context in which they were made in many 
instances. This was important, as it allowed greater consideration of the open 
systems and social structures that interact with participants’ experiences and 
perceptions of mental health issues/distress. It also further enabled me to tease out 
differences and nuances in and across testimonies. This helped me to avoid falling 
prey to providing a ‘singularity of voices’ (Ebbs, 1996, p.218), where in fact there is 
significant diversity. Thus, a picture of the interconnectedness of wider exposure to 
marginalisation in its various forms and mental health issues/distress emerges with 
all the similarities and diversity one might imagine within this varied intersectionally 
located participant group. Reflective of this, I present a multivocal piece of research 
of a dialogic nature that seeks to remain broad enough to be of use to national level 
policy without denying the particulars that stop research becoming ‘artificial and 
misleading’ (Pawson, 2006, p.43).     
A further means of ensuring authenticity was sought through enabling a 
collaborative approach in the drafting of findings so as to seek participant or 
‘respondent validation’ (Brydon-Miller and Tolman, 1997, p.806; Newkirk, 1996, 
pp.13–14; Papadopoulos, 2006, p.91; Silverman, 2013, p.288). This has two 
benefits. First, I agree with the view that ‘two (or more) people working together’ can 
‘achieve greater understanding’ (Simmons and Watson, 2015, p.56). Secondly, it 
allows verification of my representations of participant testimonies directly. For, 
despite remaining ‘close’ to the data in writing up, I am aware that misinterpretation 
is still possible, and increasingly so when working across cultural boundaries (Alim, 
2004; Wilson, 2006, p.198). Though this research has not been as participatory as 
I had originally hoped, I continued to see value in engaging participants as much as 
possible at key points in the research. As such, I again discussed with participants 
how they might want to engage with me during the analysis and write-up stages.  
Once more, application of a uniform approach was not possible. For example, whilst 
Peter asked to be provided a copy of this thesis prior to finalisation, Mahdi 
maintained that he did not want me to reflect findings back to him. Samantha and 
Satch fall somewhere in-between this. Unfortunately, I have been entirely unable to 
verify my interpretations with Andeep, Mya and Samaiya due to a lack of contact 
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from them subsequent to our interviews. Despite this lack of uniformity, I preferred 
to engage participants as and how they agreed in these final stages; not least 
because several participants had commented on the limits of understandings gained 
through research as opposed to through lived experience: 
Peter: I do believe that the… actual sufferers in all this have to play a big 
role ((in research and policymaking)). It has, they must have (.) a much 
greater degree of input than there has been so far. Maybe even more so 
than the other side. Because they’ve had the practical experience. And 
unless you’ve had that, you will always be missing something, you know. 
------ 
Fieldnote with Samantha: …she said that lived experience is totally 
different to being trained in mental health (MH). …one is telling you what 
they’ve read, and the other is talking about what they’ve lived. And unless 
you’ve lived it, you can’t know what it’s like for those who do live it.  
Limited and ununiform though the reality of engagement in the final stages might 
have been, I feel strongly that this did enable some further enrichment of this 
research. I was able (to some degree) to check my interpretations and 
representations so as to ensure authenticity in some of the more nuanced 
distinctions I make. 
Further, it kept the voices of participants ever present in my mind. A sort of mental 
safety check if you like, reminding me to remain ‘faithful’ (Ebbs, 1996, p.220) to 
participants and avoid ‘stealing’ stories (Pittaway et al., 2010). And a reminder of 
the importance of researchers being explicit about ‘how we have made choices and 
set priorities’ (Frank, 2004, p.192).  Researchers have written of the temptation 
(conscious or not) to mis-represent testimonies out of an eagerness to demonstrate 
something they feel passionate about. Resisting this temptation, the researcher 
must remain:  
true to the data, and not move beyond in a wild orgy of verbal bloodletting 
in which the researcher moves from interpretations of insights to yelling 
“revolution” from the rooftop (Thomas, 1993, p.63).  
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In reading the above quote, I was reminded of another part of the conversation I had 
with Peter regarding how findings should be represented in this thesis (see Appendix 
15). He held that I needed to be extremely careful not to claim interpretations on my 
part as the undisputed view of a given participant. This chimes with the writings of 
many researchers committed to reflexive ethical practices, in which they stress the 
importance of ensuring a praxis of ‘writing from our selves’, ‘a strategy that is 
employed to mark one’s own voice among other voices and to acknowledge that 
what is presented as knowledge is constructed from particular authorial positions’ 
(Marx and Treharne, 2018, p.335). This aligns with Thomas’ (1993) previously 
mentioned distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements. Ensuring such distinctions 
of voice, Peter stated, was particularly important in relation to topics of which I have 
little or no lived experience:  
Stéphanie: ….is it then more about not making a claim to know what the 
experience is if you’ve not had it yourself, but rather to make the claim 
that this is what you’ve heard, or this is what you’ve read about? Is that 
the difference that you’re talking about? 
Peter: Yeah. ‘This is what I’ve learnt, as a result of’. Because you’re 
dealing with people (.) with the experience. Say you’ve learnt from their 
experience and their explanations and so on, you see. A lot of people 
take these things and claim to be the expert, when all they have is one 
side of the coin. 
By ‘one side of the coin’, Peter was referring to an earlier statement about research 
only providing insights of one side of a coin; lived experience sits on the other side, 
unreachable through reading and learning alone. This view is shared by many 
scholars from a critical perspective who recognise lived experiences ‘of the 
oppressed’ as a ‘critical tool to undermine [oppressive] dominant discourses’ 
(Moodley et al., 2019, p.81), not least those working within the fields of epistemic 
injustice and intersectionality; areas of research that Collins (2019) situates as often 
being ‘resistance knowledge projects’. 
I have tried as far as possible to adhere to the suggestions Peter made in the above 
extract in my findings chapters. Not only out of respect for his wishes, but also 
because such an approach enabled me to be explicit about where I was providing 
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description and where I was using extracts illustratively to support an analytical point 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.25); where I make ‘value-free’ and ‘value-laden’ 
statements. Further, it offers an additional means of ensuring that I speak with 
participants in this work, and not for them (Alcoff, 1991; Lugones et al., 1983). It is 
in this vain that I decided to present participants’ testimonies near verbatim (see 
Appendix 16), as opposed to providing versions with all grammatical errors and 
idiosyncrasies removed. Conscious of the potential for the inclusion of such ‘errors’ 
to reinforce a disempowering dynamic (Carter et al., 2018, pp.37–38), I ensured that 
I took the same approach with my own speech (to my discomfort at times). They 
have their own voices; they do not need me to speak for them. Rather, as I feel 
Mahdi intimated, they just often lack a platform from which others will ‘really listen’. 
I hope that this research can, to some degree, act as just such a platform.  
Finally, as an additional means of verifying the authenticity of voice and credibility 
in this research, I took two further precautionary measures to provide a means of 
‘crystallization’ (Ellingson, 2014, p.444). Crystallization is ‘the practice of using 
multiple data, sources, researchers, and [theoretical] lenses’ to ‘open up a more 
complex, in-depth, but still thoroughly partial, understanding of the issue.’ (Tracy, 
2010, pp.843–844). Tracy (2010) sets this in opposition to processes of 
triangulation, which she holds leads the researcher towards providing a more 
singular representation of phenomena. The first measure, then, was to ensure that 
I paid particular attention to academic and grey literature produced by people with 
lived experience relevant to this project in the course of developing my literature 
review (which I intentionally undertook post coding). This included watching several 
mental health service user/survivor films/documentaries that, though not mentioned 
in my literature review did augment my understanding (MadFilmsByMadPeople, 
2012a; MadFilmsByMadPeople, 2012b; Mental Health America, 2017; NSUN, 
2020). This literature provided me not only with access to a wider pool of voices 
speaking from a place of lived experience, but was also a means for me to honour 
Peter and Samantha’s views that there is no replacement for the understandings 
gained through lived experience. 
Further, following on from the support that my two gateway organisations had 
provided during my data collection, I arranged to speak at staff meetings in both 
gateway organisations to give an account of my final findings and ask for views on 
49 
 
specific ways of representing issues. Consulting ‘members of the community or 
group to be studied’ has been suggested by researchers engaged in promoting 
culturally competent research as one means of increasing cultural sensitivity 
(Papadopoulos, 2006, p.86). Whilst staff in the organisations do not match the 
intersectional locations of participants exactly, the diversity among them meant that 
they did have relevant lived experience (Banks and Brydon-Miller, 2018, p.5) as well 
as insights drawn from many years of working in and with minority ethnic 
communities in a mental health context. Unfortunately the Equalities National 
Council (ENC) closed in the first few months of 2020, illustrating first-hand the 
financial difficulties that disability charities – and BAME charities in particular – have 
been experiencing for years now (Fernando, 2017, p.162; McIntosh, 2019). Though 
Nilaari remains in operation, the staff were somewhat overwhelmed with work during 
the Covid-19 lockdown and were unable to engage in this research in its final 
months. However, Julie J Charles (founder of the ENC), kindly offered to read parts 
of the thesis. Being of BAME and a mental health service user/survivor herself with 
several decades of experience in this field, I accepted her offer with gratitude. In 
these ways I have endeavoured to ensure that the thesis that follows provides an 
authentic representation of participant voices and the issues most pertinent to 




Chapter 3: Literature Review 
The State’s evidence-base for policy regarding BAME mental health inequality is 
drawn predominantly from government data/research, government commissioned 
independent reviews and research from psychiatric discourses, with some input 
from independent research bodies, other medical professional bodies and NGOs. 
This literature review takes a similarly cross-disciplinary approach, but with greater 
emphasis placed on critical, transcultural and BAME mental health service 
user/survivor perspectives. Policy pertaining to issues of public health inequality can 
be split into two parts (see Appendix 3); the first concerned with determinants of 
health to address incidence/prevalence of illness and consider prevention 
measures, and the second with healthcare outcomes and experiences. However, 
policy regarding BAME mental health inequality has thus far tended to address this 
second issue only, avoiding real engagement with the first and the controversies 
around it. These controversies are highlighted in parts A and B, which look at 
different ways of interpreting epidemiological trends and some of the 
epistemological issues arising from cross-cultural contexts and an awareness of 
systems of oppression. Part C then considers literature seeking to understand 
trends indicating inequality experienced within mental health services.    
Part A: Defining the issue 
In this section I briefly outline key trends used to define the issue within a public 
health policy context, providing discussion of important methodological issues that 
are problematic when interpreting these trends. I then provide an overview of the 
critical literature underpinning challenges to dominant western medical narratives.   
1 Epidemiological trends 
In the UK, interest in the mental health of BAME populations originated largely from 
a series of psychiatric epidemiological studies in the 1960-70’s. Reported trends 
indicated significant disparities in rates of psychiatric hospital admissions between 
BAME and white people (Hemsi, 1967; Kiev, 1965; Rwegellera, 1977). Studies 
focused primarily on ‘newly’ settled West Indian3 and African populations and 
indicated significantly elevated rates of diagnosis of psychosis. These trends persist 
(see Tables 2 and 3), despite research widening to consider a greater number of 
BAME groupings. Notably, a recent systematic review has suggested that trends in 
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the UK demonstrate not only a broadly stagnant over-representation of African and 
African-Caribbean populations in diagnoses of psychoses, but also: an increasing 
representation among some Asian groupings; and findings of the significant over-
representation of people of mixed heritage or from the white ‘other’ grouping in more 
recent studies (Halvorsrud et al., 2019). The focus of most epidemiological work 
remains on risk of diagnosis of ‘severe mental illness’ (SMI) – e.g. psychosis4. This 
is likely due to the relative ease of access to hospital admissions data, with those 
hospitalised tending to have (or be diagnosed as having) experienced psychosis. 
Increasingly, studies seek to understand trends in relation to mental health 
issues/distress categorised as ‘common mental disorders’ (CMD). CMD comprise 
of neuroses such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Although contested, some recent research suggests that CMD is somewhat over-
represented among BAME groupings (see Appendix 17). 
Debates regarding the reliability of the data used and how results should be 
interpreted are rife in this field, supported by substantial and widely acknowledged 
methodological problems (see Appendix 18). Examples of such issues include 
ethnicity not being systematically recorded on admission to hospital (Cochrane and 
Bal, 1988, p.364), and people with pre-existing diagnoses being recorded multiple 
times if they present at different hospitals (Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.90). Data may 
also be biased by variation in health-seeking behaviours or pathways to care across 
ethnic groupings (Halvorsrud et al., 2019, p.1319; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, pp.56–
7). These lead to difficulties regarding interpretations of data. For example, is the 
over-representation of the UK’s African-Caribbean population in SMI trends the 
result of ‘actual’ illness, or the result of unreliable hospital data, racism in diagnosis 
or mis-interpretations of certain experiential phenomena across cultures? Though 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP) now acknowledges the role of institutional 
racism in BAME mental health inequality (Department for Health and Social Care, 
2018b, p.10), it maintains that there is ‘more consensus that this increase [of 
Schizophrenia rates among people of black African and Caribbean heritage] is real, 
and not an artefact…’ (ibid, p10), a position akin to that in the NHMH, 2011. 
However, numerous scholars from within the ‘psy’ disciplines (including psychiatry), 
medical sociology and critical mental health studies continue to present research 
suggesting that racism and cross-cultural issues in diagnostic practices increase 
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incidence rates among BAME groupings (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1981; Fernando, 
2017; Fawcett and Karban, 2005, pp.45–53; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.55; 
Nazroo, 2015; Glasby and Tew, 2015, p.169; Bhui, 2019). Additional barriers to 
developing richer understandings of the phenomena identified in trends include 
significant gaps in the data (see Appendix 17).  
Overall, the literature most consistently highlights the following key trends: high 
diagnosis rates of psychosis among black groupings (i.e. African and African-
Caribbean); low or equal risk of diagnosis of SMI and CMD for Asian groupings 
comparative to the white/white British reference group; high risk of self-harm and 
suicide for the Irish group; high risk of diagnosis of psychosis for 1st generation 
migrants, which increases for 2nd generation migrants; and higher risk of neurosis 
or mood ‘disorders’ among people of mixed ethnicity. However, a recent systematic 
review of epidemiological research highlights some shifts in aspects of the trends 
highlighted above (Halvorsrud et al., 2019). Additionally, these trends are not always 
upheld when heterogeneity within ethnic categories or when the intersectional 
locations of people within groupings are considered (see Appendix 17).  
Considerable gaps also persist. These include a dearth of studies examining: rates 
of CMD across BAME populations (Fryers et al., 2004, p.13; Nazroo and Iley, 2011, 
p.87; Weich and McManus, 2002, p.25); trends pertaining to white ‘other’, mixed 
ethnicity/‘race’, Arab groupings and 2nd/3rd generation migrants (Das-Munshi et al., 
2012, p.17). Further, though there is a growing body of work considering diversity 
within particular BAME groupings, studies exploring people in intersectional 
locations within a particular ethnic grouping are still relatively few in comparison to 
the locations possible within a grouping. With this in mind, Tables 2 and 3 provide a 
brief overview of the trends that ‘set the scene’ for policy intervention, regarding risk 
of (diagnosis of) mental health issues/distress categorised as SMI and CMD. (See 
Appendix 17 for a more detailed overview of these trends.)  
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Table 2 – Severe Mental Illness (SMI) 
Ethnic 
grouping 










Incidence studies show 
significantly elevated risk.  
Prevalence studies show 
considerably lower risk than 
incidence, though risk 
remained elevated.  
Consistently 
high since the 
1960’s. 
Reports based on incidence rates tend to show 
particularly high rates for men – especially young 
men and non-migrant men - in this group. 
However, prevalence studies indicate rates of 
psychosis to be equal in these subgroups as in 
the white population. In prevalence studies, 
increased rates of psychosis resulted from 







Incidence studies indicate 
some elevation of risk for 
the grouping on aggregate. 
However studies 
disaggregating ethnicity 
within the ‘Asian’ grouping 
show significant variation 










Older women in this grouping seemed at higher 
risk of Schizophrenia comparative to white 
women and the general Asian populations. One 
study also found Asian women under 30 
experienced higher risk than women of the same 









Incidence studies indicate 
significantly increased risk 
among white migrants, 
(with significant variation 
according to country of 
origin) and people of mixed 







Incidence studies indicate increased risk among 
white migrants, and even higher among second 
generation migrants generally.   
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Table 3 – Common Mental Disorders (CMD) 
Ethnic 
grouping 










Some indication of 
elevated risk of both; most 





Several studies from the late 1990’s found East 







There is very little 
agreement. Most often, the 
grouping is collectively 
reported as having equal 
or lower risk of CMDs than 
white people. However, 
even those reporting this 
recognise it is untrue when 
disaggregated by 







Reported intersectional trends include; lower 
rates of depression among Pakistani women 
whilst Pakistani men are more likely to self-report 
as depressed than white counterparts; high risk of 
suicide among 1st generation migrant Indian 
women; higher risk of CMDs among Asian 
women than white women; lower risk of CMD 
among Asian men than white men and 










Elevated risk of both in the 
white ‘other’ and mixed 





Women in the mixed ethnicity grouping 
demonstrated significantly elevated risk of CMDs, 
whilst men in this grouping had lower risk than 
white counterparts. Risk of self-harm and suicide 
particularly high among Irish men. 
 
Note: Trends are comparative to the ‘white British’ or (for earlier studies) the ‘white’ ethnic grouping. This is true for Tables 2 and 3. 




2 Indicators of inequality in mental health services and treatment 
Disproportionality issues are also indicated in research and organisational 
management data assessing mental health service user/survivor experiences and 
outcomes. Box 2 provides an overview of the main issues reported. As with research 
regarding risk of diagnosis, research tends to focus on black populations9 - 
particularly the African-Caribbean grouping. Less attention is paid to trends relating 
to Asian population groups, with very little research on the experiences of other 
minority ethnic groupings or refugees and asylum seekers. This might be partially 
influenced by accessibility of data issues10. Another reason might be the historically 
more sensational nature of inequalities experienced by black service users, which 
lends itself to receiving more media and public attention. Some argue that another 
reason for such attention is the way that such incidents play into stereotypes of men 
that are ‘big, black and dangerous’ (see p.84). The UK’s black population is also 
perhaps more visible to State-affiliated services than the asylum-seeking population 
might be, with more established voluntary organisations to raise awareness of 
issues experienced (see Appendix 4). 
Box 2: Trends in mental health service performance 
Inequalities in access to services: 
 Under-representation of several BAME groupings in GP referrals to 
mental health services. 
 Over-representation of black people (particularly working-age men) in 
adverse pathways to care involving police, the judiciary system and 
mandatory sectioning. 
Inequalities in service experiences: 
 Disproportionate number of black people in secondary and tertiary 
services  
 Longer stays on in-patient psychiatric units for people of BAME 
backgrounds. 
 Greater use of coercive treatments – i.e. disproportionate use of 
Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) on BAME populations. 
 Increased use of psychotropic medication on in-patients from BAME 
backgrounds, but an under-representation of the same population group 
receiving medication for CMD or talking therapies. 
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Many of the data issues cited in relation to epidemiological trends also impact data 
collected regarding the experiences of BAME people accessing and using mental 
health services. Though definitions of the issue pertaining to service outcomes and 
experiences are more likely to draw from qualitative data than the above 
epidemiological trends, this is not always the case; e.g. where statistics are collected 
from hospital or juridical management data. Reliance on quantitative data here 
arguably fuels contestation regarding how trends found should be interpreted. 
Debates are frequently related to people’s position regarding whether 
epidemiological trends are indicative of actual mental ‘illness’ or of contestable 
diagnoses (Fernando, 2017; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b). An 
example is seen with regards to the significantly elevated rates of pathways to care 
involving the judiciary reported for African and African-Caribbean (heritage) people. 
One explanation is that this should be expected where a given population 
experiences higher rates of psychosis. This clearly aligns with the position that 
epidemiological trends demonstrate increases in actual illness, not just diagnosis. 
Another explanation, however, suggests that such trends are reflective of 
widespread racism at the interpersonal, institutional and systemic levels. 
Institutional racism is here understood as involving overt and covert racist attitudes 
at both the individual and institutional levels (Ture and Hamilton, 1992, p.5). As 
Chouhan and Nazroo point out, ‘there is a convincing body of evidence suggesting 
that the higher admission rate of black people for severe mental illness is 
disproportionate and reflects the ways in which they are racialised’ (Byrne et al., 
2020, p.82).  
Culturally-based differences in understandings and experiences of ‘illness’ may also 
impact on trends observed regarding service experience and treatment outcomes. 
For example, fundamental differences in the ways that some cultures conceptualise 
‘illness’ or the body/mind dynamic can result in distress presenting differently 
(Kleinman, 1977; Lin and Cheung, 1999, p.776; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.65; 
Bayetti and Jain, 2019, p.224). An example is the somewhat contentious 
Somatisation hypothesis, (see Appendix 19); contentious because of how such 
theories can also be applied in ways that situate racialised peoples as lacking the 
psychological sophistication to ‘express themselves verbally in a way that was 
consistent with the psychotherapeutic model’ (Moodley et al., 2019, p.82). Where 
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people do hold different worldviews that lead to greater somatisation or alternative 
understandings of mental health issues/distress, this may lead them to engage in 
health-seeking behaviours more in keeping with their conceptualisations and 
experiences of such phenomena. Such differences impact some trends highlighted 
in Box 2. For example, leading to an under-representation of people from certain 
BAME groupings being referred to secondary services by GP’s. This is important as 
such trends inform calls for mental health services to improve on their ability to 
accommodate multiple culturally-mediated presentations of mental health 
issues/distress (Lanzara et al., 2019, p.14/15). Accessibility issues (such as 
language barriers) are also raised as impacting on the health-seeking behaviours of 
minority ethnic groups subject to such experiences. These and the issues 
highlighted in the previous paragraph begin to articulate some of the difficulties of 
defining the nature of BAME mental health inequality. Adding to this are disputes 
regarding the soundness of some of the concepts core to the issue of BAME mental 
health inequality.  
3 Mental health at the intersections of ‘race’ and ethnicity. 
Debates at the epistemological level, while generally ignored in State produced 
policy documents, are highly relevant context to the interpretations of the above 
trends, to clinical practice and to my own findings (see chapters 4 and 5). Critiques 
of western medical models tend to focus on two points of contestation. The first 
relates to mental health determinants. This is viewed as of great importance due to 
its influence on treatments developed and offered to people. I.e. bio-deterministic 
determinants lead to medication. The second area concerns which experiences and 
behaviours should be categorised as ‘illness/disorder’. Radical or critical scholarship 
in this field often considers these issues together, bringing a critical lens to the 
fundamental ontological premises and epistemological frameworks that support 
them.  
Important critical figures within psychiatry began highlighting concerns in the 1960’s. 
For example, Szasz and Laing raised alarms regarding continued attempts to 
systematically categorise psychological and physiological responses to adverse 
circumstances as mental illnesses/disorders. Szasz was concerned that psychiatry 
was falling prey to a fundamental categorical error whereby the physician’s inability 
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to distinguish ‘problems of living’ from diseases of the brain and/or body was leading 
to a pathologization of distress (Szasz, 1960, p.114). Not denying that some people 
may have symptoms impacting on the functioning of the brain and emotional 
regulation as a result of biological diseases or disorders, he holds that distress is 
not always reducible to this. Therefore, conceptualising all presentations of distress 
as ‘mental illness’ not only pertains to an unfounded confidence in bio-genetic 
aetiological hypotheses, but can lead to a medicalisation of distress that is 
inaccurate and potentially damaging.  
Writing more recently, Szasz holds that scientific advances locating 
neuropathological causes for ‘mental illness’ simply confirm his hypothesis of 
categorical error, maintaining that the nature of the concept of mental ‘illness’ and 
its operationalisation is inherently political (Szasz, 2011). The ‘political’ potential to 
pathologize legitimate distress resulting from oppression has troubled many critical 
scholars in this field. Cooper - an important figure in the British anti-psychiatry 
movement - wrote that psychiatry ‘chooses to refract and condense on to its 
identified patients the subtle violence of the society it only too often represents’ 
(Cooper, 1967, p.xii). Mental health discourses, constructed within the parameters 
of the norms of the society from which it evolves, embody the discriminations and 
oppressions underpinning that society.  
Similar concerns continue to be raised (Fernando, 1995, p.23; Goodley and 
Lawthom, 2005, p.4; Kutchins and Kirk, 2001; Read and Dillon, 2013; Timimi, 2019). 
The ‘targets of these distortions often include[ing] the relatively powerless, including 
women, minorities, and gay people’ (Kutchins and Kirk, 2001, pp.10–15), 
depoliticising negative responses to adverse situations. Powerful examples are 
found in the UK’s history of ‘madness’, whereby the differential treatment of ‘pauper 
lunatics’ compared to wealthier, gentile ‘lunatics’ was supported by eugenicist 
narratives (Goodwin, 1997; Jones, 1955; Porter, 1987; Porter, 2003; Scull, 2006). 
These critiques highlight the importance of retaining a critical eye on how mental 
health discourses are constructed and operationalised. This importance grows with 
the level of State involvement in mental health, particularly for those seeking to 
address inequalities experienced by marginalised social groupings (Foucault, 2001; 
LeFrancois et al., 2013; Middleton, 2013; Timimi, 2019, p.57).  
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Where mental health discourses intersect with racialisation, history unfortunately  
provides a rich tapestry of abuses in the pathologization of distress, where 
‘difference’ has been medicalised to uphold and justify oppressive ideologies such 
as white supremacy. The complex interplay between the construction of racialised 
identities and ‘madness’, ‘deviance’ and ‘feeblemindedness’ have been well 
documented both internationally (Davis, 1995, pp.36–37; Erevelles, 2011, c.1; 
Fanon, 2001, pp.241–243; Metzl, 2011; Mills, 2019) and within the British context 
(Fernando et al., 1998; Fernando, 2017; Gilroy, 2013, c.3; Kalathil et al., 2011, p.30; 
Moodley et al., 2019). Such constructions enabled the emergence of pathologized 
explanations of acts of resistance or despair observed among oppressed peoples. 
For example: 
The cause, in the most of cases, that induces the negro to run away 
from service, is as much a disease of the mind as any other species 
of mental alienation… (Cartwright, 1851, p.707).  
This ‘disease’ was coined ‘drapetomania’. Drapetomania demonstrates the ways in 
which distress and acts of resistance from oppressed people have been 
pathologized, with the effect of de-politicising their plight and silencing their voices. 
Though slavery had been legally abolished for some decades by the 1960’s in 
America, the same process of pathologization to maintain the status quo resurfaced. 
For example, through the development of a new diagnostic category called Protest 
Psychosis: ‘a condition in which the rhetoric of the Black Power movement drove 
“Negro men” to insanity’, with ‘black liberation movements literally caus[ing] 
delusions, hallucinations, and violent projections in black men.’ (Metzl, 2011, p.100). 
This label was used to incarcerate civil rights protestors in asylums indefinitely.  
Acknowledging that progress has been made since times of legal slavery, Metzl 
maintains that ‘psychiatric definitions of insanity continue to police racial hierarchies, 
tensions, and unspoken codes’ (Metzl, 2011, p.ix), a view shared by critical scholars 
in the UK. For example, Fernando explains how psychiatric diagnoses are subject 
to racism and racial prejudice through their use of 'common sense' knowledge, 
which - in post-colonial settings - is imbued with racial stereotypes and prejudices: 
alienness seems to be linked to schizophrenia (as a diagnosis) and 
to biological (or genetic) inferiority (as a human type). It is not difficult 
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to see how 'race' comes into both these concepts - alienness and 
biological inferiority. (Fernando and Keating, 2008, p.47). 
'Common sense' images of black people as 'dangerous’ and ‘deviant’ can bias 
diagnostic assessments towards an increased application of diagnostic labels also 
associated with dangerousness; e.g. schizophrenia. In this way, racism is recreated 
within and shapes specific diagnostic categories and the diagnostic processes 
associated with them. Such processes, some argue, are necessarily present in 
societies where historical and institutionalised racism exist. The danger is that 
medicalised approaches to mental health issues/distress have the potential to lend 
the credibility associated with the natural sciences in Western societies to diagnostic 
categories imbued with racist ideas. 
The limitations and problems inherent within Western conceptualisations of mental 
health are further highlighted through cross-cultural research in this field. As 
previously mentioned, distress can be expressed in many different ways and is often 
culturally mediated, as are concepts of illness. Kleinman warns that attempts to 
(re)interpret different expressions of distress as symptoms of ‘illnesses’ within the 
Western paradigm leads to ‘category fallacy’ (Kleinman, 1977, p.4). ‘Category 
fallacy’ involves lifting phenomena from the cultural context it emerged from and 
analysing it within the parameters of a potentially incompatible epistemological 
framework. This can result in the misinterpretation of phenomena and 
pathologization of an unhelpful or harmful sort (Bennett, 2006, p.103; Littlewood and 
Lipsedge, 1981, p.291). Such processes might also be seen as a form of cultural 
imperialism, whereby Western paradigms are treated preferentially over other 
worldviews. An example of cultural imperialism in diagnostic practices might be that 
of assigning the diagnostic label of schizophrenia to people from non-Western 
cultures who express hearing voices and having hallucinations (see p.78-79).  
Part B: Determinants of inequality in a BAME mental health context 
Whilst scholars within critical factions of ‘psy’ disciplines highlight issues of 
diagnostic practices, many also accept that instances of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress are likely present within BAME groupings at an elevated rate to the 
general population. This section, then, considers key hypotheses regarding 
determinants of mental health inequality for BAME groupings where ‘actual’ 
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incidence/prevalence is at play. From a policy perspective, reviewing these 
hypotheses is important as they offer opportunities of ‘providing improved 
psychiatric services for these particular population groups.' (Fearon et al., 2006, 
p.1548) Finding responses to troubling phenomena is more likely to be successful 
if there is an understanding of causal influences. Whilst it is not within the scope of 
this research to posit any particular explanatory theories as ‘truest’, an awareness 
of the different explanations is important as they direct policy responses.  
As discussed in my introductory chapter, the NHMH (2011) and more recent policy 
documents allow for multiple causal theories to explain why people of particular 
social groupings experience higher risk of mental health issues/distress. Within 
psychiatric epidemiology, most explanatory theories provided fall into ‘two classes 
of theory [which] are in competition: those of selection, and those of social 
causation.’ (Halpern, 1993, p.567). Selection theories situate the social inequalities 
people face as a result of (or – in instances of deprivation from childhood - 
heightened by) mental health (Ødegård, 1932). Social causation theories claim that 
mental health issues/distress are caused by social inequality. Whilst both categories 
might play a role in explaining the persistence of BAME mental health inequality, the 
majority of the literature focuses on hypotheses of a more social causation nature.  
4 Biological predispositions and selection theories 
Selection-based theories align more readily with understandings of mental health 
that situate biological factors as the prime contributing factor in generating the trends 
highlighted in Table 1. Early epidemiological studies regarding these trends did not 
often expend effort determining possible causes, largely due to the underlying 
assumption that mental health issues/distress resulted from biological and/or 
genetic differences in people. Biological hypotheses proposed to explain reported 
elevated risk among BAME groupings have included genetic predisposition, 
exposure to prenatal and perinatal viruses, and hereditary low IQ (Sharpley et al., 
2001, pp.61–62). Another key hypothesis among selection theories is that of social 
drift. This seeks to explain elevated levels among migrants and people who have 
moved to more urban locations. Social drift posits that ‘symptomatic individuals’ (Os 
et al., 2001, p.667) may be drawn towards certain situations or behaviours, partly 
as a result of their ‘illness’. This explanation does not have some of the potentially 
racist implications of hypotheses of genetic predisposition. Rather, it suggests that 
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people with shared heritage who are experiencing mental health issues/distress are 
more likely to find themselves in the UK as migrants or in urban locations where 
elevated risk is generally reported; e.g. refugees from areas of conflict. Within the 
social drift framework, migration or urban settings themselves are not causal factors 
in increased risk of diagnosis (or illness/distress). Rather people with certain 
symptoms are more likely to express ‘x’ behaviour, which may lead to experiences 
of disadvantage. Social deprivation in a selection context therefore tends to focus 
on downward social mobility or the inability to escape deprivation situations as a 
result of mental health issues/distress (Tiffin et al., 2005, p.870). As Cooper (2005) 
notes, there is little doubt that experiences of mental health issues/distress can have 
serious – sometimes catastrophic – impacts on people’s life chances.  
In the context of BAME mental health inequalities, the narrative of ‘selection’ can 
serve to depoliticise disparities recorded and medicalise wider social inequalities 
experienced by people from BAME backgrounds. Acceptance of social drift as the 
explanation for – as opposed to a contributing factor in – the increased risk of 
diagnosis (or illness/distress) implies that the issue resides within BAME groupings. 
For policy-makers this means two things. First, disparities need not be conceived of 
as an indication of inequality, just difference. Policy responses based on this 
understanding of mental health might include ensuring greater access to treatments 
and programmes to improve early detection of ‘illness’. Secondly, there is a 
diminution of the argument that addressing mental health inequality requires 
attending to wider social inequalities. Within selection theory, wider society and 
social structures are not considered root causes of mental health inequalities. Even 
if a person experiences inequality as a result of illness/distress, the argument could 
run that prevention measures and treatments should not focus on these inequalities 
as they are not the cause of symptoms.  
Selection and social drift theories, however, have been found inadequate in 
explaining epidemiological trends indicating inequalities. Perhaps motivated by a 
need to contest the racist implications falling from selection theories of bio-genetic 
or cultural inferiority among racialised peoples, research to interrogate such 
hypotheses was undertaken. Studies in the late 1990’s/early 2000’s demonstrated 
several phenomena that undermined a number of selection-based explanations. For 
example, regarding social drift theories relating to the likelihood of living in urban 
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settings. Boydell et al. highlighted that the limited housing options available to 
people of BAME backgrounds in a socio-economically deprived part of London 
made it unlikely that ‘symptomatic people’ drifted towards particular geographic 
areas. Rather, they are more likely to have had little to no choice about where they 
lived. Thus social drift failed to explain increased risk of diagnosis (or 
illness/distress) in urban spaces for some BAME groupings (Boydell et al., 2001). 
Further, studies considering increased risk among migrants found: 
 no elevated risk for ethnic groupings in their countries of origin11 (Bhal, 1999, 
p.10; Brugha et al., 2004; Cooper, 2005; Fearon et al., 2006); 
 elevated risk present across a range of migrant and ethnic groups in the UK 
(Halvorsrud et al., 2019; Selten et al., 2007); and 
 elevated risk in 2nd generation migrants comparative to 1st generation 
migrants (Bhal, 1999, p.10; Das-Munshi et al., 2012, p.18; Selten and 
Cantor-Graae, 2005; Selten et al., 2007, p.111). 
These issues did not disprove the migratory social drift theory, but they did 
significantly weaken hypotheses regarding genetic and cultural predisposition. 
Additional arguments included Halpern’s observation that social drift does not 
adequately account for disparities of risk within BAME groupings (Halpern, 1993, 
p.603) – an early nod to what might now be considered intersectional phenomena. 
Together, such research provided a compelling platform from which to turn attention 
back towards socio-cultural factors of a social causation nature.  
5 Socio-cultural factors as driving mental health issues/distress 
In this section, I have organised key social causation hypotheses so as to align with 
the categories that emerged from my own data, rather than in accordance to the 
ways theories might be separated in the literature. These categories are:  
 Childhood/pre-migration trauma and suffering; 
 Material deprivation and stressors in adulthood/post-migration; and 
 Discrimination and oppression. 
I retain my focus on theories specific to BAME mental health inequality, to the 
possible exclusion of general aetiological explanations. For example, I only include 
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issues of childhood trauma or personal suffering if they are theorised as 
disproportionately impacting on BAME groupings.   
  5.1   Childhood/pre-migration trauma and suffering 
Childhood trauma and pre-migratory trauma are not generally categorised together 
in the literature. However, participants in this research tend to split their early and 
current lives via either childhood/adulthood or pre/post-migration depending on their 
migration/citizenship status, a similar divide seems to take place in the literature. In 
the literature pertaining to BAME mental health inequality – particularly that which 
aimed directly at influencing national-level policy – the focus tends to be more on 
experiences in adulthood or post-migration. The below provides some of the 
overarching issues highlighted by the literature. However I do not go into detail as 
this was not an area of great focus for participants.  
In relation to childhood trauma and BAME  mental health inequality, studies highlight 
that social inequalities can increase exposure to childhood adversity and trauma; 
factors widely acknowledged as increasing risk of mental health issues/distress in 
adulthood. The higher risk of social inequality experienced by BAME groupings 
(Cabinet Office, 2017) might therefore result in increases of exposure to difficulties 
in childhood for children of BAME backgrounds (NIMHE, 2003, p.11). Often the 
childhood trauma referred to results from sexual and/or physical abuse, neglect and 
loss (Davidson et al., 2015, p.26). Within the context of research in the UK on BAME 
mental health inequality, the experience of separation from a parent during 
childhood has been linked with the emergence of SMI. Whilst this was seen to 
impact people across ethnic groupings, several studies suggested that instances of 
such separation occur more frequently among particular BAME groupings, among 
whom trends for SMI are elevated (Mallett et al., 2002, p.334; Morgan et al., 2009, 
p.232). 
In more recent research pertaining to migrants, there is much focus on refugees and 
asylum seekers. A frequently highlighted factor that may contribute to higher levels 
of mental health issues in the UK is the higher exposure to traumatic events that 
people within this grouping are likely to have experienced (Fang et al., 2015, p.4; 
Fazel et al., 2012; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.66; Vahdaninia et al., 2020, p.12). 
Risk of mental health issues/distress as a result are highlighted as dependent on: 
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the magnitude of the  event, its personal meaning to the victim, lack of 
control over the event, its predictability, its impact on physical welfare, 
and its diversionary impact on expressed needs or normal expectations 
in the life course (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.66) 
Such factors are important determinants in understanding mental health 
inequalities among UK populations where forced migration is more likely to 
have been experienced, leading some scholars to advocate for interventions 
from higher-income nations like the UK to ‘keep negative exposures to a 
minimum in countries of origin and countries of transit’ (Fazel et al., 2012, 
p.279).   
5.2   Material deprivation and precarity in adulthood/post-migration 
Under this heading I discuss two prominent hypotheses, both of which are 
significantly inter-related: urbanicity and socio-economic deprivation. Many of the 
issues highlighted as impacting on the mental health of migrants, particularly people 
forced to migrate, are reflected in these hypotheses. However this group may also 
experience additional barriers due to a lack of legal status providing them with the 
same access to social support and security regarding remaining in the UK that most 
other people of BAME backgrounds have (Fang et al., 2015, pp.5–6). The urbanicity 
theory considers socio-economic deprivation as an important variable, just as 
housing situations are sighted in theories of the role of socio-economic deprivation 
in propagating mental health inequality. Urbanicity also highlights the higher 
incidence of mental health issues/distress among people living in urban areas. As 
previously mentioned, social drift theory fails to adequately account for increases (of 
diagnosis) of illness/distress among people with little choice about where they 
reside, as well as among those born and raised in urban settings (Cooper, 2005, 
p.361; Mallett et al., 2002, p.333). This distinction has become progressively more 
important for BAME groupings who predominantly reside in inner-city locations and 
are increasingly British-born 2nd, 3rd and 4th generation migrants. Many BAME 
groupings find themselves residing in:  
a toxic urban environment characterized not only by noise, 
pollutants, viral infections, etc., but by unemployment, low socio-
economic status and high levels of social deprivation, lone-parent 
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families, poor housing conditions and exposure to an institutionally 
racist society (Mallett et al., 2002, p.333) 
Though Mallett et al. (2002) are here referring specifically to people of African-
Caribbean descent, the same is applicable to several other BAME groupings; 
namely Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.28). 
However, as Appendix 17 shows, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations do not 
seem to experience the same level of increased risk of diagnosis (or illness/distress) 
– particularly psychosis – as the African-Caribbean group. For migrants – 
particularly asylum seekers – ‘urbanicity’ might also include exposure to ‘hostility 
from host populations in the places they flee to’ (Fernando, 2010, p.92), leading to 
policies that situate them in ‘toxic’ environments from which they struggle to escape. 
Such environments - held as detrimental to a person’s wellbeing and mental health 
generally – can retraumatise people who have had significant exposure to trauma 
and suffering in their past; e.g. asylum seekers/refugees (Watters, 2014, pp.70–71). 
Socio-economic deprivation12 is measured in a variety of ways. Most often it seems 
to encompass one or more of the following indicators: income and wealth13, housing 
tenure, employment status and educational attainment (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2002, 
pp.21–22). Links between socio-economic deprivation and mental health issues are 
relatively well established in mental health discourses (Cooper, 2005, p.361; Coope 
et al., 2014; MacIntyre et al., 2018; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2002; Thomas et al., 2019; 
Zimmerman et al., 2004). In a social causation context, it is understood as increasing 
mental health issues/distress because of exposure to stressors and oppression. The 
impact of this factor on BAME mental health inequality is still being debated as 
epidemiologists try to distinguish between the impact of socio-economic deprivation 
and other risk factors that might arise as a direct result of their minority ethnicity; i.e. 
culturally-related identity dislocation (Halpern, 1993, p.603) or racism. Yet 
awareness of the need to understand how this factor impacts on BAME mental 
health inequalities is growing (Brugha et al., 2004; Das-Munshi et al., 2012, p.p19; 
Morgan et al., 2009; Qassem et al., 2015; Shah, 2004; Smith, 2000, p.1694). Brugha 
et al. (2002) note, for example, that whilst ‘Subjective social support and recent life 
events’ did not seem to increase risk of SMI among UK African-Caribbean 
populations, ‘risk factors particularly associated with low income or poverty’ did 
(Brugha et al., 2004, p.943). 
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Distinguishing between such factors is complicated by views that socio-economic 
deprivation is, for many BAME groupings, related to disadvantages and 
discriminations experience as a result of minority ethnicity. For example, 
unemployment. Mallett et al. (2002) suggest that unemployment tends to be a 
signifier of ‘financial deprivation, lack of self-esteem, stigma and powerlessness’ and 
reduced social networks (Mallett et al., 2002, p.333). It is also one of the factors 
repeatedly cited as having a strong correlation to increased risk of mental health 
issues/distress among certain BAME groupings (Bhugra et al., 1997, p.797; Kapadia 
et al., 2018, p.302; Leff, 1999, p.46; Mallett et al., 2002, p.333; Shah, 2004, p.s11). 
This correlation is explained in part by selection theory; e.g. unemployment results 
from behaviours relating to poor mental health/distress rather than in triggering it in 
the first place.  
However, when considering this in relation to BAME populations, selection theory is 
inadequate for explaining the widespread inequalities in employment between 
ethnic groupings in the general population (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.26). By this I 
mean that prevalence of mental health issues does not account for the levels of 
inequality experienced by different BAME groupings. Several recent studies also 
found correlations between mental health issues/distress and groups experiencing 
multiple disadvantage, (e.g. low educational attainment, material deprivation), (Barr 
et al., 2015, pp.327–330; Coope et al., 2014, p.76). Low educational attainment is 
also found in some BAME groupings who also experience high unemployment 
(Bhopal, 2018, p.135; Cabinet Office, 2017, p.20). An argument for the existence of 
BAME systemic inequality that impacts on socio-economic status emerges, making 
distinctions between the effect of minority ethnicity status and socio-economic 
deprivation difficult to calculate.  
5.3   Discrimination and oppression 
Experiences of discrimination and oppression are widely accepted as negatively 
impacting on mental health. In using the term oppression in this thesis I refer to 
Young’s definition of oppression as having ‘five faces’ through which it manifests. 
These being exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and 
violence (Young and Allen, 2011, c.2). American social epidemiologist Krieger has 
found that ‘any random set of individuals selected from either of the groups [social 
categories of people], if subjected to the same adverse exposures, would have a 
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greater likelihood of morbidity or mortality compared to individuals who are not 
exposed’ (Krieger, 2014, p.658). Exploration of discrimination and oppression within 
the context of BAME mental health inequality focuses primarily on experiences of 
racism and racial prejudice, though more intersectional works do also highlight the 
role of other systems of oppression (for example, Kalathil et al., 2011, c.4). Research 
considering the experiences of migrants also highlight forms of discrimination and 
oppression specific to xenophobia, including ‘name calling, stoning and/or being 
denied services based on how they are portrayed in the media as ‘untrustworthy’, 
‘dangerous’ and ‘uncivilized’’ (Fang et al., 2015, p.5). Consideration of racism tends 
to take two main forms: the role of racism in diagnostic assessments (see section 
6.3), and the role it plays in triggering ‘actual’ mental health issues/distress.  
Research seeking to better understand how experiences of racism might act as a 
determinant in mental health continue to build an evidence base. This has led to a 
general acceptance that experiences of racism and discrimination (real and 
perceived) do impact people’s risk of mental health issues (Bardol et al., 2020; 
Karlsen et al., 2005), particularly when combined with low self-esteem or self-belief 
(Alleyne, 2008, p.171; Cooper et al., 2008, p.189; Sharpley et al., 2001, pp.64–5). 
Low self-esteem or self-belief might themselves result from experiences or 
perceptions of racism and discrimination. A study in 2006 explored whether or not 
accusations of racism from people diagnosed with psychosis might result from 
symptomatic delusions. Contrary to the anticipated results, findings indicated that 
this group was more likely to perceive social disadvantages they experience as 
resulting from their own failings than as primarily the result of experiences of racism 
and discrimination. This was partly as a result of low self-esteem and self-belief, 
leading the authors to hypothesise that:    
It is possible that correctly identifying hostility as due to another’s 
prejudice rather than to internal factors is protective, and that those 
unable to do so are more vulnerable to developing psychosis. 
(Cooper et al., 2008, p.189) 
Where this positive psychological process does not occur, such social stressors may 
cause short term physiological changes impacting on health generally. Long-term 
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exposure is suggested as leading to cognitive changes such as the development of 
mental health issues/distress (McKenzie, 2006, p.385).  
A plethora of literature exists to consider the psychological mechanisms that lead to 
mental health issues/distress as a result of repeated exposure to racism. For 
example, work looking specifically at the impact of microaggressions finds that:  
the degree to which seemingly innocuous situations were rated as 
emotionally negative was associated with the degree to which a 
participant believed that the treatment was relevant to his or her race 
(Wang et al., 2011, p.5)  
Coming at this topic from the perspective of a policy-maker tasked with improving 
national-level policy responses to BAME mental health inequality, I need to 
understand the main determinants but do not have the space to consider the 
intricacies of the psychological processes involved. Instead, I include the above to 
demonstrate why so many scholars, practitioners and activists concerned with 
BAME mental health inequality emphasise the importance of society, State and 
mental health professionals openly recognising the existence of racism in the UK.  
Racism is acknowledged in the literature as taking many forms, all of which are 
thought to impact on risk of ‘actual’ illness/distress. These include exposure to 
institutional racism resulting in fear of services (see p.76-77) and the numerous 
ways in which structural inequality occurring as a result of systemic racism 
manifests. Box 2 presents an overarching view of the main ways that racism is 
discussed as manifesting in relation to BAME mental health inequality. Among 
researchers in this space, there is an acknowledgment that studying ‘the direct 
experience of racism aetiologically to specific psychiatric illness’ (McKenzie, 2002, 
p.89) is extremely difficult given the complex ways in which racism manifests and is 
interlinked with other forms of marginalisation. 
This might lead one to the assumption that the interconnectivity and intersectionality 
of ‘race’/minority ethnicity and other forms of discrimination and oppression features 
strongly in this area of research. Whilst the issue of multiple disadvantage does 
appear with descriptions of arguably intersectional experiences (see section 5.2, for 
example), explicit exploration of intersectional experiences is relatively new. This is 
the case not only in the UK, but internationally, particularly when in relation to work 
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at the population level or in relation to health policy (Bauer, 2014; Haarmans et al., 
2016; Hankivsky, 2011, c.1; Seng et al., 2012). Empirical intersectional mental 
health research that is inclusive of ‘race’ is found primarily in America and Canada. 
In the UK, such works are increasingly appearing or being advocated for. However, 
there is yet to be enough research of this sort collated to enable an overarching view 
of how intersectionality inclusive of BAME status impacts and interacts with risk of 
developing mental health issues/distress at the group level.  
Indeed, intersectional issues tend to be discussed either as manifestations of racism 
alone, or in studies of intersectionally located groups within a specific ethnic 
grouping but without mention of intersectionality theory. This can lead to studies 
focusing the experiences of intersectionally located people not adequately exploring 
the structural elements from which such experiences emerge. Intersectionality 
theory pushes researchers to consider such factors. As a result of not employing an 
intersectionality lens, the role of intersectionality in BAME mental health – beyond 
the implicit examination of the intersection of ‘race’/ethnicity and mental ill-health 
status - has not been significantly accounted for in a systematic way in this topic 
area. As advocates of intersectional research in other fields highlight, this gap risks 
Box 3 - Manifestations of racism linked to mental health issues/distress  
 Socially inflicted racialised trauma: These can take mental, physical or 
sexual form and include continual exposure to microaggressions or 
witnessing racially and xenophobically motivated attacks. 
 Institutional racism – the primary focus being receipt of healthcare that is 
inadequate or inappropriate, or interactions with the policy and judiciary. 
 Intersectional discrimination with racialised components. 
 Racially-related decreased opportunity for upward mobility: i.e. lower 
educational attainment of racialised groups, barriers to progressing 
careers due to racial stereotypes, refusal of bank loans due to racial 
profiling; 
 Socio-economic disadvantage and racism – i.e. due to intergenerational 
poverty, which might result from the barriers to upward mobility 
discussed above; 
 Barriers to equal access to positive aspects of social environment – i.e. 
certain BAME groupings often live in poorer housing, or are subject to 
negative stereotyping in mainstream media. 
 
(M. Sharpley et al., 2001; McKenzie, 2006; Nazroo et al., 2019; Naz et 
al., 2019, p.4) 
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developing understandings of ‘patterns of differences between the groups… but only 
at the expense of suppressing those within groups.' (Flintoff et al., 2008, p.6). 
This gap aside, the wide and varying ways in which the role of racism and 
discrimination in the development of mental health issues/distress has been 
researched has led to an increasing acceptance of this as an important factor 
explaining the increased risk of diagnosis (and illness/distress) observed across a 
range of BAME groupings (Bécares et al., 2009; Bhui et al., 2018; Cantor-Graae 
and Selten, 2005; Karlsen et al., 2005; McKenzie, 2002; Nazroo et al., 2019; Pickett 
and Wilkinson, 2008; Shah, 2004; Virdee, 1997, pp.284–285; Department for Health 
and Social Care, 2018b, p.10). That is not to say, however, that there is not still 
considerable debate regarding the role of institutional racism in the phenomenon of 
BAME mental health inequalities. For example, some scholars and practitioners in 
the field hold fast that a focus on racism distracts from the role of social deprivation 
in accounting for BAME mental health inequality (Singh and Burns, 2006) – see 
p.91.  
6 Protective socio-cultural factors 
Finally, two main hypotheses emerge from the literature in relation to protective 
factors experienced by some BAME groupings where there is strong community 
cohesion: ‘ethnic density’ and social capital. The ‘ethnic density’ hypothesis grew in 
part from studies seeking to better understanding why certain BAME groupings (i.e. 
the UK’s Chinese population) do not seem to experience the same elevation in 
diagnosis (or illness/distress) as black populations, (Bécares and Nazroo, 2013; 
Bécares et al., 2018; Boydell et al., 2001; Halpern, 1993; Pickett and Wilkinson, 
2008; Shaw et al., 2012; Schofield et al., 2011; Stafford et al., 2010). It suggests 
that where BAME populations reside in areas of dense population by people of the 
same ethnicity and where incidence of ill-health/distress is lowered, high ethnic 
density may be playing a role in maintaining good mental health. Essentially, living 
in such an area may not prevent exposure to social deprivation or racism, but a 
‘buffering’ effect is created that engenders greater group understandings that 
demeaning experiences result from unjust prejudice (Bécares et al., 2009, p.701). 
Thus the maintenance of self-esteem and self-belief in the face of adversity is 
enabled. Additionally, living in areas of high ethnic density may be particularly 
helpful to migrants, protecting their mental health through a ‘minimizing of the 
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disjunction between home and host cultures.’ (Halpern, 1993, p.603) However, 
ethnic density has not been found to serve as a protection against the effects of 
material deprivation, (Bécares et al., 2018, p.1).  
Though conceptualisations of ‘social capital’ vary (Almedom, 2005, p.944), in the 
context of health research it generally refers to the health benefits of positive social 
relations and social cohesion. In areas of high ‘ethnic density’ and social cohesion, 
‘minority ethnicity’ may provide a form of social capital that acts as a psychological 
protection. Density of other unifying characteristics, such as ‘religion, occupation or 
class’ (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2008, p.328) have also been found to provide a similar 
‘buffering’ effect where social cohesion is present. McKenzie et al. (2002) note that 
social capital need not require geographic proximity to exist in a person’s life. Social 
capital might, for example, be elevated through belonging to diasporas or virtual 
communities constituted through family ties, religious beliefs or other interests a 
person has, as opposed to through their neighbourhood ‘community’. The role of 
religion as a protective factor is not often discussed in relation to BAME mental 
health inequality, with religion often treated – in policy circles particularly – as a 
separate issue. However, studies looking at specific religious communities have 
found faith to act as a protective factor (Lindridge, 2007, p.20; Department for Health 
and Social Care, 2018a, pp.280–1; Sadiq, 2019). 
Part C: Interactions with mental health support services 
Part A of this chapter provided an overview of trends found in relation to BAME 
mental health inequality in services. In this section, I take a closer look at the 
literature exploring these trends. In addition to academic research, this section is 
informed by grey literature that is highly qualitative and/or responding to specific 
events; i.e. inquiries into the deaths of BAME (particularly black) patients in 
psychiatric wards. Although such work presents testimonies of lived experience 
(much as my study does), only a small proportion of the grey literature is actually 
produced by people of BAME backgrounds who are mental health service 
users/survivors. Further, as the ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’ report points 
out, many reports fail to provide explanations for trends, making discerning between 
more likely hypotheses extremely difficult – if not impossible – to determine from the 
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literature alone (Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.171). It is in this 
context that part C explores: 
 Accessing mental health support services 
 Using mental health services 
These headings align both with those in my findings chapters and with the way in 
which policy often separates issues relating to support services. However, I note 
here that there is indeed something of a different focus between much of the 
literature and my own study (see p3).    
7 Accessing support 
Issues relating to accessing support are held as both illustrative of inequality and as 
inequality. In a policy context, the main issues discussed in relation to BAME 
groupings are disparities in primary care and adverse pathways to care. Another 
key area for consideration relates to issues found in the diagnostic process; as 
additional to, (though not distinct from), problems regarding diagnostic categories 
(see part A).   
6.1   Accessing support through primary care 
Despite an aggregate over-representation of BAME groupings in mental health 
services and proportionate (or high) levels of registration and consultation14 with GP 
practices, it is perhaps surprising to find significant pockets of under-representation 
with regards to GP involvement on the grounds of mental health issues/distress 
among this population grouping. For example, Asian groupings have long been cited 
as not engaging with GP services for mental health issues (Bhal, 1999, p.13; Bhui 
et al., 2003, pp.112–114; NIMHE, 2003, p.12), despite an over-representation in GP 
consultations for general health reasons (Lloyd and Fuller, 2002, p.102).  The 
African-Caribbean group is also under-represented in primary care services, despite 
significant over-representation in secondary or tertiary services15 (Bhal, 1999; Bhui 
et al., 2003, pp.112–114; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, c.4; NIMHE, 2003, p.12; 
Synergi, 2017, p.3). 
Contentions that such disparities are reflective of mental illness distribution across 
the population are no longer wholly accepted, despite the State implying they are 
(Department of Health, 2011b, p.59). For example, it might be expected that if the 
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African-Caribbean population do experience higher rates of SMI, they would also be 
over-represented in GP referrals to secondary or tertiary services. Yet the Care 
Quality Commission (2010) found referral rates were significantly lower for the black 
population16, including the African-Caribbean grouping (Care Quality Commission, 
2010, p.21). Additionally, indications of elevated rates of depression in community-
based studies (NIMHE, 2004, p.12; Weich and McManus, 2002, p.25) are not 
supported by accompanying therapuetic treatment rates (NHS England and 
BABCP, 2019b, p.4; Connolly, 2010, p.170; Cooper et al., 2010, p.99; Hatch and 
Thornicroft, 2012, p.844; Nazroo and Iley, 2011).  
Some scholars suggest that such trends reflect diagnostic issues within primary care 
settings (Glasby and Tew, 2015, p.167). For example, the State commissioned 
Inside Outside (2004) report suggests that ‘Black and South Asian patients are less 
likely to have mental health problems recognised by their GP or the nature of their 
presentation wrongly attributed to mental illness.’ (NIMHE, 2003). Lower recognition 
of mental health issues may result from the difficulties GPs experience 
distinguishing physical illness from somatised presentations of mental illness. 
Alternatively, the finding that South Asian groupings are under-represented in 
primary care might be consistent with findings of low or ‘proportionate’17 
representation in mental health services overall (Patel and Shaw, 2009, p.16), and 
therefore not indicative of inequalities requiring State-level intervention. There is, in 
the literature, a lack of consensus regarding the rates of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress experienced by South Asian populations. For instance, in contrast 
to Patel and Shaw, Bhui et al.’s (2003) systematic review states that:  
South Asians had the highest community rates of mental disorder, 
were the most frequent consulters in primary care and were less 
likely than White people to have their mental disorder recognised 
(Bhui et al., 2003, p.112) 
Referral rates to crisis care for certain Asian groupings have also been reported as 
disproportionately low (CAAPC, 2016, p.74)  
The impact of cultural differences regarding attitudes to illness or issues arising from 
being a migrant to the UK are also explored in this context. For migrants, differences 
in health-seeking behaviour can be driven by relatively basic logistical issues. For 
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example, a lack of knowledge about the range of services available is reported to 
contribute to the low levels of Asian women seeking support18 (Fawcett and Karban, 
2005, p.47). Linked to this is the more general role that language barriers among 
predominantly first generation migrants might play on people’s abilities to seek 
support (NIMHE, 2003, p.12). Refugees and asylum seekers may also experience 
considerable difficulties registering with a GP, despite being entitled to healthcare 
(Fang et al., 2015, p.2; NIMHE, 2004, p.24). Although primarily logistical, addressing 
these issues is not always straight forward; cultural difference can add significant 
complexity that must be accounted for in policy responses. Patel and Shaw (2009) 
provide an example of when the ‘solution’ to one barrier – in this case the use of an 
interpreter to overcome language barriers – may give rise to yet another barrier to 
accessing mainstream support:  
traditional views on mental health that are commonly held by 
Gujaratis, makes it difficult for patients to disclose what they truly 
want to say as they feel that the interpreter will stigmatise them – 
particularly as they are likely to be from the same community. (Patel 
and Shaw, 2009, p.20)  
Additionally, where there are both different conceptualisations of mental health and 
language barriers, barriers to communication between patient and healthcare staff 
are augmented (Thomas, 2016, p.467). An interpreter may have difficulties 
translating a GP’s questions if the questions rely on Western conceptualisations of 
the mind and body, or there may be no equivalent terminology for things such as 
‘depression’ (Patel and Shaw, 2009, p.21). As a result of such issues, some people 
may not seek support from mainstream services as they feel the services have 
inadequate awareness of these different conceptualisations and a lack of flexibility 
to accommodate other cultural norms. This demonstrates how solutions to barriers 
must always be considered in the context of wider issues. In this particular instance, 
conflicts in cultural norms in relation to illness and community dynamics play a 
significant role in the outcome of solutions that may – to a policy-maker – seem 





6.2   Adverse pathways to care and their impact 
Key issues regarding adverse pathways into care, then, are the high rates of 
migrant, black and Asian populations entering mental health services by compulsory 
detention through use of the Mental Health Act (1983), far exceeding rates for white 
British people (Bhui et al., 2003; K. Bhui et al., 2015; CAAPC, 2016, p.74; Hatch 
and Thornicroft, 2012, p.844; NIMHE, 2003, pp.12–13; Singh et al., 2007, p.2; 
Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.257). This might result in part from 
avoidance of mental health services in the early stages of mental health 
issues/distress. As Clement et al. (2015) note, ‘delays may contribute to adverse 
pathways to care… the duration of untreated illness is associated with worse 
outcomes’ (Clement et al., 2015, p.11), though the hypothesis of delays in treatment 
for psychosis is disputed (Morgan et al., 2006, p.246). One explanation for these 
delays relates to health-seeking behaviours that result in increased numbers within 
BAME groupings reaching an acute point with their mental health issues/distress. 
Another hypothesis relates to racism and racial prejudice, citing institutional and 
interpersonal racism in the police and judiciary services (Browne, 1997, p.21), and 
the possible role of ‘transmitted discrimination’ (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.60) as 
contributory factors.  
Transmitted discrimination refers to instances where people call the police to report 
‘troubling’ behaviour which is informed by racialised stereotypes. As a result, police 
attend to the ‘public disturbance’, initiating a process of transferring the 
discrimination felt at a community level into police action that might ultimately lead 
to sectioning under the MHA (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.60). Hypotheses 
regarding racism are supported by the high rates of primarily black people entering 
mental health services through police intervention or the criminal justice system 
(Browne, 1997; Hatch and Thornicroft, 2012, p.844; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, 
pp.59–61), and repeated findings of racism and racial prejudice in these systems 
(Ministry of Justice, 2017; MacPherson, 1999).   
Indeed, some research has found that many BAME people found mental health 
services and the pathway to care to ‘replicate the experiences of racism and 
discrimination of black people in wider society’ (Keating and Robertson, 2004, 
p.442). This has been reported as having a significant impact on health-seeking 
behaviours among black populations in particular, by inciting fear of services. 
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‘Breaking the Circle of Fear’ (2002) describes the ‘circle of fear’ that inhibits many 
black people from seeking health care for mental health issues (SCMH, 2002). 
Researchers working on the project wrote that: 
Sources of fear include perceptions of MH services, attitudes to 
mental illness and diagnosis, and experiences of hospital care. The 
impact of fear included limited trust, limited engagement and 
delayed help-seeking behaviour. …these fears mar the interactions 
between these communities [African and African-Caribbean] and 
MH services, affect help-seeking behaviour adversely, and lead to 
restrictive and punitive interventions. (Keating and Robertson, 2004, 
p.439) 
Black populations are more likely to have negative experiences of mental health 
services which include greater exposure to coercive treatments among other things. 
Awareness of this generates fear which is amplified by experiences of 
marginalisation in other aspects of life, perhaps as a result of minority ethnicity or 
from mental health issues/distress. Therefore, people may actively avoid seeking 
support for mental health in the early stages of any issues/distress (Bhugra et al., 
1997, pp.793–794; Singh et al., 2007, p.3), increasing the chances of entering 
mental health services at the point of crisis - perhaps through involuntary detention. 
Often this involves the police, criminal justice system and the use of sectioning under 
the Mental Health Act (1983). This may then elicit more coercive treatment plans 
and provides the circumstances for increased violent incidences, resulting in more 
severe treatment conditions (Sheehan et al., 1995, p.598). Staff perceptions of black 
male patients have also been reported to include perceptions of increased 
tendencies for violence, leading to differential treatment (Browne, 1997, p.20). Singh 
et al. (2007) take the view that the influence of racial prejudice on staff behaviour is 
not a significant factor in BAME mental health inequality in a service context.  
Concerns regarding inequalities continue to be raised by healthcare professionals, 
academics, BAME service users/survivors and their organisations. Indications that 
this circle of fear is still present is provided by the Mental Health Act Review African 
and Caribbean group’s recent report calling for mental health services to:  
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build confidence [in communities] that they can adequately respond 
to the needs of African and Caribbean people in the right way at the 
right time. This should encourage people with mental health needs 
to present earlier and avert crisis. (Department for Health and Social 
Care, 2018a, p.60) 
Indeed, the new PCREF (see p.10-11) – if taking the form of that recommended in  
the above cited report - seeks to address this issue. Such issues are not, however, 
limited to the black African and African-Caribbean people. For example, though the 
specifics involved might differ for Irish people, there is evidence to suggest that the 
racialised stereotyping of Irish people contributes to a tendency to seek help through 
Accident and Emergency services rather than through primary care services 
(NIMHE, 2004, p.19).  
6.3   Diagnostic practices in the context of minority ethnicity 
Issues pertaining to diagnostic practices specifically are difficult to separate from the 
racialisation involved in the construction of diagnostic categories (see section 3), 
with diagnostic processes problematic in: 
the way assessments are carried out, in the colour-blindness 
involved in ignoring ways of thinking other than those of European 
culture and the insights derived from ‘white knowledge’, and so on 
(Fernando, 2017, p.93) 
The construction of diagnostic categories aside, issues seem to relate to two main 
factors: cultural difference or racialisation/racism. In relation to the impact of cultural 
differences, these include the difficulties previously mentioned regarding healthcare 
professionals’ ability to detect mental health issues. Another significant issue is that 
phenomena considered to be within social norms in some cultures are interpreted 
in western medicine as deviant or abnormal. This can lead to diagnoses of mental 
illness that would be considered inappropriate in the person’s own culture (Morgan 
et al., 2009, p.234; Sharpley et al., 2001, p.60). Sharpley et al. provide an example 
relevant to diagnoses of schizophrenia among people of black African and 
Caribbean heritage: 
Modern Western cultures do not assign credibility to hallucinations, 
and generally regard them as pathological. However, in many non-
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Western societies, hallucinatory experiences are not considered 
bizarre, and are considered ‘real’ as opposed to ‘as if real’ (Sharpley 
et al., 2001, p.60) 
Because hallucinatory experiences are not accepted within the Western medical 
paradigm as indicative of experiencing phenomena beyond the individual, they are 
deemed evidence of illness.  
A further issue relates to stereotyping and how this can reinforce diagnostic 
categories underpinned by racism and racial prejudice, with ‘cultural and racial 
stereotyping’ impacting on ‘the types of services and diagnosis individuals from 
minority backgrounds seek and receive’ (NIMHE, 2003, p.12). ‘Seek’ here refers to 
the health seeking behaviours that result from issues such as the ‘circle of fear’.  
‘Receive’, however, refers to the ways in which mental health care and psychiatric 
practices are influenced by such stereotyping. This can lead to failures to diagnose 
or the mis-diagnosis of people, resulting in the wrong treatments being offered. 
Sashidharan provides the example provided of the stereotyping of Irish people as 
alcoholics and their over-representation in psychiatric wards with diagnoses of 
‘alcohol disorders’. The contention is that the stereotype of the Irish ‘lush’ was 
resulting in early (mis)diagnosis of alcoholism, where diagnosis of CMD/distress 
might have been more appropriate. This can result in being referred to inappropriate 
services or treatment options. In today’s system, people misdiagnosed in this way 
may experience additional barriers to accessing appropriate support due to the 
segregation of substance misuse and mental health services and the requirements 
services place on people (Institute of Alcohol Studies and Centre for Mental Health, 
2018). For example, many mental health services will not accept people who turn up 
having drunk alcohol that day.  
Perhaps the most frequent example of the influence of racialised stereotypes in this 
area, however, is that highlighted in part A regarding black men and schizophrenia. 
Additionally, the literature raises issues pertaining to the relationships between 
predominantly white psychiatrists and people of colour being assessed. For 
instance: 
the relationship between professionals and Black people are 
adversarial from the start for various reasons, e.g., their past 
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experiences with psychiatry, the police and other institutions. It is 
therefore difficult to take a full history in order to arrive at an accurate 
assessment of the situation. There is a perceived pressure to make 
a quick diagnosis that leaves no space or opportunity to make a 
tentative diagnosis. (SCMH, 2002, p.45) 
Findings like this draw attention to the distrust reported in many black communities 
towards mental health services. 
6.3   Responses to diagnostic labels 
Issues such as those highlighted in the above sections are perceived as impacting 
on the ways in which many people from BAME backgrounds respond to diagnostic 
labels. For example, the female BAME mental health service user/survivor led report 
Recovery and Resilience (2011) presents findings that: 
Acceptance [of the biomedical model and accompanying labels] was a 
complicated process based on whether a given explanation and/or 
diagnosis made sense of their experiences, the level of self-blame, 
isolation and other stigmatising factors that a person experienced, and 
whether the bio-medical explanation and the accompanying treatment 
involved some kind of “therapeutic alliance” (Kalathil et al., 2011, p.30) 
Essentially, acceptance of the biomedical model and diagnostic labels was 
dependent on how it corresponded to lived experience and the role it played in 
empowering or disempowering participants. The women’s intersectional locations 
added to the complexity of negotiations of diagnostic categories, in which stigma 
related to mental health and mental illness might add another layer of 
disempowerment. Within mental health discourses stigma is often understood as 
resulting from the process of labelling difference and applying negative stereotypes 
to these labels (Link and Phelan, 2006, p.528), impacting people’s willingness to 
accept diagnoses and seek (stigmatising) treatments (Clement et al., 2015, p.21). 
For BAME groupings in particular, alternative beliefs about the causes of mental 
health and intersectional location can complicate this stigma (CAAPC, 2016, p.74).  
For example, widely held beliefs that mental health issues/distress result from fate 
or from being possessed by evil spirits among the Chinese grouping can create a 
form of ‘moral’ stigma that western secular societies don’t have in the same way 
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(NIMHE, 2004, p.18). Similar beliefs have been reported among people of African 
and African-Caribbean descent, as well as views expressed by religious leaders in 
this grouping that mental health issues/distress are indicative of a ‘moral failing on 
the part of the individual.’ (Mantovani et al., 2017, p.375) Although religious belief 
and communities can act as a protective factor against the development of mental 
health issues (see p.72), it also has the potential to augment stigma. Mental ‘illness’ 
might also be more stigmatising in societies where there is an emphasis on social 
harmony over individual concerns (Ryder et al., 2002, p.12). 
Additionally, some cultures set a very different bar before they consider a person to 
be experiencing mental health issues. For example, Mantovani et al. (2017) also 
found that some people of African descent associated ‘mental health’ with ‘madness’ 
or ‘insanity’. One participant explained this, stating: 
Those of us from Black background… our perception of mental 
illness is somebody’s totally derailed and is walking the street 
probably naked. …and so if anyone tells you that you have a mental 
health issue you are ready to fight them… …because we relate 
mental health to insanity, a total level of insanity. (ibid, p.376)  
Cultural norms that differ from those in the UK may then contribute not only to delays 
in seeking support, but also add to stigma around treatment by implying more severe 
illness/distress than the person is comfortable with. Such norms, together with 
understandings of mental health issues/distress linked to being ‘evil’ or negatively 
‘fated’, also serve to increase ‘associated’ or ‘familial’ stigma; the stigma felt by 
family and friends by association. Within certain BAME groupings, there is a greater 
impetus to hide or a refusal to accept that a family member experiences mental 
health issues/distress. For example, some Asian groupings attach loss of status 
within the community to having family members that experience disability (of which 
mental health might be a form). Repercussions might include unmarried family 
members or the person experiencing distress having more difficulties finding a 
partner due to fears of hereditary ‘khootum’19 issues (Katbamna et al., 2000, p.15; 
Knifton et al., 2010, p.2). Concerns about family reputation and fear of contagion by 
association have also been reported among some black populations (Mantovani et 
al., 2017, p.378). Together with the issues relating to the ‘circle of fear’ and stigma, 
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the perception that available treatments are ineffective or inappropriate contributes 
to yet another form of intersectional barriers impacting on the health-seeking 
behaviours of BAME groupings (Henderson et al., 2013, p.777; Knifton, 2012, 
p.287), including acceptance of diagnostic labels. 
8 Using mental health services 
Once people of BAME backgrounds have entered into mental health services, a 
number of further inequalities are raised in relation to their experiences using the 
service. Overall, BAME service user/survivor satisfaction across primary, secondary 
and tertiary mental health services are reported as lower than for the general 
population (Glasby and Tew, 2015, p.168; Lloyd and Fuller, 2002, p.101; NIMHE, 
2004, p.20; NIMHE, 2003, p.12). Reasons for this are many, and alter according to 
ethnicity and racialisation. 
7.1   Coercive procedures and approaches 
Inequalities related to in-service experiences often highlight the disproportionate use 
of coercion and force on people of BAME backgrounds, mirroring issues relating to 
pathways to care. Once more, research often centres on the experiences of black 
populations, primarily men. However, more recently the disproportionally high 
number of black women detained in services involuntarily has received attention 
(Bansal et al., 2014; CAAPC, 2016, p.74; Department for Health and Social Care, 
2018b, p.257). There is also evidence to suggest that some women fear entering 
mixed sex wards, particularly if they have been subject to domestic violence (Kalathil 
et al., 2011, p.48). Overall, key issues raised are:  
 increased likelihood of treatments delivered coercively;  
 increased risk of being placed in secure units;  
 likelihood of enduring longer stays on wards; and 
 exposure to racism and discrimination from both staff and patients. 
Whilst some research contends that increased detentions, longer stays and use of 
secure units are likely reflective of need arising from ‘actual’ SMI (Bansal et al., 
2014; Bowers et al., 2017, p.19; Singh et al., 2014, p.1003), recent qualitative 
research undertaken to inform a review of the MHA83 supports claims that mental 
health services reflect ‘discriminatory practice at the hands of the police’ 
(Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a, p.43). This reinforces views that 
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racism and discrimination experienced in wider society are reflected in these 
services (Keating and Robertson, 2004, p.442; Adebowale, 2013, p.26). The result 
being that black African and African-Caribbean people are more likely to experience 
‘unnecessary use of force; unjustified suspicion; lack of effort to communicate; 
overuse of sectioning; more restrictive care’ (Department for Health and Social 
Care, 2018a, p.43). ‘Restrictive care’ includes hospitalisation, deployment to secure 
units and use of physical restraints. An earlier review of mental health services also 
found BAME groupings to have experienced overt racism at the hands of staff 
(CAAPC, 2016, p.71). This adds to findings from reviews and inquiries that found 
evidence of exposure to racism from other patients, which is either dismissed or 
acknowledged but unaddressed by staff (Blofeld et al., 2003; Prins, 1993; 
Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.292).  
For those who are not inpatients on psychiatric wards, BAME groupings experience 
discrepancies in the provision of Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) support, 
with Asian groupings less likely to receive such support and black populations more 
likely (Hatch and Thornicroft, 2012, p.844). Additionally, black patients are 
significantly more likely to be placed on Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) 
(Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.10). CTOs enable certain 
healthcare practitioners to enforce treatment on people even after they have been 
released to live in the community. An example might be that someone is released 
from hospital on the condition that they have regular doses of medication by injection 
by healthcare workers. They cannot simply decide to stop their medication. Thus, 
even when not detained, black patients are still more likely to experience coercive 
treatment.  
Higher rates of people of BAME backgrounds in secure units and seclusion are 
reported (Care Quality Commission, 2010, p.21; Griffiths, 2018, p.14; NIMHE, 2004, 
p.12; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.10). This is explained in 
numerous ways, including allegations that BAME patients are involved in violent 
incidents more often than white British patients (Fawcett and Karban, 2005, p.45). 
Another explanation offered is that exposure to more coercive pathways to care 
provoke a (marginally) increased involvement of black patients in violent incidents 
recorded (Sheehan et al., 1995). Many researchers contest that more coercive 
practices result from ‘actual’ aggression, pointing out that there is little evidence to 
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support this. Some even suggest that levels of aggression are actually lower among 
black patients (Keating and Robertson, 2004, p.445). It is stated that stereotypes of 
the ‘big, black and dangerous’ sort influence staff, and therefore the treatment 
provided (Prins, 1993; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a, p.43).  
7.2   Treatments 
Here I explore trends regarding treatments provided within mental health services, 
(though some of these treatments are also available through primary care services). 
I do not make judgements regarding the efficacy or reasoning behind specific 
treatments, but highlight disparities specific to BAME populations. Overall, findings 
tend to demonstrate that ‘black communities receive the MH services they don’t 
want, but not the ones they do or might want.’ (Keating and Robertson, 2004, p.439). 
7.2.1   Medication 
I mention in section 7.1 issues pertaining to forced medication when people are 
placed under CTOs. Another significant issue in relation to medication is the 
perception that BAME groupings experience an over-reliance on medication by 
mental health professionals and are at greater risk of overmedication. The over-
reliance on medication in mental health services is not, however, specific to BAME 
mental health inequality. Indeed, this highly contentious debate is conducted 
globally and regardless of ethnic groupings (Connolly, 2010; Hutton et al., 2013; 
McHugh et al., 2013; Mosher and Bola, 2013, p.373; Patel et al., 2014; Quirk et al., 
2012; Tseris, 2019). More specific to BAME populations in England are claims 
regarding overmedication and medication provided without talking therapies to 
accompany them; issues repeatedly highlighted in public inquiries, independent 
reviews and qualitative BAME service user/survivor research (Blofeld et al., 2003, 
p.68; Fitzpatrick et al., 2014, p.7; Griffiths, 2018, p.14; Kalathil, 2008, p.4; Lindridge, 
2007; Lloyd and Moodley, 1992; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a; 
SCMH, 2002, p.11; Race Equality Foundation, 2014, p.1). 
Reasons provided for an over-reliance on medication by staff in psychiatric wards 
when attending to BAME service users/survivors are many. A recent cross-sectional 
study highlighted evidence that ‘depot preparations were more likely to reduce the 
risk of relapse compared to oral preparations’ (Das-Munshi et al., 2018, pp.7–8), 
implying that this might explain higher use of injections among a population grouping 
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with high relapse rates. More frequently highlighted, however, are the lack of time 
and resources available to provide alternative care and the role of stereotypes. For 
example, where:  
prejudice and the fear of violence influence risk assessments and 
decisions on treatment, responses are likely to be dominated by a 
heavy reliance on medication and restriction. (ibid, p6). 
In line with this, some quantitative research indicates an increased risk to people of 
some BAME backgrounds being prescribed excessive amounts of medication, 
particularly psychotropic medications in psychiatric care (Blofeld et al., 2003, p.68; 
Keating and Robertson, 2004, p.440; Department for Health and Social Care, 
2018a, p.46).  
Many BAME service users/survivors express fear of medication in user-led and 
other qualitative grey literature. Their fear tends to centre around being over-
medicated; a situation not aided by a lack of information provided, particularly in 
relation to side-effects (Griffiths, 2018, p.7) and the loss of power and agency in 
relation to professionals able to enforce prescriptions (SCMH, 2002, pp.24–25). 
Even among participants who expressed some positive results from medication 
(Kalathil et al., 2011, p.60; Race Equality Foundation, 2014, p.3; SCMH, 2002, 
p.37), side-effects were still a concern. Side-effects cited include people becoming 
like ‘zombies’, limiting one’s ability to work and provoking physical health issues 
(Race Equality Foundation, 2014; SCMH, 2002; Griffiths, 2018, p.37). This was 
sometimes accompanied by a perception that the provision of medication enabled 
a lack of other support to continue (Griffiths, p.41). Examples of views related to 
power and agency include the following extract form a BAME service user/survivor: 
They [professionals] try to succeed in their way, that is to prescribe 
medication, and they don’t take you seriously, so what is the point? 
They’re not there to help me, so why should I talk to them? (ibid, 
p31) 
Another BAME service user/survivor led report states that where participants did 
accept medication as useful, they still made a ‘clear distinction between medication 
as a necessity for symptom control and ‘real’ recovery’ (Kalathil et al., 2011, p.10), 
with real recovery often involving addressing the more socio-cultural root causes.  
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Views that medication is administered in a way that pushes the need to address 
wider social issues and inequalities aside are found in much of the grey literature 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2014, p.28; Race Equality Foundation, 2014, p.3). Refusal to 
consider wider social issues and the situatedness of some service users/survivors 
has also been reported as leading to some of the most marginalised people having 
to face difficult decisions regarding their treatment. For example, asylum seekers 
were highlighted as having to choose between buying medication or food at times 
(Griffiths, 2018, p.21).  
7.2.2   Talking therapies 
Issues highlighted in relation to talking therapies and BAME mental health inequality 
often relate to low referral rates to services such as Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT), lower completion of talking therapy treatments and 
lower recovery outcomes among BAME groupings (Baker, 2020, pp.18–19; NHS 
England and BABCP, 2019a; Das-Munshi et al., 2018; Fitzpatrick et al., 2014, p.8; 
Kalathil et al., 2011, p.11; Perfect et al., 2016, p.13). Logistical issues once more 
include language barriers (Mind, 2009, p.3). More generally, one suggested 
explanation for the low success rates of talking therapies is the Eurocentric nature 
of such therapies (Tribe, 2014, p.137). The need for greater cultural competency in 
therapeutic settings is emphasised by some academics/practitioners and BAME 
service users/survivors alike. For example: 
All you need to do is look at all the psychologist (…) they’re usually 
White. They’re usually female. None of them, studied, ya know, 
transcultural therapy. So they don’t know what you know and then 
they say (…) the person’s not therapeutically minded (Participant 
quote, Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a, p.45) 
This lack of diversity is often cited as leading to a want in understanding of other 
cultures, of racism and highly secular approaches, resulting in offers of support that 
feel inappropriate for some. A report published by the BAME service user/survivor 
organisation Kindred Minds states that:  
On the rare occasions we are offered talking therapy, it is likely to 
be cognitive behavioural therapy, with no access to a broader range 
of approaches. … there is very little access to culturally appropriate 
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and diverse treatments that we would find more helpful. (Griffiths, 
2018, p.26) 
Such findings support calls for greater emphasis on developing cultural competency 
among mental health staff and therapists (Alleyne, 2008, p.173; K.S. Bhui et al., 
2015; Chowdhary et al., 2014; Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a; 
Department for Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.56), a need recognised in NHS 
England guidance to IAPT services (NHS England and BABCP, 2019b, p.5). Other 
improvement measures suggested in the guidance include: ensuring there is 
adequate consideration of literacy and language proficiency of service users, and 
making information available in other languages; using a range of distribution 
networks to spread awareness of services; being flexible around appointments and 
checking preferences regarding the gender and background of therapists (NHS 
England and BABCP, 2019a, p.7).  
Fernando (2017) warns, however, that there is also reason to be cautious of cultural 
awareness programmes, highlighting that unless implemented with great care, there 
is a risk that such learning will translate into a form of cultural profiling similar in 
practice to stereotyping. Examples of this already exist. For instance, awareness of 
the importance of family in treatment and recovery among some Asian communities 
sometimes leads to the assumption that Asian people prefer to ‘look after their own’, 
or that talking therapies are not suitable due to language barriers that are more likely 
among certain ethnic groupings (Kapadia et al., 2018, p.304; NIMHE, 2004, p.30; 
Patel and Shaw, 2009, p.21). As a result, treatment options might be withheld.  
Other stereotypes highlighted as impacting on referrals to psychological therapies 
have a more racist tone, and pertain to people of BAME backgrounds being more 
often perceived as not being psychologically minded, ‘unsuitable’ or ‘lacking in 
insight’ (Department for Health and Social Care, 2018a, p.45; SCMH, 2002, p.80); 
a remnant of colonial thinking (Fernando, 2017, p.105). A further barrier relating to 
racism is the general inability to address or the discomfort and subsequent 
avoidance of discussing experiences of racism by (predominantly white) therapists 
and psychiatrists (Bhui et al., 2012, p.196). This failure to recognise ‘the justified 
anger arising from racism in society… even if personal discrimination is recognised 
in a theoretical sort of way’ (Fernando, 1995, p.32) means that, although the link 
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between oppression and mental health issues/distress is recognised theoretically, 
in practice racism is either ignored or misinterpreted as evidence of paranoia. This 
claim is supported by the findings of inquiries following the deaths of BAME 
inpatients (Blofeld et al., 2003, pp.23–25; Department for Health and Social Care, 
2018a, p.43; Prins, 1993, pp.51–55).  
Professional bodies (or sub-committees within them) and activists have 
subsequently produced and disseminated a range of race equality and cultural 
awareness training materials (NHS England and BABCP, 2019b; Fernando, 2017, 
sec.6.2; Sewell, 2009; Tribe, 2014, p.137). Indeed, race equality training was a 
central measure in the DRE programme (see Appendix 5). However such problems 
are not easily overcome (Moodley et al., 2019, pp.85–86; Sewell, 2009, p.40), and:  
fear of working with the other can result, on the one hand, in race 
becoming either absent or marginalised in psychotherapy… On the 
other hand, if race becomes the singular focus, then therapists are 
accused of reifying race (Moodley et al., 2019, p.83) 
Moodley et al (2019) go on to advocate for therapists to acknowledge the person’s 
multi-faceted identity; including sexuality, gender, class etc. Although few and far 
between, there are a number of scholars and practitioners calling for consideration 
of multiple and intersectional aspects of experience in therapeutic practice (Kalathil 
et al., 2011, p.48; Moodley et al., 2019; Newland et al., 2015, p.173). Some call on 
therapists to:  
step beyond the comfort of familiar, but narrow confines of our 
approaches which focus only at the level of the individual; …and 
direct our interventions also to the to the social context in which 
people live, suffer and survive. (Newland et al., 2015, p.182)  
In this way, therapy may seem more appropriate to people in marginalised and 
intersectional locations. 
This section has focused on one-to-one interventions due to a dearth of recent 
studies regarding the experiences of people from BAME backgrounds in group 
therapy in the UK. The research I did find tended to be based in America, with some 
highlighting the need for the facilitator/therapist to be aware of dynamics between 
89 
 
ethnic groupings in mixed-ethnicity groups (Chang-Caffaro and Caffaro, 2018; Tsui 
and Schultz, 1988). UK studies tended instead to emphasise the need to for 
interventions to be ‘culturally sensitive’ (Masood et al., 2015, p.1; NICE, 2017; 
Vahdaninia et al., 2020, p.13). 
7.2.3   Alternate treatments and cultural norms  
Some research highlights that people with non-western cultural backgrounds and 
alternative understandings of mental health may prefer to seek out treatments 
outside of western medical and therapeutic options. For example, instead of turning 
to a GP or therapist, they may seek support from spiritual healers who might advise 
prayer, fasting or perform exorcisms (Arshad and Johal, 1999, p.66; Mantovani et 
al., 2017, p.379). Or as an alternative to western medication, they may seek herbal 
remedies or acupuncture (Patel and Shaw, 2009, p.19). Different cultural norms 
around illness also contribute to people feeling that services are not appropriate for 
them. For example, norms surrounding illness for some BAME groupings include 
the family playing a significant role in the recovery process. Yet this is not always 
recognised by services (Mind, 2009, p.13).  
Additionally, western approaches that exclude families from the treatment process 
can serve to reinforce perceptions of stigma by association, due to the employment 
of theories that ‘delineated the family as the pathogenesis of the individual’s mental 
illness.’ (Gary, 2005, p.988). These understandings therefore support treatment 
approaches that distance the person from their family. For some minority ethnic 
populations, stereotyped views of either the family makeup (e.g. – the absent black 
father) or norms for social roles (e.g. – the subjugated Muslim woman) feed into 
health-seeking behaviours that avoid such stigma. Such factors can lead to greater 
social isolation and exclusion ‘at the level of individual, family and society’, which 
might then be ‘compounded by the discrimination and racism associated with 
membership of an ethnic minority community.’ (Knifton et al., 2010, p.2) Here we 
see the emergence of multiple or intersectional stigma, often referred to as ‘double’ 
or ‘multiple’ stigma (Gary, 2005, p.979; Henderson et al., 2013, p.777).  
9 Conclusion and calls for change 
In this chapter I have set out the current state of the literature in relation to BAME 
mental health inequality in England. In part A, I provided an overview of the trends 
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suggestive of an area of inequality. Further, I explored some of the epistemological 
issues in mental health discourses that require consideration in the context of 
marginalised groups, ‘race’ and ethnicity. Parts B and C proceeded to examine the 
trends highlighted in further detail, dividing discussions into the determinants of 
mental health inequality to debate epidemiological trends, and research to explain 
trends found in service outcomes and experiences. Though debates regarding 
nearly all aspects of this subject area remain highly contentious, there is a general 
acceptance that an inequality is present. The challenges come when defining what 
these are and how they come to be. Gaps that I identified in the literature include 
the need for greater understandings of: 
 Incidence and prevalence of mental health issues//distress classified as 
CMDs; 
 the ‘open systems’ that impact on racialised people’s mental health and 
health-seeking behaviours;  
 how intersectional location impacts on mental health and support service 
experiences; and  
 how all of the above impact on under-researched BAME groupings, 
particularly newer minority groups to the England, 2nd/3rd generation migrants 
and people of ‘mixed’ ethnicity and those in the white ‘other’ grouping who 
are increasingly exposed to xenophobia. 
In thinking about ways forward, it is no surprise that scholars, practitioners and 
activists suggest an array of measures that they feel need to be implemented to 
drive change. These measures are generally targeted at either healthcare 
practitioners and therapists, or at the State. The first is one that receives wide 
recognition and is promoted without much opposition; ensuring that services 
become more culturally sensitive and for staff to develop greater cultural 
competence. ‘Cultural competence’ in healthcare includes having services and staff 
that are able to ‘identify cross-cultural expressions of illness and health’ (Metzl and 
Hansen, 2014, p.126) and provide services that are ‘sensitive to the needs of people 
from diverse backgrounds’ (Thomas, 2016, p.463). However, this must be 
implemented with care and, as Fernando (2017) and Bhui et al. (2012) note, without 
an avoidance of addressing racism. 
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Other calls for change tend to fall into two camps recognisable by their emphasis 
(or lack thereof) on racism. On the one hand there are those who feel that a focus 
on racism within mental health services is unhelpful in addressing BAME mental 
health inequality (Morgan and Hutchinson, 2010, p.707; Singh, 2009). They call on 
the State to increase investment in geographic areas of high BAME populations to 
enable services there to better meet the needs of BAME service user/survivors. This 
is underpinned by the view that higher rates of diagnosis are reflective of ‘actual’ 
illness. Singh and Burns reject accusations of institutional racism in mental health 
discourses and practices as a driving factor in the trends seen, though they allow 
that racial discrimination ‘undoubtedly occurs in British society and leads to much 
personal suffering and possibly also to mental illnesses’ (Singh et al., 2007, p.17). 
However, they maintain the position that a focus on racism detracts from the 
provision of much needed support and may lead to ‘damaging consequences for the 
profession, ethnic minority groups, and, most crucially, for ethnic minority patients’ 
(Singh and Burns, 2006, p.650).  
In opposition to this, many scholars whose work focuses specifically on BAME 
mental health inequalities call for racism in mental health discourses and practice to 
be addressed. Scholars such as Fernando, Nazroo and Bhui insist that inequalities 
such as those represented by the trends cannot be resolved without a concerted 
focus on racism at the micro, meso and miso levels (Bhui et al., 2018; Byrne et al., 
2020; Fernando, 2017; Nazroo et al., 2019). For example, Nazroo et al. write that 
‘racisms are fundamental causes of observed race/ethnic inequalities in risk of 
severe mental illness and in outcomes relating to severe mental illness’. Addressing 
BAME mental health inequality therefore requires examination of:  
the ways in which structural, interpersonal and institutional racisms 
operate and mutually constitute one another. …alongside a focus 
on other sources of social and economic inequality, it is crucial that 
the public health agenda pays close attention to issues of racism 
and how they shape the lives of race/ethnic minority people. (Nazroo 
et al., 2019, p.12) 
The implication for policy is that there is need to address not only racism and racial 
prejudice at the interpersonal level, but at the institutional and epistemological levels 
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also. Initiatives from such positions might include examining how stereotyping 
influences decisions, increasing BAME representation at all levels of staffing, re-
interrogating diagnostic categories and their application, and recognising 
intersectional forms of racism. Instigating action to do this requires an explicit 
recognition by professional bodies and the State of the existence of institutional 
racism in mental health discourses and systems. Though the recognition of racism 
provided by the RCP in the MHA83 report (2018) was a step in the right direction, 
many feel that it does not quite go far enough. For example, Fernando highlights 
that it ‘fails to even mention institutional racism’ and ‘raised false hopes in the minds 
and hearts of many black people’ (Fernando, 2018).  
In literature emerging over the recent years, I have increasingly seen discussion of 
the need to address intersectionality in this space (Bhui et al., 2012, p.186; Griffiths, 
2018, sec.2; Mantovani et al., 2017, p.381; Nazroo et al., 2019, p.4; Department for 
Health and Social Care, 2018b, p.258). Historically, there has been some resistance 
to taking ‘single equalities’ approaches to address inequalities experienced by 
BAME groupings in England. This stems from a fear that such an approach might 
‘obscure the particular drivers of inequality in a specific domain’ (Vige and Sewell, 
2012, p.146). This perspective is understandable when we consider that the 
implementation of a ‘single equalities’ approach in the NHMH (2011) resulted in the 
strategy addressing BAME mental health inequality being reduced to a few short 
paragraphs. However, it is my view that the NHMH (2011) is simply an example of 
the single equality approach being poorly utilised to develop strategy. However, a 
single equalities approach still falls short of intersectionality as it does not 
necessitate consideration of how systems of oppression mutually sustain each other 
or emphasise the specificities of intersectional experiences. I recall Crenshaw’s 
statement that: 
focus on the most privileged group members marginalises those 
who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be 
understood as resulting discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest 
further that this focus on otherwise-privileged group members 
creates a distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the 
operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in 
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experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more 
complex phenomenon. (Crenshaw, 1989, p.140)  
Crenshaw insists that to truly address racism, intersectional experiences must be 
accounted for, a position also taken by other intersectionality theorists. 
Interestingly, people emerging as supportive of intersectional approaches tend also 
to highlight the need for action that ‘deal[s] with the complexity of socio-economic 
factors or the experience of racism’ and ensures that ‘broader attention is paid to 
the structural and societal factors that cause ethnic inequalities in health, without 
which ‘progress on reducing them will be minimal’ (Byrne et al., 2020, p.320). This 
aligns with calls for recognition that ‘future policy to reduce racial inequality in mental 
health will need to locate its mission more in the realm of human and civil rights and 
public health’ (Sewell, 2014, p.86). By this, I take Sewell to be calling attention to 
the multiple and intersecting ways in which racialised people experience inequality, 
discrimination and oppression such that BAME mental health inequality emerges.  
Such views open up space for policy-makers to recognise not only the various forms 
of racism that must be addressed, but also the interconnectivity of a range of 
oppressive experiences. I note Synergi’s recent employment of the vocabulary of 
‘wicked problem’ (Bhui et al., 2018, p.576) in one of its reports. In my view, the 
introduction of this concept demonstrates an acknowledgement that addressing 
BAME mental health inequalities requires addressing not only racism, but also other 
‘open systems’ that impact on the lives of people from BAME backgrounds with 
mental health issues/distress; albeit without losing sight of the importance of issues 
stemming from racism and racial prejudice. In this, scholars advocating for and 
against a focus on racism in psychiatric practices are joined in highlighting the need 
to address wider social inequalities so as to take preventative measures. Together, 
these calls articulate a need to consider the wide systems which produce and 
reproduce the array of inequalities highlighted in the body of this chapter; many of 






Participants and their intersectional locations 
Andeep: A Sikh, middle age man, Andeep indicated having previously experienced 
depression and difficulties with alcohol. His views about currently experiencing 
depression or not alternated throughout our conversation. At the time of our 
interviews he was unemployed, though he spoke of being a carer for his mother. 
Andeep expressed his aspirations of one day returning to work and a desire to 
undertake qualifications in computing. He is currently unmarried.  
Mahdi: Mahdi is a young Afghan man in his early 20’s who received refugee status 
a few days before our first meeting. He described experiencing a number of 
psychosomatic symptoms as a result of trauma, and has made several suicide 
attempts. Born into a Shia Muslim family, he has now converted to Catholicism. 
Though married to a British woman, Mahdi and his wife separated during the course 
of this research, leading to his having an unstable housing situation for about a year. 
He has no other family, as they were murdered in the Afghan conflict; around the 
age of 11, Mahdi was taken prisoner by the Taliban for 7 years. He is currently 
unemployed and living in council housing, though he aspires to work one day. He 
has no formal education, but feels he has learnt much from the ‘university of life’.  
Mya: Self-identifying as a white British middle-class woman, Mya is also a third-
generation migrant of Jewish descent. Mya experiences anxiety and some suicidal 
thought, and mentioned undergoing assessments for another undisclosed 
diagnosis. A qualified occupational therapist, she is currently unemployed due to 
her mental health. Though not identifying with any one religion, she has moved from 
being agnostic to having a strong faith in a God in recent years. Mya is unmarried 
and gave no indication of living with a partner, and her family do not live nearby.  
Peter: A black man in his late 50’s, Peter migrated to England with his family in his 
early life. Peter preferred for his country of origin not to be disclosed in this thesis. 
Experiencing ‘depressive moods’, Peter also describes experiencing some 
difficulties with his physical health. Having been brought up in a Baptist family, Peter 
now identifies as spiritual without adhering to a particular religion. Previously a 
business man and owning his own home, Peter did not disclose his current 
employment status. Peter lives alone, but indicates having family nearby, including 
grandchildren.   
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Samaiya: Samaiya is a Muslim woman of Bangladeshi descent in her mid-30’s. She 
experiences anxiety and depression, and describes having several physical health 
issues. She explains that chronic illness in childhood has significantly impacted her 
mental health as an adult. Samaiya also experiences learning difficulties that have 
led her to have low literacy and numeracy skills, though she would like to address 
this one day. Samaiya has never been in employment. Living with her parents and 
other family members, she helps in the house and with her nieces and nephews 
when feeling well enough. She is very close to a sister who currently lives abroad.   
Samantha: In her mid-30’s, Samantha is a black woman who migrated to the UK 
from Swaziland in her 20’s. Samantha describes experiences of anxiety and 
depression and describes having hallucinations at times. She experiences 
difficulties with alcoholism, but became sober half-way through this research. 
Samantha also has a number of physical health conditions, including HIV, epilepsy 
and a newly acquired visual impairment. Samantha has a strong faith in God, 
identifying as Christian. Divorced, Samantha currently lives alone in council housing. 
Presently unemployed, Samantha previously worked in the hospitality sector, 
gaining college qualifications in his area.  
Satch: A black British man in his late 50’s, Satch was born in England to an Irish 
mother and Puerto-Rican father, and was raised in a children’s home from the age 
of 5. He describes experiencing stress, anxiety and sadness, making two suicide 
attempts during this research. An ‘old man addict’, Satch has been largely sober of 
class A drugs for more than 15 years. Satch has numerous physical health issues 
limiting his mobility, such as COPD. Satch identifies as part of the ‘Dreads’ scene, 
holding beliefs aligning with Rastafari spiritualism, though he rejects some aspects 
of the religion. Previously living alone in council housing, he now lives in sheltered 
accommodation. Unable to work, Satch was previously a labourer and was in prison 
on multiple occasions. He has several children and grandchildren.  
Experiences of mental health issues/distress: As previously mentioned (p.29), I 
do not provide details of participants’ mental health diagnoses in this thesis. 
However, an overview of participants’ descriptions of their mental health 




Chapter 4: Mental health - understandings from BAME intersectional 
locations 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the literature discussing BAME 
mental health inequality pertinent to policymaking activity, with parts A and B 
addressing how the issue is defined and the main aetiological theories explaining 
epidemiological trends indicating inequality. Here, I explore the perspectives of the 
seven core participants described in the previous pages. I use a range of mental 
health terminology throughout this and the following chapter, reflecting participants’ 
terminological preferences. For example, I employ the term ‘mental illness’ when 
presenting testimony from Mahdi and Mya, and ‘mental problems’ when referring to 
discussions with Samantha. When making general points, I employ ‘mental health 
issues/distress’, in an attempt to encompass all perspectives.  
First, then, I explore how systemic inequalities influence participants’ views of 
mental health issues/distress as it effects social groupings of which they are 
members. I also consider participant choices regarding mental health terminology 
in more detail, examining how these are negotiated from their specific intersectional 
locations. In part B of this chapter, I seek to present participant views and 
understandings of the determinants of mental health issues/distress. I focus 
primarily on determinants that participants indicate as impacting people who share 
marginalised or stigmatised identity-makers. This is with a view to developing an 
understanding of their views on the determinants relevant to BAME mental health 
inequality, as opposed to more general contributory factors in mental health.   
Part A: Defining BAME mental health inequality  
Most participants did not comment specifically on trends situating people of BAME 
backgrounds as at increased risk of (diagnosis of) mental health issues/distress. 
However, several did raise issues of social inequality that disproportionately impact 
people from BAME backgrounds. Mahdi spoke passionately about the way that 
State policies regarding asylum seekers not only traumatise, but drive some people 
towards acts of suicide. Such acts are often perceived within western mental health 
discourses as symptomatic of or as a mental health issue (Bennett, 2006, pp.216–
221). Thus, though Mahdi does not speak about the aetiological trends highlighted 
in the previous chapter, he provides an example of systemic issues that he feels 
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result in increased risk of mental illness at the population level. Similarly, Samantha 
and Mya highlight – albeit briefly – issues pertaining to cultural differences and how 
these might provoke mental health issues/distress. For Samantha this relates to not 
feeling able to express herself adequately without being judged as breaking with 
English norms of communication. Mya’s example highlights issues arising from the 
intersection of gender and minority ethnicity. She explains that women living in 
multicultural contexts have to navigate multiple and conflicting social expectations, 
which can negatively impact on a person’s mental health where stigma and 
judgement is present. Both examples disproportionately impact people of BAME 
backgrounds, particularly migrants and their descendants.  
Peter, however, does comment directly on the issue of BAME mental health 
inequality. He does not believe black people are predisposed to mental health 
issues/distress at any greater rate than others. Rather, he provides numerous 
alternative explanations for reported increased rates of distress among black people 
in the UK. These can be broadly separated into two categories: issues of 
misdiagnosis; and increased incidence of distress as a result of systemic injustices. 
Issues pertaining to misdiagnosis include the symptoms of physical health issues, 
such as nutritional deficiencies being misinterpreted as signs of mental health 
issues. An example that Peter provides relates to Vitamin D deficiencies, which he 
informs me occur at higher rates among black people in cold climates like the UK. 
Peter reports that ‘it’s not really a mental thing as such, in a lot of cases.’ However, 
a person ‘presenting’ in this way is diagnosed as such because the ‘Medicine doctor 
has no interest in exploring the reasons… and sometimes it’s simply due to a 
deficiency’. If symptoms commonly interpreted as mental health issues/ distress are 
in fact the result of nutritional/vitamin deficiencies, then it seems  logical to Peter 
that this mistake would disproportionately impact black people living in the UK. He 
expresses that diagnoses of mental illness in these circumstances are then propped 
up by racist claims that black people are more susceptible to such illnesses.  
The view that racist stereotypes and racial prejudice situating black people as more 
predisposed (as a result of genetic or cultural factors) to mental ‘illness’ seems to 
inform Peter’s deep scepticism of diagnoses involving ‘paranoia’ (see Appendix 20). 
Peter implies that people from disadvantaged backgrounds are ‘treated as almost 
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you’re paranoid’ if they ‘see certain things taking place’ that don’t conform to the 
dominant view in society; i.e. micro-aggressions or other indirect forms of racism. 
The result sometimes being that experiences of oppressive systems are denied. 
There are traces of such experiences in Satch’s testimony, an ‘old man addict’ who 
rejects other people’s attempts to diagnose him as ‘mentally ill’. For example, he 
speaks of being told that he has a chip on his shoulder, a comment that denies the 
legitimacy of any ill-feeling he might have towards others as a result of injustices 
experienced. Such denials, Peter indicates, can lead to a pathologization of 
oppression, such that ‘people are being decided / people are sectioned and so on, 
when sometimes it’s not necessary’. Such issues, Peter seems to suggest, augment 
epidemiological trends already elevated due to ‘actual’ distress resulting from 
greater exposure to oppression. 
Participants also perceive many inequalities in relation to mental health and related 
support services that might be interpreted as disproportionately impacting people 
with particular intersectional locations or identity-markers. These will be explored in 
the following chapter, where their testimonies demonstrate a view of the scope of 
BAME mental health inequality that I interpret as moving beyond a focus on just 
healthcare.  
1 Determining the terms: terminological decisions  
Also of relevance to this discussion is the way that participants navigate mental 
health terminology. Just as scholars evaluate the implications and uses of certain 
terminology, so too do participants. With the possible exception of Samaiya, they 
are not passive recipients of terminology handed to them by medical practitioners, 
but rather active players who navigate their way through the implications of various 
options available. This may not illuminate participant views on statistical trends that 
currently define BAME mental health inequality. However, the ways in which 
participants justify terminological choices provides significant insights into how they 
view mental health discourses and wider social inequalities (experienced as the 
group level) to interact and impact on the individual. As Peter points out, it is 
important to notice who ‘determines the terms’ within a mental health context, and 
why they make the choices they do. 
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Discussions about terminology were easier with some participants than with others 
for a variety of reasons. For example, it was difficult to discuss mental health 
terminology directly with Satch. He often turned the conversation to substance 
misuse, even when we had agreed in advance to discuss mental health specifically. 
At one point however, Satch states that he considers substance misuse to be a 
strand of mental health. Equally, his avoidance of ‘mental health’ terminology itself 
is revealing. Samaiya and I did not discuss terminology around mental health and 
what informed the words that she prefers specifically. However, she did state that 
anxiety and depression ‘can count this as a disability’ as it can lead people to ‘feel 
isolated scared and they / they've got depression they might feel bad or anxiety 
which is you know keeping you back not doing things’.  
I was able to have more direct conversations with other participants about their 
terminological preferences and their reasoning. From these conversations (and 
Satch’s subversions of such discussions), it seems that the main factors influencing 
participant relationships to certain terminology are: 
● personal experiences of mental health issues/distress; 
● aetiological beliefs; 
● exposure to specific discourses (including different cultural 
understandings); and 
● experiences of oppressions, at the individual and systemic level (including 
intersectional ones). 
Whilst all four factors play some role in the adoption of particular terminology, focus 
on particular factors varies across participants. Whilst the below might be read as 
individual experiences rather than issues that speak to inequalities at a population 
level, many of these experiences are mediated by power dynamics that create such 
inequalities and social stratifications.    
Mahdi seemed most focused on personal experiences, for example. Whilst he is 
clear that he attributes his mental illness to pre-migration trauma and present social 
factors, he does not seek to use the terminology of distress. Instead he comfortably 
speaks of ‘illness’. For example, in describing a recent incident where he became 
very upset and experienced psychosomatic symptoms, he states ‘I’m not well’. At 
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no point in our conversations did I detect shame relating to his being ‘ill’. Prompting 
him to further consider the word ‘illness’ and his comfort with the term, he 
responded: 
Well I’m, I’m OK I’m / I think we can’t change the truth. That’s the truth, 
that I’m not good. I’m not in a good place. But I hope in future I will get 
better. I hope, the only thing you can do is hope. And at the moment I 
know I’m not, I’m not a normal / sometime I’m thinking about something 
else, and I jump I talking about something / I don’t, I can’t really focus on 
something. I have problems / I have memories problem that, I, I put 
something at home and I forget it very soon. And I have to search for it 
hours. (.) Most of the time I feel like if I don’t have my wife or somebody 
to help me out at home, I don’t think so I can function very well. 
Mahdi links his being ‘ill’ to his inability to ‘function very well’ at present. At the time 
of our first interview, Mahdi’s wife supported him with everyday tasks (see Appendix 
20), as he sometimes feels unable to do this alone due to his mental illness. 
Additionally, ‘unusual’ behaviours and ticks that other people notice (see Appendix 
20) add to his sense of not being ‘normal’ following what the Taliban ‘did in my brain’ 
and subsequent trauma.  
Though Andeep oscillates between referring to himself as having a mental illness or 
not, demonstrating discomfort with the terminology when applied to himself, he 
comments that mental health issues as ‘illness’ exist. As with Mahdi, he justifies this 
conclusion by drawing on the impact of mental health issues/distress on a person’s 
ability to ‘do things’. Indeed, he seems more comfortable with medicalised 
terminology when this is discussed in the context of his current inability to work; 
whereas his discomfort intensifies when discussed in the context of medication. 
Mya, too, draws on functionality issues she experiences to inform her adoption of 
‘illness’ terminology. However, being a trained occupational therapist, she also 
seems to draw on her knowledge of aetiological theories: 
I just think that, if it stops you functioning, it is illness. It’s not just 
difference. You know, I’m not / you know if I’m depressed and I can’t get 
up in the morning and get dressed and showered, I am ill, I’m not just 
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different, do you know what I mean? And I suppose, and even like, you 
know with anxiety, if I’m too anxious to engage with certain things, well 
then I am ill then I’m not just neuro / because I might want to, not 
engaging in it because I don’t want to, I’m not engaging in it because it 
makes me feel anxious. 
Mya is keen to highlight that differences in her behaviour in relation to other people 
result from an ‘illness’ which she is afflicted with. Whilst the above statement that 
she is ‘not just neuro’ – indicating ‘neurodivergent’ - initially seems to jar with a 
previous claim that her brain may have been predisposed to certain mental 
illnesses, it is in fact consistent with her articulation of illness resulting from a 
combination of genetic, biological and social/environment factors. Such 
predispositions do not mean that people are fundamentally different to others, but 
rather that certain aspects of their being and situatedness trigger an illness that 
others may be more or less susceptible to. This allows her to maintain that the 
difficulties she experiences meeting social expectations are not the result of a lack 
of willingness or an innate inability that situates her as inferior to others. She notes 
the usefulness of a diagnosis in helping her to recieve financial support while she is 
unable to work, for example, through the welfare system. 
Mahdi displays similar concerns about meeting social expectations when he 
repeatedly informs me that he wants to ‘be useful’, asserting that Afghan people are 
full of pride and want to support themselves. He wants to work in the future and to 
contribute to the economy and to society in general, but feels he is ‘not stable 
mentally or, or whatever, I’m not stable to work at the moment.’ Mya demonstrates 
awareness of the stigma attached to mental health labels that attribute blame to 
individuals for not meeting social expectations; i.e. ‘If you’re depressed, they go ‘Oh 
are you depressed or are you just lazy?’’. For Mya, as with Mahdi, it is very important 
to hold to a conceptualisation of mental illness that does not situate them as a 
fundamentally ‘different’ sort of human or as making a lifestyle choice that means 
blame can be attributed to them for the difficulties they face. For Andeep, Mahdi and 
Mya, ‘illness’ narratives seem to provide such a space as well as aligning with their 
personal experiences of limited ‘functioning’. 
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Samantha encountered western conceptualisations of ‘mental health’ after arriving 
in the UK in her 20’s. She is very uncomfortable with the way ‘mental problems’ are 
spoken about within a health context. Though she acknowledges that the concept 
of ‘mental health’ provides her with a new way of thinking about her mental state 
prior to emigrating, she remains cautious of the term and utterly rejects ‘mental 
illness’: ‘I hate saying mental illness because (.) because I don't believe in that word. 
I don't.’ The reasons she gives are twofold. First, she feels that it simply doesn’t 
correspond with her own personal experience: 
Samantha: …you could just say ‘oh yeah I'm, I've got mental problems’. 
Or, (.) yeah. Something like that, or, I’m men / ment / I've gone men / 
mental. Like, or something like I feel like I've / I / I’m, I’m going mentally 
(.) distracted. I feel like mentally (.) mentally or physically mentally 
Stéphanie: Distr[acted? 
Samantha: distracted] yeah. 
Samantha seems to view what is termed ‘mental health’ or ‘mental illness’ in the UK 
not as health issues, but an amplification of psychological and emotional difficulties 
that people face as a result of things that happen to them. As such, people might 
end up with ‘mental problems’ or being ‘mentally distracted’. The person 
experiencing such issues can then choose to handle them (or not), just as they may 
choose to handle (or not) other ‘problems’ in their life.  
This links to the second reason Samantha rejects illness terminology, which is that 
she perceives such narratives as enabling people’s agency to be removed. This 
removal of agency can happen as a result of internal reasoning whereby a person 
becomes ‘paranoid’ that they are unable to control their own mental processes. She 
feels that this leads to people ‘freaking out’, resulting in feelings of losing control and 
experiencing suicidal thoughts. Thus, whilst Samantha does employ labels such as 
‘depression’ or ‘stress’, she does not use them as diagnostic labels, but rather to 
express emotional states. For example, she states that ‘mental condition (.) is (.) it 
is depression. It is depression, stress (.) those things, once they come together, they 
can make you mad.’ These emotional states may both precipitate and be part of the 
experience of distress, but do not appear to be regarded by Samantha in an ‘illness’ 
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context; she neither speaks of them as symptoms or as diagnoses of illness. Rather 
they are emotional and mental states that may result in a person becoming ‘mad’, 
but still not ‘ill’.  
Another way in which medicalised terminology is perceived by some participants to 
reduce agency links to how such discourses and approaches can be used to oppress 
people. Specifically, Samantha feels that it encourages both people in positions of 
authority and people deemed to have a mental ‘illness’ to avoid addressing the root 
causes of their ‘problems’. This sense of being dismissed if one accepts mental 
health labels is shared by Satch and Peter. Satch, for example, speaks of 
mainstream support services that ‘just put us in the package mental health’, where 
people deemed to have mental health issues can be ‘pushed to one side’. Instead 
he uses terminology that describes distress - such as being ‘pissed off’ – rather than 
terminology like the ‘mad’ or ‘crazy’ that Samantha employs. This, it appears to me, 
stems from Satch’s view that such responses would be natural for anybody forced 
to go around in circles in a frustrating search for the support they feel they need. 
This view seems to resonate with Peter, who – as I have shown – perceives multiple 
causes for the apparent mental health inequalities experienced by BAME 
populations in the UK.  
This takes us to the fourth factor influencing the terminology adopted by various 
participants: experiences of oppression. In particular, the way that medicalised 
mental health discourses interact with racism to produce even more profound forms 
of oppression that might exist where only one marginalised identity-marker is 
present. I have already highlighted some of Peter’s comments on this topic. Satch 
provides a further such example when he recounts the story of his Dad’s admission 
to a psychiatric ward when Satch was a small child (see p.122). Witnessing his 
father’s degradation within a medicalised mental health context, as a result in part 
of his father’s resistance to and distress in the face of racist practices that sought to 
separate him from his young children, no doubt impacted on him greatly. This gave 
him early insight into how medicalised mental health discourses can legitimise 
practices that both deny people their human rights and pathologize the resultant 
distress. As a child onlooker, Satch perceives a disconnect between the father he 
knew and the man in front of him in the hospital, asking what ‘they’ – the authorities, 
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be they hospital staff or the police – had done to him. The belief that mental health 
labels can and are used to disempower people has been supported by Satch’s 
experiences in subsequent years, as will be explored in the following chapter. 
Both Satch and Peter, then, perceive medicalised discourses around mental health 
as acting to de-politicise distress by enabling practitioners and institutions to dismiss 
the need to address social inequalities (even when they acknowledge the causal role 
of such inequalities); a view also expressed by Samantha, and Mahdi to some 
degree. Medicalised approaches instead allow the focus and responsibility for 
recovery to be placed on the individual and, sometimes, the individual’s community. 
To my understanding, Peter views this refusal to address inequalities as something 
deeply insidious; a pathologization of the distress that arises from oppressed and 
marginalised locations. This likely informs Peter’s discomfort with even the term 
‘mental health’: he is ‘not keen on the term really to be honest’.  
Peter’s consideration of the interplay between mental illness and oppression is not 
limited to just racially motivated oppressions. In addition to highlighting how such 
discourses impact on black people, he also speaks of how people from the ‘upper 
echelons’ of society manipulate terminology to avoid stigma attached to mental 
health labels that he feels are disproportionately applied to people who are socio-
economically disadvantaged. Referring to the upper class, he states that ‘if you’re 
from that level of society then you’re eccentric. But if you’re sort of working class, 
you’re mad.’ Peter is clear that he does not believe people from working class 
backgrounds to be psychologically inferior to those residing in the upper classes 
such that they have a greater predisposition to being ‘mad’, a term which attracts 
significant stigma. Instead, he views the disproportionate application of such terms 
to poor people historically, as a heuristic used by people in the upper class to 
distinguish those within their class experiencing mental health issues/distress from 
those in the poorer, less educated ‘working class’.  
This belief also highlights Peter’s awareness of the deeply problematic stigma 
surrounding mental health and associated terminology. He states of mental illness 
that ‘It’s just that term / that / that you’re, that you’ve a mental problem. A lot of people 
may see that as being told they’re mad’, implying that he believes mental ‘illness’ to 
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carry the same stigma and disempowering properties that ‘madness’ did/does. Once 
more illustrating Peter’s point, Satch also acknowledges the role that stigma plays in 
his refusal of mental health labels, stating ‘It’s a horrible, horrid stigma to it. I wouldn’t, 
wouldn’t even say I’ve got it. Not got anything mental health for shhh’. Allowing 
oneself to be associated with terminology that has the power to disempower and 
stigmatise is dangerous, particularly for people who already feel disempowered as 
a result of other social categories into which they are placed. Though Samaiya and 
her sister don’t speak of stigma in relation to mental health issues that Samaiya 
have, they do tell me of the stigma that their brother fears. Also experiencing mental 
health issues, their brother recently turned down a job with people they know as he 
was concerned that they would notice his difficulties. Even Mya, who insists that 
mental illness is no different to everyday physical illnesses, is acutely aware that ‘the 
stigma in itself of just saying mental health exists. Some people don’t like that.’ Here 
she highlights not only the stigma placed on people experiencing mental health 
issues/distress, but also the stigmas that influence some people to deny the 
existence of mental illness altogether.   
Part B: Perspectives on determinants of mental health 
In this section I explore participants’ views regarding the determinants of mental 
health resulting from both their lived experiences and understandings of mental 
health issues/distress. There is much diversity across participants’ perspectives. 
However, there is also a significant margin of agreement among them in relation to 
the importance of socio-cultural determinants. Once more, though discussion of this 
is predominantly in the context of personal experiences, social inequalities and 
power dynamics are highlighted that impact incidence and prevalence of mental 
health issues/distress at the population level.  
2 The role of biology 
All participants except Samaiya have interacted with mental health-related services 
beyond support from their GP, and all had encountered medicalised approaches 
and terminology of mental health issues/distress though the depths of knowledge 
ranged greatly. For example, Mya, having previously worked in health-care settings 
has perhaps the most in-depth insight into medicalised conceptualisations of mental 
health. In contrast, Samantha expressed her surprise at genetic hypotheses outlined 
106 
 
in an episode of ‘Law and Order’ she had recently watched and asked me to explain 
more about such ideas. She explained that in Swaziland there is no such thing as 
mental health; people just have to get on with things. Alternatively, they are believed 
to be possessed by Jinn. Samantha did not feel that genetic explanations were 
helpful as they may lead people to think ‘I’ll be like that’ and get ‘paranoid’. 
Unsurprisingly, Mya’s views on the causes of mental health issues are those that 
most closely align with medicalised conceptualisations. In discussing the role of 
biological factors in the development of mental illness, Mya states that ‘as 
technology evolves’ and there is ‘more and more research being done in 
neuroscience’, ‘they’re finding lots more physical evidence.’ Mya demonstrates a 
belief that evidence does exist to support the claim that there are neurological – be 
they genetic or other biological - reasons why some people experience mental 
health issues and others do not. She feels it is simply a matter of time before enough 
physical evidence is gathered to enable a fuller understanding of how these factors 
cause psychosomatic and other symptoms of mental ‘illness’. It is important to note, 
however, that she at no point implies this as being an explanation for increased 
(diagnosis of) mental illness among certain population groups.  
When I ask about the role of social and environmental factors, she acknowledges 
that these can have a significant impact on someone’s experience. However, Mya 
is quick to point out that social and environmental factors also play a role in 
numerous physical conditions: ‘say you get migraines, well actually maybe what 
that’s triggered by is (.) …stress, or its by people talking loudly on a bus’. Mya 
continues ‘But is it a social and environmental illness, migraine? Because it’s 
brought on by loud noise and strip lighting created by man?’. Drawing on her own 
lived experience of asthma and mental health, she positions asthma as being: 
a bit genetic, maybe a bit environmental because I did seem to develop 
it when I lived in this really damp house. And mental health, maybe it was 
genetic factors but also environmental factors caused you know certain 
things to manifest, but you know certain things I think probably were / 
was there in my brain 
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In drawing such analogies, she presents a view of mental illness as a vulnerability 
to certain experiences of ill-health as a result of any number of reasons, including 
biological ones, in the same way that a person might be predisposed to a particular 
physical ailment. She asks, ‘why’s mental health got to be treated differently to 
physical health?’.  
It is possible that Mahdi believes that neurological or biochemical issues play a role 
in mental illness, however this terminology is not familiar to him. Instead, he speaks 
of his brain as separate to himself in statements such as ‘I can’t trust my brain’, 
indicating elsewhere that his mental illness results in part from all that the Taliban 
‘did in my brain’. The inference here is that something has been done to alter his 
brain such that it now behaves in ways he cannot always control. However, as 
becomes evident in section 3, Mahdi’s views in many ways seem more aligned with 
social-cultural and environmental aetiological hypotheses. Taking this up with him in 
a later conversation he described his view as being that mental illness is biological 
in the way that a cut is. It might be caused by things other than your own body, but 
it is biological and if you keep infecting it, it won’t get better. He makes the analogy 
between infection and stress, stating that if someone is in a continual state of stress, 
they can’t heal and get better.  
Another way in which biological factors are thought to cause or aggravate mental 
health issues/distress by several participants is through the role that physical health 
issues play in their own experiences. I have already explored these in relation to 
Peter in part A, p.97-98. Physical health issues play a significant role for Samaiya. 
She expresses a belief that her anxiety and depression are very much linked to the 
comas she had as a child:   
Stéphanie: Earlier you were saying as well that you were in some comas 
when you were younger. 
Samaiya: Yeah, three times because of the problems I had. 
Stéphanie: And you said that you got very anxious and you think it comes 
from that as well. 
Samaiya: Yeah, I think depress or anxious, everything stress out. 
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Samaiya and her sister believe that Samaiya’s mental health issues began around 
the time that she started to experience significant problems with her physical health. 
Whilst they also believe her learning difficulties play an important role in maintaining 
her anxiety and depression, they do not underestimate the impact that childhood 
comas – and the fear that accompanied these – have had in the initial development 
of her mental health issues. These factors, in addition to the continuous pain 
Samaiya experiences, contribute to her on-going depression and anxiety.  
The role of pain and exhaustion resulting from physical health issues is similarly cited 
by Satch and Samantha. For example, when Satch recounts the reasons that he 
tried to die, he mentions ‘fatigue’, which results in part from coping with physical 
health conditions. These include COPD, Hepatitis C and a spinal injury. Samantha 
describes how exhaustion and mobility issues frustrate her to the point that they 
aggravate feelings of depression. Samantha is currently losing her vision and is HIV 
positive. At the time of our first conversation, Samantha spent much of her time in 
bed, feeling physically exhausted. Explaining how physical conditions might impact 
on people psychologically, she draws on the analogy of losing a leg. Samantha, 
whose identity revolves around being extremely active and sporty, feels that losing 
a leg would be a tragedy she could not recover from: 
You look at it and you go your life is done. It’s ended. That is where / You 
start getting mental in your head. Because you feel like / like me, I feel 
like my life has ended. Because I’m not able to do the things I used to do. 
In addition, Samantha states that her HIV diagnosis leaves her feeling ‘Terrified’ 
because of the future she believed it to bring at the time of our first conversation. 
This terror is augmented by having seen so many loved ones die as a result of the 
disease. Illustrating her fear, she explains that during one of her periods of 
hospitalisation, she ‘even have a seizure. …I was that (.) stressed and, I was crying 
like, I was starting to remember him there.’ She remembered seeing a man who was 
a father-figure to her in a hospital bed as he died of HIV. The possibility that the 
same would happen to her triggered feelings of acute distress.  
Satch highlights the ways in which physical health issues have impacted on his 
mental health on several occasions. For example, recounting his experience of 
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receiving interferon treatment for Hepatitis C, he states that ‘interferon pain is, is 
hard to explain. It's there, it's in your head… And you’re emotional, you know.’ In 
another example, Satch highlights his frustration in relation to seeking out support 
to ‘get me flat into, into normal, healthy, living space for me lungs.’:  
getting the council to give you a proper home, emm, or like I got a shit 
hole and, and slowly it got fitted, it's being fixed. …I mean I've got COPD, 
I mean the worst one / the worst lung diseases and I'm 57, and they're 
not (.) they're just ignoring it, and, you know, it's like (.) you could die the 
next day and nobody would know that these people are the / are the / 
hand in your death, you know. 
Here, Satch’s declining physical health and reliance on social housing combine to 
create significant anxiety, frustration and fear. Having experienced precarious living 
situations throughout much of his life he seems deeply concerned that he won’t be 
able to resolve this before his health declines further and he is unable to fight for the 
support he needs. At one point referring to substance misusers as ‘the nameless’ in 
society, this concern appears further augmented by feelings that he is viewed as 
‘less than’ by people in positions of authority; a feeling shared by Mahdi. 
3 Socio-cultural factors  
The following sections explore participants’ views in relation to a number of possible 
determinants in BAME mental health inequalities.  
3.1   Childhood/pre-migration trauma and suffering 
Recognition that childhood and/or pre-migration trauma plays a role in people 
developing mental health issues/distress is one area where participants’ views align; 
indeed the only participants not to mention such issues were Andeep and Peter. 
However, Peter does cite past difficulties from an unspecified period in his past as 
playing a significant role in his own distress when he speaks of talking therapies that 
‘stirred up things’ which he had ‘sort of buried in my mind somewhere in the past’. In 
contrast, Mya highlights having a difficult relationship with her mother and having 
been raised in a strict family that did not match that of others around her, with the 
implication being that these have impacted on her mental health in some form. As 
previously illustrated, Samaiya points to trauma resulting from childhood comas as 
playing a causal role in the development of her mental health issues. Additionally, 
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she and her sister speak of how early negative experiences linked to having learning 
difficulties have lowered Samaiya’s confidence. This they cite as an important factor 
in Samaiya’s on-going depression and anxiety. Samaiya explains ‘I honestly felt 
scared and because of my learning difficult saying I don’t know I (.) couldn’t go to 
teacher. I just didn’t feel confident to go to, because I was scared I don’t know.’ 
These early experiences still influence her current attitude towards education, 
contributing to her hesitation to take courses to improve her numeracy and literacy 
skills, as she desires to. 
Satch also indicates an understanding of mental health issues as being informed by 
past trauma, including childhood trauma. Satch speaks on several occasions of 
extremely traumatic events in his childhood that have had lasting impacts on his 
ability to cope with challenges in life and with emotions. One such experience being 
the violence with which he was removed from his father’s care when his father was 
committed to a psychiatric hospital. Another is being rejected by his mother’s new 
partner due to being ‘half-caste’, which led to his being placed in a children’s home 
where abuse prevailed:  
Satch: A lot of the kids, when they were growing up around me, knew 
not to, not to make too much of a, you know, a and moan about it, 
cos (.) cos you know the staff would just, yeah, kid / they’d get sent 
off to a place (.) a place, for under, I think it was for under 18’s, so 
they could lock ‘em up and keep ‘em quiet. 
Stephanie: Oh what, if the kids were having too much emotional? 
Satch: Umm. Umm. ((Agreement)) 
Stephanie: being too 
Satch: If they, if they was trying to, if they thought they was tryin’ to 
cause an, a problem, you know stir get eh fill the other others in and 
get them to you know, rebel and start you know, and start their 
behaviour up and that sort of thing. And you know, you had one or 
two that just wouldn’t give up. They’d get beat. I mean. That. I mean. 
They used to roll you up in a mattress and beat the fucking hell out 
of you, but they can’t do none of that now. 
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In an earlier discussion, Satch speaks of not knowing how to handle his emotions 
as a result of the need to suppress emotional responses in the children’s home to 
stay safe. The idea of letting emotion out, he states, terrifies him. Satch explicitly 
sites this fear of emotions as a key driver in his substance misuse. In a separate 
discussion, he relays that events from his childhood have led him to having 
difficulties coping with responsibility and accepting love. He explains that having 
faced rejection ‘from me own Mum and Dad’ means that ‘any type of rejection, I-I-I 
really took to heart’. The result being that Satch fears feeling ‘love, because if I felt 
love and then I lost them, it was more pain than (.) God no.’ Building and maintaining 
the sorts of intimate and loving relationships that constitute a close, supportive social 
network is difficult for Satch. Indeed, Satch states that this contributes to why he 
remains in the city he lives in instead of moving to cities closer to his children and 
grandchildren.  
The two participants who speak of pre-migration trauma and suffering are Mahdi and 
Samantha. Mahdi draws clear links between trauma experienced in childhood, pre 
his migration to the UK, and his current mental illness: 
obviously I had lots of problem from my back country all they did in 
my brain and everything leading up. I brought my illness here with 
me. It’s not something that I getted here. My parents died in front of 
me. They got killed. I been tortured for six, seven years. My whole 
body is full of tortures. My head and everywhere. 
Mahdi is clear that his mental illness was initially caused by exposure to extremely 
traumatic events while still very young in Afghanistan. Having been born into war, 
around the age of 11-12 years old his family was murdered and he was taken as ‘a 
slave’ by the Taliban, ‘doing everything for them by force.’ The result is a significant 
impact on his ‘brain’ which, aged 23-4 at the time of this research, he continues to 
contend with (see Appendix 20).  
Samantha alludes to trauma as a child or young person contributing to her mental 
distraction when she states ‘I know what caused me to be down. (.) I come from, I 
come from Africa and there was a lot of stuff going on innit back home.’. However, 
she does not discuss what this trauma was. It is worth noting that though she here 
refers back to her time in Swaziland, in the rest of this discussion Samantha speaks 
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of her mental health as having declined as a result of traumatic events that took 
place whilst in the UK. Only on one other occasion does Samantha reflect that 
difficulties she experienced psychologically in Swaziland may have been deemed 
mental health issues in the UK. Similarly, though Mahdi is forthcoming about some 
of the trauma he experienced in Afghanistan as a result of the war, the majority of 
his testimony focuses on experiences since arriving in the UK.    
3.2   Material deprivation and precarity in adulthood/post-migration 
Most participants cite aspects of their current situation or trauma experienced as an 
adult as playing a significant role in the development and/or aggravation of their 
current mental health issues/distress. One of the most commonly cited issues among 
participants was the stress arising from attempts to maintain stability, security and a 
decent standard of living. Concerns included financial precarity, housing issues and 
interactions with the State that heighten feelings of insecurity. Though not all issues 
impacted all participants, these do form a significant portion of conversations 
pertaining to the determinants of mental health issues/distress.  
For several participants, discussions of these issues were often bundled together, 
with Samantha and Satch referring to these as ‘stress’. Samantha states that her 
feelings of depression and stress - which can lead to ‘mental problems’ - result from 
‘money problems, domestic violence, family problems. You know, like, boyfriend 
problems, husband problems (.) things like that.’ Samantha explains that her current 
‘depression started when (.) well, it started when (.) when I was doing my visa’ and 
the ‘person I came with from Swaziland, who was like almost my dad to me, he was 
very ill.’ She clarifies that ‘he was literally dying at that time I am doing a visa.’ She 
later provides a fuller picture of the context that triggered her current mental 
problems: 
Samantha: then I have to go and see my husband, who used to beat me 
up, that's why I left. And I used to go and see a domestic violence person, 
and the same thing again. Uh, my mother-in-law passed away just after 
((father-figure)) passed away. So every, everything was just happening 
in, you know June and July, was the hardest one I will never forget. 
Stéphanie: Yeah. Everything happened at once. 
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Samantha: Everything happened at once in one go. Visa, I had to go to 
Newport. Had to do the funerals, and then the next day I've got hh, you 
know I was, I was so depressed, so stressed out, I don't even know. I 
was going crazy. 
It is worth noting that Samantha proudly displays her certificate of citizenship 
prominently on her dining room table, alongside professional certificates gained in 
UK colleges; or at least these were present when I visited. 
Many participants’ problematic interpersonal relationships, exposure to violence and 
grief are highlighted as are key causal factors in people developing mental health 
issues/distress. For example, grief also feeds into several other participants’ 
experience of distress; i.e. Andeep losing his Dad, Satch who’s youngest son died 
approximately seven years prior to this research, and Mahdi who lost all of his family 
to war as a child. Whilst participants acknowledge such events as having profound 
impacts on their emotional and psychological wellbeing, it seems to be these in 
combination with other experiences more akin to social inequalities that are held to 
cause mental health issues/distress. For example, interpersonal issues combined 
with financial issues feature in Andeep’s articulation of what causes mental ‘illness’. 
Contemplating whether mental illness exists or not, he concluded that it probably 
does because of issues such as wanting a spouse but not having the finances to 
support such a desire, or going through a divorce. Further, he notes that his own 
experience of being ill was precipitated by having lost a lot of money.  
A combination of factors augmenting feelings of a lack of security certainly influenced 
actions taken by Satch that he describes as being ‘mental health’, such as when he 
‘tried dying’. Explaining the circumstances that led to his attempt, he states ‘I been 
round and round and I’m sick of it.’  In a previous conversation some weeks prior, 
Satch had been extremely anxious about various requests he was making of the 
State for support; primarily in relation to welfare payments and housing. These fears 
were not unfounded. Following a reassessment for a welfare benefit - Satch’s 
payments were stopped and he had to appeal to have his award reinstated. In 
relation to his housing, he was adamant that this was inappropriate for someone with 
his physical health issues, stating ‘I got a shit hole’ that has only recently had its 
central heating fixed. An altercation with a member of staff in a charitable 
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organisation supporting him with these claims led the organisation to ban him from 
their services for six weeks. Satch explains that ‘I just got pissed off with all that, 
being banned and all that, and I thought I can’t be arsed man. I’m getting nowhere 
fast. And, I’m getting too old.’ An accumulation of trying to obtain support and feeling 
that he is not getting anywhere fast, combined with the exhaustion and pain he 
experiences lead him to feel acute distress. As a result, he does not merely seek to 
engage in substance misuse, but to actually take his own life.  
Most participants in this study mentioned being in receipt of welfare payments of 
some form. Mya, Andeep and Samantha all seem content enough with the benefits 
they are in receipt of, though Samantha does mention that money is tight at times. 
Mahdi, however, highlights the disparities in the financial support provided to asylum 
seekers: £35-40 per week. He reminds me that some people wait for refugee status 
for 10 to 20 years with only this to subsist on. Drawing comparisons to the majority 
population, Mahdi states: 
you can’t just torturing people with £30 a week. Uh, look at people. 
They’re going to pub. They’re going to restaurant. They / one-time dinner 
is more than £100. How come £35 is enough for a person for one week? 
Mahdi adds that the State ‘don’t give the chance to the asylum seeker to go and 
work.’ As such, government policy is viewed by Mahdi as not only providing 
inadequate financial support for asylum seekers to live as others around them do, 
but also as prohibiting them from seeking to elevating their position through 
employment. Though Mahdi does not use the language of discrimination, it is clear 
that he experiences this as an injustice not only to himself, but towards others in his 
predicament. 
The psychological impact of Mahdi’s financial precarity is reinforced by the insecurity 
of his asylum status. A large part of Mahdi’s testimony in our initial discussion 
focuses on experiences of the asylum-seeking process, which he describes in places 
as a ‘kind of torture.’ Using this term with regards to the asylum-seeking process 
shortly after having described the torture he underwent at the hands of the Taliban, 
Mahdi does not use this word simply for dramatic flair. Rather, it is an accurate 
depiction of the impact it has had on him, repeating and adding to it on multiple 
occasions: ‘that effect my mental issue a lot that, it’s kind of torture’ or that it is ‘kind 
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of mentally emotionally torturing me’. Indeed, a refusal of Mahdi’s asylum claim 
precipitated the recent suicide attempt described in Appendix 20: 
that time when I tried to suicide it was, I got refused. I knew I’m gonna be 
tortured and dead. And get killed. And that’s why I wanted to end it here. 
But at the moment as like, I got five years to stay here. And I don’t think 
so I’m going to suicide. I might get upset at something, I do self-harm, I 
can do self-harm or I can be something, I can be rude or stuff, I can be 
upset or I can do anything but I am not going to really think about suicide 
at the moment. 
Mahdi directly links this action to fears of being sent back to Afghanistan, where he 
believes the Taliban will ‘find me out, then they gonna kill me like very horrible way.’ 
Mahdi further notes that even if the Taliban were completely expelled from 
Afghanistan, the Home Office is not taking into consideration that he has converted 
from Islam to Christianity and has married a non-Muslim woman. He explains that 
his fellow compatriots ‘would make my life hell the moment they see me’ praying in 
a Christian way. Mahdi describes how such stressors have led him to experience 
panic attacks, stating ‘I have a record of panic attack. I / I / my body start shaking 
and I fall down (.) and I bang my head on the table, that back in the day, probably 
two years ago. When they wanted to send me to Hungary.’ 
Reflecting on the fact that he has been given 5 years leave to remain instead of 
indefinite, he states ‘you still put me on hold. So, my mental health doesn’t get better’. 
Mahdi directly links such factors as both seriously aggravating his existing mental 
illness, and inhibiting his ability to heal and recover. Mahdi’s personal experience 
also informs his more generalised understandings of the causes of mental illness, 
made evident when he moves from stating that such processes are ‘torturing me’ to 
claiming that ‘they kind of torturing people’. Mahdi strongly implies that asylum 
seekers ‘suffering from depression and anxiety and other forms’ of mental illness are 
all likely to be significantly impacted by insecurities and lack of a sense of stable 
safety in the same way that he is. This, together with uncertainty regarding his Visa, 
lead to considerable concerns regarding his marriage. With ‘all the pressure was on 
my wife all the time’, Mahdi at one point suggests that it might have been better if he 
had not married his wife despite loving her. As an asylum seeker married to a woman 
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who works, he was not entitled to much in the way of financial support. Mahdi was 
acutely aware of the negative impact this was having on her, and the subsequent 
impact on his dignity. When they did in fact separate, however, things did not go 
smoothly for Mahdi. Having been given refugee status, he was entitled to welfare 
and housing support. However, the housing he was provided was shared with others 
whom Mahdi felt very uncomfortable being around, further aggravating his mental 
illness.  
Peter also highlights his belief of the negative role that financial instability and 
subsequent feelings of insecurity has on both a person’s physical health and 
distress. Peter states that ‘people are finding it very difficult to cope, struggling quite 
badly in some cases’ with ‘the pressures of society these days’. When I ask which 
‘pressures of society’, he responds ‘the whole work situation’. Peter cites lowered 
wages and the increase of short-term contracts as creating a situation where ‘there 
are no certainties’, a significant change from ‘years ago’ when ‘you’d be in a job that 
is pretty much guaranteed, so you didn’t have that worry’. The result being that 
nowadays: 
people feel very insecure. You know and that creates a lot of worry, 
stress, tension, all the rest of it. And as we know, stress is a major 
contributing factor in many illnesses. And so on. And being under 
constant stress, and people not sleeping well and so on because they’re 
worried and you know, all that sort of stuff, it all, you know, has a, you 
know, an impact on you and creates all sort of problems’ 
Here Peter articulates a view that unstable access to basic material goods impacts 
on many people by causing physical ‘illness’ and/or ‘all sorts of problems’. I interpret 
‘all sorts of problems’ here as including experiences of distress due to difficulties 
coping with uncertainty and hardship: i.e. having a ‘mortgage to pay and all the rest 
of it, you have young children, and so on, and it’s a constant worry.’ Peter, like Mahdi 
and Satch, contextualises such problems within a broader narrative of social 
dynamics and inequalities. Peter proposes that employees – a proxy for people in 
positions lacking authority - ‘don’t feature much in anything, you know, you’re just a 
number. And I think throughout society now we’re pretty much being treated in that 
way’. This can result in a feeling of ‘constant stress’ and being devalued as a person. 
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There is a real sense of Peter feeling that a devaluation of individuals who occupy 
disempowered social positions is an important factor in why some people ‘struggle 
quite badly’ to ‘cope’, amounting to significant distress. In fact, in a later conversation 
to discuss my findings, Peter adds that simply knowing that you are at ‘the bottom of 
the ladder’ in any respect adds additional stress and pressure, which impacts on a 
person’s ability to cope.  
3.3   Discrimination and oppression 
The above sections describe participants’ views regarding the central role that 
trauma and heightened stress play in the triggering and maintaining of mental health 
issues/distress in many instances. Running through these narratives are inferences 
to the impact that discrimination and marginalisation have on people’s psychological 
and emotional wellbeing. Many participants seemed to oscillate between feelings of 
disempowerment and hopelessness, and those of agency, resistance and 
determination. These instances often include broader social inequalities 
encountered as a result of being placed within particular marginalised social 
categories. Only Andeep did not report experiences of discrimination or oppression 
of any form in our conversation. However, when stating that praying helped him 
manage his mental health, he quickly stated that he did not want to talk about this 
practice. I can only speculate that this might be due to having experienced and/or 
anticipating negative responses to his religious beliefs.  
3.3.1   Racism (including xenophobia) 
Predominantly, such experiences relate to various forms of racism (including 
xenophobia), though issues pertaining to other forms of discrimination and 
marginalisation are also highlighted. Racism was primarily spoken of by participants 
racialised black, as opposed to other categories of racialisation. Interestingly, the 
women in this research spoke less about racism than the men. For example, though 
Samantha admits on one occasion that she has experienced racism, she does not 
provide details beyond confirming that it negatively impacted her mental health. 
Though unhesitant in confirming this, she also expresses her frustration when other 
migrants ‘complain’ about such issues. She reports telling them ‘look around, do you 
see your country?’. Samantha states that the UK has a strong ‘blame’ culture that 
she finds difficult, and she perceives comments about racism from fellow migrants 
as evidence of this culture influencing them. Further, whilst Samantha indicates 
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experiencing difficulties specific to black women, she is closed to discussions on the 
subject. Excluding Mya20 (the only core participant able to identify as white British if 
she wants), only Samaiya and her sister report not having experienced racism. 
Samaiya’s sister reflects that this might be ‘because we're in a place where you know 
it's there's a lot of people of ethnic minorities here’, meaning that ‘you just didn't 
feel like you stood out’. As a result, they do not feel that racism has impacted on 
Samaiya’s mental health issues.  
Satch and Peter, however, readily provide multiple examples of racism, with Mahdi 
speaking openly about more xenophobic forms of discrimination that impact mental 
health. Speaking in more general terms about the role of racism in the creation and 
maintaining of distress, Peter reports that black people are in a ‘constant battle’. This 
results from having to satisfy mainstream culture’s behavioural (and possibly other) 
norms ‘in order to gain a degree of acceptance’: 
it can get difficult, because it can get you into a frame of mind where you 
feel constantly observed and analysed and all the rest of it. When you 
come across that sort of thing constantly, you’re constantly being 
impacted by that and so on. 
Having to constantly navigate between the norms of dominant society and those of 
the minority communities and cultures that racialised people identify with requires a 
constant vigilance and attention to ‘the other’. To illustrate this point, Peter speaks 
of a recent experience of a micro-aggression he has had when using public 
transport. Having just spoken of how black people are often misinterpreted as 
aggressive when being expressive, Peter explains that as he was catching a train 
there was some confusion with a ticket officer: 
Peter: the gentleman said to me ‘No, no, no, you can’t you’re not allowed 
to do that..’, and I said ‘yes, I know this is just to enter this end, I’ve got 
my ticket in ( )’, and he was growing / So I said ‘It’s OK, I understand, I’ve 
done this before.’ You know. And he said ‘It was only a mistake. I was 




Peter: So I said ‘Yes I know’. He said ‘I was only trying to help you, I was 
only trying’. I said, ‘Yes I do know that.’ I said ‘Why are you explain.’ And 
he said ‘Oh, because you seemed as though you, you were, you were 
upset about’. I / I was just / I was shocked. I mean really shocked. And 
he was quite convinced that I was behaving in that manner. And that was 
so disturbing. 
Peter comments that such experiences inevitably impact on a person’s wellbeing 
and state of mind, remarking that if white people ‘were subjected to the same, it 
would affect anyone in the same way.’ It is interesting to note the similarities between 
this and Samantha’s account about having to mediate her behaviour so as not to be 
perceived as aggressive. However, where Peter perceives such instances as 
emerging from racial prejudice, Samantha couches them in terms of cultural clashes 
(see p.164-165). 
Mahdi highlights injustices he perceives as being perpetrated towards asylum 
seekers, often using comparative discursive techniques similar to that of Peter 
above. Speaking of his interactions with the Home Office, he poignantly asks ‘You 
blood is red, my blood is not red? Do you think my veins are all water? Do you think 
I don’t feel pain? I am not a human? Or you are much better than me?’ It is telling 
that Mahdi feels compelled to explicitly state ‘I think asylum seekers are human 
beings …and they should be treated like human as well.’ In addition to his very real 
fear for his life if he is returned to Afghanistan, he is also fearful that his marriage will 
be effectively interrupted. In response to asking how he is to maintain his marriage 
if he is sent to Hungary, he reports being told by the Home Office that he could 
continue his relationship via Skype. Incredulous, Mahdi expresses his wish to ask 
the official who made this statement: 
‘Can you just do the same? I’m going to do this. I have problems that I’m 
going to get killed my / in Kabul and my country, but I’m still fine if you 
want me to get killed I’m going to go. But can you do the same with me? 
Come over with me and just keep your relation with your missus on the 
Skype?’ 
The result of the approach of officials and policy being that both Mahdi and his wife’s 
lives were ‘kind of stopped, on our, our life’. For Mahdi, this all amounts to being 
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treated as a denial of human rights. He states that ‘the past three years I got very 
bad tortured’ in the UK, going on to explain that he attempted suicide as a result of 
such torturous stresses. Feelings of being perceived and treated as ‘lesser humans’ 
combine with policies and practices (i.e. not allowing asylum seekers to work whilst 
providing insufficient finances to live on) to aggravate Mahdi’s mental illness and 
hinder his recovery. 
This view also influences his perceptions of interactions with non-State services. The 
morning before our first interview, Mahdi and his wife had tried to open a bank 
account for him as he had just received refugee status and would now be entitled to 
welfare payments. However, the banks refused to open accounts for him as they did 
not accept governmental documents as proof of address. In response to bank staff 
stating that it is not their fault that they cannot open an account for him, Mahdi 
agrees, stating ‘Obviously it’s not your fault because the system is not good.’. He 
elaborates that ‘it’s government’s fault that proof / your stupid policies. Why I have 
leave to remain. I am human being. You put me down in front of other customers 
there. / I was just embarrassed.’ Mahdi appears here to associate such barriers to 
wider State positions that discriminate against asylum seekers and refugees. After 
having this experience in several banks, Mahdi reports that he began to experience 
physical symptoms associated with his mental illness such that he and his wife had 
to return home.  
As a result of practices such as those above, Mahdi is not only beholden to his wife 
who is struggling to support them both, but he also feels subject to humiliations that:  
put down my dignity. And that tortures me in front of my own self like, I 
don’t feel the same like other people. Eh, that is also a big effect on my 
trauma (.) and my brain that I, every day I’m like, in a very, trying to just 
die. Just because I am not (.) I can’t be the same like other people. I 
can’t have my rights you know. I can’t have / I don’t have nothing you 
know. I / I / if my wife is not there I might end up homeless 
When Mahdi speaks of being different to others, this tends to be in relation to his 
mental illness. Here, however, it relates specifically to not being granted the same 
legal rights as others. He directly links having his dignity ‘put down’ and experiencing 
barriers to accessing his own ‘rights’ to his trauma being aggravated such that he is 
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unable to move forward. Again, this experience informs Mahdi’s understanding of 
factors that maintain and aggravate mental health issues more generally. This is 
evident when he advocates for the introduction of policies that would allow asylum 
seekers to ‘help themselves’ to live with dignity by allowing them to work. Without 
this, Mahdi feels that asylum seekers are being driven to ‘the centre of the bridge’, 
where the State ‘leave them to jump’. Mahdi is effectively stating that, by denying 
people equal treatment and the opportunity to live with dignity, society pushes people 
in certain social locations towards suicidal thoughts and actions.  
The intergenerational nature and impacts of racism and racial injustices are 
highlighted by Peter in his comment that:  
You look at the black race, who for centuries, not one experience, but for 
centuries (.) what those children experienced. All the way through their 
lives to adulthood, and continue to endure. You know, you see your father 
just taken out to be beaten to death, or beaten to unconsciousness then 
he’s hunged up. 
Rejecting claims that black people are ‘more susceptible to this mental thing’, Peter 
articulates how intergenerational trauma might contribute to reportedly higher rates 
of psychosis experienced by black people in societies with a history of racism. I 
understand the inference to be that black people are not more susceptible to 
psychosis, but may experience post-traumatic slave syndrome (PTSS). Referring 
me to Dr Joy DeGruy’s work (Carney, 2016), Peter notes that this legacy of slavery 
is not yet widely accepted within mainstream mental health discourses. Responding 
to sceptics, he states that ‘when those things have happened for centuries, for 
generations (.) it must have had an impact.’ Peter’s acceptance of this diagnostic 
category, however, should not be taken to mean that he suddenly accepts mental 
‘illness’ labels. Rather I understand this as Peter welcoming research that 
acknowledges the psychological and cognitive impacts of intergenerational trauma 
and that highlights the logic that such issues therefore necessarily disproportionately 
impact any group within society that has experienced systemic trauma for 
generations. It offers the possibility of acknowledging a person’s distress without 
implying that a population’s susceptibility to psychosis is biological/genetic, but 
rather socio-historical in nature. A similarity might be found here between Peter’s 
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views around PTSS and how it should be understood as producing distress, and 
Mahdi’s explanation of mental illness as a biological phenomenon when 
experienced, but caused and healed through social and environmental factors.  
Though Peter is the only person to speak directly of intergenerational trauma, Satch 
shares experiences that illustrate Peter’s point. He states, for example, that racist 
practices in 1960’s Britain prohibited his Puerto-Rican ‘GI’ father from caring for him 
and his younger sister when Satch’s parents’ relationship broke down, stating ‘back 
then, when a black man and a white woman made children, and they split up, the 
black man never got, there was rules like, the English-born parent gets the most 
say’. As a result of desperate actions that his father took to keep his children in his 
care, Satch’s Dad was incarcerated in a psychiatric institution and Satch was placed 
in an abusive children’s home, as previously mentioned. Though Satch does not 
speak of specific trauma his father experienced, he hints at the oppression his father 
was subjected to in America, stating ‘even in America blacks didn’t get much’. He 
recalls the impact that seeing his Dad in the psychiatric ward had on him as a small 
child: 
Satch: I remember going to visit him, and he had this fucking nightie on, 
and when he turned round to get us a cup of tea, you could see his black 
bum.  
Both: ((laugh)) 
Stéphanie: Was it one of them nighties like, from the hospital? With no 
back? 
Satch: Yeah. Yeah, and I, you know, I was crying. I thought ‘What have 
they done to him?’ 
This appears to have had a profound impact on Satch and indicates his awareness 
of the interconnectedness between institutionalised racism, experiences of extreme 
distress and being deemed ‘mentally ill’. He also infers that such experiences at the 
age of five years had a lasting impact on his wellbeing and played an important part 
in his eventual substance misuse. Exploring why he might be an ‘addict’ whilst others 
are not, he explains that though he now understands how wider issues such as 
racism played an important role in his separation from his parents, ‘Back in the day 
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I felt I’m / I don’t / I been. What it is, it’s like being rejected, and, from, the day I were 
five when me Dad and Mum rejected me’. In this way Satch’s testimony begins to 
illustrate and evidence Peter’s claim regarding the role of intergenerational trauma 
on the mental health of black people in the UK.  
A further example of intergenerational trauma as a result of racialisation might be 
found in Mya’s account. She explains that her grandfather was a Jewish refugee 
from the Second World War who, upon arrival in the UK, rejected his religion entirely. 
Exploring how this history and her Jewish heritage might have impacted on her own 
upbringing, Mya notes that her Granddad: 
doesn’t talk about (.) he doesn’t like to talk about his family life at all 
because you know it wasn’t very happy. And (.) my Mum wasn’t very 
happy as a child, so she doesn’t really like to talk, so, I don’t know if it, if 
it’s because of the cultural aspect or if it’s just because of how my family 
was? 
Just prior to this, Mya had stated that she saw her family life and structure as aligned 
with ‘really traditional families’ that ‘mirror quite almost like, quite religious families’, 
as opposed to the secular family structures and behaviours dominant in the UK. 
Though brought up atheist, she felt she could relate to traditional religious family 
structures ‘more than I can then relate to my like atheist and agnostic peers’. Part of 
this seems to involve a certain strictness imposed by her mother, which Mya 
supposes could be due either to ‘Jewishness’ or just how her Mum and Grandad are 
as people. She notes ‘my grandad is very black and white’, adding ‘that is a lot to do 
with his personality, but I think it is a lot to do with (.) how / it’s a lot to do with how 
he was brought up. And that probably is a lot to do with (.) yeah, the Jewishness.’ 
For Mya this seems to have created a disconnect in the way that she was raised, 
having to obey to a strictness not shared by her peers, but without the justificatory 
framework: ‘if you’re brought up like quite strictly but you also have religion and you, 
you maybe have a slightly different interpretation of religion, if you can study it and 
justify it’. Having now developed a faith in God, this disconnect and that with herself 
and her family appears to have deepened. Whilst this part of Mya’s testimony might 
be read as part of her past trauma - one that results from being brought up with 
multiple cultural reference points that do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
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dominant culture around her – I believe it is also reflective of how intergenerational 
trauma can operate. Mya and her mother were not subjected to the atrocities of 
World War II committed towards Jewish people. However, Mya seems to recognise 
the possibility that this part of History – through her Grandad’s undiscussed unhappy 
‘family life’ - has had a direct (albeit diffuse) impact on Mya and her mental health. 
3.3.2 Additional and intersectional discrimination and oppression 
Another aspect of identity from which oppressions disproportionately impacting 
people of BAME backgrounds can arise relates to encounters between cultural 
norms. Being of a minority culture in the UK can lead to a marginalisation of one’s 
own mannerism, behaviours and beliefs if they are in conflict with cultural norms in 
the UK. For example, Samantha explains that people in England express 
themselves very differently and have a tendency to avoid confrontations when there 
in a dispute. She provided examples from both her previous marriage and 
employment where she had either to repress her emotional responses to situations 
or apologies for her behaviour when she felt she had simply sought to resolve a 
dispute. Continually having to do such things meant she felt unable to ‘say what you 
want to say’, thereby ‘suffocating’. This, she explains, has a significant impact on a 
person’s mental health and it contributed to her feelings of depression. Whilst Mahdi, 
as the only other participant to have migrated to the UK as an adult, also reports 
cultural differences as negatively impacting relationships in his personal life; namely 
through his marriage to a British woman. However, the difficulties he expressed do 
not seem to take an oppressive form. Rather they relate to differences in 
expectations of what a marriage should entail.   
Though not addressing cultural differences directly, Mya does highlight difficulties 
that women with mixed cultural backgrounds may experience in relation to the 
numerous and sometimes contradictory social expectations placed on them. This, 
Mya states, can lead to a ‘no-win’ situation that women have to navigate. She offers  
the example of mothers and expectations around work; i.e. a woman who stays 
home to raise her children might be considered either ‘judgemental of women who 
do go out to work’ or alternatively as ‘a drain on society’. Mya further highlights that 
such expectations differ across cultures, and seems to suggest that judgments are 
made by other women regarding such choices without adequate consideration of 
what the norms and expectations might be in different cultures. Navigating such 
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expectations and judgements, Mya intimates, can put significant pressures on 
people that impact on their mental wellbeing. 
The above and the previous section describe the ways in which difference, 
discrimination and oppression considered central to BAME inequalities impact on 
mental health inequality experienced by this population grouping. However, 
participants also raised a number of further social categories that also exposed them 
to discrimination and oppressions. Primarily, participants raised the issues that arise 
as a result of poverty or being considered ‘lower class’. Mya, Peter and Satch 
indicate people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds being treated 
differently: as ‘numbers’ or have others ‘look down on’ them. In addition to creating 
significant pressures and stress that impact mental health issues/distress, difficulties 
highlighted in relation to the issues discussed in terms of how they disempower and 
attack people’s dignity. Peter highlights social dynamics whereby ‘the hierarchy 
system’ states that ‘whatever applies to you down there (.) can’t possibly apply to us 
up here’.  
Satch provides a personal example from his childhood. Explaining that children in 
the children’s home had to tidy the home ahead of inspectors visiting, Satch 
describes his impressions of these visits. Namely, that the officers would look down 
on them whilst they put their best efforts into pleasing the inspectors. Satch 
comments ‘What do you get out of, you know (.) them kind of people? To impress 
them, what do you get?’ Satch, like other participants, is acutely aware of the ways 
that various aspects of his identity and situatedness – and their combinations - 
disempower him in relation to others. For example, he comments that ‘the nameless 
population’ of substance misusers are treated in ways that ‘nobody deserves to be 
treated’. It should be noted that Satch is not speaking of substance misusers who 
are able to fund their addictions, but people like himself who experienced addiction 
in a state of poverty. He implies that being treated with so little dignity and humanity 
impacts negatively on their mental health when he adds that ‘what would help’ would 
be to get substance misusers ‘into, you know, the rest of the community, you know, 
get you involved’.  
Other examples highlight the competition that seems to emerge between 
marginalised groups; be that competition for status or for support. In relation to 
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status, Mahdi provides an example when he distinguishes between ‘worthy’ 
immigrants and those who ‘exaggerate, they lie’ to receive benefits from the State 
in the UK: 
we say in Afghan in our language that when a forest get burnt, there is 
thousand of trees. Probably they’re all dry. But there are five portions of 
fresh trees. If 95% of the dry trees get burnt, the 5% of the fresh tree also 
burn with them. 
By this Mahdi expresses his view that there are many asylum seekers who are here 
for economic betterment or an easier lifestyle, and that it is because of this that 
people like himself have to endure torturous waits and immigration processes. In 
contrast, Satch expresses feelings of being in competition with migrants to receive 
support: ‘it's like anything you want or you need, you've got to have a big / going in 
for some kind of uhh, mad competition to get.’ He expresses frustration that migrants 
to the UK are receiving support when he is struggling to gain what he needs. 
In relation to status, Satch speaks of factions within black communities. Speaking 
of when he was a young adult, he recalls calling ‘All the black people who come to 
England and started acting emm, so British (.) that they ended up wearing Union 
Jack jumpers’ the ‘black petit bourgeois.’ Following just after his account of the 
children’s home inspections, he states that ‘the black petit bourgeois’ positioned 
themselves as above other black people having gained white-collar jobs, running to 
tell the authorities when someone within the black community was misbehaving. He 
reports similar dynamics within the ‘Dreads’ community, stating that ‘there was a lot 
of back-biting. Hypocritical talking. Too much, too much lip servicing.’ He believed 
that this happened because some people wanted to ‘feel a bit, a bit more, righteous’ 
and ‘stroke their egos a bit.’ Though, having been the one looked down upon in this 
dynamic, Satch states that he can understand this need; i.e. to gain advantage from 
deeply marginalised positions. Nonetheless, it is evident that this was unpleasant 
for him. Further, he recognises that such efforts did not create equality for racialised 
people even if one or two were invited to the occasional dinner or party. These 
examples further highlight the multiple systems of oppression that can operate on 
oppressed groupings such that intersectionally located people within them become 
even further marginalised.   
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Additional identity-markers explored or that emerged as having impacted on 
participants’ mental health issues/distress include gender and having a learning 
dis/ability. Beginning with gender, though issues were highlighted, these were few 
and often not elaborated on in much detail. Samantha mentioned domestic violence 
and acknowledged issues specific to black women but did not expand on this. Mya 
highlights issues surrounding social expectations of how mothers should behave. 
However, these tend to be spoken of more in terms of difficulties with competing 
social expectations than oppression per sae. Equally, though gender played a role 
in some incidents recounted by Satch and Peter (e.g. their being viewed intimidating 
or aggressive), sexism itself was not highlighted. Instead, these were presented 
predominantly through the lens of racism. Such incidents seem intersectional in 
nature, though not presented using such terminology. This is perhaps because the 
concept of intersectionality was either new to or unknown to most participants. 
With regards to dis/ability, Samaiya and her sister indicate a belief that issues 
relating to having learning difficulties and physical disabilities that disrupted her 
education have negatively impacted Samaiya’s mental health. They speak of how 
Samaiya ‘tries to disguise’ her learning difficulties and low levels of numeracy and 
literacy for fear that ‘Some might judge her for it’. The impact being that she feels 
unable to address some of the issues that maintain her current feelings of 
depression. Samaiya’s sister adds - and Samaiya agrees - that ‘if she can deal with 
the basic numeracy and literacy issues, she would feel empowered she would not 
feel how she’s feeling all the time’. However, Samaiya does not feel confident 
returning to college as a result of barriers experienced in her childhood and 
adolescence; all of which relate to her difficulties and disabilities. For example, she 
states that in school: 
Stéphanie: And do you think part of it is them taking more time to make 
sure that you understand it? So if they had spent more time talking to 
you,  
Samaiya: Yeah, that would have helped me more. There wasn’t much 
help from them.  
Stéphanie: And did they make you feel comfortable asking questions? (.) 
Did anyone do anything to say ‘do you understand this’?  
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Samaiya: Maybe in the class, or with all the children. Do you understand 
() 
Sister: Not individually, no one asked you individually? 
Samaiya: No, no not individually. 
Stéphanie And I suppose it’s / you’ve got to be very brave to put your 
hand up. 
Samaiya: Yeah I was shy and you know not [confident. 
Sister: Also if you’ve got such] a big learning gap and then I don’t know. 
Samaiya: I honestly felt scared and because of my learning difficult 
saying, I don’t know I couldn’t go to teacher. I just didn’t feel confident to 
go to, because I was scared, I don’t know. 
Stigma surrounding learning difficulties and low educational attainment prohibited 
Samaiya herself from seeking support as a child, leaving her needs inadequately 
provided for. Samaiya’s sister reflects that ‘when she went to college she 
experienced the same problem’ – referring here to not being provided ‘someone who 
was a specialist in special needs student, who could help her’. Her sister also recalls 
their family seeking support for Samaiya’s education, but they were informed there 
was no support available. Further, they highlight that changes to college campuses 
mean that Samaiya’s physical disabilities together with her lack of confidence are a 
further barrier to attending college. As such, Samaiya feels further disempowered 
when considering taking actions that might improve her mental health issues and 
confidence.  
4 Protective socio-cultural factors 
Participants highlighted not only how their mental health issues/distress impacts on 
them specifically, but also the aspects of their lives and actions taken that help them 
to manage such experiences. Whilst some of these were highly personal, several 
seemed common across participants in one form or another as well as relating to 
wider social issues. These were: 
● Social networks and belonging 




4.1   Social networks and belonging 
Mahdi is the only participant living with a partner during (part of) this research, 
though Samaiya lives in the family home with parents, a brother and sister-in-law 
and their children. Andeep is his mother’s care-giver, but I was unclear whether they 
lived together or not. Satch, Samantha and Peter live alone, though Peter has family 
members living nearby. Satch was moved into supported living several months after 
his second attempt at dying. It was unclear whether Mya had flatmates (she did not 
mention any). This is relevant because living with family, where mentioned, seems 
to offer support that helps participants manage their mental health issues/distress; 
support that those living alone do not have. For example, Samaiya speaks of 
‘playing with the children in the house’ to ‘keep myself to stay happy’, and Mahdi 
makes frequent statements to the effect of ‘Most of the time I feel like if I don’t have 
my wife or somebody to help me out at home, I don’t think so I can function very 
well.’ Such statements contrast to those such as Mya’s ‘I feel quite isolated’, or 
Samantha’s self-declared tendency to keep people at a distance using sarcasm and 
her sense of having ‘to deal with everything myself’. Satch, was unable to travel to 
visit his children and grandchildren due to his health prior to his suicide attempt. 
Further, not wishing to concern his son, he had also disengaged from his family 
though it was evident that he missed them. Comments made some weeks after his 
suicide attempt lead me to believe that this separation added to Satch’s acute 
despair.  
Other participants also comment on the negative impact of losing or having a 
reduction in the support received by family. For example, Samaiya states that when 
her sister returns to her residence in Saudi Arabia, she feels ‘isolated sometimes’. 
Samaiya continues that ‘it's ok, I still have to get on with life. She has her own life I 
have my own.’ However, this separation evidently leads to an intensification of 
feelings that contribute to her depression, such as isolation and feeling that she is 
not able to fully live her life. Equally, the importance of Mahdi’s wife in staving off 
feelings of isolation became clear to me when we met following their separation and 
he confided that he missed having female figures in his life to speak to (see p.41). 
His wife seemed central to how he managed the emotional turmoil that accompanies 
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his mental illness. At one point he states that he feels so alone that he has 
contemplated turning to drink, though he then reports that he has come through too 
much trauma to allow himself to do so over the breakdown of his marriage. These 
examples highlight the important role that close support networks and family play in 
enabling people to manage their mental health issues/distress.  
Throughout our discussions, Satch recounts stories that recognise the importance 
of ‘belonging’ to his mental health/wellbeing. Often, he seems to have found this 
through music scenes and subcultures. For example, he recalls how being part of 
the Northern Soul scene as a teenager provided him with much needed respect, 
belonging and even love, stating that ‘getting some love and (.) understanding. Ahh, 
it’s just mad man, it’s, you know / my music, my music taste, was also part of my 
family.’ When the Northern Soul scene waned, he joined the ‘Dreads scene’, 
seeking that same sense of belonging. Speaking of music that he listens to today, 
Satch recommended an album called ‘Distant Relatives’. He highlighted a particular 
song that held great meaning for him:  
listen to it. I swear to God. There’s one called Dispear. And it’s called This 
Spear. You know what I mean, we got to, we got to stop all this with this 
spear. We’ve got to come together. And then another one saying yeah 
we’re all brothers and sisters 
This song speaks to the sense of connection that Satch craves, highlighting the 
need for people - the black diaspora and indigenous people in particular - to come 
together to combat despair created through marginalisation and the current social 
structure (see Appendix 21). Media and cultural outlets also play an important role 
for Andeep in terms of feeling connected to his heritage and culture. He explains 
that he and his mother watch the Sikh TV channel, and that this brings them both 
much joy as it shows enthusiasm in keeping Sikhism alive. It also makes them feel 
more connected as it brings Sikh people together. Though Andeep may not be 
physically surrounded by other Sikh people, he is reminded that there is a 





4.2   Religion, spirituality and faith 
Religion, spirituality and faith in a higher entity are highlighted by most participants 
as important aspects of their inner lives and experiences. Several participants were 
hesitant in speaking of this. However, when they do, religion, spirituality and faith 
play supportive roles in participants’ management of their mental health 
issues/distress. Though Samaiya and her sister do not speak specifically of how 
Samaiya’s relationship to God influences her wellbeing, Islam is cited as a positive 
influence in their lives. For example, speaking of the potential benefit to Samaiya if 
she were to feel she had ‘purpose in life’ - which she suggests might be found 
through going back into education - Samaiya’s sister states ‘our prophet Muhammad 
he said you know you should learn from your cradle to your grave.’ Mahdi, having 
converted from Islam to Christianity following fleeing Afghanistan, explains that 
‘When I get so upset, I go to church’, as ‘church give me peace and I sit and I feel 
relaxed.’ It is unclear if this is due to Church itself being a peaceful quiet space with 
few people most of the time, because he feels closer to God in the space, or 
because he has a good relationship with the parish priest. Mahdi clearly feels a great 
bond with the priest, stating ‘He is the first person in this country that I really 
respected.’ Mahdi explains that the Father ‘helped me a lot and when I go there and 
I sit with him I feel much better. He makes me feel, he bless me and he makes me 
feel that life is not over.’ 
Samantha, who makes a major breakthrough over the period of this research with 
regards to her own mental problems, speaks of reconnecting with God as an 
important factor in this turn around. She describes a discussion where a support 
worker encouraged – and ultimately prompted - her to find her way back to God. 
Though Samantha rejects churchgoing, she speaks of God as providing her with the 
strength she needs to recover. Satch also rejects churchgoing but remains very 
spiritual, stating that he turns to the ‘higher power’ in times of crisis. Having grown 
up in Catholic institutions, his beliefs now align more closely with Rastafari 
philosophy though he rejects practices that ban ingesting certain substances. Peter 
does not speak of how his spirituality supports him, though he indicates that it is an 
important feature of his lived experience and is informed by traditional African 
practices that have more focus on community and the interconnectedness of people. 
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Andeep mentions that prayer helps him with his mental health, commenting that he 
finds the rituals within religion particularly helpful when practising meditation. 
In comparison to most participants who grew up with religion, Mya went from being 
agnostic in an atheist Jewish family to having a powerful spiritual experience a few 
years ago. This experience entailed God coming to her such that she felt she could 
not deny his presence. She now finds herself with a strong faith in God, but without 
a religion. Whilst she takes comfort in her faith, she also perceives the possible 
support that might accompany being part of a religious community. Shortly after 
reporting that she finds herself feeling isolated, she states ‘I feel like the idea of 
having like a religious community where people are (.) I don’t know, it tends to be 
more wholesome doesn’t it. Like I want that.’ In referring to ‘more wholesome’, Mya 
makes a comparison to her wider social group whom she describes as ‘lovely 
people’, but who ‘want to just go to the pub, or take drugs, things like that.’; activities 
she finds difficult to engage in due to her mental illness. She seems, in fact, to be in 
search of the sort of support that Mahdi reports finding with his Father, aware that it 
holds the potential to have a positive impact on her wellbeing. Further to this, she 
suggests that ‘religion offers you a worth (.) when maybe other sections of society 
when you’ve got a mental health condition kind of bin you off.’  
4.3   Self-worth 
Mya, in her search for a religion that might provide a sense of worth, demonstrates 
an importance of feeling self-worth that is mirrored in the desires and coping 
mechanisms of other participants. For example, Satch speaks of gaining a sense of 
self-worth through employment when he was younger and from volunteering in more 
recent years. Though now unable to undertake volunteering work, Satch recalls that 
‘I would love to / I mean I used to / for them, I used to go to colleges and stuff’, 
explaining that he would ‘talk to about, eh, 60 young, males mostly, and em just tell 
them about the downfalls of messing around with substances’. He told me that he 
received a certificate of thanks and positive feedback, as well as a sense of pride in 
having helped others. He later reflects on the importance of being treated with 
respect and being given a sense of worth when recovering from substance abuse, 
which Satch perceives as a strand of mental health issues:  
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giving people a chance to (.) make / feel like they’re, making, making 
they’re helping to make a change. And it makes them, it makes, you’re 
putting some / some / Something into people who’ve never had a job and 
now they’re getting a bit of respect 
Satch had previously expressed that he ‘was never so happy as when I was working. 
I felt / you were / you know, when you feel you’re somebody’. Though participants 
express not being able to work at this moment, knowing that they did and - for 
Andeep, Mahdi and Mya – hoping that they will once more work, seems extremely 
important to their sense of self (Mahdi) and self-worth (Andeep). It is telling that 
when I shared with Andeep that I had once taken medication related to mental health 
issues/distress - albeit for a short period – he responded by stating with some 
evident relief that there is hope for people with mental health issues. This conclusion 
was drawn from the fact that I was now sitting in front of him, working; returning to 
work being a strong ambition for him. For Mahdi, this seems to be intricately tied 
into his self-identity as a young Afghan man:  
I know myself and I know our culture, I know Afghans. Once I’m on my 
feet, I will never take free money from you. I will try and help people like 
me. Or not people like me even Britains, the homeless Britains. Lots of 
homeless innit. 
Mahdi had previously stated of Afghan people that ‘All our people are not bad.’, 
adding ‘we have full of honour, we have full of pride, we have full of dignity.’, part of 
which is linked to the ability to provide for themselves and support others. Though 
Mahdi is unable to work at present, he prides himself in working towards being able 
to and in helping people such as myself in this research in the meantime. Mya notes 
that there is a lot of stigma in today’s ‘capitalist society’ if you are not working or 
furthering yourself in education, a sentiment not far removed from Peter’s own that 
capitalist societies disempower and devalue many with a subsequent negative 
impact on levels of distress. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided insights into participants’ understandings of mental health 
issues/distress as it impacts on them and others similarly situated in society. Whilst 
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most participants drew primarily from their own lived experiences, they also provided 
insights into situations they have witnessed as impacting the mental health of others 
in their communities or locality. Overall, most participants demonstrated 
understandings that stressed the role of socio-cultural issues in maintaining and 
aggravating mental health issue/distress. However, whilst participants are very clear 
that social inequalities play a significant role in their mental health issues/distress, 
they do not present themselves as victims lacking agency. Indeed, most went to 
great lengths to demonstrate how they resist narratives that threaten their agency 
and reinforce marginalisation. This same tendency is present in participant’s 
testimonies regarding experiences of mental health and related support services, 




Chapter 5: State support for mental health - BAME intersectional 
perspectives 
In the previous chapter, I explored participants’ understandings and perceptions of 
mental health issues/distress. The chapter presented not only views relating to their 
own personal experiences, but also perceptions of how mental health issues/distress 
relates to a person’s social stratification and experiences of marginalisation. In this 
chapter, I consider participants’ testimonies regarding their experiences of State 
support for mental health issues/distress. In this way, it relates to issues of health 
inequalities focused on service performance. Part A, then, focuses on participants’ 
experiences of accessing support for their mental health issues/distress.  This 
section includes some limited discussion of perceptions of diagnostic practices, 
complimenting discussions in chapter 4 regarding views on diagnostic categories. 
Part B explores experiences of participants in using the services once they have 
accessed support. This include accounts of maintaining support, and views on the 
treatment options provided to them. Though focusing primarily on mental health and 
related services (i.e. primary care and substance misuse clinics), I also highlight 
accounts of interactions with other public services. I include such accounts as they 
impact on participants’ actual mental health issues/distress and influence how they 
perceive and interact with mental health services; participants’ testimonies often 
present such experiences as interwoven and interdependent. Whilst problematic 
dynamics at the interpersonal level are present in this chapter, this is not my focus. 
Instead, I concentrate on how systems, processes and policies are experienced and 
perceived. 
Part A: Accessing support 
Whilst Samantha is the only participant to describe how she first came into contact 
with mental health services, most do share experiences related to accessing 
support. This includes interactions with GPs and/or undergoing assessments. 
Descriptions often highlight a range of procedures that participants respond to 
differently according to the context in which they encounter them and the outcomes 
of engaging in these. This testimony has been organised under the following 
headings: 
● accessing support through primary care; and 
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● being diagnosed and assessed. 
Unlike discussion of access to support in the literature review chapter, I do not 
explore adverse pathways to secondary or tertiary care as participants either had 
not experienced these or did not share these experiences with me.  
1 Accessing support through primary care 
Peter appears to access support for his depressive moods through his GP practice. 
Though he reports positive experiences with GPs, recently Peter feels that the 
service he is provided has changed for the worse. This includes accessing support 
for distress. For example, he reports difficulties receiving the support he required 
following an assessment of his needs:  
I don’t know whether it’s down to individuals or whether it’s the actual 
system, but more recently, I was sent for an assessment. And, that was 
conducted, recommendations were made, and it just wasn’t followed up 
on. 
Peter notes that his previous GP, with whom he had a good rapport, had recently 
retired. Around this time, the GP appointments system changed and ‘things just 
wasn’t quite the same.’. Not only was the new GP more intent on medication as a 
treatment option, an approach Peter disagrees with, but appointments also became 
a strict 10 minutes slot in which patients are limited to discussing only one issue. 
Peter states that ‘as a result of that, you find sometimes, you don’t really get to say 
what you need to say.’ Whilst the ‘one issue per appointment’ policy may be 
adequate for people with less complex needs, Peter indicates this being impractical 
for people with more complex needs such as his; i.e. people with both physical 
health issues and, say, depression.  
Similarly, Samantha highlights difficulties obtaining information and accessing her 
GP directly following changes to triaging services that required her to discuss very 
personal information with the receptionist before being allowed to make a GP 
appointment. Aware of the stigma surrounding a range of conditions she has 
(including HIV and alcoholism), Samantha is uncomfortable sharing this information 
with reception staff. As a result of her refusal, she was told by the GP in a telephone 
consultation that she had developed an ‘attitude’. Samantha is angry about this as 
she feels the doctor had not adequately accounted for the fact that she was awaiting 
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very important test results and that the anxiety around this, together with her desire 
for privacy and concerns around stigmatisation, was impacting her ability to adhere 
to their new procedures. Here, procedural issues collided with interpersonal ones to 
create barriers to accessing services in a way that supports Samantha’s wellbeing. 
This contrasts significantly with her account of when the hospital she attended 
listened to her explanation of difficulties she was having with processes around 
receiving medication and met her ‘in the middle’ with a workable solution.  
Peter also hints at the role that individuals working within GP practices can play in 
hindering patients’ receipt of support in his account of undertaking an assessment 
and then not receiving support. He does not, however, expand on this to clarify 
whether he believes this to result from problematic interpersonal relations (including 
discriminatory behaviour) or incompetence. In fact, though other participants 
discuss the presence of discrimination in other situations, only Mya relays a specific 
account about seeking access to support from GP services. In a conversation about 
barriers to accessing services, Mya makes an interesting comparison between her 
experience and that of a friend who is visibly of a minority ethnic background. Of 
Asian heritage, her friend moved to the UK at the age of 7 but was raised ‘quite 
separately from her community’, by which is meant Asian communities. Mya 
comments that this friend has experienced significant issues accessing mental 
health support. At times, the role of stereotyping in this differential treatment was 
explicit. For example, a health worker once commented that her English was 
excellent, assuming that she had migrated here later in life when her friend had in 
fact grown up in the UK. Noting that her friend’s GP practice is in a part of the city 
where poverty is rife and reflecting on the difference of treatment that she and her 
friend have received, Mya states: 
you’ve got mental health problems but you’ve got problems with 
substance mis-use, got alcohol problems, and maybe there’s a lot of, you 
know, people might see that ‘Oh well you’ve turned away from your 
traditional society and you’ve gone down the route of drug and alcohol 
abuse’. And maybe it’s seen as well either you’re seen as part of your 
traditional community or you’re on this path. Rather than actually, maybe 
you’re somewhere in between, and maybe we need to not really be 
thinking about / you know, that stuff’s irrelevant, let’s treat the person in 
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front of me, rather than thinking like / Because you know with her, I’m sure 
that she’s almost been a bit written off before her time. 
Alive to intersectional theory and issues, Mya continues by pointing out the role that 
negative stereotypes of racialised people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds 
might play in experiences of health care. She believes that stereotypes of racialised 
people who have ‘their expensive Nike trainers on’ and ‘their hair back’ act as a 
barrier to accessing mental health services. Mya contrasts her friend’s experience 
with her own. She reflects that, although a direct comparison cannot be made due 
to them attending different GP practices, the practice she attends serves a similar 
demographic. Yet the treatment she receives is very different:  
maybe because I’m dressed, you know I’ve got my little thingy on 
((indicates a headband)), you know I’m wearing a dress, it might make 
me look a bit more sweet, and I might go in and say very similar things, 
and I’m seen as a victim. 
Mya expresses the belief that white women are more likely to be considered victims 
of difficult circumstances than racialised women, despite statistical evidence to the 
contrary (Office for National Statistics, 2018). 
Mya also indicates a belief that signifiers of class and education play a significant 
role when seeking an explanation as to why she and her friend had such different 
experiences accessing services: ‘I think other people are seen as rough. And that’s 
not necessarily just to do with the colour of their skin. It’s class (.) and education as 
well’. This view echoes statements made by Peter in relation to class and ‘madness’, 
and Satch and Mahdi regarding being treated disdainfully as a result of either class 
or ‘race’, or combinations of various identity-markers (see chapter 4). Whilst no other 
participants comment on the role of discrimination specifically in the initial stages of 
seeking to access mental health-related support, this issue is a significant part of 
the narrative provided when considering access to a broad spectrum of support.  
2 Being diagnosed and assessed 
Though Mya does not describe her own experience of a diagnostic assessment, she 
does comment that having ‘a particular diagnosis over another, is helpful because 
it means that you get the right support.’ As discussed in chapter 4, Mya considers 
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medicalised terminology and approaches useful; not only in terms of allowing a 
person to understand the psychosomatic symptoms they experience, but also in 
situating oneself in relation to others (i.e. not lazy, but ‘ill’) and to enable systems of 
support to be delivered more effectively. Perhaps unsurprisingly given his adoption 
of medicalised terminology, Mahdi also frames having been assessed and 
diagnosed as having a mental illness generally positively. It is worth noting that a 
diagnosis of mental illness provided Mahdi with a certified recognition of his trauma, 
which supported his claim for asylum. Mahdi had lost his case with the Home Office 
and was in the process of appealing the decision to deny him refuge. He recalls that 
a psychologist ‘proved that I have problem’ and that the ‘Home Office, due to that 
report, accept my case and give me five years visa.’ His diagnosis enabled him to 
jump the final hoop that gave him access to the security he required. 
Samantha speaks in neutral tones about her encounter with a psychologist who ‘was 
in tears’ when she ‘told how it was going on’. As a result of this interaction, the 
psychologist ‘got in touch with my GP and told him that ‘can you put Samantha on 
anti-depression tablets’. Though Mahdi and Samantha mention having met with 
psychiatrists, in both instances this related to going through immigration processes 
rather than seeking support specifically for their mental health issues/distress. 
Neither comment directly about their experiences of the psychiatric assessment 
itself. Satch, having undertaken one between suicide attempts during this research, 
does describe his experience. His telling takes a somewhat different tone: 
the other day when they sent me to this psychiatrist (.) and, you know, 
with him it was more (.) you just, you just getting in to telling him about 
your family, and then he, he’ll switch it over to, like, Bristol and, you know, 
what I’m doing to, help meself stay off, drugs and stuff like that and you 
get / so you start trying to get your head into, telling him how hard it is. 
You can't, you know, 
Satch indicates finding the assessment extremely hard to participate in, feeling it is 
conducted in a way that makes engaging in a structured, cohesive manner 
impossible.  Satch, fearful of being labelled ‘mentally ill’ (see p.122), is extremely 




Whilst this does not mark his entry into mental health-related services, psychiatric 
assessments are part of the process for accessing further or different mental health-
related support. He conveys a belief that this process assessed his mental state 
with little to no regard for his own perspectives. He describes his biographical 
accounts being unceremoniously dismissed before he had finished telling them, 
stating that the psychiatrist was ‘changing his way of talking’, (i.e. ‘going on about 
me family,’ and then switching suddenly to ‘why I went to prison, so many times’). 
Otherwise, Satch reports he would be ‘throwing a tennis ball at you and asking you 
to peel an orange’. This contrasts significantly in tone to the brief mentions of 
interactions with psychologists that Mahdi and Samantha make, which both convey 
– if not gratitude, then a positive impact from having their distress recognised by 
someone in a position to help them. Instead, Satch describes feeling unheard whilst 
being expected to speak of traumatic memories that invoke emotions he struggles 
to cope with. It is worth noting that Satch’s account of this then flows into an account 
of his time in a substance misuse clinic that used degradation as a means of 
promoting recovery which then also led to descriptions of life in prison. Stories from 
all three settings having in common the sense of others trying to degrade, undermine 
and exert control over him. 
Diagnostic assessments by a psychiatrist are just one form of assessment that 
participants describe in relation to accessing mental health services. Despite the 
neutral tone she takes in relation to her psychiatric assessment, Samantha does not 
speak positively of the repeated mental health-related assessments she has been 
exposed to since then. Describing an assessment process later undertaken to 
access support from a substance misuse clinic, Samantha emphasises frustrations 
resulting from all of the ‘paperwork’ that accompanied it. Samantha emphatically 
states ‘they assessed you, which is the most annoying thing. Might as well be mental 
by the time, by the time they finish’. Asked what she found so annoying, she 
continues ‘It’s the paperwork. I hate it. It's just all writing, writing, writing, writing, 
writing, writing, writing, writing, writing, writing, writing.’, later using profanities to 
convey the extent of her feeling.  
This frustration does not stem exclusively from physical barriers to completing forms 
as a result of visual impairment, as she explains that in this instance the person 
assessing her was ‘asking questions, writing down’ her answers. Rather it was the 
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need to answer so many questions that she feels are simply for the purposes of the 
service that ‘was annoying me’, seeing little return for herself in this exchange. 
Samantha finds talking ‘very hard’. By talking she risks providing personal 
information to people who – armed with such knowledge - ‘know how to break me’. 
Thus, opening up in an assessment means putting oneself in a vulnerable position 
in a space where the ‘reward’ of support is neither immediate or guaranteed. 
Additionally, Samantha confirms in a later discussion that dealing with paperwork 
brings back traumatic memories of going through the UK immigration process. As 
with Mahdi, the process of acquiring a Visa was traumatic, involving multiple 
applications and vast amounts of paperwork. Samantha describes the ‘paperwork 
and that, in dealing with it’ as having taken ‘the life out of me.’ 
Like Satch with his psychiatric assessment, Samantha must place herself in what 
feels like a vulnerable position and relive old trauma in an attempt to gain increased 
support for her mental problems. One difference, however, is that while Samantha 
focuses purely on the procedural issues that ‘annoyed’ her, it is less clear from 
Satch’s account whether his abhorrence results from the specific psychiatrist who 
assessed him, the assessment format or a mix of both. Regardless, it is evident that 
- like Samantha – the process forces the confiding of deeply personal information 
for assessment rather than therapeutic purposes. For Satch – and to some extent 
Samantha – this frustration is likely further aggravated by their scepticism of 
diagnoses (see chapter 4) and dominant treatments. Further, this process is 
conducted by people perceived by participants to be in positions of greater power; 
a power that is then augmented by the acquisition of such intimate knowledge (Tate, 
2019).  
Whilst Satch is generally more comfortable talking about past experiences than 
Samantha, having spoken to school children on multiple occasions about the 
realities of being an ‘addict’ and being in prison, this is different. Speaking in schools 
provided Satch with a sense of being valued for sharing his stories. In contrast, this 
‘switching’ of topics just as he is ‘getting into talking about’ difficult subjects, 
reinforces feelings of disempowerment and not being heard properly. For both, 
engaging in processes that require making oneself vulnerable and evokes past 
trauma in an attempt to gain additional support triggers feelings of anger, irritation 
and frustration. Particularly when there is no guarantee that adequate or appropriate 
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support will be provided afterwards; a point that Peter also makes in relation to an 
assessment undertaken on the request of his GP. 
2.1    Responses to diagnostic labels  
Influencing such experiences is the need to navigate diagnostic labels. This issue 
includes specific difficulties for participants who challenge medicalised approaches 
and/or have long histories of marginalisation. Participants have complex 
negotiations to make when considering accepting mental health or mental illness 
labels (see chapter 4, part A). This includes a tension between the possible 
disempowerment and stigma that such labels can bring, and their desire for support. 
Though each have different responses to such labels, Mya, Samantha and Peter all 
explicitly recognise that it is very difficult to find the right support without being able 
to articulate what the issue is. For example, Samantha states that mental health 
professionals ‘will help you through that when they know exactly what is going on.’ 
Where these participants’ views differ is that whilst Peter and Samantha feel it is the 
causes of distress that must be understood to be properly addressed, Mya seems 
more comfortable with the symptoms of a diagnosis remaining the focus of treatment 
plans. Not only do diagnostic labels help to ensure the ‘correct’ medical treatment is 
provided, but she also accepts its necessity in accessing other forms of support: ‘I 
need to claim benefits and stuff’, noting that ‘if I’m out of work because I’m ill, I’m 
entitled to a lot more.’ Diagnosis not only serves to direct treatment, but – as Mya 
and Mahdi point out - is also a passport to a plethora of support.  
For many participants, as highlighted in the previous chapter, accepting a diagnosis 
is a fraught process that risks amplifying their marginality relative to the 
organisations and professionals they interact with. For example, Samantha equates 
accepting having a ‘mental illness’ diagnosis with handing ‘power over that’ to 
people with the potential to ‘break’ her. Satch, who together with Peter are arguably 
the most resistant to accepting mental health labels, makes this issue apparent 
when he states that people are ‘forever trying to label me mentally ill and it makes 
me feel bad’. Though in the same meeting Satch states that he just wants more 
support - even if it takes a suicide attempt to get it (see Appendix 20) - he is still 
resistant to being associated with any mental illnesses beyond addiction. Recalling 
the story Satch tells of his Dad’s time in a psychiatric ward (see p.122) and the 
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consequences of this for him as a child, this is perhaps unsurprising. Peter 
comments on the problematic – even prohibitive - nature of mental health-related 
labels, stating that ‘a lot of people fail to seek, help. Because they don’t want to be 
labelled. They don’t want, you know, to be associated with that stigma.’ I found 
evidence of this phenomenon while interviewing people. For example, Samaiya’s 
brother’s hesitancy to admit to other people that he experiences mental health 
issues for fear of being stigmatised.  
As suggested above, Peter, Samantha and Satch express the sentiment that mental 
health labels enable a dismissal by services to address the causes of the 
issue/distress. In one discussion Satch states: ‘I feel like, you know, just pushed to 
one side’ by mainstream support services as ‘they just put us in the package mental 
health.’ Being placed in the mental health ‘package’ equates, in Satch’s view, to 
receiving a lesser service. Peter highlights that this dismissal of causes includes a 
refusal to address structural inequalities experienced in daily life or nutritional 
deficiencies. Labels are, for Peter in particular, inherently political:  
I just think things are labelled these days, for specific reasons, and they’re 
not favourable to those (.) involved, those who co / you know, those who 
are suffering from these conditions and so on. And I think these, some of 
these labels are unnecessary. 
The implication seems to be that the application of stigmatising labels is not 
necessary to the provision of support to people. Peter is – as I understand it – stating 
that whilst he acknowledges the role that such labels play in the provision of support, 
this would not be necessary if services really listened to what people actually 
needed. This is presented as an alternative to relying on medical authority in the 
form of diagnostic labels. In his view it seems that service provision is not an 
adequate justification for diagnostic labelling to perpetuate. Rather it is a useful 
device for those in more powerful positions, i.e. service providers, justifying their 
existence and supporting their practices even when these are ‘not favourable’ to 
those living with the ‘illnesses’.  
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Part B: Using mental health and support services 
In the above I begin to demonstrate the dynamics that many participants perceive 
between themselves, the systems they are navigating and the professionals working 
within them. Considering participants’ testimonies of being in receipt of support, two 
key themes emerge. First is the sense of continually having to adopt and take 
actions that serve the interests of service providers and not themselves. Participants 
describe this as often being at a cost to their own wellbeing and mental health. 
Second is the overwhelming view of being provided inappropriate or inadequate 
support. Usually this refers to encountering services that are unable to meet the 
needs of participants due to systemic or organisational reasons, as opposed to 
interpersonal issues. Here we therefore see the introduction of broader structural 
issues that go beyond influencing or maintaining problematic procedures. They 
include the implementation of problematic policies at national (and international) 
levels, leading to the delivery of practices - such as treatment options – that most 
participants feel do not meet their needs. For example, most participants express 
the view that there is either an inability or unwillingness of support services to 
address the issues they perceive as causing or aggravating their mental health 
issues.  
3 Service needs vs the needs of BAME service user/survivors 
Many participants spoke of feeling that mental health services and related support 
(i.e. substance misuse clinics) were more concerned with ensuring that procedures 
were complied with and boxes ticked than with meeting the needs of the people 
accessing the service. For example, Peter speaks of healthcare staff running around 
‘making sure all the boxes are ticked’ so as to pass inspections, rather than ensuring 
that good practice is in place all year round. In a later interview Peter reiterates this 
view, stating that policy is created but that ‘it’s not being done but paperwork is in 
place to say yes it’s being done.’, satisfying the authorities who have oversight of 
service delivery without needing to invest time and resources in actually delivering 
the initiative effectively. Also drawing on the analogy of ‘ticking boxes’, Satch speaks 
of ‘ticking pocket doctors’ who have ‘the minimum knowledge of ….mental health 
where drugs are concerned’ being sent to provide him care, indicating that they have 
just enough knowledge to tick a box but not enough to actually help him. Recalling 
Satch’s comment that he is always provided ‘the cheapest kind of understanding’, it 
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is evident throughout his testimony that he does not feel that services really 
understand his needs, or that they genuinely seek to. Instead, he indicates believing 
that they provide what they want to provide, sometimes expecting him to act as their 
‘guinea pig’ for new treatments with no regard to the after effects on him.  
A similar sentiment is present in Mahdi’s testimony when he explains his healthcare 
navigator’s expectation for him to report to him once a week to show him that ‘I’m 
not gonna kill myself’:  
they are not helping me. I think it’s just a business. To just ‘Oh yeah yeah, 
I had a client today. Mahdi. Job done’ No, no no. Get another client. 
Leave me be in peace. I want to be in peace. I want to relax. I just got my 
five years visa. I want, I’m trying to focus on my life. 
Mahdi, like Peter and Satch does not believe that his wellbeing is driving the forms 
of support being offered. They feel instead that ‘business’ concerns, such as meeting 
targets and delivering support for the least possible cost, are being prioritised over 
delivering what people with mental health issues/distress actually require. Whilst 
Mahdi recognises that the NHS is ‘too crowded’ due to its being free, and is therefore 
‘under pressure’, he is not willing to submit himself to practices that serve only to tick 
the box of the service provider and are of no benefit to him. Particularly if it requires 
him to denigrate himself in some way; e.g. asking his wife for money for the bus.  
The view that business interests take precedence over the needs of individuals using 
the services is shared by many participants. They perceive mental health-related 
support as being provided more as a commodity in a business setting than as 
healthcare with the wellbeing of the person as its priority. Following comments 
regarding the healthcare system’s reliance on medication, Satch observes that ‘all 
this money they say they’re spending, I can’t see it. All this money they’re spending, 
they’re just making up ‘oh this and that’’. He continues:  
I mean of course people need work, but get them to be doing / If it’s this 
kind of work where they’re working with another human being, mental 
health or not, you know, nobody deserves to be treated like that 
Satch demonstrates his awareness of government announcements that more 
money is being put into mental health-related care, however he does not see 
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evidence of this at the ground level. Further, he highlights the role that a demand 
and supply model might have in influencing policy within a ‘business’ setting. People 
make their livelihoods by providing care and treatments to people with mental health 
issues, hence ‘people need work’. While he accepts this, he does not feel that the 
way services are delivered meets the needs of people accessing them; an issue that 
he indicates is reflected in the way staff treat service users/survivors. 
Several participants express similar views, implying that this business focus is at 
times reinforced by interpersonal interactions with healthcare professionals. Overall, 
the main themes to emerge with regards to participants’ views of their interactions 
with individuals working within the mental health support context were: 
● feelings that staff lack real understanding of their experiences and needs, 
which sometimes translates into or includes discriminatory behaviour; 
● not feeling heard or believed; and  
● an acute awareness of power dynamics - often this involves participants 
feeling that staff were behaving coercively, augmenting the coercion inherent 
in the system. 
These issues seem to contribute to participants’ needs to conduct acts of resistance. 
Where resistance does not appear to occur, participants acted to hide aspects of 
themselves or altered their behaviour/appearance. As the rest of this chapter 
highlights, participants instead feel that they have to take significant steps – often to 
their own detriment – to meet the needs of service providers so as to access the 
support they require. This, it seems to me, is further augmented by the particular 
intersectional locations that some participants occupy. 
3.1   Meeting services’ expectations to gain support 
Participants highlighted specific ways in which they have had to put the needs of 
support services before their own wellbeing, so as to access much needed support. 
Whilst not all of the support discussed is strictly provided by mental health services, 
it was required by participants in part to enable them to maintain their wellbeing; i.e. 
substance misuse clinics. In my first encounter with Satch, he quickly introduced me 
to his sense of continually having to ‘jump through loops’ to receive the support he 
needs. Within the first minute of turning my Dictaphone on, he states that support 
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services ‘want the ideal, substance abuser who’ll just come skipping in and say all 
the right things and everything.’ Shortly after, Satch reports: 
Satch: I'm trying, always having to jump through loops as well, you 
know.  I feel like, you know. You get (.) you know, offers for help and then 
you’ve got to end up / you find yourself, uh yeah, jumping through loops 
man. 
Stéphanie:   What sort of hoops? Like what sort of things? 
Satch: You know. Find a, a daily group. I don't want a group. Do you know 
what I mean, I’ve bee / I've done all that. You know, I've been 15 years 
in recovery, you know. 
Satch explains that ‘everything seems to be a fear thing.’ In another example he 
states that threats included being told that ‘you will be removed from this home or 
house, and will be moved away from your friends’ if people do not abide by rules 
regarding sexual relations with other service users/survivors. Satch explains that 
abiding by these rules was difficult when in substance misuse rehabilitation, 
because once sober ‘all the feelings’d come back and the feeling of being a normal 
man or women. It’s natural.’ He expresses the view that service providers set rules 
that may make sense from a service delivery perspective, but that deny recognition 
of service users as having the same natural desires and needs as other human 
beings and enforced severe penalties for people who act on such needs. Satch 
described being forced to engage in a process of trading-off between basic needs 
and other aspects of their identity.  
Satch perceives this as an example of ‘mad rules and regulations’ that ‘come and 
go’ – implemented by service providers to manage their services and those that use 
them, but that are harmful and dehumanising while in place. It is not that Satch 
believes services should not have any rules or expectations of service users, but 
rather that they should not be ‘as rigid’ and strictly applied, as trying to conform to 
these to ensure continued support is ‘just tiring’. Failure to adapt to the criteria or 
expectations of the services, even when they require a person to disavow important 
parts of themselves, can be perceived as a refusal to behave appropriately such that 
services disengage (Harvey, 2019). Aware of this but exhausted by attempting to 
meet their expectations, Satch would sometimes struggle to contain his frustration. 
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This is often perceived as aggression and has led to Satch losing support, 
sometimes with disastrous consequences (see p.113-114).  
Satch also describes counselling sessions using similar techniques of fear: 
the counsellor could, kinda pl.. / you know, like the, the donkey on a stick 
kind of thing. You know, ‘Do this. Do tha.’, or ‘We was expecting, you 
know, some more from you’. You know stuff like that when you was, when 
you're in the rehab. Well in, in the (.) what’d you call it (.) care thing. Yeah, 
or you got your accommodation / you get, you're worried about losing 
that. You're worried about, you know, it's all fear. 
It is unclear if this counselling was undertaken in the context of mental health 
services or substance misuse services. However, this testimony reveals the ways 
in which people located at the intersection of poverty, substance abuse and mental 
health issues might experience coercion in the context of mental health treatments. 
As with Samantha and requirements to complete paperwork, engaging in such 
groups may actually be detrimental to Satch. The expectation placed on Satch to 
engage in activities that he does not find beneficial, and may in fact cause harm, so 
as to maintain support or be granted access to additional help epitomises shared 
perceptions of continually jumping through hoops. This power dynamic arguably 
also sheds light on Mahdi’s willingness to submit to medication he does not believe 
is effective so as to receive welfare payments, despite his usually assertive 
demeanour. Mahdi recognises the link to accepting the treatments staff want him to 
undertake and receipt of a wider range of support that he requires, such as welfare 
payments due to his relative poverty.  
Another example of engaging in practices felt to be harmful is again found in 
Samantha’s testimony. I have previously highlighted Samantha’s disdain for 
paperwork. Requirements to complete paperwork continued in counselling sessions 
where she was expected to respond to a wellbeing questionnaire each time she 
attended21. Given that the counselling was being provided at a substance misuse 
clinic as a result of excess drinking, it is concerning that engaging in this activity led 
her to feel that ‘by the time I get out of there I just wanted to go to the bar and get a 
whiskey’. She states that the paperwork was ‘a lot of rubbish’, later adding that 
completing these questionnaires is ‘enough to make you crazy.’ As previously 
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discussed, completing copious paperwork reminds Samantha of a particularly 
traumatic period of her life. Additionally, though she did receive help completing the 
forms, the process forces her to confront loss relating to her deteriorating eyesight. 
Samantha feels that this activity serves no benefit to her, stating that ‘I didn't come 
here to do, for you to do paperwork.’ Further, cultural differences may also influence 
her view of paperwork as ‘a lot of rubbish’, as she seems to consider it as being in 
opposition to taking ‘action’. Samantha stipulates ‘action’ as being how things, 
including dealing with distress, are dealt with in Swaziland. The insistence of 
services that she complete wellbeing questionnaires in her counselling sessions 
forces Samantha to engage in a process that does not align with her views of what 
is helpful to recovery, and forces her to confront past and present points of distress 
in her life, intensifying her desire to drink22. That this is to satisfy the requirements 
of a process tailored, Samantha implies, to the needs of the service provider rather 
than her own is ‘annoying’ at the very least. Yet engaging in this is presented as a 
mandatory part of receiving therapy. 
Peter highlights the marginalisation that can occur when practices implemented do 
not allow for multiple understandings of mental health issues, and the additional 
effort then required to maintain support. Peter’s testimony suggests friction between 
himself and a new GP, resulting largely from them having different beliefs about how 
Peter should manage his ‘depressive mood’. He recounts an exchange with his GP 
where he explained that he did not want to take the medication offered because it 
had not previously worked. In response he ‘was told that if I don’t take it, I’m not 
helping myself.’ Peter clarified that he felt compelled to take the medication against 
his better judgement, to stop himself being categorised as someone unwilling to help 
himself. Such a categorisation might lead to further hesitancy on the part of the GP 
to provide other forms of support. Given GP’s roles as gatekeepers to other forms 
of support, it is understandable that Peter might have felt compelled to take the 
medication once more, if only to demonstrate that it was not effective on him. Yet, 
Peter believes this medication to be not only ineffective but harmful, causing him 
‘Gastroenteritis, and all the rest of it.’ Thus, like Satch and Samantha, he was forced 
to jump hoops that are potentially detrimental to his wellbeing simply to assure 
continued or future support from service providers and gateway services.  
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Like Peter, Satch and Samantha also highlight ways in which the services’ demands 
were borne out through interactions with mental health practitioners. Stating that 
she’s ‘got to do it my own way’, Samantha outlines disagreements with staff 
members telling her what they believed she should do to get onto the path of 
recovery from both her substance misuse and her mental problems. Samantha 
continues ‘I keep explaining it to the mental team’, telling them that she ‘can’t step 
in other people’s shoes’; by which she means doing what others do and having the 
same result. This belief that what worked for others is not helpful for her may be 
partly informed by the cultural differences regarding treatments, (see p.164) 
However, it is also influenced by Samantha’s openly admitted tendency to follow the 
path that opposes that which she is told she must follow; it is an act of defiance 
and/or resistance.  
Another factor also seems to be that Samantha believes most staff do not 
understand what she is going through because they lack lived experience of mental 
problems. She feels that there is a very real disconnect between what is taught in 
textbooks and how such issues/distress are experienced. As such, Samantha is 
unwilling to accept people lacking lived experience as ‘expert’, and herself as ‘less 
expert’. Satch demonstrates a similar view when describing an unsuccessful therapy 
session with a councillor. Unable to engage with the therapy the way expected of 
him - stating ‘I couldn’t do it, couldn’t do it’ – Satch observed the councillor becoming 
‘irritated by that.’ Satch holds that this demonstrates a lack of understanding, stating 
‘if you can't understand (.) past your nose like uh, you can't understand, you know, 
he's in the wrong job like.’ For both Samantha and Satch, a perceived lack of relevant 
lived experience undermines not only the authority with which they feel staff conduct 
themselves, but also their expertise. Through these conversations, they emphasise 
the need for staff to realise their limitations of knowledge and adjust their approaches 
accordingly. 
3.2   Altering behaviour and appearance 
Finally, several participants speak of people having to alter their appearance or 
behaviour so as to ‘fit’ within service provider criteria/expectations. Some of these 
accounts are relatively subtle, with the connections to wider systemic issues (such 
as prejudice and cultural incompetence) not being explicitly stated. For example, 
Samantha highlights instances where her behaviour led to her removal from 
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therapeutic settings23 or prevented her from gaining the support she actually 
needed24. In the previous chapter I highlighted how difficult Samantha finds 
continually mediating her behaviour and way of expressing herself. Samantha does 
not bring these things together in her testimony, but I note the similarities and 
possible crossover. In contrast, Mya explicitly highlights how signifiers of 
marginalised identity-markers might impact on people’s experiences of health and 
mental health services in her account of the different way she and her friend were 
treated in GP practices. Satch provides first hand examples from within a mental 
health-related context of how his intersectional location creates additional hoops to 
jump to maintain access to or receipt of additional support. I have already provided 
one example in his having to ignore sexual desired to retain his accommodation. A 
further example relates to altering his appearance to avoid stereotyping and 
discriminatory treatment.  
Accompanying Satch to a meeting with one of his support workers, I learnt that he 
has previously cut all of his dreadlocks off in preparation for entering a substance 
misuse clinic. His support worker recalled asking him why he had done this; she 
states that he said he didn’t want any trouble. She adds that she felt he was often 
perceived as threatening due to his being a black man with dreadlocks. She later 
provides an example of Satch being banned from using mental health-related 
services on the premise of having intimidated a member of staff when he looked into 
the facility through the window. When she challenged this, she was informed that 
intimidation is subjective. Satch validates her account and in other discussions 
provides further similar stories of how his appearance and particular intersectional 
location as a black man with dreadlocks have impacted on the way he has been 
treated in services; no doubt further augmented by his history of both substance 
misuse and spells in prison. 
Some participants also described engaging in a protective silence about aspects of 
themselves that they feel put them at further risk of losing credibility and becoming 
even more disempowered. Examples of this include Satch’s unwillingness to be 
open about his initial suicide attempt with support services and Samantha’s use of 
sarcasm to avoid revealing anything too personal. Another example can be drawn 
from Mya’s testimony regarding her spiritual experience several years ago that 
awakened a strong faith in God, though she remains unaffiliated to any specific 
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religion. When I ask if she has spoken to anyone within mental health services about 
her spiritual awakening, she responds that she has been too frightened to do so. 
Part of the reason for this is based on something she witnessed when working as an 
occupational therapist in a psychiatric ward: 
before I got ill / well I / before I got more ill, and, when I was doing one of 
my placements in mental health / wasn’t based in, on a psychiatric ward 
but I did spend a couple of days there / and there was this one lady and 
she / her, her delusion was very much about, God and (.) I mean what 
she was saying didn’t make any sense, but I think that, maybe, is an extra 
thing that scares me.  
Mya observed the way that staff responded to this woman’s testimony regarding her 
spiritual or religious beliefs and witnessed these being understood by healthcare 
staff as evidence of delusions. Fearful that a similar thing could happen to her if she 
reveals her own spiritual experience, she researched the subject. Mya found 
information from the Royal College of Psychiatrists ‘saying how hard it was to, you 
know to have this sort of, to identify which is which’; ‘which is which’ meaning that it 
is hard to determine what results from religious belief which is considered to reside 
within ‘normal’ psychopathy, and what is the result of ‘delusion’. As a result of this 
ambiguity and her previous agnostic position, Mya feels safer keeping her 
experience to herself - even within her counselling session – despite the fact that it 
occupied an important place in her life and is causing her considerable inner conflict.  
However, this is not everyone’s experience. Meeting Samantha at a time when she 
felt ‘life is getting greater’, she speaks of the positive impact of reigniting her 
relationship with God in her recovery. She explains that a mental health worker from 
one of my BAME-led gateway organisations encouraged her to revisit her faith as a 
means of finding the strength to move forward. I also asked if she had felt 
comfortable expressing her faith when receiving mainstream healthcare. Samantha 
informs me that she had, and that while in hospital she was in, she regularly visited 
the chapel. Thus, whilst religious beliefs can and are accommodated within some 
healthcare services, they also hold the potential – particularly in a mental health 
context – to further discredit people. This power differential creates obvious and 
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logical motivations to consider hiding aspects of the self, even at the cost of the 
effectiveness of treatments such as talking therapies.  
4 Treatments 
In the previous section I consider examples of service provider expectations of 
service users that must be met if people wish to access or continue receiving 
support, regardless of the implications for individual participants. I also highlight 
testimonies where services adjusted their processes or practices to better suit the 
needs of a particular participant and the positive impacts this has. In this section I 
consider participants’ views of the appropriateness and adequacy of support 
received to help manage or recover from their mental health issues/distress; 
exploring views on specific treatment options provided. I focus, as participants do, 
on medication and talking therapies. 
4.1   Medication 
I begin by stating that most participants express an overriding sense that there is, 
among healthcare workers, a limited ability to or interest in seeking to understand 
and address the causes of people’s mental health issues/distress. Peter is 
particularly articulate on this point, stating: 
I just think, the current approach isn’t, isn’t right at all because there are 
reasons as to why people find themselves in those situations and if you’re 
not dealing with the root cause, it’s pointless. What you’re doing basically 
is masking the symptoms, and that makes no sense to me.  
For Peter and several other participants, this belief that healthcare 
services lack the interest or ability to address ‘root causes’ is closely 
aligned with a perception of an overreliance on medication: 
Samantha: the mental group when I was in [Hospital A], they came and 
see me. They talk to me. They asked me how I'm feeling and la la la la la 
la. After that they just went and upped my dose, and then that was it. 
----- 
Peter: Medicine doctor has no interest in exploring the reasons as to why, 
and sometimes it’s simply due to a deficiency25, or certain deficiencies. 
And that is not explored. You’re given a medication to mask the 
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symptoms. The cause is not taken into consideration. And there is this 
whole mental thing going on. Which is a symptom. And that’s where all 
the focus is. 
----- 
Mahdi: I’m getting 150 Sertraline every day, and 15 ml ( ) night time, so 
(.) I don’t think so 150 is low dose, it’s very strong dose for anti-depression 
tablets …So, so, if I am having that already, that’s not helping me. 
Because you’re not trying to help me. Why didn’t you give me leave to 
remain forever? 
These extracts demonstrate a strong belief that mainstream approaches aimed at 
supporting people to manage or recover from their mental health issues/distress are 
too limited. Instead of seeking to address the ‘root causes’ that trigger, maintain or 
aggravate the issues/distress (see chapter 4), participants feel that mainstream 
healthcare tends to address or ‘mask’ the symptoms by simply prescribing 
medication. Present traumas tend to be understood as arising from social factors, 
such as socioeconomic position, exposure to discrimination, disempowerment, 
violence etc. When participants speak of services not addressing the root causes, I 
suggest that this should be understood primarily as not addressing ongoing 
experiences of trauma, stress and systemic marginalisation and discrimination.  
For example, Mahdi views insecurity around his rights to remain in the UK as a 
significant factor aggravating his mental illness. Having expressed frustration at 
being granted only a 5-year Visa, he reflects ‘I’m secured I feel OK. I’m safe. I’m not 
gonna die. Not today.’, adding ‘So at least there’s one switch is off in my brain OK. 
I’m relax.’. He continues:  
I think, I need to be more relax more than medications. Because as much 
I take these chemicals, even 3, 3 tablets, 4, 4 tablets, every day, but I’m 
not good here, I’m not relax. I am not stable. I am not safe. 
For Mahdi, being given medication is simply ‘not helping’ him. It does not address 
the ‘root causes’ triggering his present ongoing trauma and does not adequately 
‘mask the symptoms’. What he needs is to know that he is safe not just for ‘today’, 
but that he can start to build a new life for himself in the UK that he won’t be uprooted 
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from in the future. For Peter, root causes include biological factors, such as vitamin 
deficiencies. This, he suggests, might be remedied by greater exposure to the sun, 
changes of diet or the taking of vitamin and mineral supplements. Peter explains 
however, that alternatives to medication are ‘not explored’. Andeep, who explains at 
the start of our conversation that talking to someone means that you probably won’t 
develop mental health issues, is also deeply sceptical of medication. He describes 
a cycle with medication that is unhelpful to recovery. He states that you become 
depressed, and so you are put on medication. But these medications make it difficult 
to communicate because of the impact they have, and this is a problem because 
communicating difficulties is – in Andeep’s view – integral to recovery.  
Medication received not just the greatest attention when discussing support 
available, but also elicited some of the strongest emotional responses. Most 
participants consider this practice problematic for two main reasons: 
1. Applying a ‘one cap fits all’ approach ignores the person’s individual situation 
– this approach insists that medications should be assumed to work and be a 
positive step for everyone; and 
2. It’s depoliticising and disempowering effect – several participants consider 
medication’s sedative effect as a means for support services to avoid 
addressing more complex ‘root causes’. 
Peter is most explicit about feeling there is a ‘one cap fits all’ approach: ‘The other 
problem is, this one cap fits all situation. Medication does not work for everyone’, 
later stating ‘it clearly doesn’t work for me, but their approach is to keep trying 
another and another and another and another, and so on. And that doesn’t make 
sense to me.’ Similar experiences are evident in both Mahdi and Samantha’s 
testimonies in the extracts at the start of this section, with healthcare professionals 
not openly acknowledging that medication does not work for everyone. Samantha 
describes her medication dose being ‘just upped’ despite explaining the issues 
troubling her. This clearly frustrates her as, like Peter, she considers this practice 
somewhat pointless. In fact, it informs her rejection of medicalised terminology:    
if you say that to them ‘Oh I've got a mental health / a mental illness’, they 
will bring the mental team. They will assess you. (.) And then, they give 




they give you citalopram, and, and then if they don't work, they change it 
and they give you something else. 
The implication being that, when medication does not have the desired impact, 
healthcare providers simply up the dose or switch to different tablets. When it comes 
to ‘depression tablets’, Samantha has ‘done them all! Been there, done it.’ She states 
that she ‘started on Citalopram, and all it does is, it takes away your moods. And it 
makes you happy.’ Though she here recognises that the medication had a positive 
impact on her emotional state, she is not satisfied that it should be the extent of 
support offered to her; it does not address the other issues in her life.  
This reliance on medication is not only concerning to participants because of its 
avoidance of social and environmental factors, but also because of the potential 
side-effects. Peter speaks of developing gastroenteritis and other maladies as a 
result of taking such medication, highlighting that others in his social network have 
had similar experiences. Speaking of his sister, he states that whenever she ‘hit a 
really bad patch’, her medication was changed. Additionally, the number of 
medications prescribed are ‘continually going up. Because as one side-effect kicks 
in, you’re given another, in order to combat that. And on and on it goes.’ Peter feels 
that the negative impacts of mental health medication are not generally given 
adequate consideration. Peter also expresses the view that medications affect black 
people differently to white people due to ‘a difference in the genetic makeup of a 
Caucasian person and a black person’. He states that there are ‘no clinical trials 
done on the, on the black race.’ He asks the rhetorical question:  
if none of that is taken into consideration, no data is collected, no trials 
are being done and so on, how can those medications work effectively 
for a group that was never taken into consideration at all? 
Another side-effect is highlighted by Andeep, Peter and Satch; the ‘Zombie’ effect. 
Satch gives the following description of men residing in his locality: 
Satch: it’s easier to just shut them up with / you see a lot of them who 
ain’t, who ain’t as outspoken, and they just walk around. Every day I see 
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some of them walking around the streets and they’ve got nothing to do, 
nowhere to go, and [they jus 
Stéphanie: What, the] doctors? 
Satch: and they all, there’s a Jamaican one who [shouts] and he drinks, 
and he’s walking around ‘eiyayaeiya’, you know and, the poor guy’s like 
that because they’re just feeding him full of fucking (.) shit.  
Stéphanie: Like what?  
Satch: You know like, liquid cosh we used to call it in jail. It’s like (.) it / it 
/ keeps like a loud patient a bit ((mimics ‘spaced out’ look))  
Stéphanie: Aww, like it sedates them? 
Satch: Yeah. And they’re just walking around like a, like a Zombie you 
know. 
A direct link is made here between the medications being provided to people and 
their ‘zombie’-like state. Peter speaks of ‘a lot of people walking around like Zombies’ 
as a direct result of medication. When I met Andeep, he was at that time using 
medication though he stated that he didn’t like them as they make his mind ‘boggle’. 
I observed that he did seem in something of a sedated state, speaking very slowly 
and eyelids heavy. I cannot compare this behaviour to when he is not medicated, 
but my observation fits with his own comments. Peter suggests that ‘in some cases 
depending on, you know, the practitioner you’re dealing with’, there are instances 
whereby ‘black people may be more / there’ll be more of an urgency to medicate’.  
Peter suggests that ‘one of the things that, presents a problem is (.) expressions’, 
continuing that ‘you might find some black people very expressive’. However, ‘if 
you’re assertive, you’re seen as aggressive’ by staff, which ‘is a major problem’ for 
many black people seeking support. Whilst Satch does not make this exact claim, 
he does use the above story to illustrate his view that medication is used as a means 
to stop people making too many demands or causing problems for support services. 
He believes that services find it easier to supply medications to ‘shut them up’ than 
to listen and address the social and environmental issues causing people to seek 
support in the first place. This implies an active choice on the part of service 
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providers or ‘the system’ to disempower and depoliticise people who are struggling. 
As a result, people who ‘ain’t as outspoken’ as himself are likely to be transformed 
into a passive ‘Zombie’ who ‘just walk around’ with ‘nothing to do’. The implication is 
that to avoid being ‘fobbed off to medication’ or being told to ‘just take the medication 
and carry on’ – as Peter puts it – people must be willing to be ‘outspoken’. However, 
this comes with its own difficulties as Satch notes.  
Self-confessing to being ‘hard to work with’ – or at least to having been hard to work 
with in the past - Satch knows that his willingness to be ‘outspoken’ and demand 
what he feels he needs earns him such a badge. Indeed, supporting him to receive 
medication during the Covid-19 lockdown by going to the pharmacy to pick it up, I 
found that the pharmacy workers knew him by name and his reputation as ‘difficult’ 
was evident. Yet, speaking with his support worker, she explained that he only 
behaves this way when he feels unheard or frustrated that he is not being given the 
support that he needs. Stating that she doesn’t find him hard to work with, she adds 
that she feels people view him this way because of a combination of his behaviour 
(i.e. being demanding and ‘mouthy’) when upset and the stereotypes of black men 
– particularly those with dreadlocks – being dangerous. She adds that if you 
understand his history and the barriers he has faced, his behaviour is entirely 
understandable. This seems to echo Satch’s own view when he recounts being told 
‘you’ve got a chip on your shoulder’ by a member of staff at a prison he served at, 
to which he responds ‘So?! You would if you lived’ his life. Seen in the context of his 
past experiences, his responses to certain situations are, in his and his support 
worker’s view, entirely logical.  
It is notable, perhaps, that Mahdi also mentions his wife’s statement that he can be 
‘a very difficult person’ at times. Though he later explains that is partly due 
behaviours towards her that result from his mental illness and being very ‘sensitive’, 
he also links this to not allowing professionals to refuse his needs. He recounts 
exchanges with his solicitor where he asks: ‘Are you playing with me? Like, you can’t 
play with me. I know everything. Come on! Move on! Don’t / don’t / stop hide and 
seek. Do your job.’ Yet, in response to medication, Mahdi, uses submissive language 
when he declares his willingness to ‘lay down like this, have Sertraline’ in return for 
receiving financial support. Just as a diagnosis label supported his claim for asylum, 
so too does he feel that taking medication supports his claims for financial - and later 
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housing - support. Such accounts begin to demonstrate why participants feel the 
need to embark in acts of resistance against mental health treatment practices 
offered by the NHS, whilst others accept them even if they do not agree that they 
are helpful.  
Peter expresses a further view that many people accept medication as a result of 
‘conditioning’. He states that many people would:  
rather pop a pill and get the quick fix and that is never going to solve your 
problem. And I think we’ve also / we’re so conditioned now that we don’t 
focus on a permanent solution to the problem. So, we accept what’s on 
offer, and, in my opinion it’s not a cure. It’s just a suppression of the 
symptoms. 
Accepting medication without challenge is not, for Peter, evidence that people 
believe it effective. Rather, it is evidence of an unwillingness or inability to fight for 
what they feel is really needed for recovery or effective management of their mental 
health. Peter holds that an important factor in this conditioning is the authority given 
to medical practitioners and medical discourses in society. Whilst he states that 
service users seek a ‘quick fix’, he does not attribute this to people’s natural 
dispositions or a lack of interest in alternatives. Rather he suggests such behaviour 
as the result of having been ‘conditioned’ to ‘accept what’s on offer’ and placing trust 
in medical practitioners. Peter maintains that ‘the medical profession is a trusted 
source. By the majority’, stating that people are more likely to trust the advice of 
medical doctors than holistic practitioners. As such, Peter does not blame individuals 
for accepting inappropriate or inadequate support in the form of medication, but the 
system that has conditioned them to accept it. He states that ‘the pressures of 
society’ mean that ‘people are finding it very difficult to cope, struggling quite badly 
in some cases’ such that ‘things spiral out of control’. Therefore, when ‘in comes the 
quick fix’, it is understandable that people who have ‘struggled’ might seek the path 
of least resistance with the promise of a ‘quick’ turnaround. In contrast, Peter 
describes actively fighting the dominance of medicalised approaches by seeking out 
alternative treatments that he feels better address his symptoms. This involves 
seeking out and trying alternative approaches, such as addressing nutritional 
deficiencies or finding ‘some homeopathic things’ which he feels ‘works quite well’.  
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4.2   Talking therapies 
Though participants who discuss treatments they undertook focus mostly on 
medication, several also speak of experiences with talking therapies. Whether 
participants feel these are helpful or not depends on many factors and acts of 
resistance are certainly present here also. Once more, negative experiences are 
raised more often than positive ones. A common theme is feeling pushed or coerced 
to attend group therapy sessions which many participants feel are not helpful to 
them. I highlighted earlier that Satch perceives having to ‘find a daily group’ to access 
other support as just another hoop to jump through. Peter also finds attending group 
therapy sessions unhelpful, stating ‘I don’t fare well in groups’, elaborating that ‘I just 
don’t feel comfortable with it. Because some people are good at speaking in a group 
and opening up and so on and I’m not.’ Yet Peter explains feeling compelled to 
attend as he was unaware that he should have had a choice in the sort of therapy 
he undertook:     
Peter: They put this in place, and everyone has to fit into that. It’s for 
instance like the group therapies. You see. It’s not for everyone. I’m sure 
that’s known. And yet, it’s been implemented in such a ways as to say 
this works for everybody. That’s one cap fit all situation. And, even when 
you’re being interviewed, you’re being pushed in that direction, you know 
and so. And I didn’t know I had a choice. 
Stéphanie: Oh really! 
Peter: No, it wasn’t until (.) I had a call for some feedback, and I was 
asked, as to whether I was um happy with my choice. And I said ‘Choice? 
I didn’t have a choice.’ And then there was a pause (.) and I asked the 
question ‘Was there a choice?’ And they became a bit awkward and 
eventually I got the answer well, you know. I realised that there was a 
choice but, you know. 
Peter expresses knowing himself well enough prior to attending the sessions to 
judge that he was unlikely to ‘fare well’, as he would not ‘feel comfortable’ ‘opening 
up’ in that setting. Therefore, had he been aware that there was a choice of attending 
one-to-one therapy sessions, he has no doubt he would have done so. Peter 
communicates that this obscuring of the choices is intentional, at both the systemic 
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level and at the level of individual interactions; i.e. the person he spoke to who 
‘pushed´ him in a particular ‘direction’, who is part of a system that creates a ‘one 
cap fits all situation’ which ‘everyone has to fit into’. Satch expresses a similar belief, 
stating that this is problematic as ‘out of ten, maybe two people will be / will be / will 
get something from that, but the rest, they’re just going round in circles’. Recall that 
Satch’s attendance of such groups is sometimes a requirement of receiving other 
support that he actually desires. 
Samantha provides examples from her own experiences of unhelpful group therapy 
sessions, describing attending one where she was eventually asked to leave by the 
session leader. This was a group for people experiencing mental health 
issues/distress. Samantha describes the experience as ‘frustrating’, stating ‘I don’t 
get it.’ She also struggled to connect with other people’s outlooks, stating ‘me, I don't 
like people talking bullshit sometimes.’ She later informs me of being paid to attend 
a group therapy session for people living with HIV. To ensure that mobility issues or 
finances are not a barrier, transport to and from the session was paid for and an 
additional £10 provided as an incentive to attend. Samantha explains that she 
attended because she ‘just had to do it to shut you up’; ‘you’ being her support 
worker. However, she left early as she found the group was bringing her down. 
Though the situation differs from Peter and Satch in that receipt of support wasn’t 
dependent on attending sessions, Samantha’s description contains elements of 
feeling pressured into attending a form of support she does not feel suited to. 
Samantha discusses her experiences with group therapy in detail. Two key issues 
are also reflected in Peter and Satch’s testimonies:  
1. Difficulties connecting with others in the group and/or navigating group 
dynamics; and  
2. Impact of being brought up to deal with issues in particular ways. 
I draw on the example of Samantha’s mental-health group to explore the first issue. 
Samantha refers to people talking ‘bullshit’. By this she means either that they talk 
about ‘mental illness’ as something they have no control over, or complain about the 
government not adequately supporting them. Just as Samantha found genetic 
explanations of mental problems unhelpful, (see p.105), so too does she seem to 
find these discussions to be self-disempowering experiences that are unhelpful to 
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be exposed to. She also describes group dynamics that position her and two other 
‘girls’ as being overpowered by another woman in the group who spoke more openly 
about her experiences and views. Samantha refers to this lady as ‘Lady Gaga’, 
stating: 
She just couldn't give anybody a chance to speak. There was this girl, 
she was sitting next to me, I kept on pushing her saying ‘say something’. 
And that, I could tell that that is dep / she is depressed, and I could fee / 
I could relate to that and I could see that to her, on her. And I kept on 
pushing her to speak. But oh no!  Lady Gaga over there (.) 
Adding when I asked if she managed to speak: 
No. Yeah. (.) Well if what everything I tried I speak, she would speak Lady 
Gaga over there, and speak over you. 
Though Samantha focuses on the other ‘girl’ being silenced by Lady Gaga, it seems 
that Samantha feels that the group dynamic was also not convivial to her opening 
up. Though the reasons that Samantha finds the two groups she attended unhelpful 
differ, there is a common thread about finding the dynamics in the group and content 
discussed challenging, thus she experiences them as negative. Peter, too, indicates 
issues with managing group dynamics in his declaration that he does not ‘fare well 
in groups’.  
Satch’s accounts of group therapy sessions in substance misuse clinics and prison 
also raise this issue, however this is framed more as dynamics which are inherently 
problematic rather than as difficulties he has personally. Satch’s descriptions provide 
insight into how identity-markers and the power dynamics surrounding them impact 
on experiences of and behaviour in group therapy. Describing the format many such 
sessions took, he explains that you first had to write a statement which you then read 
out to the group: 
Satch: And then (.) everyone gives you a ‘eyyyyyy’ and that and said that 
was, that was (.) potted history (.) And you’ve got / and you go ‘how I got 
here today’. And you know, you know, mostly you just say yourself ‘I want 
to make amends to my family’ and all this, that and the other. Like you 
hear some of them like, they talk like they, they’d never dream of it, 
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something like that, if they hadn’t have / come to Bristol or met, met the 
people they did meet when they got here. It’s like they act like you know 
the, the middle-class people really. It’s just that (.) 
Stéphanie: What they were middle class, or they’re acting like they were? 
Oh, they were. ((Responding to nods)) 
Satch: Yeah, they thought that, they thought they were and, and they 
acted like / it was / they would act like (.) ‘I’ you know, ‘I’, ‘I put shame on 
my family and broke my mother’s heart’ and all that, and it was all so fake. 
It is unclear whether Satch feels people were being fake because they didn’t actually 
care about ‘putting shame’ on their family, or whether he meant they were attempting 
to fake their social status prior to becoming addicts to meet the expectations of 
service providers or situate themselves in a particular way within the group. 
However, he makes clear that markers of social status, stigma and social divides 
such as those explored in the previous chapter are not left at the door of group 
therapy sessions, but impact on the group dynamics and how people behave within 
them. Additionally, in certain contexts it is important to note that people brought 
together to participate in such group sessions may already know each other from 
their wider community or past encounters. As Satch highlights when talking about 
experiences within prison settings, ‘a lot would kind of know each other in the wire’. 
This aligns with a later comment by Peter that he was uncomfortable discussing 
deeply personal information with people from his locality who he is likely to 
encounter in the street, and with whom he has not built a trusting relationship. A 
group setting, then, is one in which harmful power dynamics in the outside world 
can be brought into the intended therapeutic space.  
Linked to this perhaps, is the impact of being brought up to respond to adversity and 
distress in particular ways that do not necessarily match with the group therapy 
format. For example, Satch – like most other participants - experienced trauma and 
marginalisation throughout his life. Chapter 4 presents Satch’s account of learning 
not to express emotion or discontent in public in the children’s home he was placed 
in. Children who did express emotion were ‘sent off’ ‘so they could lock ‘em up and 
keep ‘em quiet’, or staff would ‘roll you up in a mattress and beat the fucking hell out 
of you’. This exposure to organisational cultures of ‘shutting up and putting up’ over 
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a sustained period in childhood has been compounded by exposure to similar 
cultures within prison systems and marginalising experiences in wider society. The 
effect being that opening up in group settings at times when he feels vulnerable is 
more difficult than it might be for those who have not been immersed in such 
environments.  
Samantha attributes her difficulties ‘get(ting) it’ as resulting partly from a cultural 
clash. This clash impacts not only on her experience of group therapy, but all talking 
therapies:  
Sometimes talking, yeah. But action, is what I do. That's because I grew 
up in Africa where we’re always acting. We didn't have talk. That is why 
for me it's difficult for me to just sit down and talk.’ 
Samantha explains that in Africa, her Grandmother woke her and her siblings up at 
around 5 or 6am to do chores such as ‘go and fetch water in the river. We had to 
clean the house, we had to go and fetch firewood. We had to go to the field’. There 
just was not time, nor was it customary, to talk about how one was feeling: ‘for me 
it's a different culture, like sort of thing like how I grew up. It was always fast, fast, 
fast, fast, fast. It was always action.’, adding ‘That’s why I find it difficult me, to sit 
down and just talk.’ Aware that alternative approaches to therapy are available in 
the form of gardening, craft-based therapies etc, I ask if she has been offered such 
alternatives. Her response is ‘I ain’t doing frigging gardening! Forget it’, adding ‘I like 
action stuff. Like active stuff. Not bloody scooping things. I think I find that enough 
back home.’ ‘Active stuff’ being ‘Zumba. (.) And I like to go to the gym. Me and my 
friend used to finish work and go to the gym. (.) I liked to play tennis. (.) Like all the 
fun stuff.’ Samantha’s physical health limits her ability to engage in her usual coping 
mechanism of ‘action’, yet less intense activities hold no appeal, as they do not 
match her preferences or identity, stating that she is ‘not a patient person’: ‘I fidget 
all the time. Got to do something.’ 
Yet, I have observed that Samantha does enjoy talking, whether with myself or 
members of staff in the gateway organisation, regularly calling for a chat. In a more 
recent discussion Samantha states that it is not that she does not want to engage 
in talking therapies, but that it is a case of two cultures clashing. She states that she 
does not agree with the way things are done in the UK in relation to mental problems 
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and ‘we’ do not agree with how things are done in her culture. She continues that in 
such situations, unless a middle ground is found, there is no way forward. This 
aspect of Samantha’s experience does not appear generalisable to all participants, 
even those who are also immigrants to the UK. For example, though Peter indicates 
not receiving any benefits from group therapy sessions, he does not cite cultural 
issues as part of this. Peter does speak of cultural clashes. However, he is speaking 
at a more fundamental level about clashes between western individualistic 
approaches and more communitarian approaches from Africa. He expresses that 
conversations about cultural clashes always remain at a very surface level, where 
actually these more fundamental issues require attention. Mahdi does not speak of 
talking therapies at all. However, he does state that he does not feel that cultural 
differences have been problematic for him within mental health services, though 
they are in interpersonal relationships in his private life.  
Interestingly, towards the end of this research Samantha called me to tell me about 
a different group session she attended which she found a more positive experience, 
largely because conversations were interspersed or interwoven with activities; a 
session was run by one of the BAME-led gateway organisations supporting this 
research. Andeep, though not referring specifically to talking therapy, states that 
having someone to speak to means that you probably will not have mental issues 
as half of the burden is gone once shared. Peter also speaks of his experience of 
receiving one-to-one therapy sessions through the NHS. This differed significantly 
from that of group sessions in that he ‘was beginning to see some benefits from it’. 
However, just as benefits were emerging, ‘it finished’ and: 
I ended up with more questions than answers. Yeah, you know it stirred 
up things and, some of which some I wasn’t aware of, some which I’d sort 
of buried in my mind somewhere in the past, I’d sort of shelved things 
and some of those things were ( ) and were resurfaced and so on. And 
there wasn’t sufficient time to deal with them. 
Peter indicates that though he found the one-to-one therapy beneficial, this took time 
and NHS provision does not allow such support on a long-term basis. He continues 
that his therapist ‘was quite concerned’ about stopping the sessions at that point, 
stating that ‘she couldn’t leave me like that, and then she tried to get me some more 
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sessions, but she could only get me two.’ Despite healthcare professionals 
recognising both the potential benefit to his mental health/distress and the risk of 
acute distress if therapy sessions are discontinued, staff reported being constrained 
in what they could provide. Peter feels that ‘that sort of, made things even more 
difficult than when I started. Eventually it sort of, went into a bit of a dive.’ Though 
recognising Peter’s need for one-to-one therapy, ‘the doctor wasn’t sure whether it 
was wise to put me through that again because the sessions were limited and there 
was nothing they could do, it wasn’t in their control.’ As a result, Peter ‘just sort of 
struggled, struggled along’. He relays that ‘things would get worse. I would, you 
know, dig in and try to, fight back’, reflecting that ‘I would sometimes make a 
headway and sometimes not, and so on, and it was just sort of pretty much up and 
down.’ 
Before I move to the next section, I want to quickly highlight some additional views 
expressed in relation to treatments that reinforce comments earlier highlighted 
regarding service provider needs being put before those of service users/survivors. 
Many participants state or imply that medication is a low-cost means of enabling 
people to tread water while the real issues are ignored. Indeed, Peter seems to feel 
that such cuts in funding are driving the ‘one cap fits all’ approach discussed earlier, 
as well as determining the particular forms of ‘support’ most readily available to them:  
Well I think decisions are made, more in line with, available funding and 
other interests and so on. Sometimes I don’t think they, individuals’ needs 
are put first. You know. And so on. That, that’s what I’ve noticed.  
Adding that people’s needs are: 
not taken as seriously as it should. And it’s trivialised and, ‘regardless to 
what’s needed, this is what we are prepared to do’, or ‘this is what we are 
allowed to do’, or ‘this is what we can do, as a result of the available 
finance we have’.  
Peter continues, stating that achieving better support is possible, but that it requires 
‘enough finance’ and for the ‘right people’ and ‘policies’ to be implemented. He 
implies that the ‘right policies’ would have to enable enough flexibility in the system 
for it to be able to meet people’s individual needs, rather than expecting people who 
are already struggling to meet the system’s needs. At present ‘the person absolutely 
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needs to shape to fit to whatever policies are laid down’, regardless of their 
appropriateness for the individuals the policies are intended to support. ‘It’s for 
instance like the, the group therapies’, he continues, elsewhere stating ‘group 
therapy is much cheaper to run, (.) and that’s the reason I believe for, creating all 
these new policies and programmes’. The implication, I believe, is that Peter regards 
the support made most readily available is that perceived by policymakers as the 
most cost efficient rather than the most effective for the recipient.  
4.3   Additional considerations when intersectionally located 
A number of logistical issues also present hoops to jump to recieve support. These 
issues further frustrate participants, causing additional and different difficulties for 
those already struggling to meet service expectations – often as a result of their 
specific intersectional locations. For example, Mahdi comments that ‘my wife have 
to do for me. Even my medication, we have to buy every two months, every one 
month.’ Any aspect of Mahdi’s treatment that requires spending money means 
asking his wife for additional financial support. Mahdi’s particular intersectional 
location – an asylum seeker married to a woman who earns a wage - means that 
his prescriptions are payable: 
My anti-depression tablets and everything. From food-wise to clothes to 
everything and being dependent. And that put down my dignity. And that 
tortures me in front of my own self like. I don’t feel the same like other 
people. That is also a big effect on my trauma 
Mahdi was unable to claim normal employment benefits or work legally as an 
asylum-seeker due to legislation. As discussed in chapter 4, his mental illness 
further prohibited his ability to seek out work. Further, his being married to a salaried 
woman meant that he was not eligible for some of the few benefits he may otherwise 
have been granted. Mahdi is forced to be financially dependent on his wife. He 
describes his ‘dignity’ as being negatively impacted such that it ‘tortures’ him and 
aggravates his ‘trauma’.  
Elsewhere Mahdi speaks of the cost of transportation to attend weekly check-ups 
with his NHS care navigator as a result of previous suicide attempts. Having now 
been provided with leave to remain in the UK for five years, Mahdi feels he is no 
longer at risk of attempting suicide. As such, he feels that the check-ups are ‘kind of 
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waste for me for going like every week, every two week to the [health centre] for just 
sitting, just to enquire.’ Reiterating that he is not in receipt of welfare benefits, Mahdi 
states that ‘most of the time I have to walk to ((the Centre)) and come back walking. 
I feel embarrassed asking my wife for bus ticket. It affects my dignity, I’m Afghan 
man.’ This contrasts with Satch’s experience. The cost of transport would hinder 
Satch’s ability to attend healthcare (albeit not mental health-related) appointments. 
To overcome this, a support worker from a charitable organisation put in place 
arrangements for Satch to receive free transport to and from appointments26. Whilst 
Satch’s significant mobility issues may account for the difference in support 
available here, the fact remains that whilst a solution is found for Satch, supportive 
measures for Mahdi - such as the check-ups - fail to recognise the additional 
financial burden they create for people with no recourse to financial support. For 
Mahdi, there is also a failure to recognise the role of cultural difference that, here, 
increases the potential harm to Mahdi’s wellbeing caused by the loss of ‘dignity’ at 
having to ask his wife for additional financial support.  
As the above shows, some participants did provide evidence of support being 
provided to overcome logistical barriers (or hoops) to provision. A further example 
is provided by Samantha. Both Samantha and Satch have significant mobility issues 
at various points in this research and highlight difficulties retrieving medication from 
the chemists as a result of their physical health. Such issues caused significant 
frustration for both participants. As with Mahdi, it forces them to confront an aspect 
of their present situation that they find difficult to cope with in order to receive the 
treatments they required in the way mainstream services want to deliver them. 
Following an extended period of significant decline in her physical health and 
increased ‘mental distraction’, Samantha was asked by hospital staff ‘How can we 
make things less complicated for you?’. Explaining the difficulties she has collecting 
and correctly self-administering her many medications due to her sight loss, the 
hospital agreed to collate all her medications into one monthly delivery straight to 
her home. Packaging them such that the pills are separated into those she needs 
to take in the morning, afternoon and evening. Samantha states that this adjustment 
to standard practices ‘eases things up a bit because that way I’m on top of it’, 




5 Calls for change 
At the time of collecting data, political rhetoric was still insisting on a need for 
austerity measures with regards spending on public services27, while government 
also claimed to be putting more money into mental health services. In line with 
Satch’s earlier statement, several other participants indicate not being able to ‘see 
it’, speaking instead of diminishing services. For example, Peter’s account of 
changes to GP practices that result in 10-minute consultations where only one issue 
is discussed. Over the course of this research Samantha and Satch also comment 
on difficulties getting adequate time with their GPs. Peter speaks of his discharge 
from specialist support in a homeopathic hospital occurring ‘at a point when they 
weren’t funding that anymore’; hence no possibility of re-referral. Both Satch and 
Samantha express concern that entire services are shutting down, indicating their 
belief that this will have serious impacts on people needing support; including leading 
to criminal acts or deaths. Satch explains: 
Satch: now all the money’s going in from the, city council, ((City)) council, 
they can hardly run these places anymore. There’s not a lot of ‘em left 
now, ‘cos a lot, a lot keep closing down. They, I mean 
Stéphanie: Just ‘cos the funding’s gone? 
Satch: Umm ((in agreement)). I mean, even the funding for / I mean, 
there’s only the ((substance misuse service)) and em, em, (.) and the 
little, little organisations like ((gateway charity)) and where ((support 
worker)) is now, that one at ((location of support organisation)). I mean, 
they’ve always been there, support places, and probably always will be. 
When the government starts taking them away, that’s when there will be 
trouble, [because 
Stéphanie: What sort of] trouble do you think there’d be? 
Satch: Because, well there’s be no-one, nothing, nothing at all.  
Stéphanie: So, what do you recon [will happen? 
Satch: So people’ll just have] a, a / it'll be like 
Stéphanie: Do you think it’ll be like crime or deaths or (.)? 
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Satch: Yeaahhh, they, I mean, God there’d be no-one around to help, to 
look ou / you know, to try and, be and make a difference. I mean, it feel, 
it feels like that already. It feels like everyone’s given in already. 
Satch already feels that smaller local support services are struggling to cope with 
demand due to funding shortages, and that a number of services have already shut. 
The result for him personally is that he finds himself ‘running round’ more to receive 
the array of support that he needs. I asked about crime or deaths here because I 
recalled a previous discussion wherein Satch described ‘losing all, all sense and 
common (.) you know, decency and thinking of going out and koshing someone.’ His 
thought to ‘bop someone over the head’ resulted from extreme frustration getting the 
support he requires, including difficulties receiving his medications. Instead, he had 
attempted to take his own life. Following this incident, he half joked about making 
himself homeless if the support worker he turned to for support did not step up.  
Samantha, also frustrated by her attempts to get adequate support from her doctor 
and difficulties accessing medications, states that she feels like going out onto the 
street and ‘clobbering’ someone. Whilst this is not stated with any real intent behind 
it, it does indicate a high level of frustration and anger. Samantha directly links the 
issues she is experiencing with government cuts in funding. This surprised me as 
Samantha had previously expressed frustration when people in group therapy 
sessions repeatedly made comments such as ‘the government is not looking after’ 
them adequately (see p.162). Whilst Samantha retains a position that people should 
not blame ‘government’ as much as some around her do, as this research 
progressed, she gradually expressed concerns at receiving increasingly inadequate 
health-related support as a result of process changes and cuts to services. 
Samantha and Satch’s views align also with Mahdi’s observations that the way 
asylum seekers are treated by the State in the UK drives people to commit suicide 
(see chapter 4, section 3) or towards stealing: ‘you want me to do? Go steal? To go 
jail? Or go kill myself? You’re trying to make the situation very tight for asylum seeker 
so they do something stupid.’ Though not speaking here about funding being pulled 
from services, Mahdi too highlights what a lack of support might drive people to do. 
Some participants did make a few comments regarding improvements they felt 
should be made to services provided. Regarding having the ‘right people’ and 
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‘policies’ in place and delivering services with adequate flexibility to meet the needs 
of a diverse population, Peter also calls for: 
● BAME people to be employed in mental health services;  
● user-led involvement from people with mental health issues/distress; and  
● the need for more black people to be involved in medical trials.  
Satch explicitly comments on the need for more black people working within support 
services. This view relates to a belief in the need for a greater diversity of lived 
experience among support staff to tackle racism and racial prejudice. Satch’s 
comment follows testimony about specific experiences of racism/racial prejudice 
within the context of mental health related support. He recounts the story of a staff 
member in a substance misuse clinics who continually accused him of dealing drugs 
to the other inhabitants though he could provide no proof. Satch insists that he was 
doing nothing of the sort and is adamant that such treatment results from his being 
a black man with dreadlocks. Such experiences led Satch to alter his appearance 
prior to returning to such clinics, (i.e. cutting off his dreadlocks to look less 
intimidating). Satch implies that if there were more staff from a BAME background, 
some of the stereotypes driving discriminatory behaviours he has been subjected to 
might be countered. Overall, this points to a call for the voices and expertise of 
people with relevant lived experience to be prioritised. This aligns also with 
comments made by Samantha regarding her needing staff members to meet her 
half-way regarding how her treatment is delivered. 
A further plea is also made that people using support services also be treated with 
greater dignity. Mahdi and Satch highlight the need for this in a range of services, 
highlighting to me the need for consideration of all State-led support services when 
seeking to address mental health issues. Mahdi, for example, speaks of this issue 
particularly in relation to asylum seekers not being ‘treated like human’ in the UK, in 
the context of immigration processes and welfare payments.  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that, just as the negotiations made regarding 
understandings of mental health are complex and shaped by participants’ 
intersectional locations, so too are their negotiations of State support services. Their 
experiences and perceptions of support cannot be separated out from the wider 
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context in which they experience them. It is this, for example, that leads to 
perceptions of support as inappropriate or inadequate to their needs. Indeed, 
participants express that engaging in treatments or engaging with support providers 
can aggravate their mental health issues/distress because it ignores their living 
circumstances, triggers past trauma or exposes them to situations that reinforce 
their marginalised positions. In the following chapter, I discuss my own 
interpretations of what the findings in this and chapter 4 mean for policy-makers 
working in this field. I do this in the context of the literature, highlighting where it 
supports or contradicts participants’ testimonies as presented here. Overall, I find 
three core lessons for policy-makers to draw from this in-depth exploration of the 






Chapter 6: Discussion 
In both my literature review and across my findings chapters I consider issues in 
relation to the three key areas of public health policy regarding health inequalities; 
definitions of the issue, prevention, and service performance. This structure will now 
support me in considering what policymakers might learn from those with lived 
experience at the intersections of BAME status/backgrounds and mental health 
issues/distress. I therefore begin this chapter by considering how BAME mental 
health inequality is defined by various parties as an issue requiring attention and 
intervention. As mentioned in chapters 4 and 5, most participants did not 
hypothesise at a group level about why people from BAME groupings might 
experience (diagnosis of) mental health issues/distress at disparate rates to white 
British people, making direct comparison between the literature review and my own 
data more difficult. However, participants’ choices of terminology often highlight 
important negotiations they make in relation to mental health and other experiences 
resulting from how they are stratified and situated in society. Close examination of 
these navigations and responses to diagnostic categories therefore provide insights 
into how power dynamics at the population level are understood to manifest through 
mental health discourses and practices. Consequently, these conversations open 
up opportunities to explore whether ontological and epistemological issues 
highlighted in the critical literature are reflected in participants’ own perspectives.    
In part B, I move to discuss the determinants of mental health issues/distress 
highlighted by participants and in the literature. Having focused primarily on those 
determinants that say something of participants’ particular social stratification and 
intersectional locations in chapter 4, I offer an analysis across hypotheses focused 
at the group level in the context of views of determinants at the individual level. The 
results of this analysis are then considered in the context of national strategies to 
address BAME mental health inequality to determine what might be learnt by 
policymakers. Part C undertakes the same process, but with a focus on experiences 
of State-led support services; primarily mental health and related support services. 
Once more, a direct comparison between my findings and the literature is not 
straight forward. This is primarily due to this study intentionally seeking to fill a 
relative gap in the literature regarding the experiences of people from BAME 
backgrounds diagnosed with CMD and living in the community, (as opposed to 
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being in a psychiatric ward). Throughout these sections, I include testimony from 
staff members at my gateway organisation that I interviewed. These are inserted 
primarily where their positions offer a unique or significant insight into a given issue 
raised by participants. Finally, I examine calls for change in the literature in the 
context of participants’ views on what needs to change and how. Ultimately, this 
chapter seeks to highlight several changes that policymakers might bring to their 
approach of the issue to be better placed to develop any future national strategies 
addressing the issue. I begin, then, with and examination of how the issue is defined.  
Part A: Defining the issue  
In Appendix 6, I suggest that aspects of the State’s definition of BAME mental health 
inequality in the NHMH (2011) are problematic. The State now explicitly recognises 
trends highlighted in epidemiological research and service outcome/experiences 
data as evidence of inequality, not just disparity. This shift by the State is likely linked 
to a shift within ‘psy’ disciplines dominant within the NHS. Whilst practices in the 
NHS remain largely adherent to bio-medical models, they have increasingly moved 
away from bio-genetic explanatory hypotheses of a selectionist nature to explain 
BAME mental health inequalities, focusing more on the role of social factors. This 
shift is welcomed by many scholars, practitioners and activists in this area. However, 
significant debates persist regarding how this issue should be defined (see chapter 
3), and what this means for interventions implemented to address it. Often these 
debates concern the role of racism and cultural imperialism in mental health 
discourses and practices, and how these impact interpretations of epidemiological 
and service-performance trends.  
Though dominant discourses, grounded in western medicalised models of mental 
health, maintain that epidemiological trends are indicative of ‘actual’ illness, they are 
increasingly open to hypotheses that service performance trends reflect the 
influence of racism and racial prejudice (Cox, 2001, p.248; Department for Health 
and Social Care, 2018b, p.10). Yet, these explanations also insist that differences 
in service outcomes recorded are most often the result of disparities in need; e.g. 
the increased medication and longer stays in psychiatric wards experienced by 
black people are primarily the result of increased need, not racial prejudice in mental 
health systems. Scholars and practitioners writing from a critical or transcultural 
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position do not dismiss that increased need may be at play. However, some highlight 
that the continued dominance of the western medical tradition within mental 
healthcare in the UK likely increases both perceptions of and ‘actual’ BAME mental 
health inequality. The State currently adopts the dominant narrative regarding how 
BAME mental health inequality ought to be defined (see Appendix 6). This 
undoubtably fuels focus on mental health services, while evading taking action to 
address the socio-cultural factors contributing to increased ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress as they impact on BAME populations.   
Whilst the need for ‘cultural competence’ – which seeks to address issues such as 
those arising from culturally-mediated differences in understandings of mental 
health - is widely accepted in services (see chapter 3, part C), this tends to be at a 
relatively surface level and does not disturb the epistemological framework of 
western medicine. Further, there is no real examination of how systemic and 
institutionalised racism functions in this space. I note once more that whilst the State 
has accepted the presence of interpersonal racism in mental health services, it has 
yet to accept institutional racism. The unquestioning adoption of the dominant 
medical narrative, while understandable as the State and its policymakers (often) 
are not experts in the field, is to the detriment of scholarship from trans-cultural and 
critical standpoints. This omission is of great importance as such scholarship 
presents research that better encompasses the experiences of racialised and 
minority ethnic peoples. Indeed, I have found that the testimonies of participants in 
this research are most aligned with such scholarship. The PCREF currently being 
trialled was formulated primarily by people with lived experience of the 
BAME/mental health intersection. Although this framework falls short of a national 
strategy to address BAME mental health inequality overall due to its focus on mental 
health services, I do feel that the added value of lived experience is visible. This is 
because of a measure that pushes at the boundaries of epistemic assumptions 
regarding diagnosis through its recommendation to revisit how many BAME people 
should be expected to experience actual mental health issues/distress (see p.10).   
1 Interpreting trends from the margins 
Exploring the main challenges to more medicalised interpretations of trends and 
how these might provide too narrow a scope for an impactful national-level strategy, 
I find in the literature a strong focus on the ways that racism and cultural imperialism 
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is translated into diagnostic categories and assessment practices, and the practices 
that fall from these. Primarily, the transcultural and critical literature deconstructs the 
emergence and development of specific mental health labels and how they have 
been influenced by racist narratives. Most participants do not hold this specialist 
knowledge. However, several express beliefs and/or provide examples that 
demonstrate points made in the literature regarding racism. For example, Peter’s 
observation of the historic perception of black people as ‘more susceptible’ to mental 
health issues/distress than white people. This perception – which is a form of racial 
prejudice when applied in a blanket manner that does not account for group-level 
oppression and trauma - can discourage medical practitioners from exploring 
alternative explanations when a black person presents with physical symptoms. 
Peter’s suggestion that these ‘symptoms’ are sometimes symptomatic of physical 
health issues is reminiscent of both: Szasz’s (2011) warnings regarding ‘categorical 
error’ in diagnosis, where physical health issues are categorised as mental health 
as a result of the limitations of diagnostic tools and concepts; and of cautions 
regarding the blanket application of theories of somatisation among people of BAME 
backgrounds (see Appendix 19). 
Whilst no other core participant highlights this issue, a staff member interviewed 
also reported similar experiences. Ruth, previously a senior NHS mental health 
nurse herself, spoke of a time when both she and her son were diagnosed as having 
mental health issues/distress as a result of physical health symptoms they 
described. Working in the field herself, Ruth was adamant that the problems they 
were experiencing were not related to mental health issues/distress. Insisting that 
they be seen by specialists, she was eventually diagnosed with ‘severe obstructive 
sleep apnoea’ and vitamin D deficiency among other things. Her son received a 
diagnosis of hypermobility (see Appendix 22). Cautions in the literature regarding 
the possible mis-application of somatisation theory (see Appendix 19) speak exactly 
to that which Peter and Ruth describe; the assumption of somatisation among 
people of BAME backgrounds. More commonly reported in the literature, however, 
is the opposite; e.g. the mis-diagnosis of mental health issues/distress as physical 
ailments among many BAME groupings (see chapter 3, section 7.1).  
Fears of misdiagnosis are present in the testimony of other participants also. For 
example, when Satch speaks of professionals ‘forever trying to label me mentally ill’ 
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(see p.142), or when Mya explains her reticence at speaking of her spiritual 
revelation some years prior (see p.151-152). Though no other participants 
expressed fear in relation to spirituality and misdiagnosis, Ruth also highlights 
instances she witnessed when spirituality that did not conform to the major religions 
of the UK were misinterpreted as symptoms of psychosis (see Appendix 22). She 
provides an account of a lady sectioned under the MHA83 with religious delusions 
who faced a diagnosis of schizophrenia, remarking that: 
it was a blessing that this particular consultant [who undertook the final 
assessment] understood the culture. He knew of that religious sect. It's 
dominant in certain parts of Africa.  
Had it not been for the consultant psychiatrist assessing the lady being both able to 
speak pigeon English and aware of a religious sect prominent in Africa, this lady 
would likely have been sectioned and placed on psychotropic medication. Such 
issues are precisely the reason why Mya feared speaking to therapists about her 
spiritual experience, and are arguably of greater importance among BAME 
groupings than for the white British population. Many people of BAME backgrounds 
are more likely to be affiliated to religious groups that are less well understood in the 
UK, and to view religious belief and affiliation as core to their identity generally 
(Burton et al., 2008, pp.17–18; Government Office for Science, 2013, p.17). Yet 
previous strategies to address BAME mental health inequality have not addressed 
this.  
Though the role of differences in religious/spiritual beliefs and cultural norms in 
misdiagnosis is discussed in the literature, more commonly debated in relation to 
diagnostic labels and practices in the critical literature are the ways in which mental 
health discourses pathologize responses to oppression. Dominant discourses 
widely accept prolonged exposure to discrimination and oppression as a significant 
risk factor for mental health issues/distress. This acceptance is mirrored in the 
State’s strategies regarding mental health inequalities. For example, the NHMH 
(2011) includes an Annex with actions across government departments that the 
State claims supports its equality agenda; e.g. reforms to welfare payments, and the 
introduction of ‘pupil premiums’ to increase support to disadvantaged children 
(Department of Health, 2011b, pp.79–85). As I demonstrate in my findings chapters 
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and discuss in part B of this chapter, participants also recognise the role that distress 
from and resistance to oppression plays in their own mental health issues/distress. 
Indeed, many participants emphasise the role such experiences play in triggering 
mental health issues/distress among people of similar ‘race’, ethnicity, or migrant 
status to themselves (see chapter 4).  
A more controversial claim is that mental health discourses and practices serve at 
times to reinforce such oppressions. One form being the pathologization of outrage, 
suffering and resistance arising from experiences of discrimination and oppression. 
In my literature review, I provide examples of such diagnostic categories; for 
instance, Drapetomania and protest psychosis (see p.59). This study provides 
testimony in support of this hypothesis. For instance, Satch’s refusal of any mental 
health label other than ‘addict’ is inextricably linked to the disempowering and 
dehumanising effects of such labels. For Satch, the difficulties he has with addiction 
and emotions result from very real experiences of discrimination and oppression 
faced throughout his life, and likely those experienced by his father. Comments 
denying him a right to anger in relation to such experiences (e.g. ‘you’ve got a chip 
on your shoulder’) only reinforce his determination to reject being labelled such that 
his resistance to oppression can be pathologized.  
Another example is found in Peter’s problematisation of ‘paranoia’ in the context of 
exposure to racism and racially-motivated micro-aggressions. Peter appears to 
imply that mental health discourses are not able to appropriately differentiate 
between responses to actual incidents of racism and irrational paranoia. This claim 
is interesting when married with the writings of scholars such as Fernando, Bhui and 
Nazroo who argue that racism is not adequately or appropriately accounted for 
within mental health practices (Fernando, 2017; Nazroo et al., 2019), leading often 
to a focus on the individual instead of systemic inequality and oppression. The 
danger of such pathologization at the individual level, is that protests against 
injustices are interpreted as evidence of pathologies, lending an illegitimacy to 
claims made by those deemed ill as opposed to being viewed as legitimising 
evidence of injustice. Several participants express such concerns; for example, in 
addition to Peter’s concerns above, Mahdi, Samantha and Satch highlight how 
medication is used to dismiss the need to address the ‘root causes’ of, or 
aggravating factors in, their distress when these pertain to wider social inequalities. 
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Their voices are depoliticised and/or silenced. Not only might this be a contributing 
factor in the repeated findings that people of BAME backgrounds are less satisfied 
with their experiences of mental health services, but it may also explain why some 
disengage or refuse to seek out support from services in the first place. It is perhaps 
not a coincidence that the participants who were most resistant to medicalised 
terminology are those carrying the identity-marker ‘black’. 
At the level of national policy, strict medicalised and depoliticised interpretations 
provide a basis on which the State can moderate the degree to which it addresses 
discrimination, oppression and inequality in society. Medicalised discourses 
acknowledge that racism and discrimination contribute significantly to mental health 
inequality, thus such issues must be recognised and addressed. However, the same 
discourse also posits that claims of discrimination and oppression are delusions or 
paranoia resulting from mental ‘illness’, not factors external to the person. The State 
retains room to manoeuvre regarding the extent to which it seeks to address such 
issues, leading to the development of strategies that (largely) avoid taking 
preventative measures to reduce incidence/prevalence of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress among BAME populations. Thus, a strict adherence to dominant 
narratives in mental health discourses renders the scope of national-level strategies 
to address BAME mental health inequality inadequate.  
Additionally, such approaches enable the continued failure to consider the ways in 
which England’s racist and colonial past has infused itself in mental health 
discourses and practices, and manifest in the present day. It fails to question how 
systems around mental health reinforce racism and colonial narratives that 
denigrate other worldviews. Given the role of such phenomena in ‘actual’ instances 
of mental health issues/distress, in possible misdiagnoses and in diagnostic 
practices, this is a significant gap in any policy aimed at addressing BAME mental 
health inequality. The failure to challenge such assumptions or to address the ways 
in which racist and colonialist narratives still permeate our society results in 
phenomena core to shaping BAME mental health inequalities remaining out of 
scope of policy responses. This is of particular importance when considering 
national-level strategies, as local policies have a more limited ability to address the 
ways that high-level systemic issues pervade England’s national institutions. 
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2 Navigating medicalised terminology of mental health 
Thus far, my own research seems to align well with the literature specifically 
concerned with BAME mental health inequality, particularly that of a transcultural 
standpoint with its particular focus on racialisation and cultural imperialism. Where 
it diverges, however, is the primacy given to racism as the form of oppression 
requiring attention in this area of inequality. Whilst experiences of racism are present 
in my findings, more widely found was the impact of oppression experienced as a 
result of a wide range of identity-markers. It is these in both additive form and in 
combination that seem to impact most on participants’ navigations of mental health 
discourses and practices. This becomes evident when paying close attention to 
individual participants’ specific experiences of oppression and how these intertwine 
with their discussions of mental health terminology (see chapter 4, part A). 
It is telling that those participants who do accept medicalised terminology for mental 
health tend to do so in part because it somehow helps them to overcome various 
forms of stigma or oppression. The medical model of mental health has legitimised 
claims for specific support for some participants - e.g Mahdi and his asylum claim, 
and Mya regarding access to welfare benefits (see p.101) - and provides a socially 
accepted reason for not meeting social expectations - e.g Andeep, Mahdi and Mya 
regarding expectations to work (see p.101-102). Indeed, an examination of 
participants’ testimonies to explore the role of illness narratives for people in 
marginalised intersectional location would undoubtably provide interesting insights. 
However, this would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I note that part A 
of chapter 4 demonstrates that aetiological beliefs were not the most significant 
factor in participants’ choice of terminology. Rather, people’s experiences of 
marginalisation and the forms of discrimination and oppression they are subject to 
does. This explains, perhaps, why two participants who accept medicalised 
terminology (to varying degrees) do not accept medical treatments as sufficient 
support for mental health issues/distress (see Table 5).  
As discussed in chapter 4, Andeep remains continually cautious about labelling 
himself as experiencing mental health issues, often shifting between ascribing to 
being ill or not, with his discontent with medication driving evasions of medicalised 
terminology to describe his own experiences. In contrast, Mahdi fully adopts the 
language of ‘mental illness’. Yet, like Andeep, he is deeply critical of the current 
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reliance on medicalised approaches to mental health treatments. Something else is 
at play for Mahdi, and it does not appear to be that his aetiological beliefs are 
inclusive of biological factors. Instead, his reasons seem more linked to how 
different discourses situate him in relation to his identity and oppressions 
experienced. For instance, how his mental illness impacts his interactions with 
people (see Appendix 20) or his ability to be in employment. A further consideration 
supporting Mahdi’s adoption of mental ‘illness’ terminology might also be the role 
that a diagnosis has played in his obtaining refugee status in the UK. He recalls that 
a psychologist ‘proved that I have problem’ and that the ‘Home Office, due to that 
report, accept my case and give me five years visa.’  
Table 5: Accord between terminology and views on treatment 







with views on 
support? 
Andeep Yes No No 
Mya Yes Yes Yes 
Mahdi Yes No No 
Peter No No Yes 
Samaiya Yes Unknown Unknown 
Satch Mostly no No Yes 
Samantha No No Yes 
Other forms of discrimination and oppression that seem to mediate the 
terminological choices of participants include those relating to class, disability and 
experiences of a more intersectional nature. For example, Peter speaks eloquently 
about how poverty or being ‘working class’ means that a person is more likely to be 
labelled as ‘mad’ (see p.104). Juxtaposed with his views that stress resulting from 
financial difficulties and worries about housing result in many people ‘not coping’, 
this leads me to believe that he perceives the distress of poverty to be too often 
pathologized. In this way, the issue is turned into one of the individual, rather than 
remaining focused on inequalities in UK society. This sort of rationale seems to drive 
several participants’ to reject medicalised terminology to describe their distress (see 
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chapter 4, part A). One reason that Peter seems more amenable to the diagnostic 
category of post-traumatic slave syndrome (PTSS) is that the experience of 
oppression – specifically, intergenerational trauma - is a founding block of this 
category. These negotiations, though not a significant feature of qualitative research 
into BAME mental health inequality, are reflective of findings in the BAME mental 
health service user/survivor led report Recovery and Resilience (2011, p27). 
For Samantha this rationale seems to augment any disposition against medicalised 
understandings that might arise from a discord between such narratives and the 
alternative understandings she has brought from Swaziland. Though 
understandings of mental health issues/distress from Swaziland do seem to 
influence Samantha’s views, her rejection of medicalised narratives seem more 
often to stem from the way that such terminology encourages submission. For 
example, she states that the mental health team ‘just went and upped my dose, and 
then that was it’, dismissing what she actually wanted or needed. A woman who has 
experienced domestic violence, who is continually told to express herself differently 
and who has experienced racism and intersectional oppression as a black migrant 
woman, she is unwilling to expose herself to discourses that further silence her. 
Evidence of the pathologizing of distress from marginalised locations was presented 
to me by staff members. Perhaps the most shocking example pertains to a lady 
living in council housing. Marcia explained that a lady she had worked with had been 
falsely diagnosed as delusional following her reports to a housing association that 
‘seeing blood coming through the wall’ of her apartment. Deciding to investigate 
further, Marcia found that the lady’s neighbour ‘would actually self-harm’ such that 
blood seeped through the wall into her apartment. Marcia provides three such 
examples of people’s living conditions being ignored and a diagnosis of mental 
health illness being given instead (see Appendix 22).  
This study therefore suggests that oppression in its many forms is key to 
understanding BAME mental health inequality. Scholars of a critical standpoint 
within mental health discourses do highlight how marginalisation of all forms can be 
reinforced within mental health discourses. Whilst it is natural that scholarship 
specific to the experiences of BAME populations might focus primarily on racism 
and cultural imperialism, this practice tends to be at the expense of recognition of 
multiple and intersectional experiences of discrimination and oppression. As I 
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highlight in my literature review, this gap in the literature is increasingly being 
recognised with some starting to call for policy responses to address intersectional 
issues (see p.92). There has, however, been no national-level strategy to address 
BAME mental health inequality since such calls have emerged from prominent 
figures in the field. Just as Fernando (1998) comments that the impact of racism is 
understood at the theoretical but not the practical level, I feel that this point too is 
understood at the theoretical level to some degree but not at the practical level in 
policy circles. By this I mean that both the DRE evaluation document and the NHMH 
(2011) went to great lengths to emphasise that no person is entirely defined by one 
facet of their identity and many people experience multiple disadvantage. However, 
this did not translate into a scoping of the issue of BAME mental health inequality 
that adequately emphasised the need to consider interconnecting issues arising 
from multiple disadvantage. Where such issues were included in the scope, they 
were only of an additive nature; with the intersectional nature of many forms of 
multiple disadvantage neglected entirely.  
Summary 
In considering how BAME mental health inequality is defined in national-level policy, 
setting the scope for any potential strategies to address the issues, I find the 
following. First, the dominant narrative that the State draws from is not 
representative of the views and lived experience of many within the target 
population. In designing and implementing a policy response that meets the needs 
of BAME people experiencing mental health issues/distress – a health issue that is 
often intimately linked with experiences of marginalisation - definitions of the issue 
must seek to incorporate, (not marginalise), the diversity of voices of that group and 
the research that most aligns with them. Whilst there is still a place for dominant 
narratives, this must not be to the cost of alternative perspectives. Accepting 
definitions that are not reflective of the diversity of perspectives within the target 
population, strategies:  
● fail to address an array of issues not accepted by dominant 
conceptualisations; and  




Using dominant western medicalised perspectives to limit - or ‘tame’ (see Appendix 
8) – the scope of policy responses, leads such responses to become both more 
manageable for policymakers and less relevant to the problem as it is experienced 
by those impacted. It is perhaps in part due to this that responses thus far have 
failed to have the impact desired. Changing the approach taken to scope policy, so 
that the process becomes more inclusive of diverse perspectives and more 
representative of lived experience of the inequality in question, might lead to greater 
emphasis being placed on structural and systemic issues. This includes the 
influence of racism and racial prejudice on psychiatric epistemologies and practices, 
and the way that mental health discourses navigate oppression and the networks of 
systems of oppression that uphold it.  
Part B: Determinants of mental health/distress in the context of ‘inequality’   
Running parallel to the largely epistemological challenges set out in part A is the 
acceptance by many that aetiological trends are predominantly reflective of 
inequalities in ‘actual’ mental health issues/distress. This position does not 
contradict the above challenges, but rather highlights the complexity of BAME 
mental health inequality as a social issue. The co-existence of these explanations 
of trends seems supported by consideration of the testimonies of participants in this 
research. For, even those participants most averse to the use of medicalised 
terminology spoke of determinants that might reasonably be considered to 
disproportionately impact people of BAME backgrounds in the UK in triggering or 
aggravating ‘actual’ mental health issues/distress. Exploration of determinants is 
important in a policy context as aetiological hypotheses direct the actions taken to 
address increased risk of incidence/prevalence.  
3 Pre-disposition and biology in BAME mental health inequality 
Overall, the body of research examining epidemiological trends supports policy 
approaches that prioritise consideration of wider social inequalities, though it does 
not entirely rule out explanations of a bio-genetic basis at the individual level, and 
selection basis at the group level. Though bio-genetic understandings of a selection-
basis are present among participants, understandings of determinants align 
predominantly with the literature of a more social causation approach. The 
exemption being perhaps in relation to the theory of social drift. Though participants 
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do not express awareness of this theory, both Mahdi and Samantha report 
experiencing psychological/emotional difficulties prior to migration (see chapter 4, 
section 3), indicating that this played a role in their decisions to leave their countries 
of origin. For Mahdi, this was the need to escape torture at the hands of the Taliban. 
Samantha is less explicit. However, she seems to suggest that difficulties 
experienced in Swaziland contributed to her decision to follow her then British 
boyfriend to England. She further recognises that some of her difficulties might be 
considered mental health issues in the UK. In this way, Mahdi and Samantha 
describe motivations for migration that align with the proposition that ‘symptomatic 
individuals’ might be drawn to migrate in disproportionate levels to ‘non-
symptomatic’ people (Os et al., 2001). A similar process is expressed in relation to 
urban spaces to explain increased levels of mental health inequality in cities. Satch 
describes migrations across cities in his adult life as being intricately linked to 
seeking support for his substance misuse or to follow music scenes; music being 
one of the key ways that Satch develops a sense of belonging that mitigates some 
of his distress.   
More generally however, participants’ understandings of mental health determinants 
seem partly influenced by both their lived experiences and judgements regarding 
whether hypotheses empower or disempower. This seems to mimic the rationale 
employed when making terminological choices. It is perhaps unsurprising then that 
very few participants accept bio-genetic explanations of a selection-basis. Such 
explanations are often situated in the critical literature as disempowering to people 
of BAME backgrounds due to historic links between these claims and racist views 
regarding the biological inferiority of racialised people. Bio-genetic explanations 
proposed in relation to BAME mental health inequality included suggestions of black 
people as more prone to low IQ (Sharpley et al., 2001). Though there is evidence of 
links between low IQ and mental health (Aylward et al., 1984; Koenen et al., 2009; 
Melby et al., 2020; Sheitman et al., 2000), and of low educational attainment among 
African-Caribbean people in the UK (Rhamie and Hallam, 2002, pp.151–152), 
putting these two factors together in a simplistic manner misses the significant 
impact of systemic racism and cultural imperialism in the education system on 
educational attainment among BAME pupils. Narratives that position BAME 
groupings as genetically or culturally predisposed to mental health issues/distress 
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have been largely disproved (see p.62-63). Several participants express awareness 
of how such narratives reinforce oppressions they experience, e.g. Peter on 
paranoia and susceptibility (see p.98). Indeed, the only participant to express an 
acceptance of bio-genetic predisposition to mental illness via their acceptance of 
neurological determinants is Mya; the one participant in this research who can 
evade racialisation.  
Interestingly, though Mahdi is the other participant most comfortable with 
medicalised terminology, he is clear that mental illness remains the result of external 
factors that then impact a person in ways that can manifest as biological. This 
understanding is best conveyed through his analogy of a cut (see p.107). Socio-
cultural factors are inextricably linked to the biological aspect of mental illness in that 
they direct whether the ‘cut’ heals or becomes increasingly infected. The biological 
‘cut’ interacts and reacts with socio-cultural and environmental issues. This 
interaction recognises that mental illness is not isolated within the body/mind of the 
individual, but rather that it functions among open systems that influence its journey. 
In this way, Mahdi accepts medicalised models of mental health, whilst also 
maintaining a view of determinants that is firmly situated within explanations of a 
social causation nature. In this way, Mahdi navigates the potentially disempowering 
aspects of biological explanations of mental health issues/distress in a process very 
similar to that described in the Recovery and Resilience report (2011, p30-31). 
A similarity might be seen here with Peter’s navigation of acknowledging inequalities 
of ‘actual’ mental health issues/distress experienced by black people without 
accepting medicalised narratives that depoliticise or reinforce aetiological 
hypotheses imbued with racism. The similarity being that acceptance of the 
existence of ‘actual’ mental health issues/distress is predicated only on theories 
most aligned with social causation approaches. For instance, PTSS is accepted 
because acknowledgement of social inequality as the cause of distress is inherent 
in the category, not bio-genetic or cultural inferiority. Thus, its manifestation in a 
group is evidence of exposure to inequality, not susceptibility due to racial inferiority. 
I note also that whilst Mya accepted genetic explanations for mental illness in some 
people, she at no point indicates a belief that this explains mental health inequalities. 
Additionally, whilst Mya allows that mental illnesses might be bio-genetically 
determined in some instances, she too speaks of the relationship between biological 
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and environmental factors in mental health. I simply wanted to highlight her 
acceptance of bio-genetic predisposition as contrasting significantly with views 
expressed by other participants who have been exposed to oppressions that include 
racialisation.  
A second way in which biological factors present among participants’ testimonies in 
a ‘social causation’ manner relates to the psychological and emotional impact that 
experiences of physical ill-health and disability can have on an individual. Samaiya, 
Samantha and Satch report that their physical impairments directly impact on their 
mental health/distress when they describe feelings of exhaustion and physical pain 
(see p.107-109). Other statements relate to the additional psychological impact of 
disabling experiences associated with physical impairments (see p.127-128). For 
instance, Samaiya’s sentiment that she ‘wanted to do things which I haven't 
achieved’, due to difficulties experienced in an education system that did not 
adequately accommodate for her learning needs or the needs arising from her 
chronic illness (see Appendix 20).  
Far from bringing participants’ views closer to bio-genetic explanations that posit 
mental illness as ‘prior to’ experiences of inequality (see chapter 3, section 4), my 
findings demonstrate the extent to which participants’ view mental health 
issues/distress as caused by social factors. Even where participants highlight 
biological issues that precede mental health issues/distress, this is often intricately 
linked with experiences of disablement, which I understand as issues of social 
inequality. In more recent decades, research has tended to prioritise exploration of 
socio-cultural and environmental factors. This aligns well with the determinants that 
participants in this study prioritise. However, I suggest that the increasing absence 
of consideration of biological issues might have inadvertently led to a gap in the 
literature regarding experiences at intersections inclusive of chronic illness/physical 
impairment, disability, race/minority ethnicity and mental health. Whilst 
consideration of the intersection of physical and mental health and disability does 
take place within Disability Studies (Beresford et al., 2010; Erevelles, 2011; Goodley 
and Lawthom, 2005; Price, 2017), it is ominously absent in studies on BAME mental 
health inequality.  
188 
 
Within the context of national-level policy, the NHS long-term plan (2019) implies an 
approach to addressing physical and mental health inequalities for BAME groupings 
that is informed by an additive approach. This looks at both physical and mental 
health, but not the intersection of both such that it impacts on BAME mental health 
inequality. Similarly, the NHMH (2011) addressed disability and BAME mental 
health inequalities entirely separately as a result of its ‘multi-strand’ approach (see 
Appendix 6). As such, the State misses the ways that these issues intersect and co-
construct each other. With physical health issues and disability experienced at 
higher rates among BAME groupings (Byrne et al., 2020; PHE, 2018) – an issue 
made more visible during this pandemic period - I suggest that this area could be 
fruitful in better understanding some of the complex ways in which BAME mental 
health inequality arises. 
Despite this identified gap, I acknowledge that public health policy circles do 
increasingly recognise the importance of socio-cultural and environmental issues, 
and the interconnectedness of the body and mind, in matters of health (Department 
for Health and Social Care, 1998; Department of Health, 1980; Department of 
Health, 2011b; Marmot et al., 2010; NHS England, 2019b). Indeed, my evaluation 
of the NHMH (2011) demonstrates that the State included the rhetoric of both 
selection and social causation in their definition of mental health inequality (see 
Appendix 6), with some very limited action to address social inequality. Influencing 
policies addressing mental health inequalities, reports such as those highlighted 
above should encourage greater consideration of the role of socio-cultural and 
environmental factors when seeking to implement preventative measures in public 
health, particularly when addressing health inequalities.  
4 Socio-cultural factors: open systems and intersectionality 
Many of the key socio-cultural determinants found within the literature are present 
in the testimonies of participants in this study. For example, issues raised regarding 
childhood and pre-migratory trauma and suffering are present in all but Andeep’s 
testimony. With regards to childhood trauma, Satch’s account correlates strongly 
with research that points to the trauma inflicted through separation from a parent 
(Mallett et al., 2002, p.334; Morgan et al., 2009, p.232). The literature on this matter 
recognised that such events in any child’s life would likely increase risk of mental 
health issues/distress in adulthood. However, scholars here acknowledge this as an 
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issue of particular importance for BAME mental health inequality because wider 
social inequalities experienced by many BAME groupings increase incidents of 
separation. The role of social inequalities specific to racialised people in Satch’s 
separation from his parents is absolutely clear. First, racism at the interpersonal 
level led to his mother’s decision not to keep raising him and his younger sister. 
Secondly, Satch reports that racism at a more systemic level influenced social work 
practices such that his father was not permitted to care for his children as a single-
parent black man. Thus, whilst separation from parents is a determinant of mental 
health across social categories, it has a particular relationship to the inequalities 
experienced by BAME groupings that renders it of particular importance to BAME 
mental health inequality. 
Though an area of relevance to increased rates of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress, much of the literature in this space does not focus on childhood 
experiences of hardship and trauma specifically. Rather, it tends to be implied in 
discussions of exposure to socio-economic deprivation and racism; including 
intergenerational forms. In considering how participants viewed mental health 
determinants in this sub-theme, I note that most acknowledge childhood and pre-
migratory trauma as being the or an instigator of mental health issues/distress. 
However, they tended not to view these as the issues that this research should focus 
on. Perhaps because some consider these to be the result of personal 
circumstances, not inequality – a view that I might challenge. For example, Samaiya 
expressed that her physical health and learning difficulties as a child have had a 
significant impact on her mental health, but does not necessarily situate difficulties 
faced as resulting from an ablest society when others might. Another reason for not 
wanting to focus on these issues might be that they feel that these issues go beyond 
the scope of what the State and society in England can reasonably be held 
responsible for; for example, in relation to pre-migratory experiences such as 
Mahdi’s and Samantha’s. For these reasons, I highlight such issues as important for 
future epidemiological research and national strategies to address when considering 
BAME mental health inequality, despite a lack of detailed exploration in this thesis. 
A final reason why participants seemed not to want to focus on such issues was that 
they conveyed feeling able to heal or manage the issues/distress arising from 
childhood/pre-migratory trauma if not continually exposed to stressors and 
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oppression that aggravate their mental health. Focusing on issues more pressing 
and relevant to their adult/post-migratory experiences, participants often spoke of 
issues created or sustained by the State through its policies and services, or 
inequalities perceived as within its scope of responsibility, e.g. socio-economic 
deprivation, systemic racism etc.  
Material deprivation is situated as a key determinant within both the literature and 
the testimonies of participants. Even Peter, who owns his own home and ran a 
business for many years, holds issues related to material deprivation as significant 
in the distress that many people experience. The literature highlights several 
hypotheses relating to different aspects of material deprivation; I focused on 
urbanicity and socio-economic disadvantage. Encapsulated within these are the 
material experiences of inadequate and unstable housing, unemployment, low 
educational attainment, and the increased risk of exposure to low social status. All 
of the above factors are found in some form in participants’ testimonies. For 
example, housing. This was generally raised by those participants living in council 
housing and pertained to the unsuitability of the property for their needs, though 
Peter did pass comment in the margins between our conversations about the 
negative impact of people in cities not having a garden. Like Mahdi, who often seeks 
refuge in parks (see Appendix 20), he was all too aware of the positive impact of the 
outdoors and of nature on people’s wellbeing. Housing issues constituted a 
considerable part of Satch’s anxiety at the start of this research and was cited by 
him as contributing to his suicide attempt. Equally, inappropriate housing 
aggravated Mahdi’s mental illness following his separation from his wife, as he did 
not feel safe with the residents in the apartment he was placed in.  
Perhaps, however, the factor most widely raised across participants in relation to 
material deprivation and stressors is that of financial difficulties; an issue that also 
features significantly in the literature. These are situated by participants and 
scholars alike as an important aggravating factor for mental health, with Peter citing 
it as a cause for people ‘finding it very difficult to cope’. Indeed, only two participants 
did not indicate any difficulties of this sort: Mya, who positions herself as middle 
class; and Samaiya, whose family have always provided for her and who (from 
observation) seem well enough situated financially. The stress caused by such 
precarity and the exposure to other difficulties as a result is evident throughout 
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participants’ accounts. Instability of finances is highlighted as limiting what 
participants can achieve, e.g. Andeep is unable to consider marriage (see p.113); 
Mahdi and his wife could not move forward and build a life together in part due to 
financial constraints (see p.116). For others, it creates anxiety about maintaining a 
decent standard of living and security; for instance, Satch’s fears of being left without 
heating (see Appendix 20); Peter’s linking financial concerns to being able to pay 
the mortgage (see p.116); Mahdi’s struggle to afford medication (see p.167). This is 
also something commented on by staff members interviewed (see Appendix 23). 
John O explains that people he is supporting with welfare claims on the basis of 
physical disabilities are: 
afraid of / ‘oh my benefit is being stopped’ / they are very unsure that they 
couldn’t get money. …They tend to now become so severe, anxiously 
severe and depressed because of those difficulties. Maybe because of 
the financial aspect of it. ...So all of this coupled together to give them 
mental problems.  
This extract is supportive of the literature regarding the links between poverty and 
mental health issues/distress, situating people who experience poverty as exposed 
to more stressors and as at increased risk of mental health issues/distress (see 
chapter 3, section 5.2). Specific to BAME mental health inequality, the literature 
tends to explore how oppressive social dynamics situate people of BAME 
backgrounds as more likely to experience socio-economic disadvantage. 
Interestingly, only Mahdi provided me with comments that explicitly bring his BAME 
status and financial situation together when he highlights that the Home Office is 
‘torturing people with £30 a week’. Though much more implicit, Satch’s account of 
the ‘black petit bourgeois’ also demonstrates an awareness of an 
interconnectedness between ‘Blackness’, socio-economic deprivation and class. In 
describing this he acknowledges that some black people arriving to the UK in the 
1960/70’s perceived it necessary to reject their own cultural norms, and assimilate 
into British society to gain ‘white collar’ jobs that might lift them from socio-economic 
disadvantage and elivate their social standing.  
This racial aspect of the disproportionate poverty experienced by BAME groupings, 
whilst acknowledged as an area of inequality by the State remains unattended to in 
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its policy to address BAME mental health inequality. For example, the DRE clearly 
states that ‘Financial insecurity, unemployment and a poor built environment also 
have a negative impact on mental health and all disproportionately affect BME 
groups’ (Department of Health, 2005, p.60). Yet its only action in relation to financial 
insecurity was to make ‘modifications to state financial assistance so that patients 
do not leave residential hospital care in order to obtain adequate financial assistance 
from the state’ (Department of Health, 2005, p.32). Whilst undoubtably important to 
those leaving psychiatric wards, this recourse addresses only a problem in mental 
health support provision rules and nothing to respond to financial insecurity as a 
determinant of BAME mental health inequality. In the NHMH (2011), 
disproportionate levels of socioeconomic disadvantage among BAME populations 
were once more recognised as a determinant of importance. However, the 
measures set out to address poverty were generalised and in no way addressed 
this racialised intersection of disadvantage (Department of Health, 2011b, pp.79–
85). It certainly does not contain any measures that might address inequalities 
described by Mahdi regarding providing adequate financial support for asylum 
seekers. These omissions are reflective not only of political discourses that 
problematise migrants, but also of a more general ambivalence and avoidance 
regarding intersectionality in State policy.  
A further gap in policy, and an issue that seems less stressed in the literature, relates 
to how interactions with the State can heighten feelings of precarity and retraumatise 
people. Whilst policy and the literature in this space tend to focus on State-led 
mental health services and pathways to care involving the police and judiciary, 
interactions relating to other support systems (e.g. welfare and housing) seem to 
feature less. This is despite government reports highlighting inequalities in such 
services for BAME populations (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010). Whilst 
the asylum-seeking process does receive some attention in the literature, broader 
experiences with visa applications tend not to. As the above paragraph suggests, a 
lack of the State’s consideration of the interaction between socio-economic 
disadvantage and BAME status is reflected in a lack of consideration of how 
processes for seeking support such as welfare and housing might disproportionately 
disadvantage people at the intersection of BAME status and mental health issues. 
This disadvantage increases further when people at this intersection also have lower 
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levels of education or intellectual disabilities (both of which are reported as 
impacting some BAME groupings at increased levels, see p.67 and p.61 
respectively). As a staff member – Zara - explains ‘if you don't speak a certain 
language’ (i.e. technocratic), then people are likely to ‘be left out of society on your 
own’ without the support that they should be entitled to (see Appendix 23).  
Thus, issues such as those exemplified by Mahdi and Satch, which 
disproportionately impact BAME groupings due to their increased exposure to 
poverty as a result of systemic injustices, remain largely unaddressed. Instead 
policies to address access of support to the majority feature in strategies under the 
auspices of tackling issues for marginalised groups (Department of Health, 2011b, 
pp.79–85). The retraumatising impact of the asylum and visa processes on migrant 
people within the BAME population are not addressed in any of the most recent 
national-level strategies addressing health or BAME mental health inequality 
(Department of Health, 2005; Department of Health, 2011b; NHS England, 2019), 
although it has been highlighted in the literature as an important area for policy to 
address (Fazel et al., 2012, p.266). Instead the DRE (2005) and NHMH (2011) 
simply acknowledge a disparity in mental health diagnoses among migrants and 
their children or in their ability to access and influence service design (Department 
of Health, 2005, p68; Department of Health, 2011b, p.59). Yet it is clear from Mahdi 
and Samantha that going through these processes was traumatic as a result of the 
system in place, contributing to mental health issues/distress. As with Satch and his 
interactions with multiple agencies regarding welfare and housing, these 
interactions with the State re-traumatised Mahdi and ultimately prompted a suicide 
attempt. As I showed in chapter 5, such experiences not only contribute to 
participants’ ability to recover or manage their mental health issues/distress, but also 
have a significant impact on how they engage with mental health services. I explore 
this further in part C.   
5 Discrimination, oppression and their networks 
This leads neatly to a discussion of discrimination and oppression as important 
determinants in BAME mental health inequality. Of all of the various forms of 
discrimination and oppression, an aggregate of participants’ testimonies highlights 
racism as one of the most common forms experienced or witnessed; sitting 
alongside issues pertaining to socio-economic disadvantage. As such, findings in 
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this study reflect the primary focus given to issues of racism in the literature. 
However, it is important to note that it was not a majority of participants who spoke 
of racism, but rather those racialised black (as opposed to racialised people more 
generally). If discrimination pertaining to migrants, or a certain ‘class’ of migrants is 
included due to the racialisation involved in such discrimination, then a majority of 
participants can be said to have spoken of personal experiences of discrimination 
and oppression of a racial nature. Racism in the literature is described as impacting 
BAME mental health inequality in a number of ways, and of operating at the 
interpersonal, institutional and systemic level. Further, a range of manifestations of 
racism are highlighted; overt racial abuse, microaggressions, intergenerational 
inequality and trauma resulting from systemic racism, and more recently 
intersectional experiences. Most of the manifestations of racism highlighted in the 
literature are also present in participant accounts of the experiences that have 
impacted on their mental health or that of racialised peoples’ more generally.  
For example, the literature highlights how racism operating both systemically and at 
the interpersonal level in social interactions can be psychologically harmful for 
racialised people exposed to such abuse and prejudice. The literature explores the 
intricacies of the psychological processes that trigger mental health issues/distress 
resulting from such experiences (see chapter 3, section 5.3). Peter and Samantha 
both cite exposure to racism as causing or aggravating mental health 
issues/distress. Similarly, Mahdi repeatedly states in very explicit terms that 
discrimination and oppression experienced as a result of his status as an asylum 
seeker significantly aggravate his mental illness, likening such experiences to 
‘torturing’ (see p.114-115). Peter highlights the cognitive dissonance created 
through constant exposure to micro-aggressions and having one’s own cultural and 
culturally-mediated behaviours marginalised (see p. 98 and p.118-119). Peter also 
highlights the impact of exposure to micro-aggressions which are often then denied 
by perpetrators. As Cooper et al (2008) intimate, Peter’s testimony appears to 
support suggestions that the denial of such experiences resulting from a racialised 
system of oppression is psychologically harmful to the oppressed racialised person. 
Satch does not explicitly speak of such instances outside of the context of mental 
health-related support services. However, comments made between recorded 
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conversations indicate the extent to which racism and microaggressions impact his 
daily life (see p.32).  
Combining experiences resulting from racism with those of oppression issued from 
being a migrant, I find further evidence in my own findings that support the literature’s 
claims in relation to the existence of many forms of racism and their impact on BAME 
mental health inequality. Mahdi articulates the importance of retaining his ‘dignity’ on 
many occasions, a dignity that is intertwined with his ability to meet the social 
expectations placed on men in Afghan society and in the UK. This includes financial 
expectations, such as providing for his wife and himself. Yet, he describes multiple 
ways in which his status as an asylum seeker prohibits this, placing him in a position 
of poverty from which he cannot escape. This causes him great distress additional 
to that he brought from Afghanistan. One final example comes from Samantha, who 
is continually being interpreted as aggressive when expressing herself. This acted 
as a barrier to her achieving what she wanted in a variety of ways, for instance in 
work or in her interactions with her GP’s practice. For both Mahdi and Samantha, 
these barriers reinforced their marginal positions and gave concrete form to their 
oppression, significantly impacting on their mental health issues/distress.  
Thus, for the State to address BAME mental health inequality with any level of 
success, it must understand this social issue as having a particular ontology. Racism 
(inclusive of xenophobia) must be understood not as an isolated belief system 
operating like a coloured lens on a camera, for example, an overlay to an image that 
can easily be separated from both the camera and the image. Rather, it is an open 
system that shapes and is shaped by everything that it comes into contact with. In 
part A of my literature review and this chapter, I explored how racism and mental 
health discourses are interconnected such that they can be mutually constitutive. 
This understanding of racism as a dynamic open system must be carried into 
conceptualisations of the determinants in BAME mental health inequality by policy-
makers, the ramifications of which are a recognition of the need to tackle racism of 
all forms and at all levels: interpersonal, institutional and systemic. To date, any 
focus on this in relation to BAME mental health inequality has been to address 
(some aspects of) racism within mental health services without an admission of the 
existence of institutional racism by the State (see Appendix 5). In the NHMH, it is 
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notable that all actions to address stigma in relation to mental health pertained to 
stigma and discrimination specific to ‘mental illness’.  
The analysis presented in this section supports calls for the State to better address 
racism in all of its forms as part of any response to BAME mental health inequality 
in the UK. However, it also draws attention to the need to do so in a way that looks 
beyond the ways in which racism impacts mental health discourses and manifests 
in related services. It must include consideration of how it manifests in society and 
as wider social inequalities. Importantly, it must examine the ways that the State 
itself acts as a conduit for a variety of forms of racism through its own policies and 
practices, including how it produces and maintains institutional racism across the 
services it provides. For example, no State strategy for BAME mental health 
inequality has highlighted the need to address racism in the  system at either 
the interpersonal or systemic levels. As both this literature and my participants 
demonstrate, this issue is pervasive, impacting multiple areas of life that limit a 
persons’ ability to thrive. Additionally, I have yet to see evidence that the State has 
actively considered the impact of visa and asylum-seeking processes on the mental 
health of migrants to the UK. First generation migrants form a significant portion of 
the BAME population in the UK, albeit decreasingly so as demographics change. 
However, the majority of the literature in this space does not highlight migration 
processes as an important factor requiring urgent attention in the context of BAME 
mental health inequality unless the research is specifically focused on the 
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers.  
Further, this study supports the view that racism operates as part of a network of 
systems of oppression that interact and maintain each other in one form or another. 
It is in this ‘network’ that intersectional experiences emerge. Crenshaw highlights 
that a focus on the ‘most privileged group members marginalises those who are 
multiply-burdened’, providing ‘a distorted analysis of racism and sexism’ (Crenshaw, 
1989, p.140), or any other relevant system of oppression. Thus, intersectional forms 
of racism must be addressed if policy responses to mental health inequality of a 
racialised nature are to have any success. A lack of such an approach would 
continue to leave unaddressed experiences of discrimination and oppression that 
impact on people of BAME backgrounds, increasing exposure to recognised risk 
factors in mental health. For example, experiences at the intersection of race, 
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cultural difference, migrant status and gender – for example, Samantha’s being 
continually perceived as aggressive and unprofessional such that her career 
stagnates and wellbeing is negatively impacted.  
Awareness of these issues are of particular importance when we observe that the 
State’s inability, resistance or evasion of addressing intersectional issues then 
results in policies and practices that further exasperate BAME mental health 
inequality by placing certain BAME groupings into extremely oppressive positions. 
For example, in addition to experiencing the discrimination and oppressions that 
often accompany racialisation, asylum status and experiences of long-term mental 
health issues, Mahdi is also forced into a position of poverty by State policies and 
legislation. Given the significant links drawn between mental health and socio-
economic deprivation - particularly when paired with racialisation and migration - 
such oversights would seriously limit policy responses seeking to lower 
incidence/prevalence of mental health issues among certain BAME groupings.   
Intersectional locations may also impact peoples’ abilities to benefit from protective 
factors such as ethnic density or social capital. All participants in this research have 
experienced mental health issues/distress of some form, and thus have not been 
protected from developing such issues as a result of these factors. However, it is 
clear through most participants’ testimonies that protective factors such as those 
highlighted in my literature review (ethnic density and social capital) do play a 
supportive role in participants’ lives. For example, Samaiya’s sister comments that 
they have never really experienced difficulties as a result of racism, suggesting that 
this might be due to living in an area with high ethnic diversity. Andeep expresses 
that feeling connected to his Sikh community is very important for him and his 
wellbeing. In contrast, Mya describes the negative impact on her mental health of 
not belonging to a religious group that might better understand her background and 
align with her beliefs. Belonging is equally important to Mahdi and Satch. However, 
taking an intersectional eye to their testimony it becomes clear that their 
intersectional locations act as a barrier to benefiting from these to the extent that 
other people of BAME background might. For example, Mahdi is conscious that 
having converted to Christianity means that people in Afghanistan ‘would make my 
life hell the moment they see me’. Indeed, he confided that he is rejected by some 
Afghan refugees in the UK as a result of his conversion. Equally, Satch’s being of 
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‘lower class’, an ex-offender and substance misuser, places him in an intersectional 
location that has led him to experience ostracization by certain people in black 
communities and sub-cultures.  
Reflecting on my findings more generally, I also find that female participants were 
much less likely than their male counterparts to highlight systems of oppression as 
impacting on their wellbeing. For example, Samantha gets frustrated when she feels 
there is too much focus on racism, preferring to speak in terms of cultural difference; 
Mya speaks of competing social expectations for women more as cultural issues 
than oppressions experienced by women; Samaiya and her sister did not 
necessarily frame the barriers Samaiya experienced in education in terms of 
ableism, at least not initially. Given findings that suggest the protective value of 
recognising adversities faced as resulting from systems of oppression as opposed 
to personal failures (Cooper et al., 2008, p.200), such findings from gendered 
intersectional locations may be important to address; not least given the indications 
in some epidemiological studies of increased risk of mental health among women in 
some BAME populations (see Appendix 17), and in the UK population generally 
(Mental Health Foundation, 2015). A focus on intersectionality, however, should not 
be to the detriment of a focus on racism. Rather, I have situated it as necessary to 
addressing racism in a way not distorted by the adoption of a limited understanding 
of the problem (see Crenshaw, p.92-93). Similarly, I would highlight the need to also 
consider other forms of discrimination and oppression experienced additionally too 
(and not intersectionally) by people of BAME backgrounds. Non-racially motivated 
forms of oppression significantly impact the mental health of participants in this 
study, for example, Samaiya’s disability. Whilst not linked to racism in Samaiya’s 
case, links between disability and mental health issues/distress warrant attention 
from policymakers addressing BAME mental health inequality. This is because 
disability disproportionately impacts certain BAME groupings (Cabinet Office, 2017, 
p.25; ENC and SCOPE, 2012, pp.13–14). 
Summary 
Overall, I found a great deal of overlap between the determinants highlighted in the 
research as of prime concern to BAME mental health inequality though there were 
a few gaps. These generally pertained to issues that are most often understood as 
being of concern for people grouped together under a different identity-marker in 
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research taking a ‘single issue’ approach; e.g. disability is dealt with in research 
focused on/with disabled people, while BAME research focuses on racialisation, 
racism and cultural difference. Additionally, in paying attention to how participants 
discussed these determinants, I have highlighted two aspects of their experiences 
that are less pronounced in the literature. These relate to the interconnectedness of 
determinants and the presence of intersectional experiences. Consideration of the 
interconnectedness of determinants are present even in the testimonies of 
participants most aligned with biological aetiological beliefs. Responding to such an 
understanding of determinants would require policy-makers to break out of the 
restrictions imposed by the somewhat arbitrary and artificial policy silos currently in 
place, with all (or most) of government working more fluidly to reflect the complex 
and open systems that they seek to influence.  
Further, reviewing how intersectional experiences contribute to mental health 
issues/distress and related inequality, I also began to discuss why intersectionality 
is vital to building richer understandings of key determinants in BAME mental health 
inequality. Examination of intersectionality reveals how open systems of oppression 
might combine differently for people of BAME backgrounds, sustaining 
disadvantages and oppressions experienced. For instance, knowing that socio-
economic deprivation and precarity significantly impact mental health, policy makers 
drawing on intersectionality might consider how these combine with fears of being 
refused refuge to retraumatise asylum seekers with pre-existing mental health 
issues. Understanding this it may not prevent incidence/prevalence of mental health 
issues/distress, but may support the prevention of people requiring acute services 
as a result of suicide attempts or the triggering of psychosis.  
Part C: Experiences of State-led support services   
Improvements to policies preventing increased risk of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress among BAME groupings satisfy one element of health inequality 
policymaking. The other area requiring attention is that of improving service 
provision and its efficacy and appropriateness for BAME groupings. I argue that in 
countries where welfare, health and social care systems (including mental health 
services) are State-led, this must include consideration of how State services 
contribute to BAME mental health inequality. As previously mentioned, despite a 
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disparity between the focus and sample groups in much of the literature and my own 
study, there are significant parallels in some of the overarching themes that emerge.  
6 Accessing support from services  
Issues pertaining to health seeking behaviours, interactions with primary care 
services and diagnostic assessments were present in both the literature and the 
testimonies of participants. What comes to the fore in the literature are a range of 
problems that relate either to cultural difference or racialisation. These are 
highlighted as leading people of BAME backgrounds to be unable to access support, 
not want to access the support offered or be forced to engage in services against 
their will. Not being able to access support is often reported as stemming from 
logistical issues such as language barriers or from cultural differences that mean 
GP’s and patients experience miscommunications. The lack of such issues 
emerging from my own findings is likely reflective only of my small sample group 
which did not include people with very low levels of English language skills28.  
The literature speaks of people not wanting to access the support available as a 
result of two main issues. First, as a result of culturally-mediated differences in ideas 
of what ‘mental health’ is and how it should be addressed. Examples of such 
disagreements within the context of interactions with GPs are present in my study. 
For example, Peter explicitly states that he wants to use alternative treatments for 
his distress as he indicates a belief that some of his issues stem from nutritional and 
digestive problems, not psychological difficulties. Whilst Peter’s position might not 
result from cultural differences regarding health issues and illness, it places him in 
a position of epistemic difference from western medicine similar to that created by 
cultural difference. Samantha’s testimony provides evidence of very different, 
culturally mediated understandings of mental health. As with the African participants 
in Mantovani et al. (2017)’s study, Samantha also seems to associate mental health 
issues with a ‘a total level of insanity’ (Mantovani et al., 2017, p.376) that might be 
perceived as SMI in the UK. Though Samantha did engage with the GP and mental 
health services, this seems not to have resulted from her own decision to seek help 
from medical professionals, but from the actions of a psychologist met during the 
process of seeking residency in the UK.  
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People of BAME backgrounds may also resist accessing mental health services as 
a result of ‘circles of fear’ (see p.77). This links closely to people being forced into 
services against their will. This finding of the role of fear is reflected in my own 
findings, perhaps most strikingly in the testimony of Satch. Satch avoids any mental 
health labels beyond ‘addict’ and does not want to be placed in ‘the package mental 
health’. Both Peter and Satch demonstrate awareness of the particular issues that 
black people face within mental health services, knowledge that seems to augment 
their resistance to medicalised approaches to mental health (including diagnosis). 
As ‘Breaking the circles of fear’ (2002) and Satch and Peter’s testimonies 
demonstrate, awareness of inequalities in mental health services for black people 
are widely known in black ‘communities’. Further parallels between the literature and 
my own findings pertain to the ways in which practices and procedures when 
accessing services reinforce and ‘replicate the experiences of racism and 
discrimination’ (Keating and Robertson, 2004, p.442) endured in other settings. 
Such experiences are recognised in both the literature and this study as manifesting 
through interpersonal interactions. An example from this study is Mya’s account of 
her friend’s experience. I also note Peter and Samantha’s remarks regarding being 
perceived as aggressive instead of assertive and Ruth’s account of the near 
misdiagnosis of a religious lady, and how such stereotyping can lead to and reflect 
issues such as ‘transmitted discrimination’ (see p.76) and intersectional 
experiences.  
In the literature, the reinforcement of discrimination and racism at institutional levels 
often entail coercive practices of a more explicit and physically violent nature than 
in my own findings. More nuanced experiences tend not to be exposed to the same 
degree; likely due to a focus primarily on people diagnosed with SMI or on adverse 
pathways to tertiary services (e.g. psychiatric wards). Yet, such experiences often 
set the tone for engagements with services once access has been gained and 
undoubtably contribute to issues such as the ‘circle of fear’ (Keating and Robertson, 
2004). The insistence by some services that BAME service users/survivors comply 
with practices rooted in dominant understandings marginalise those for whom these 
narratives are foreign. In some instances, this can result in participants engaging in 
processes that are experienced by them as harmful. For instance, Peter’s feeling 
obliged to take medication so that he was not labelled as ‘not helping myself’ (see 
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p.149). Engaging in certain processes to access support can also rekindle distress 
by demanding that participants engage in activities that remind them of painful 
and/or traumatic experiences. For example, Samantha’s account of needing to 
engage with ‘paperwork’ in order to receive counselling sessions. Something she 
stated was ‘enough to make you crazy’ partly because it recalled to mind a 
particularly distressing period of her life (see p.148-149). Given that people from 
BAME backgrounds are more likely to have previously engaged with such 
processes in difficult circumstances, such issues are important considerations for 
services seeking to minimise re-traumatisation or similar experiences. 
A further disparity between the literature and my own research is the literature’s 
prime focus on racism (inclusive of xenophobia). Whilst this focus was reflected in 
conversations of determinants, it is not replicated in this study in relation to 
accessing support. Instead, participant accounts tend to highlight ways that their 
disempowered and marginalised positions in general are reinforced. A prime 
example of this is found in Satch’s account of his diagnostic assessment, whereby 
he felt that he was being forced into providing an account of his life that was 
incohesive as a result of the techniques used in the assessment. Reflective of 
findings in the ‘Breaking circles of fear’ report (2002) that highlighted issues of trust 
and psychiatrists failing to take full histories, Satch feels that he is being manipulated 
in such a way that positions him as ‘diagnosable’, which he openly resents. His 
resistance to diagnosis, however, does not seem to arise solely from experiences 
of racism, but from exposure to a range of oppressions – including intersectional 
ones. I observe, for example, that Satch’s account of this assessment quickly 
merges into accounts of substance misuse clinics and prison, and degradations 
experienced there. Interestingly, the times when participants speak positively of their 
experiences arise when they serve to empower them in some way, for instance, 
Mahdi’s account of his diagnostic assessment and how this enabled him to gain 
refugee status (see p.139).  
Applying a lens that recognises multiple and intersectional oppression also 
highlights how simple procedural changes to services acting as gateways to mental 
health services might contribute to BAME mental health inequality. For instance, 
Peter’s testimony regarding the inadequacy of 10-minute GP consultations, which 
disadvantages people with multiple or complex needs. This is partly because ‘you 
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don’t really get to say what you need to say’, (see p.136), and GPs ignore the 
interconnectivity of matters of health. Whilst the under-representation of BAME 
groupings receiving GP support for mental health issues is a trend that pre-dates 
the widespread introduction of the practice that Peter is referring to (and is not 
therefore an explanation for those trends), it does demonstrate that seemingly 
simple changes can have significant impacts on marginalised groups. This is 
particularly so when the impact on a diverse range of people are not considered. A 
lack of consideration of such impacts can contribute to health inequalities 
experienced by social groupings with disproportionately high rates of complex 
needs. For instance, disabled people, people experiencing communication barriers, 
and people whose intersectional location puts them at greater risk of experiencing 
co-morbidity.   
7 Using services 
Whilst participants in this research did not experience or speak of experiences of 
CTO’s and psychiatric wards, several parallels still emerge from their testimonies 
regarding receiving support for mental health issues/distress. These include: 
perceptions that support delivery methods are not conducive to recovery/coping; 
caution and distrust in relationships with staff; and disagreements about the 
appropriateness and efficacy of treatments provided. Further, issues of cultural 
difference, discrimination and racism are present in both. Interwoven through these 
findings I find a continuation of the themes I highlight as important for policy-makers 
in previous sections of this chapter. Namely, the interconnectedness of phenomena 
as they are experienced and lived, and the need to recognise the role of 
intersectionality. Indeed, it is arguably in relation to experiences of services that 
issues of intersectionality crystallise most strongly into concrete examples in this 
study.  
In relation to service delivery, participants in this study do not speak of the more 
violent coercion and restraint most present in the literature. However, as with 
comments regarding access to support, their views of using services certainly do 
encompass feelings of being forced to engage in practices and treatments that are 
not beneficial to them. Additionally,  participants also sometimes describe having to 
engage with mental health treatments so as to retain access to other wider support. 
For instance, Satch reports being told he must engage with counselling or he will 
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not be allowed to retain his accommodation (see p.147-148); or Mahdi, who 
perceives taking medication for his mental health as linked to being in receipt of 
welfare payments and related support (see p.158). In these examples, participants’ 
locations at the intersection of mental health and socio-economic disadvantage 
combine to create an experience of these systems that is coercive.  
In the literature, reasons for the disproportional use of coercive practices in mental 
health systems are not always elaborated on. A common hypothesis is of increased 
rates of SMI manifesting in a state of crisis due to the avoidance of services in the 
early stages of ‘illness’. The most common explanation provided is racial 
stereotyping. Racial stereotyping is highlighted in this study as impacting on some 
participants’ experiences of mental health and related services. Notably, Satch 
provides accounts of several occasions where he was treated with increased 
suspicion and denied access to support as a result of being perceived as 
intimidating. This is a claim that his own social worker Lisa firmly believes resulted 
from his being black, male and having dreadlocks when she states that this results 
from ‘how he’s looked, and, and people get scared easily by him’, despite his having 
‘never been huge, he’s never been kind of bulky or anything’ (see Appendix 24). 
The impact on Satch being that he felt compelled to alter his appearance when next 
attending a clinic so as not to invite ‘problems’. However, stereotyping is not 
highlighted in this study in relation to coercive practices.  
Two additional factors are highlighted as contributing to the coercion that 
participants perceive in their interactions with mental health services. The first 
relates to multiple disadvantage and intersectionality. Attending to people’s 
intersectional locations in this study has revealed why some participants perceive 
certain processes as coercive when others service users might not. For example, 
were it not for Samantha’s intersectional location as physically disabled and a 
migrant, she might not have been exposed to difficulties that – when told she must 
engage in certain activities to receive support – amount to an experience that feels 
coercive. Coercive because she feels forced to engage in something that she knows 
to be harmful to herself. Similarly, Satch and Mahdi imply that they had no real option 
other than to engage in treatments they did not care for due to their need for housing 
and financial support. This demonstrates the need for policymakers considering 
future strategies to address BAME mental health inequality to consider more than 
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oppressions of a purely racial nature. As found in relation to determinants (part B), 
the intersectional forms that racism can take and the other forms of oppression that 
people of BAME backgrounds are at increased risk of experiencing also require 
significant consideration. Additionally, my study illustrates the need for policymakers 
to consider how negative and fear-provoking interactions with the State in other 
systems (e.g. housing, welfare, visas) are transferred into experiences of mental 
health services. Whilst this has been explored repeatedly in relation to policing and 
the judiciary, and to some extent in relation to education, it is less explored in relation 
to support services related to socio-economic disadvantage/urbanicity.  
The second factor is the impact of austerity and the approach taken to cuts in public 
services in its wake. Interestingly, this is not an issue that I have seen raised in the 
literature pertaining to BAME mental health inequalities. Whilst the issue of service 
cuts has been highlighted as having a detrimental impact on mental health services 
generally (see p.8), its link to more coercive methods impacting people with BAME 
status is not generally made. This is perhaps because this literature on austerity 
tends to focus on practices that are coercive, regardless of any identity-markers 
unrelated to socio-economic positions. This study, however, reveals that a number 
of practices are experienced as coercive as a result of participants’ social 
stratification and intersectionality. The impact of austerity was to significantly and 
systematically cut public expenditure from 2009/10, (including to mental health 






The impact of this on services’ abilities to deliver support flexibly to a diverse set of 
people’s needs is reflected in most participants’ accounts of using services, 
contributing considerably to feelings of being coerced. Participants make clear their 
view that services are focused on meeting their own targets, even if this is to the 
detriment of clients who diverge from the mainstream (see chapter 5, section 3). 
Samantha’s account of the GP’s receptionist trying to force her to use a newly 
implemented triaging service (see p.136-137) for example, demonstrates an 
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important consequence of efficiency projects; namely, that these often take as their 
starting point the experience of an aggregate ‘majority’. Around this, processes are 
designed and implemented. Then where possible or where consideration is given, 
adjustments are made for marginalised groups or people with differing needs. In this 
instance, little regard seems to have been given to the impact of this process change 
on someone with ‘mental problems’ who is awaiting important test results linked to 
a number of stigmatising health issues, and whose cultural differences manifest in 
part through how they express themselves. Add to this the increased workloads of 
staff and the margin for flexibility to accommodate different needs closes in; often 
on those for whom the system is not primarily designed for.  
 
 For 
example, John M works in a project spanning multiple services to improve the 
experiences of people with complex needs including mental health issues/distress. 
He explained that he gets ‘so pissed off with it’, referring to the lack of flexibility in 
systems when just a little ‘flex’ could create the ‘perfect storm’ for people he is 
working with to get their lives back on track. He elaborates that ‘the situation can be 
really overcome if we are just using / these terms now the system flex / flex in the 
system, just a tad, you know, we're not asking for much’. Yet, he reports often being 
met with resistance from within services, particularly from psychiatrists. This 
resistance is something that he anticipates worsening with the increased 
centralisation of services such as prisons. Ruth provides a moving account of the 
frustration that she and many of her colleagues experienced as their workloads were 
increased and they were told they could no longer provide the type of care that they 
felt was most humane. The impact of this was that ‘Some of the social workers / 
very experienced, and they are saying ‘No! This is not right.’ You know. All of us left 
with (.) broken. Broken. Really. Broken’. This account is mirrored by Marcia’s own 
misgivings about remaining in the mental health profession, stating ‘Being part of 
that machine, do I want to be part of it?’. (See Appendix 25 for full accounts). 
For others, this inattention to people outside of the mainstream leads not only to 
poor services, but a total lack of support in relation to mental health for certain BAME 
populations. Kamilla, a therapist and fellow PhD researcher, speaks on this topic in 
relation to the money being spent by the State and large charitable organisations to 
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raise awareness of mental health. The main purposes of raising awareness being 
to tackle stigma and increase awareness that support exists. Kamilla explains that: 
in like mainstream society, I can see that a lot is being done, but then 
if I look at / my culture, for example, so I'm Pakistani, so if I think about 
the Pakistani community, there’s not really much done or I don't feel 
like there's being much done. (.) I know somebody here who / like 
whose, whose Mum has schizophrenia but she, she's home all the time 
and he looks after her and he doesn’t really have anyone to talk to 
about how difficult it is …which is very sad, because obviously then 
people are dealing with this stuff in isolation  
This is arguably reflective of Satch’s comment that ‘All this money they’re spending, 
they’re just making up’, followed by a discussion of the services that are closing due 
to lack of funding. Satch states that there will ‘be no-one around to help’. Though 
the context is different, both Kamilla and Satch highlight how a focus on the 
‘mainstream’ in expenditure leaves marginalised parts of the population ‘isolated’ 
and without support. The result here being that some of the most marginalised 
people in our society feel pushed to ‘Go steal? To go jail? Or go kill myself?’, 
compelled to ’clobber’ or ‘bop someone over the head’ or to intentionally put 
themselves in situations of crisis (see chapter 5, section 5), just to have their right 
to an ‘adequate standard of living and social protection’ (UN General Assembly, 
2007, sec.28) fulfilled. Thus, marginalisation in the wider society is reinforced once 
more as people are provided ‘the cheapest kind of understanding’ under the pretext 
of ‘austerity’ and/or ‘value for money’ in public services.   
8 Treatments 
This sense of being provided the cheapest support available, with little regard for 
people’s situatedness or preferences - cultural or other - continues into discussions 
of specific treatment options provided. This is true in both the literature and the 
testimonies of participants in this research (with the exception of Mya and Samaiya). 
Indeed, though the setting and conditions in which participants in this research 
receive treatments may vary from those predominant in the literature, many key 
themes again align. This is true even in relation to talking therapies, despite 
participants speaking primarily of group therapies whilst the literature focuses 
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almost exclusively on one-to-one forms of therapy. In relation to medication, only 
two participants (Mya and Samaiya) seemed neutral to its use. All other participants 
expressed concern at its position as the prime form of support provided.  
The literature highlights three main issues in relation to medication and BAME 
mental health inequalities. The first relates to the role of racism and racial 
stereotypes in causing certain BAME groupings to experience higher overall levels 
of medication. Whilst it is impossible for this study to determine if such claims are 
true, I do note the perception among some participants that there is an ‘urgency to 
medicate’ black people and anyone whom services perceive as making too many 
demands (see p.157). The second issue relates to problematic side-effects, and the 
fear and lack of information around these. These issues are found primarily in 
qualitative research, particularly that committed to giving primacy to the voices of 
BAME mental health service users/survivors. Problematic side-effects include 
serious negative impacts on physical health such as those mentioned by Peter in 
relation to himself and his sister. Both Griffiths (2018) and Peter report that people 
are not often provided with information regarding the side-effects of medication for 
mental health issues – physical or other. More often raised in both the literature and 
this study, however, was the impact that medication has on people’s abilities to 
communicate and function as per their ‘normal’. Findings in the ‘Breaking circles of 
fear’ report (2002) mirrored wording used by three participants in this research: that 
people were being medicated to the point of becoming ‘zombies’.   
Participants express resistance, irritation and anger, resulting from a sense of 
disempowerment and marginalisation that accompanies the insistence on 
medication. This disempowerment and marginalisation constitute the third issue 
highlighted in the literature. Indeed, the parallels between participants’ testimony in 
the BAME service user/survivor-led report ‘A call for social justice’ (2018) is striking. 
The report highlights one particular quote where a participant states that in pushing 
people to take medication, mental health professionals refuse to ‘take you seriously’, 
adding that ‘They’re not there to help me’ (Griffiths, 2018, p.31). Such sentiments 
are reflected in extracts presented in chapter 5, where multiple participants describe 
being ‘fobbed off to medication’ whilst their actual desires for support are dismissed 
or ignored. It is for this reason that Satch feels he must remain ‘outspoken’, that 
Peter has taken his care into his own hands and researched alternative approaches, 
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and that Samantha, Mahdi and Andeep express frustration when medication 
continues to be the support offered. There is a shared sense that medication is used 
as a means of enabling the State to avoid having to deal with the actual causes of 
mental health issues which, for participants, are primarily socio-cultural factors. This 
view is one shared in the grey literature and some academic works.  
Reliance on medication by mental health services and professionals therefore 
serves two functions that are likely to increase poor experiences of mental health 
services for BAME groupings. The first is that, even if it does not reinforce racism 
per sae - though I do not deny that it does in some instances - such practices do 
reinforce the oppressions that people of BAME backgrounds experience outside of 
the mental health system. In this, marginalisation in particular is enforced as 
people’s own views and knowledge born of lived experiences are denied in favour 
of medical perspectives and practices. Indeed, such practices undoubtably 
contribute to the widespread distrust between BAME groupings and mental health 
professionals highlighted in both the literature and this study. Further, for those 
participants who are socio-economically disadvantaged, medication acts as the 
mechanism by which their requests for support to address poverty – a key 
determinant in BAME mental health inequality – can be denied or put to the side. I 
recall to mind Marcia’s account of the lady with bleeding walls in her council 
apartment, (see p.182). Socio-economic disadvantage was both explicitly and 
implicitly linked by both participants and staff interviewed as being used to coerce 
people to adhere to the treatments prescribed. For example, Ruth states that: 
I did take the medications when they threatened me… with if you don't 
take it, we will discharge you from the services, and.. When they just 
discharge me from the services what happens then is that PIP I’m 
getting and everything will stop. Because they will say ‘You refused 
treatment.’ This is the letter. Oh yeah, that’s what happens. It has knock 
on effects  
This testimony brings to my mind Mahdi’s linking ‘lay down like this, have Sertraline’ 
to receiving welfare payments. Poverty, in such circumstances, is used to coerce 
people to take medications that they do not want or feel are helping very much.  
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Interactions with services of this sort carry through, at times, into talking therapies 
offered. For example, experiences of feeling coerced to engage with various forms 
of talking therapies are present in Peter, Samantha and Satch’s testimony. Another 
issue raised is the sense that not all staff in services have the best interests of BAME 
service users/survivors at heart. For instance, Satch speaks of a councillor whom 
he felt had little understanding or empathy for his situation (see p.148). Yet, he 
reports not being able to disengage due to the ‘the donkey on a stick’ (e.g. carrot 
and stick) approach employed whereby he would lose his accommodation by not 
attending. Peter also highlights that, even when staff did want to ensure that he got 
the support he needed, sometimes the system would not allow them to provide it 
(see p.166). This particular issue is one not limited to BAME groupings in the 
literature, but highlighted in relation to anyone with more complex needs (Perfect et 
al., 2016). However, people of BAME backgrounds are among those most likely to 
have such complex needs due to their exposure to racism and a variety of additional 
social inequalities.  
Contrary to trends reported in the literature regarding a lack of access to talking 
therapies, the majority of participants in this study were provided access to talking 
therapies, (whether they desired them or not). I cannot say that my findings 
contradict those of the literature as this might very well be an anomaly within this 
very small sample of people, most of whom were being supported by BAME-led 
organisations. Further, I am aware that those participants who are more likely to be 
deemed ‘unsuitable’ or ‘lacking in insight’ did not speak to me about engaging with 
talking therapies. I am thinking here of Andeep and Samaiya. Andeep appeared 
heavily medicated and, though he spoke of the benefits of talking through emotional 
and psychological difficulties, he did so in relation to sharing these with loved ones 
rather than in a therapeutic setting. Samaiya, whose mental health issues were 
frequently overlooked when younger due to her physical health conditions and 
learning difficulties was not in receipt of talking therapies. Reasons for this were not, 
however, discussed.  
The main reasons provided in the literature regarding lower outcomes in relation to 
talking therapies relate to the cultural inappropriateness and insensitiveness of 
therapeutic practices, and the evasion of racism due to therapists’ discomfort or 
inabilities to speak of this (see p.87-88).  Whilst issues of cultural appropriateness 
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are present in Samantha’s account when she speaks of finding it difficult to ‘sit down 
and just talk’ (see p.164), the only therapy that Samantha spoke well of was one 
organised by a BAME-led organisation where discussion was mediated by activity. 
In contrast, Mahdi reports experiencing no cultural barriers in relation to support 
received for his mental health. Issues pertaining to therapists’ abilities to address 
issues of racism or other forms of oppression were not highlighted, a possible 
exception being Satch’s account of the councillor who wouldn’t ‘understand (.) past 
your nose’30. However, I believe Satch to be referring more generally to oppressive 
experiences in his past, pointing towards a need highlighted by both Moodley et al. 
(2019) and Newland et al. (2015); primarily, the need for therapists to consider the 
ways in which people are multiply and intersectionally located and how this might 
impact on the treatments they need. Support for this is further provided by this study 
through discussions of group therapy.   
Though group therapy is provided through State-funded IAPT services (Perfect et 
al., 2016, p.4), it barely features in the literature pertaining to BAME mental health 
inequality. Yet, it was a primary focus for the three participants who spoke at length 
about talking therapies. Peter, Samantha and Satch, all highlighted similar 
concerns. The first concern being the coercion/significant pressure they felt under 
to attend group therapy, despite each being eloquent about why they did not feel 
this support was most appropriate for them. Perhaps most significant to this thesis 
was the way in which their individual intersectional locations and past experiences 
made them uncomfortable in group settings of this sort. The distrust of others that 
people at certain intersectional locations or residing within communities with 
different dynamics do not seem to be taken into consideration. Core participants 
were not the only people to provide narratives as to why group situations might be 
more problematic in the context of BAME mental health inequality. Some staff also 
highlighted such issues  Jean, a staff member interviewed, explained that within her 
community: 
it's not tight knit as in unity stand together. It's a very much a what's he 
doing, or oh if he can do that, then my daughter can do that. …we all 
often describe ourselves as crabs in a bucket. If you put some crabs in 
a bucket they will stand on each other's head to get out and actually 
that's pretty much it.  We tend to be looking around, we trust no one 
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James also reported that within certain black communities there was a tendency to 
feel that:  
amongst our race people is when / I think / ‘you're probably thinking 
negative of me’, ‘you're probably doing this and that’, because we're 
so used of the discrimination or people thinking ill of us  
Similar issues were also highlighted by Satch, albeit from a very different setting. 
Speaking of group therapy sessions in a prison context, Satch highlights that many 
in the group would already ‘know each other in the wire’, a situation not conducive 
to making oneself vulnerable. Indeed, Satch provides the most explicit discussion 
of how social hierarchies and systems of oppression influence the dynamics of 
group therapy in ways that, once more, bring such issues into therapeutic spaces 
(see p.162-163). These social dynamics and histories of oppression are not left at 
the therapists’ door, just as they are not left at the door of mental health services 
more generally.  
Peter and Satch both express the view that group therapy is being increasingly 
provided as a result of cuts to services, with Peter stating that this is ‘much cheaper 
to run’ than one-to-one therapy. I could not find documentation to confirm the actual 
delivery rates of group therapy comparative to one-to-one interventions; group 
therapy within IAPT is clustered into ‘CBT’ treatments which also include one-to-one 
sessions (Perfect et al., 2016). However, if this is the case, it opens up particular 
issues for people of BAME backgrounds and in intersectional locations that 
policymakers must be aware of, particularly if they wish to decrease BAME mental 
health inequalities in service performance data. As the literature highlights, 
therapeutic spaces are often not neutral spaces. Just as racism is highlighted as 
present in interactions between people in psychiatric wards, so too can it and other 
forms of oppression manifest in group therapy sessions. Being alert to the 
marginalised and intersectional locations that many people in BAME groupings 
inhabit is therefore vital to policymakers if considering increasing reliance on such 
therapeutic methods. Even if such considerations do not change the ultimate 
direction of the policy, an intersectionally-sensitive approach would provoke 
consideration of how different social groupings might respond to this, and what 




Overall, the experiences of participants of mental health services reflected the 
literature in that they were felt predominantly to be inadequate or inappropriate, 
despite some positive experiences. Interestingly, the positive experiences 
recounted by participants emerged where care was taken on the part of service 
providers/staff to attend to participants’ specific needs31. Indeed, the causes of many 
of the problems highlighted above can be viewed as resulting from the application 
of the ‘cheapest kind of understanding’ at the interpersonal, institutional and 
systemic levels. Newland et al (2015) calls for therapists to direct interventions to 
address issues in the wider social context in which people reside. Supporting this, 
my thesis points to the need for policymakers engaged in addressing BAME mental 
health inequality to do the same. A tight focus on mental health services, whilst 
important, is inadequate, just as a focus on wider social inequalities that does not 
account for their interactions with racism and intersectionality is. 
9 Calls for change 
My literature review highlighted a number of calls for change in relation mental 
health discourses, service practices and policy made at State levels. These 
generally fell into the following categories: increased resources to expand service 
capacity and improve delivery; increased cultural competency among mental health 
service staff and practices; a focus on racism and the ways it manifests in mental 
health discourses and practices; and an increased need to build understanding of 
and address intersectional experiences within BAME groupings. Staff members 
interviewed by myself advocated for many of the same improvements. For them, 
however, there was not the same division between those calling for more resources 
and those advocating a focus on racism. Most staff highlighted both as absolutely 
necessary, along with greater cultural competence.  
Some participants also spoke of what they think is needed to improve mental health 
and experiences of services for people similarly ‘located’. Where discussed 
explicitly, improvements generally related to service provision. Highlighted by the 
largest number of participants was the need for more resources to be directed 
towards marginalised groups. Aligning with the critical literature, the need to address 
racism was also raised. Additionally, participants drew attention to the need for 
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increased lived experience of both BAME status/background and mental health 
issues/distress in decision-making and service delivery. Indeed, it is in this call for 
increased lived experience that we see a possible point of coming together between 
people advocating for action in relation to BAME mental health inequalities, and 
movements such as the Disability, Mad or mental health service user/survivor 
movements, and anti-racism movements. Interestingly, participants did not seem as 
focused on cultural differences as needing addressing as the literature or staff 
members. 
Finally, a note in relation to calls for greater consideration of intersectionality and 
action that recognises the impact of wider inequalities at play in relation to BAME 
mental health inequality. Calls from participants regarding their desires that services 
stop focusing on prescribing medication and actually address issues like material 
deprivations or migrant status aligns strongly with advocates in the literature that 
draw attention to the need to consider wider social issues to address BAME mental 
health issues. In the literature this increasingly includes issues labelled 
‘intersectional’. Whilst most participants in this study do not have the language of 
intersectionality, they do provide examples of intersectional experiences that impact 
on their mental health and experiences of services. In this way, their testimonies 
support calls for wider social issues and intersectional experiences to take a more 
central role in any future BAME mental health inequality strategy, whilst also 
emphasising the need to address racism and cultural difference. 
10 Conclusion 
These findings have important consequences for policy-makers adopting a 
conceptualisation of this social issue as emerging from and operating within open 
systems. They reinforce the need to consider the network of State-led support 
services more holistically to improve experiences of mental health services by this 
population group, rather than mental health services in isolation. This need arises 
not only from participants bringing a variety of past experiences into how they 
respond to treatments and the delivery of services. It is also borne of the increased 
likelihood that people of BAME backgrounds are intersectionally located and will be 
(or have been) exposed to a range of systems of oppression. In the next, and final 
chapter, I bring this discussion into sharper focus. Primarily, I demonstrate how the 
above support my proposal that any future strategy to address BAME mental health 
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inequality would benefit not only from greater inclusion of people with lived 
experience of both BAME status and mental health issues/distress (including 
‘CMDs’), but also from employing two heuristics, the first being that of the ‘wicked 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Comrades, let us flee from this motionless movement where gradually 
dialectic is changing into the logic of equilibrium. Let us reconsider the 
question of mankind. Let us reconsider the question of cerebral reality 
and of the cerebral mass of all humanity, whose connexions must be 
increased, whose channels must be diversified and whose messages 
must be rehumanized.  
(Fanon, 2001, p.252) 
The arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic in the last 12 months has sent shockwaves 
across the globe, altering much about the way we in the west and elsewhere live. 
Not only has it raised questions regarding what we as a society truly value, it has 
also brought the fault lines in our social structures to the fore. For example, the way 
that people working in care are underpaid and un-recognised, or the educational 
inequalities experienced by children from socio-economically deprived backgrounds 
who do not have ready access to computers and the internet. Whilst this period has 
been more than trying for many, it is often in such times that opportunities for change 
arise. Already, we have seen the rise of anti-racism movements that state that 
enough is enough. Though the killing of George Floyd was the final catalyst, the 
context of stark health and morbidity inequalities highlighted through the pandemic 
cannot be ignored. It, too, provided vital fuel by highlighting how the inequalities 
experienced by BAME populations across many wealthy western nations translate 
into matters of life and death (Booth, 2020; The Movement for Black Lives, 2020). 
This was exemplified in a child’s powerful poem, which circulated on social media 
supporting anti-racism movements in my home town of Bristol (see Appendix 27).  
Sitting at my desk writing up my thesis, I found many of the things I was writing about 
now being heatedly debated everywhere I turned. The morning news, social media 
outlets, notices from my university, friends and neighbours. Still in contact with a few 
participants in this research, I saw first-hand that this pandemic was not ‘the great 
leveller’ claimed by some in the spring. Rather, it was a magnifier of the social 
inequalities that participants had spoken to me about in the years preceding the 
pandemic outbreak. It brought home to me the relevance of this work in today’s 
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social and political climate, demonstrating the role that policy-makers have in 
augmenting or mitigating against health inequalities. Participants had been right. 
This thesis does need to be about policy and change. It does need to put forward 
participant’s perspectives such that readers better ‘understand what’s people’s 
problem’ (Mahdi, 2018). And it does need to address policies that provide 
marginalised people with ‘the cheapest kind of understanding’ (Satch, 2018). As I 
set out in my introduction, past strategies have been impoverished in several ways, 
not least due to their continued narrow focus on inequalities within mental health 
and related support services. Nowhere do these strategies seek to address wider 
social inequalities recognised within ‘psy’ disciplines as a significant causal factor in 
the increased risk of (diagnosis of) mental health issues/distress among BAME 
groupings. This impoverished approach has led to nation-level policies addressing 
BAME mental health inequalities to fail to have any significant impact on 
epidemiological or service performance trends.  
Taking a predominantly inductive approach, I discovered much about what policy-
makers of future strategies addressing this policy issue might learn from the lived 
experiences of people at various intersections that include BAME status/background 
and mental health issues/distress. Considering these findings within the context of 
why previous strategies might have failed to improve trends, I found the following 
main lessons. These are the need for policy-makers to: 
1. widen the policy scope to reflect diverse definitions of BAME mental health 
inequality, which includes addressing the ‘root causes’; 
2. base policy design on the ontological understanding that phenomena and 
systems in this space operate and are experienced as interconnected; and 
3. recognise intersectional experiences and design policies that both address 
needs arising from this and do not reinforce such forms of marginalisation. 
Reflecting on my own journey from policy-maker to researcher, I recognised how 
central particular epistemological frames and theoretical lenses have been to my 
own ability to ‘really listen’ (Mahdi, 2018) and enrich my understanding. Thinking 
about how these might be translated into a policy context whereby most policy-
makers simply do not have the luxury of interrogating the more philosophical 
aspects of epistemological and methodological choices, I happened across two 
things. First was the notion of complex social issues as ‘wicked problems’. The 
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second was the emerging work being done to translate intersectional theory into 
workable tools for policy-makers, often stemming from the work of those developing 
intersectional research methods.    
1 Wicked problem: scope and ontological considerations 
The concept of the ‘wicked problem’ addresses the first two issues, which speak 
more to epistemic and ontological issues within policy-making practices that are 
particularly problematic when responding to issues of inequality. Outlined briefly on 
p.12-13 and expanded on in Appendix 8, the concept of the ‘wicked problem’ 
essentially stipulates an ontological and epistemological frame that situates social 
issues as complex, interconnected, and involving a multiplicity of knowledges which 
each play a role in building richer theories of reality. It situates ‘wicked’ social issues 
as having no single definition and operating within complex networks of open 
systems; open systems being systems that are shaped and shape other systems, 
particularly in the social world. The concept of a wicked problem is not, therefore, 
applicable to all policy issues, but I feel that it encompasses something core to the 
issue of BAME mental health inequality.  
As demonstrated by both the literature and my own analysis of data from this study, 
this area of inequality is one in which definitions are multiple and it is nearly 
impossible to delineate the start or the end. This is because epistemological and 
ontological issues are highlighted as fundamental to some of the manifestations of 
inequality (see chapter 3, section 3). As previously alluded in this thesis, the State 
in its strategies has relied on definitions provided by scholars and professional 
bodies applying understandings firmly within western medical discourses. These 
discourses now allow for understandings that move beyond bio-genetic aetiologies. 
However, they leave unproblematised issues pertaining to diagnostic categories and 
the possible ways in which such categories pathologize difference and distress 
arising from experiences of oppression. Yet, this understanding is far from the only 
one available to policy-makers. Even from within ‘psy’ disciplines, there are those 
calling for such pathologization to be problematised within mental health practices 
and related policies. Focusing in on the findings of this study and other research 
where testimonies of lived experience are given primacy, this call intensifies. 
Similarly, interpretations of trends and explanatory theories most commonly put 
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forward by dominant medical narratives are not those that best align with 
scholarship focussing specifically on the experiences and understandings of BAME 
groupings or participants in this research (see chapter 6, part A).  
Adopting a conceptualisation of BAME mental health inequality as a ‘wicked 
problem’ would require policy-makers to actively seek a diversity of perspectives 
that represent all parties with an (significant) interest in the area prior to defining the 
issue and scoping the strategy. This moves beyond current practices of consultation 
or collaboration, whereby interested parties are invited to provide their views on the 
main issues within a topic area or – as is more common – to provide answers to a 
series of questions set by policy-makers and Ministers. Regardless of the approach 
taken, however, policy-makers come already armed with significant limits to the 
scope of any potential policy or strategy. These result primarily from assessments 
of political will, financial and resource considerations, and barriers arising from 
governmental and governance structures. Interested parties are then encouraged 
to respond within these parameters, situating current structures - moulded in the 
shape of dominant discourses and practices - as unable to be altered in any 
fundamental way.  
Certainly, this seems to be the process at play in relation to BAME mental health 
issues, where no strategy has ever moved beyond addressing inequalities related 
to the provision of support for mental health issues/distress. Though wider social 
inequalities are accepted by the State as an important risk factor in the development 
of mental health issues/distress within a health inequality context, no strategy has 
set about trying to systematically addressing these causes. Looking closely at the 
testimonies of participants in this research and issues highlighted in the literature in 
relation to this topic, I find this to be a serious limitation. Indeed, this policy position 
is arguably mirrored in the overreliance on medicalised treatment practices whereby 
people are given medication with little or no attention being paid to ‘the root cause’; 
an approach highlighted by several participants as ‘pointless’ (Peter, 2018). I would 
argue that maintaining such approaches is not only detrimental to the ultimate 
strategy or policy designed, but is actually a means by which experiences of 
oppression are perpetuated. The State becomes no different to the medical 
practices that ignore alternative perspectives. As alluded in my introduction, the 
inability of the State – and by proxy, its policy-makers – to truly bring all interested 
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parties into dialogue prior to setting parameters forces people in marginalised 
positions to ‘fit in’ with those in more privileged and dominant positions. In this way, 
policymaking practices pursued in the name of addressing BAME mental health 
inequality risk replicating the very experiences of marginalisation cited as a key 
factor in generating this inequality.  
In contrast, an approach informed by the concept of a wicked problem necessarily 
accepts complexity and multiplicity as critical to understanding how an issue 
manifests and operates in the social world. Therefore, consultation, collaboration 
and co-production at the scoping stage, informed by this way of thinking, should 
actively seek out diverse perspectives which are then treated with equal legitimacy. 
This, I suggest, supports policy-makers defining BAME mental health inequality to 
mitigate against engaging in ways that replicate oppression and cultural imperialism 
and provides a non-partisan means of shifting dynamics of power. In addition to 
supporting State policy-makers to avoid replicating the inequality they seek to 
address, actions to broaden the perspectives feeding into definitions of the issue 
should result in richer ‘theories of reality’. Richer in that they are truer to the ‘actual’ 
phenomena as they are experienced by multiple parties involved.  
However, there is an important limitation within the concept worth recognising, 
particularly in relation to BAME mental health inequality and other issues of 
inequality. ‘Inequality’ as a phenomenon is not only made up of concrete issues 
divorced from a person’s internal processes. Aspects of this phenomenon are in fact 
located within the lived experiences of people subject to a given inequality. This 
gives people with lived experience of a particular issue access to ‘theories of 
knowledge’ more directly in contact with the ‘actual phenomenon’ being examined. 
They are therefore likely to be coherent with the ‘actual phenomenon’ in a way that 
decreases with every level of abstraction that is inserted. This provides a basis for 
such knowledges to be prioritised above other more abstracted forms. As Fricker 
states: 
When our practice is uninformed by the experience of people in a given 
social position, we are collectively in a position fully to understand 
neither the experiences in question, nor any other areas of the social 
world to which they have interpretive relevance. (Fricker, 1999, p.208) 
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This, together with any emancipatory or anti-oppression aims of future BAME mental 
health inequality strategy, provide strong arguments for people with lived experience 
of the intersection of BAME status/background and mental health issues/distress to 
have their testimonies prioritised in policy-making without designating other 
perspectives as obsolete.  
The need for an awareness of competing knowledges in the articulation of an issue 
all bring different aspects of a phenomena to light, building richer understandings 
that enable policy-makers to take more wholistic approaches. Without this, 
policymaking processes are unable to produce responses able to attend to a given 
issue in anything remotely resembling a wholistic way. This is deeply problematic 
where an issue is identified as having the characteristics of ‘wickedness’, as such 
issues not only have no single, conclusive definition, but also have an ontology 
whereby no aspect of the problem can be isolated without impacting on other 
aspects. Changes in one area, even if treated as an isolated issue by those 
implementing the change, will most likely have a ripple effect as the systems 
involved are open in nature. Certainly, the issue of BAME mental health inequality 
does seem to be one in which the systems core to its emergence are ‘open’ in 
nature, interconnecting to shape and be shaped by each other. Though there was 
evidence of this in the literature, an in-depth examination of testimonies of 
participants in this study revealed that this interconnectedness was not only 
happening at the level of structuring the phenomena itself, but also at the level of 
experience of such phenomena.  
Evidence that the State’s understandings of health inequalities as purely an issue 
for medical practices is disappearing, influenced by repeated reports (Department 
of Health, 1980; Department for Health and Social Care, 1998; Marmot et al., 2010) 
that emphasise the interconnected nature of social inequalities and health issues. 
For example, the increasing implementation of ‘social prescribing’. Though 
remaining within medicalised models that focus attention on interventions for 
implementation by an individual, this intervention does begin to operationalise 
recognition of the role of the social world in health. Whilst such approaches still 
evade the issue of dealing with the structural causes of inequality, it begins to build 
a culture that situates consideration of wider social factors as integral to addressing 
issues previously ‘tamed’ as pertaining to the body only. This evasion of structural 
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inequality, however, is problematic for policy issues such as BAME mental health 
inequality, whereby systems of oppression are fundamental elements of the network 
of open systems giving rise to the issue. A true embracing of the issue as a ‘wicked’ 
problem would not be able to make such an evasion. One reason being that it is 
highly unlikely that those involved in defining the issue and scope, (i.e. people with 
lived experience of the inequality), would accept such an approach. Another being 
that where an ontology whereby all relevant systems involved are open in nature is 
truly embraced, consideration would have to be given to how the mechanisms and 
manifestations of structural inequalities shape the systems that focus is being turned 
to. This position might strengthen arguments for issues such as the need to 
recognise institutional racism, providing a stronger basis on which to counter 
politically-based arguments against this. Further, it would necessarily require the 
development of a national-level strategy that, for the first-time in England’s history, 
addressed the causes of BAME mental health inequalities in relation to service 
provision and incidence/prevalence of mental health issues/distress. This would be 
due to a recognition that experiences leading to the development of mental health 
issues and/or in diagnostic practices are deeply interconnected with those forms of 
inequality manifesting within service outcomes and experiences.  
The concept of the ‘wicked problem’ provides the policy-maker with a tool that 
situates them as non-partisan, whilst enabling them to argue for recognition of 
formulations of an issue uncomfortable to those in positions of privilege. The policy-
maker can provide an argument for a particular conceptualisation of the issue whilst 
distancing their arguments from those that might be otherwise understood as 
politically-charged and partisan. Thus, the concept holds two main benefits that I 
propose position it as a potentially useful heuristic for State policy-makers working 
in this policy area. First, it distils complex epistemological and ontological arguments 
into an easily understandable tool that promotes approaches to enrich 
understandings of issues requiring policy responses. And secondly, it provides a 
means by which to argue for the scope of strategies to be expanded in the non-
partisan way so integral to the a-political position that State policy-makers must 
present themselves. In making this statement, I am not however doing so naively. 
An acceptance of non-political arguments for taking one course of action over 
another requires a will to prioritise the implementation of a strategy fit for purpose 
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over and above considerations of a more partisan nature. This requires a level of 
humility and introspection that State parties are not always willing to demonstrate, 
as evidenced by repeated refusals to recognise institutional racism in England’s 
health and care systems (see Appendix 5). However, I maintain that the non-
partisan nature of the ‘wicked problem’ still provides a helpful basis on which State 
policy-makers can push for changes in policy-making practices in this and similar 
policy areas and start working towards organisational cultural change. 
2 Incorporating an intersectional lens 
Intersectionality, as I point out in chapter 2, was originally developed to address a 
gap in the American legal system that was unable to account for particular 
experiences. This led to an equalities legal framework that was unable to safeguard 
intersectionally located people from forms of discrimination and oppression that 
deviated from those allowed for within a framework based on single-issue 
approaches. A similar issue is at play in national-level policy responses to BAME 
mental health inequality in England, as was in fact pointed out in the DRE’s 
evaluation report (see Appendix 5). Department of Health (2010) highlights that 
BAME populations are complex and diverse, and that any future strategy must 
recognise this and act accordingly. The implication being that homogenising 
approaches to BAME mental health inequality were simply inadequate. For Wilson, 
this led to a need for a ‘single equalities’ approach that saw discrimination and 
oppression resulting from any of the 9 protected characteristics in the Equality Act 
2010 as relevant.  
My own research concurs with views that situate any form of discrimination and 
oppression experienced within BAME groupings as relevant to the issue of BAME 
mental health inequality. As chapters 4-6 demonstrate, the role of discrimination and 
oppression resulting from classism and ableism in relation to physical and learning 
impairments seem of particular relevance to this area of inequality. These, and other 
stigmatising identity-markers played instrumental parts in both the development and 
aggravation of mental health issues/distress and inequalities experiences within 
support services. However, such issues are not always presented as of relevance 
to this issue and receive little attention in the literature. As a result, whilst I align with 
those advocating for greater focus on racism and racial prejudice in policy 
224 
 
responses to BAME mental health inequality, I suggest this must be done alongside 
an attention to both multiple discrimination of an additive sort and to intersectional 
experiences. Intersectionality is increasingly recognised within activist circles and 
slowly being introduced into British academic research in this area of inequality. 
However, it still comes up against significant opposition from within and outside of 
government and seems still relatively unknown among many people living in the 
intersection of BAME status/background and mental health issues/distress.  
 
 
 learning about 
intersectional theory was a turning point in my understandings of inequality, 
discrimination and oppression. In relation to this research, without the understanding 
gained of how prejudicial power dynamics can function together to create ‘different’ 
expressions of oppression, I am certain that I would have missed some of the 
nuances of participants’ experiences. For example, it is my grounding in 
intersectionality theory that drew my attention to the interconnected and 
interdependent ways in which power dynamics and systems of oppression 
experiences past and present were impacting on how participants responded to 
processes involved in accessing support. Further, it is this intersectional lens that 
enabled me to identify commonalities of experience without losing the richness of 
difference and diversity among participants. By this I am referring to the 
commonality of experiences of discrimination and oppression, though the specific 
forms of these differed across participants. Taking an intersectional lens enabled 
me not only to identify experiences of intersectionality, but also those gaps in the 
literature that relate to experiences more aligned with multiple discrimination. 
 
 I realised that one of the reservations 
around employing this lens is the perception that intersectionality in policymaking 
would require consideration to be given to a never-ending number of sub-groups of 
marginalised people. In the world of policy, this is simply unfeasible much of the 
time. Whilst intersectionality theory does highlight that people in an indefinite 
number of intersectional locations have differing needs that require attention, it does 
not do so by advocating and considering each intersectional location individually 
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until each is addressed. Instead, in keeping with the ontological premises of wicked 
problems, intersectionality theory highlights the need to understand the open nature 
of multiple systems of oppression in operation in our society and what happens 
when these interact. Whilst these do manifest in a multitude of different experiences 
at the individual and group levels, this way of thinking about intersectionality 
provides policy-makers with a more manageable approach that is inclusive of and 
open to issues of an intersectional nature. Indeed, this sort of interpretation seems 
to be that which has underpinned more recent attempts to translate intersectional 
theory into policy approaches (Coll-Planas and Solà-Morales, 2019; Hankivsky, 
2012; Heard et al., 2020).  
A second obstacle to the implementation of intersectional approaches, still related 
to people’s perceptions of intersectional theory, is that it would diminish focuses on 
the system of oppression particular to a given social group. For example, Sewell 
(2012) seems to suggest that approaches to BAME mental health inequality that 
take either a ‘single equalities’ or intersectional approach might lead to a lesser 
focus on racism. This reservation is understandable in the context of a State that 
continues to refute the existence of institutional racism as a significant factor in the 
inequalities BAME groupings experience within mental health services. However, I 
tend to agree more with Crenshaw’s position when she states that a refusal to 
acknowledge and explore intersectional experiences leads to a distortion in our 
understandings of systems of oppression, such that we are ill-equipped to truly 
tackle them (Crenshaw, 1989). Indeed, this is a position increasingly held by 
organisations such as the UN, whose CRPD committee recently published a general 
comment advocating consideration of intersectionally located disabled people in 
equalities policies (UN CRPD, 2018). As my own study and other research 
conducted with an intersectional lens highlight, a lack of attention to such 
experiences leads to significant gaps in understandings of the issue at hand. Gaps 
that I hold produce precisely the ‘cheapest kind of understanding’ that deepens the 
inequalities and marginalisation experienced by people such as participants in this 
study; the impacts of which include higher risk of development or a worsening of 
mental health issues/distress.  
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3 Limitations and implications following from this research 
In chapter 2, I highlighted several limitations to this research in relation to the width 
of diversity within my sample. I recognise that participants in this research are not 
necessarily representative of the BAME population or of the population at the 
intersection of BAME status/background and mental health issues/distress. 
Experiences pertaining to important systems of oppression such as those relating 
to sexual orientation and sex are absent from this study, as are the experiences of 
people from within many minority ethnic groupings, older people and children and 
wealthier people within this population group. Had this research been seeking to 
identify a series of pointed policy recommendations, these limitations would be 
significant. Certainly, any future policy-making work in this area should ensure that 
experiences pertaining to all of the key systems of oppression and a wider range of 
intersectional locations are represented. Though my findings did highlight specific 
areas requiring action, (i.e. meeting financial and housing needs, over-reliance on 
medication), this was not the ultimate aim of my research. Instead, I was taking a 
more overarching look to identify if there was something in the overall approach that 
policy-makers bring to this area of inequality that might benefit from changing. In 
this I feel I was successful, drawing from participants’ testimonies to identify several 
reasons why the overall approaches taken by previous policies were inadequate to 
the aims they espoused.  
I therefore suggest that this thesis holds much of significance for any future work on 
a national-level strategy to address BAME mental health inequality. Though based 
specifically on people located at spaces within one particular intersectional location, 
I do feel that the recommendations I deduced from this study hold potential 
relevance for policy being developed in other areas of inequality. Though the 
political climate at present may be a difficult one in which to introduce a ‘wicked 
problem’ approach to this topic and intersectionality, I feel that it is time to start 
introducing policy-makers to such concepts more widely than is done at present. In 
this time of significant change in England, and the UK more widely, there is 
opportunity for change. Not just in what we do, but hopefully in how we do it. The 
value of lived experience and recognition of intersectionality is increasing in civil 
society, and the State must keep up.  
227 
 
There are also implications for academic research, though these are more specific 
to the area of BAME mental health inequality. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, 
chapter 6 revealed several gaps in the literature that the field would benefit from 
investigating further. First, I feel that much can be learnt from examining the 
experiences of people deemed by medical discourses to have CMD forms of mental 
health issues/distress. There is a tendency in research to focus on those deemed 
to experience SMI who use/survive tertiary services. Indeed, even much of the 
research pertaining to aetiological theories for this area of inequality focus primarily 
on risk factors for SMI. This focus mirrors that in State policy, which fails to address 
with any real purpose the risk factors for increased rates of ‘actual’ mental health 
issues/distress among BAME populations. Yet, participants in this research 
demonstrated themselves to have an acute awareness of the issues involved in 
triggering, maintaining and aggravating their  mental health issues/distress. More 
research of this sort is necessary to any future strategy considering prevention 
measures; measures that address the wider network of open systems giving rise to 
this inequality. 
Primarily, however, chapter 6 highlighted the need for more research considering 
the role of intersectionality and intersectional experiences in perpetuating BAME 
mental health inequality. An intersection of particular relevance for which there is a 
dearth of research is the intersection of BAME status/background, mental health 
issues/distress and other forms of disability and chronic illness. Whilst the need to 
consider the above is pressing, I also recognised a need to examine the role of other 
systems of oppression as they act on BAME groupings in more additive ways. 
Emphasis on intersectionality, then, must be situated not as replacing ‘single-issue’ 
or ‘multiple discrimination’ approaches, but rather as providing another lens by 
which to augment understandings of inequalities as they are experienced by all in a 
marginalised social grouping. I emphasise the need for the UK to catch up with 
countries such as America, Canada and Australia to develop workable 
intersectionally informed policy-making models if it wishes to maintain its 
international reputation as a world leader in equalities issues. More importantly, it 
must do so if we wish to see a ‘rehumanized’ society emerge from these turbulent 






1 For example, in sexual-health related policy, the needs of disabled women 
were stated to have been considered.  
  
2 Primarily: disability studies, Black feminism, medical sociology and philosophy 
of epistemology.  
Chapter 3 
3 This Windrush generation migrated in answer to the British government’s 
request for citizens of the British Empire to help rebuild the UK following the 
destruction caused during the second world war. 
4 Whilst definitions can differ (Ruggeri et al., 2000, p.149), SMI generally refers 
to psychosis and CMD to neurosis (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.55). 
5 Occasionally studies also included black British people. Sometimes it is unclear 
if the black African and African-Caribbean population considered include black 
British people who are 2nd/3rd generation.  
6 This group is usually assumed to comprise predominantly of Irish-born people 
and people from central and eastern Europe. Such studies often do not 
include, or fail to distinguish between, 1st and 2nd generation migrants.  
7 Footnote 3 applies 
8 Footnote 4 applies. 
9 On close inspection, this often includes the experiences of black people of 
mixed heritage and second generation black migrants.  
10 It is easier to research groups that are over-represented in services rather than 
those who are under-represented.  
11 Bhugra et al. state that ‘A genetic cause is unlikely because two 
epidemiological studies in Jamaica (Hickling & Rodgers-Johnson, 1995) and 
Trinidad (Bhugra et al. 1996) have not found the incidence of schizophrenia to 
be raised.’ (Bhugra et al., 1997, p.797) 
12 This is sometimes also referred to as ‘social deprivation’, ‘social disadvantage’ 
or ‘socio-economic disadvantage’ – this terminology appears to be largely inter-
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changeable with differences mirroring variety of measures used within specific 
terminology. 
13 Often measured by ownership of a car, which may in fact be a culturally or 
geographically inappropriate measure. I.e. – high numbers of BAME groups 
reside in London where ownership is rarer.  
14 Lloyd and Fuller also add that age was a significant factor in likelihood to 
consult a doctor, with older people from South Asian and African-Caribbean 
backgrounds. There was also variation in consultation rates in relation to 
gender across ethnic groupings. For the Asian grouping, migration after the 
age of 12 also impacted on likelihood to consult a doctor (Lloyd and Fuller, 
2002, p.102).  
15 Secondary services include community care; acute, crisis and rehabilitation 
services; and many services provided through the ‘Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT) programme. Tertiary services include secure 
mental health wards and forensic psychiatry services; inpatient ‘Child and Adult 
mental health services’ (CAMHS); and prison health care.  
16 The report states that ‘Rates [of GP referrals] were 8% higher than average 
among the White British group. They were lower than average among the 
Other White, black Caribbean, black African and White/black Caribbean Mixed 
groups by 28% to 72%.’ (Care Quality Commission, 2010, p.21) 
17 By which I mean equal to levels found in the comparison population, be that 
white or white British.  
18 More recent research challenges the assertion that Asian women in the UK 
don’t know where to seek support, pointing out that Asian people have high 
use of GP services for physical health issues. (Kapadia et al., 2018, p.304). 
19 Khootum refers to ‘kinship network united by common blood-line’, (Katbamna 
et al., 2000, p.15) 
Chapter 4 
20 Mya is seen as qualifying as being of minority ethnicity within this research as a 
result of her Jewish heritage. However, this is not visible and as such Mya is 
generally perceived as being white British. She is indeed able, and does, self-
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identify as white British, though she believes her Jewish heritage to have 
impacted on her upbringing. 
Chapter 5 
21 These forms ask people to mark how they are feeling that day against a range 
of measures, generally by providing a number of a scale. 
22 Samantha confirmed this in a later discussion. My field notes state the 
following: ‘I asked why she hated the paperwork in MH so much, and without 
me prompting she said straight away because it reminds her of the Visa 
process.’ – Samantha: Field notes 190808. 
23 She was removed from the group therapy session she cites for the way she 
was speaking to and about other people in the group.  
24 Deflecting questions from healthcare practitioners with sarcastic remarks and 
refusing to speak about her issues. 
25 Here Peter is referring to mineral or vitamin based deficiencies, such as a lack 
of Vitamin D3 due to lack of exposure to sun. 
26 Satch would also become confused and anxious about his appointment times 
and who he was supposed to see, for what and when. As a result, Satch 
expressed needing a support worker to book the transport and keep him on 
track with appointments. Without this support, he became quickly 
overwhelmed. 
27 Most experiences and interviews were conducted prior to the September 2019 
Budget announcement where the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the 
formal end of austerity measures. All were concluded prior to Covid-19 
measures. 
Chapter 6 
28 That said, having begun to interview a lady who did not speak English and her 








30 The lack of such findings regarding racism I recognise once more as possibly 
the consequence of a limitation of this study as opposed to a lack of 
participants perceiving this gap. I simply did not enter into conversations about 
the content of therapeutic sessions with participants unless they volunteered 
such information, acknowledging the limits of my own skills and not wanting to 
risk causing harm. 
31 For example, the hospital organising Samantha’s medicines into daily tubs to 
help her keep track and accommodate for her decreasing eyesight. Or Peter’s 
previous GP who took notice of his past negative experiences with medication 
and valued his views on treatments enough to refer him to a homeopathic 
hospital. Or Satch’s attachment to a particular social worker who did not stick 
to rigid ideas of how people ‘should’ behave, but took the time to understand 
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Appendix 1: ‘Race’, ethnicity and BAME - problematic concepts / 
terminology 
In this thesis, I am tentative in my use of certain terminology, often adopting more 
unusual wording such as ethnic ‘groupings’ or adding ‘distress’ to the customary 
‘mental health issues’. Where I have used more medicalised terminology, I have 
tried to indicate a level of scepticism. This is not because I disavow of all medicalised 
interpretations and understandings of psychological phenomena, but rather to 
emphases the ‘provisional and fallible’ (Gorski, 2013, p.659) nature of such 
knowledge. This, I feel is important given the certainty with which such concepts are 
often treated within more positivist sciences, including much of western medicine. 
Whilst this is linguistically cumbersome at times, it is the result of taking a critical 
approach in this research and acknowledging the fundamentally problematic nature 
of concepts core to this topic. I.e. ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘mental illness/disorder’ and 
‘mental health’. Debates on the conceptual soundness of these notions centre 
largely on ontological disputes or arise from a plurality of epistemological positions. 
I address some of the issues pertaining to mental health in Chapter 3. However, 
within the topic of BAME mental health inequality, consideration of such issues 
around ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are also important though I am unable to include this in 
the body of this thesis. 
‘Race’ was held for many years to be a legitimate means by which to categorise 
differences between people and peoples. This was based on the idea that specific 
features of a person, (predominantly physical), indicate not only a difference in 
heritage, but in ‘type’ of human. Today, some scholars still consider classifications 
of ‘race’ as legitimate. However, many dispute this, positing it instead as a social 
construction (Hacking, 2000, pp.16–18), often emerging from a desire to 
differentiate between ‘them’ and ‘us’. This latter conceptualisation, does not deny 
differences in skin tone, hair or facial structure. Rather, it disputes that these 
features constitute a different ‘type’ of human, being instead diversity within the 
category of ‘human’. Such scholars are also likely to state that whilst ‘race’ is a social 
construct without a solid basis, ‘racism’ remains ontologically sound. 
Whist racial boundaries are sometimes used in this field to delineate between 
population groups, today ethnicity is more commonly applied. However, ethnicity is 
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also problematic. Emerging in the 1970’s, the term is conceptualised differently 
across the globe. Distinct societies, for example, place a lesser or greater emphasis 
on racialisation in constituting certain people as having minority ethnicity (Fenton, 
2010, c.2). At the most basic level, ‘ethnic collectively and belongingness (i.e. ethnic 
phenomena)’ are generally conceptualised ‘using notions of common origin or 
destiny.' (Anthias, 1992, p.421). These categories become problematic when they 
are deployed as though fixed and a naturally occurring phenomena, rather than as 
constructions that fit current social and political needs (Anthias, 1992, p.425; Cole, 
1993, p.671; Fenton, 2010, p.4; Moodley et al., 2019). Fixed groupings of this sort 
are inconsistent with the reality of homogeneity within geographic areas and the 
fluidity and flux of borders. Furthermore, they ignore the homogeneity emerging as 
a result of people’s social stratification and other aspects of identity (Bhatti, 2011, 
p.84). Thus ‘ethnicity’, whilst it might provide some indication of a person’s cultural 
heritage, provides only that; an indication of possible cultural and religious heritage. 
Employing ethnic groupings too simplistically poses significant issues for research:  
ethnicity is not a sound epidemiological variable because of problems of 
definition, problems of heterogeneity in the population and ethnocentricity 
among researchers, among other factors. (Bhugra and Bahl, 1999, p.3).  
The employment of crude categories can lead to misrepresentations and 
misunderstandings of what is happening at the community level. For example, in the 
1990’s, ethnicity data did not disaggregate population groups originating from South 
Asia. It was not until studies began separating out the experiences of people of 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian backgrounds that it was found that the groupings 
differed significantly in their experiences (see Appendix 17). However, when 
investigating inequalities that seem to emerge when population data is 
disaggregated by ethnicity, it becomes necessary to employ such concepts, albeit 
whilst recognising their problematic natures (Maynard, 2002, p.35; Sewell, 2018). 
Thus, I refer to categories of ethnicity as ‘groupings’, maintaining awareness of their 
fluidity and socially constructed nature and the heterogeneity within them. 
Primarily, however, the terminology I employ is that of ‘BAME’. In policy and 
statistics the terms most commonly used across the time period most relevant to 
this research 2000-present are BAME, later expanded to BAME. However, the term 
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‘BAME’ remains controversial (Adebisi, 2019; Bhui et al., 2012, p.196), with debates 
around this reasserting themselves in light of Covid-19 health inequalities and the 
global anti-racism resurgence (Fawcett Society, 2020). I decided to continue using 
this term for several reasons. First it is one commonly used in mental health 
discourses, policy circles and by many user-led organisations and activists. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of another term that encompasses both ‘race’ and 
ethnicity, and allows for consideration of white minorities also. I considered using 
‘racialised people’. However this places ‘racism’ specifically at the core of this 
research, which was not the intention of this research nor reflective of many 
participants’ testimonies. This is not a study focused on ‘race’, racialisation and 
racism, but originally of the experiences of people with mixed cultural backgrounds. 
Rather issues of ‘race’ form an important part of this work because it is one of the 
main focuses within the literature speaking to policy, and because it was raised by 
several participants. It would have been disingenuous for me to leave this topic out 
of the research and tantamount to a white-washing of participants’ testimonies. As 
such, I do not feel that ‘minority ethnicity’ on its own would be adequate; I need a 
term inclusive of racialisation, including among white people. This is because my 
sample includes one participant who does not presently experience racialisation 
though she might in certain circumstances. Mya, who identifies predominantly as 
white British would have been racialised ‘Jewish’ in Nazi Germany. 





Appendix 2: Julie J Charles statement 01/07/20 
People of colour and of different ethnic backgrounds are known widely as BAME... 
BLACK ASIAN and MINORITY ETHNIC. Not everyone relates to this term as it can 
be quite stigmatising and more people are relating to being black British, south 
Asian, African and Caribbean etc. 
When we then cross paths with having lived experience of mental health this can be 
quite soul destroying as it somewhat overlaps with some of the descriptions or 
categories we are put in. Such as being a women who is unmarried, bisexual, has 
lived experience of living with bipolar and is also living with long term physical health 
difficulties. 
The Equality Act states 9 strands of which a person can be categorised into: age, 
disability, gender, marital status, maternity, race, religion/belief, sex and sexual 
orientation. However even with these in place as human beings we experience 
widespread sectionalism as many of us cross over more than one strand. This is 
called intersectionality. Intersectionality is real and it’s vital that policy recognises 
this so services at a grass roots level are meeting the needs of all communities 
instead of putting us in tick boxes. 
As a black British disabled women I experience the constant lack of services to meet 
my needs as they are not at formed on the basis of intersectionality but on just 
whatever can be met, whether a service meets your needs or not or I continue to 
experience discrimination which feels like racism and sometimes is racism so to 
end. 
I STRONGLY recommend that there be a new framework of the EHRC categories 
which in fact does not define a person but actually does not hold to account most 





Appendix 3: Definitions of health inequalities 
Though the State has intervened at a national level in mental health issues in one 
form or another since 1774 (Act for Regulating Private Madhouses, 1774), a focused 
interest in BAME mental health inequalities did not emerge until the late 1990’s/early 
2000’s. In fact, despite the Department of Health and Social Care’s publication of a 
report into health inequalities generally in the UK in 1980 (Department of Health, 
1980), Marmot states that it was not until the newly elected Labour government 
came to power that the State committed to addressing health inequalities (Marmot, 
2004, p.262). Research was commissioned, resulting in the Acheson (1998) report. 
This report highlighted the significant role of social and environmental factors in 
health inequalities. It not only upheld findings from the earlier ‘Black report’ (1980)1, 
but pointed to the persistent nature of health inequalities2 and the need to address 
issues extending far beyond medical care3. Additionally, it demonstrated the link 
between the disproportionate experience of wider social inequalities and 
presentations of health inequalities amongst BAME communities4 (Department for 
Health and Social Care, 1998, p.79). 
The Acheson report adopted a socioeconomic model to explore and understand 
health inequalities. This essentially meant that disparities in health would be 
explored in relation to social and economic factors widely understood to impact on 
health outcomes. Additionally, instead of considering health policy in a silo – as 
more medicalised approaches might tend towards - the inter-linked nature of policies 
                                                          
1 Possibly one of (or ‘the’) first government sanctioned reports considering health inequalities in the context 
of government policy globally (Department for Health and Social Care, 1998, p.10) 
2 These health inequalities had in fact been reported prior to the Acheson report to be widening (Smith et 
al., 1990, p.373), adding to the need for government to begin addressing such issues.  
3 It is notable that less than 10% of the 39 recommendations provided were directly about medical care. In 
fact, the opening general recommendation explicitly sets out the need to address structural and systemic 
inequality across society in order to address health inequality: ‘We RECOMMEND that as part of health 
impact assessment, all policies likely to have a direct or indirect effect on health should be evaluated in 
terms of their impact on health inequalities, and should be formulated in such a way that by favouring the 
less well off they will, wherever possible, reduce such inequalities.’, (Department for Health and Social Care, 
1998, p.75) 
4 As a result, the report specifically recommended 1) that the needs of BAME groups be given particular 
attention in the development and implementation of policies designed to address socioeconomic 
disadvantage; 2) develop health services more sensitive to the needs of BAME communities and promote 
awareness of health risk among BAME groups; and 3) to ensure that the needs of BAME groups are given 
specific consideration with regards to ‘needs assessment, resource allocation, health care planning and 
provision’, which would entail better collection of data disaggregated by ethnicity (Department for Health 
and Social Care, 1998, p.79).  
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was explicitly acknowledged (Department for Health and Social Care, 1998, pp.10–
13). Though mental health services in the UK are still widely felt to operate on a bio-
medical model [insert refs], remnants of Acheson’s socioeconomic model resonate 
in the State’s current ‘health inequality’ definition. At the time of writing, the Public 
Health England (PHE) website defined ‘health inequality’ as: 
the preventable, unfair and unjust differences in health status between 
groups, populations or individuals that arise from the unequal distribution 
of social, environmental and economic conditions within societies, which 
determine the risk of people getting ill, their ability to prevent sickness, or 
opportunities to take action and access treatment when ill health occurs. 
(PHE, n.d) 
This definition explicitly acknowledges the impact of social, economic and 
environmental factors in the causation and maintenance of health inequalities 
across England’s population. As such, health inequalities are defined as disparities 
in incidence or prevalence of ill-health in a given population (or disproportionality 
issues), occurring as a result of inequalities experienced in wider society. It is this 
attribution of systemic issues – as opposed to biogenetic factors or non-systemic-
related trauma - to the causation of ill-health that positions disparities in health as 
‘inequality’, not ‘difference’. The final sentence of the above definition also 
delineates the current focus for public health policy with regards to health 
inequalities: prevention and service/treatment performance of ill health.    
Interestingly, the definition provided regarding BAME populations differs slightly. 
Whilst continuing to recognise the ‘unfair’ nature of health inequalities, the PHE also 
highlights the role of historical inequalities when it acknowledges the role of ‘current 
and past disparities in wealth, power and resources for health and differential 
exposure to health damaging environments and risks.’ (PHE, 2018, p.8). Reference 
to the historicity of such issues seems to recognise that many BAME populations in 
the UK have been exposed to intergenerational marginalisation, which might lead 
to being impacted by adverse circumstances differently to social groupings who 
don’t experience similar historical inequalities. This framing aligns with the following 
statement by the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP): 
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We are all affected by our culture… We all have racial characteristic. 
However, what is often forgotten is a history of colonialism and neo-
colonialism, which can still condition present-day discriminatory 
attitudes. (Cox, 2001, p.248) 
Here, the RCP explicitly acknowledges the relevance of colonialism and neo-
colonialism on the present existence of BAME mental health issues; a step not made 
by the PHE. For, whilst it hints at systemic injustices, the PHE instead uses the 
language of ‘disparities’ in ‘wealth’ and ‘power’ distribution. Yet, the PHE definition 
does insinuate recognition of marginalisation. Marginalisation is here understood as 
entailing both issues of distributive justice and existence of cultural and institutional 
conditions that deprive people of ‘exercising capacities in a context of recognition 
and interaction’ (Young and Allen, 2011, p.55). This omission is perhaps reflective 
of the fact that the State is yet to accept charges of institutionalised racism within 
the healthcare context. Avoidance of this is aided by disputes within psychiatry, 
psychology and psychoanalysis regarding how to conceive of BAME mental health 
inequality and the circumstances giving rise to them. More recent definitions in State 
strategies addressing mental health inequalities do not make reference to the role 
of colonialism and racism, even when responding to BAME mental health inequality 




Appendix 4: Socio-political circumstances that drove State intervention 
This annex provides a very broad overview of what is a rich history of social change 
that encouraged State intervention in BAME mental health inequality in the late 
1990’s/early 2000’s. In addition to growing concern with widening health inequalities 
despite the introduction of the National Health Service (NHS) and the welfare state 
in the 1940’s, the 1960’s through to the 90’s saw significant social change. 
Commenting on challenges to the dominance of traditional forms of psychiatry in 
Britain from the 1960’s onward, Crossley notes that ‘…social movements introduce 
plurality, dynamism and the potential for change’ (Crossley, 1998, p.877). Identity 
politics and civil rights movements across minority groups were emerging more 
strongly than previously and society was in a state of radical change, overtly 
critiquing traditional authorities. Of central importance to BAME mental health 
inequalities are the anti-racism movement and the mental health service user’s 
movement (MHUM). 
First, from the 1960’s through to the 80’s, the British anti-racism movement 
continued to gain momentum, partly in response to growing neo-fascist movements 
in the 1970’s (Gilroy, 2013; Virdee, 1997, p.259). It is in this period that the Race 
Relations Act (1976) was implemented. This Act prohibited both direct and indirect 
racism and placed a duty on local government to eliminate unlawful racism and 
promote equality of opportunities (Race Relations Act, 1976, p.71). Direct and 
indirect discrimination can be seen as aligning to the distinctions Gilroy makes when 
he speaks of racism and racial prejudice. Additionally, whilst the Act was welcomed 
in many spaces, some working within health services highlighted the difficulties this 
Act might cause in terms of addressing BAME health inequalities. However, racism 
continued to be a considerable issue, both in society at large and within the context 
of the State. Gilroy (1987) points to the racialisation of events such as the Brixton 
riot of 1981, reflecting that the State commissioned report investigating the causes 
of the riots did not help to calm racial tensions. He notes that ‘Scarman’s clumsy 
denial that ‘institutional racism’ exists in Britain5, however plausible within his own 
definitions, fuelled the anti-racist fervour of his critics’ (Gilroy, 2013, p.178). The term 
‘institutional racism’ comes originally from the seminal text ‘Black Power: The politics 
                                                          
5 The conclusion of the report stated: ‘institutional racism does not exist in Britain: but racial disadvantage 
and its nasty associate racial discrimination have not yet been eliminated’, (Scarman, 1981, p.135) 
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of liberation’ (1967). In this text, Ture and Hamilton posit that institutional racism 
involves both overt and covert racist attitudes at both the individual and institutional 
levels (Ture and Hamilton, 1992, p.5). Thus, admission of interpersonal incidents 
and direct racism alone will not adequately address issues stemming from racism in 
societies where institutional racism is present. 
Then, in the early to mid-1990’s, a new neo-fascist nationalist party emerged in the 
form of the British National Party (BNP). The BNP won a number of seats on local 
councils and stirred racial hatred in their localities. BAME communities responded 
in several ways. First, community representatives put pressure on authorities such 
as government and the police to take action to prohibit and punish racially-motivated 
violence. Secondly, there was a growth in anti-racism groups seeking to support 
victims of racial hatred. Thirdly, was the emergence of ‘self-defence groups for the 
first time since the 1970’s’ (Virdee, 1997, p.260). From a position of opposition in 
parliament, Labour-held councils in London who had significant anti-racist factions 
within them, mounted anti-racism campaigns which included the slogan ‘Stamp out 
institutional racism now’ (Gilroy, 2013, p.183).  
Indeed, on coming into power once more in 1997, Labour made an amendment to 
the Race Relations Act in 2000 which extended the duties of local government to a 
greater number of ‘specified public authorities to work towards the elimination of 
unlawful discrimination and promote equality of opportunity and good relations 
between persons of different racial groups;’ (Explanatory Notes to Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act, 2000, para.8). Labour’s arrival to power also saw the eventual 
opening of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry in 1997. This inquiry culminated in the 
MacPherson report which cited institutional racism in policing as a significant factor 
in Mr. Lawrence’s death in 1993. Though there is controversy regarding the 
definition of ‘institutional racism’ provided in the Macpherson report6, a watershed 
moment occurred when the State accepted this claim of institutional racism. Whilst 
racism and racial discrimination occurring at the personal level had previously been 
acknowledged in State commissioned reports (Scarman, 1981, p.135; Department 
                                                          
6 Significant space within the report is given to debating what is meant by the term ‘institutional racism’. 
The definition provided in the MacPherson report has received criticism as it implies that racism at the 
individual level is ‘unwitting’ (MacPherson, 1999, para.6.34), thus denying overt racism at the individual 
level as being part of institutional racism in Britain. 
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of Health, 1992, p.26), this was the first time that government accepted the existence 
of racism at an institutional, and therefore structural and systemic, level.  
A second area of social change relevant to this thesis was the increasing recognition 
of psychiatric patients’ movements in Britain in the 1980’s, which became known 
more generally as the MHUM7 (Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991). This movement began 
to elevate the previously silenced voices and rights of people experiencing mental 
health issues/distress8. The MHUM comprised of numerous smaller organisations 
across Britain. Actions taken by the movement included:  
 co-ordinated lobbying of MPs;  
 actions to remove prominent posters depicting psychiatric patients as 
‘frenzied’ and ‘dangerous’ (i.e. those published by the charity SANE) from 
public spaces9; and  
 opposing the RCPs’ actions to amend the Mental Health Act 1983 such that 
it included Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) (Rogers and Pilgrim, 
1991, pp.13–132).  
Catching up with mental health service user movements abroad, the MHUM 
continued to promote the importance and value of knowledge gained through lived 
experience to increasingly wider audiences. Though there have been many 
divisions in the movement (Crossley, 2004), action continues today. An example is 
through movements such as the UK’s mental health service user/survivor movement 
                                                          
7 Though organisations aimed at elevating the voices and rights of people using mental health services 
existed in the early 1970’s (Crossley, 2004, p.164), they struggled to receive recognition and to stay 
operational. However, some did re-emerge later to join the MHUM (Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991, p.131). 
8 Movements claiming to advocate for psychiatric patients prior to recent decades had tended to be led by 
people who lacked lived experience of either mental health issues/distress or mental health treatments. For 
example, key figures in Reform movement of the 1800’s were primarily members of parliament, of 
aristocratic background and/or highly educated; thus, not representative of the majority of people 
incarcerated in asylums of the time who were predominantly ‘pauper lunaticks’. Whilst reformist Lord 
Ashley and commissioners working with him ‘broke with tradition in listening to the patients’ grievances’ 
(Jones, 1955, p.170) in the course of their work, it would not be until the MHUM that mental health service 
users themselves would take a prominent part in activist work regarding mental health.   
9 These posters were launched by the organisation ‘Schizophrenia A National Emergency’ (SANE). This 
organisation was concerned by the systematic closure of mental health hospitals from the mid 1950’s 
onward. Their depictions of psychiatric patients as ‘frenzied’ and ‘dangerous’ maintained prejudicial 
attitudes and stereotypes. Efforts to challenge such stereotypes included filming a powerful documentary 
called ‘We’re not mad, we’re angry’, where people with lived experience of psychiatric treatment spoke of 
their experiences (MadFilmsByMadPeople, 2012b).  
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and the more global Mad Pride movement (Beresford, 2012; Menzies et al., 2013; 
Sweeney et al., 2009). 
CTOs provide doctors with the legal powers to enforce compulsory treatment to 
people experiencing mental health issues/distress living in the community (Mental 
Health Act, 1983, sec.17). Activists such as those in the MHUM felt that CTOs 
fundamentally undermine efforts to emancipate people who had previously been 
psychiatric patients. From the State perspective, CTOs were seen as an alternative 
to inpatient psychiatric care in order to provide the least restrictive care possible, 
and as a means of balancing deinstitutionalisation agenda with the need to provide 
care. This view must be seen in the context of decades of inadequate community 
care provision following the rapid acceleration of mental health hospital closures in 
the 1970’s/80’s in the UK10 (Scull, 1984, p.77; Goodwin, 1997; Rogers and Pilgrim, 
2001, p.62).  
At the time, promises for the delivery of community care did not materialise to any 
adequate degree (Davidson et al., 2015, p.42). Whilst a white paper (1975) on the 
subject stated that improvements to psychiatric care had been made and out-patient 
clinics expanded, it acknowledged that ‘these improvements are not getting at the 
core of the problem. What we have to do is to get to grips with shifting the emphasis 
to community care.’ (Department of Health, 1975, para.6). Lack of adequate funding, 
attributed by some to the UK’s economic downturn in the 1970’s, is often cited as 
the reason for the failure to implement provisions set out in the White paper. Instead, 
by the late 1980's, there was a relative crisis in the system whereby people did not 
seem to be receiving the support that they required (Glasby and Tew, 2015, p.35)11. 
                                                          
10 Inpatient numbers in hospitals in the UK peaked in 1954, Mental health hospital closures were part of 
successive governments’ plans to implement ‘decarceration’ or ‘deinstitutionalisation’ policies. Scull 
suggests that drivers for this include ‘the advent of psychoactive drugs; and a realization, fuelled by a mass 
of modern social scientific research, that mental hospitals are fundamentally antitherapeutic institutions…’ 
(Scull, 1984, p.77). Scull, together with several other leading scholars in this field, does not seem to believe 
the introduction of psychoactive drugs to have driven hospital closures so much as the growing evidence of 
hospitals not succeeding in providing appropriate therapeutic environments for mental health issues 
(Goodwin, 1997, pp.35–37; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2001, p.62). The last remaining ‘asylum’ in the UK was 
closed in the 1990’s. Scull (1884) later also points to the rocketing costs of mental health hospitals pre-
1960’s. These closures, well intentioned or not, failed to be accompanied by the community care promised 
by government.  
11 Growing pressure to review community care provision across both physical and mental health led to an 
investigation which culminated in a report called ‘Making a reality of community care’ (Audit Commission, 
1986). The report highlighted the need to reform community care as it stood due to ‘a lack of joined-up 
working between health and social care’, and ‘growing concerns about the essentially unpaid and significant 
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By the late 1990’s, reforms of the NHS contemplated by a new government would 
have to include reforms to the mental health system. CTOs were brought in to 
legislation through the 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act (Lawton-Smith, 
2008, pp.4–5).  
Within the mental health space, the 1960’s/70’s also saw serious critique of 
traditional clinical and forensic psychiatry and psychiatric practices from within its 
own discipline. In my Introduction chapter I outlined the theory of ‘wicked problems’ 
and highlighted the emergence of the anti-psychiatry movement led by Laing in the 
UK in the mid 1960’s. The arrival of the MHUM was likely aided not only by a general 
social context of increasing civil rights and psychiatric patient movements globally12, 
but also by discourses from psychiatric dissenters - such as Laing and Cooper - who 
highlighted the ‘violence’ of traditional psychiatric practices13. Though some feel that 
the 1980’s/90’s saw a retrenchment of biomedical models of mental health (Menzies 
et al., 2013, p.6), there is also evidence of continued efforts from within psychiatry 
to push against its traditional practices and limited epistemological position.  
In the UK, one movement of particular importance to this research was the work 
undertaken by affiliates of the Transcultural Psychiatry Society (TCPS). Although 
concerned with both issues of ‘race’ and cultural insensitivities within the mental 
health system, the mid 1980’s saw a specific focus on tackling racism following 
research with BAME people with lived experience of services (Fernando, 2017, 
pp.114–115). Unfortunately, the transcultural psychiatry movement lost much of its 
ability to incite change by the early 1990’s14 due to a misappropriation of core ideas:  
                                                          
contribution that informal, often family, carers were increasingly being expected to provide, harking back to 
the pre-Victorian, pre-asylum era of mental health care’ (Glasby and Tew, 2015, p.35). As a result, an 
Independent review was commissioned by government. This reaffirmed the claim that insufficient 
resources and confusion around responsibility within governance structures meant that community care 
was failing, leaving people with inadequate support for both physical and mental health issues. This finally 
resulted in the instigation of the National Health Service and Community Care Act (National Health Service 
and Community Care Act, 1990). 
12 Rogers and Pilgrim note that the UK was somewhat late to have an active metal health service user 
movement in comparison to the US and the rest of Europe (Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991). 
13 Cooper writes that ‘…I have been concerned with the question of violence in psychiatry and have 
concluded that perhaps the most striking form of violence in psychiatry is nothing less than the violence of 
psychiatry in so far as this discipline chooses to refract and condense on to its identified patients the subtle 
violence of the society it only too often represents to and against these patients.', (Cooper, 1967, p.xii) 
14 Fernando writes ‘Gradually many consultants and other senior staff in areas with relatively high number 
of ethnic minority people began to claim an interest in ‘transcultural psychiatry’, some of them claiming to 
actually practice ‘transcultural psychiatry’… The notion was circulated in the NHS that all psychiatrists 
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Gradually many consultants and other senior staff in areas with 
relatively high number of ethnic minority people began to claim an 
interest in ‘transcultural psychiatry’, some of them claiming to actually 
practice ‘transcultural psychiatry’… The notion was circulated in the 
NHS that all psychiatrists should be ‘transcultural’ and some health 
authorities claimed that the psychiatrists in their region were… By the 
early 1990’s, the term ‘transcultural psychiatry’ was demeaned in 
practice as merely meaning a voicing of sensitivity to ‘culture’, usually… 
by using interpreters when the clients concerned were not proficient in 
the English. (Fernando, 2017, p.116) 
Arguably, however, such misappropriation of the term might indicate growing 
awareness of BAME mental health inequalities within public health services at the 
time, if not a genuine interest in addressing such issues. Determined to force 
genuine change, members of the TCPS continued to seek opportunities to highlight 
issues relating to institutional racism. This led to the building of a significant body of 
evidence in government commissioned independent reports and inquiries 
highlighting a range of inequalities experienced by BAME groups. Successive 
reports provided to Parliament by the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) from 
the late 1980s to the mid-1990s reported inequalities where racism and racial 
prejudice were evident.   
With regards to inquiries, the 1990s saw the emergence of several shocking 
incidents involving black psychiatric patients. The Blackwood inquiry investigated 
the deaths of three black men in the Broadmoor mental health hospital (Prins, 1993); 
and the Clunis inquiry followed a murder committed by a black former-psychiatric 
patient (Ritchie et al., 1994). The Blackwood report’s title, ‘Big, Black and 
Dangerous’ acknowledged the racialised stereotyping prevalent in public discourse 
at that time; stereotypes not helped by sanist propaganda such as that mentioned 
earlier promoted by SANE. Despite the wider context of multiple MHAC reports 
highlighting racism within the mental health system, the government of the time 
                                                          
should be ‘transcultural’ and some health authorities claimed that the psychiatrists in their region were… By 
the early 1990’s, the term ‘transcultural psychiatry’ was demeaned in practice as merely meaning a voicing 
of sensitivity to ‘culture’, usually… by using interpreters when the clients concerned were not proficient in 
the English.’ (Fernando, 2017, p.116) 
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refused to accept the Blackwood inquiry’s finding of racism as a significant factor in 
the three deaths. The report’s summary anticipates this denial, stating: 
Because of the deep-seated defensive (but to a degree understandable) 
reactions that arise in response to the type of criticisms we are making, 
we’re concerned that our recommendations may not be implemented… 
(Prins, 1993, p.77) 
As with the Black report in 1980, government was not yet prepared to act on 
evidence of structural and systemic inequalities impacting on minority or 
marginalised groups15.  
It is interesting, perhaps then, that the Clunis report one year later did not 
report findings of institutional racism. Investigating the circumstances that led 
long-term psychiatric patient Christopher Clunis to murder a man he did not 
know, the only mention of racism (despite claims to ‘keep a close eye‘ on 
‘suggestion of racial prejudice’) are statements to the effect of:  
we have not come across any prejudice or discrimination in relation to 
Christopher Clunis, save a willingness to accept too readily that he had 
abused drugs. (Ritchie et al., 1994, p.129).  
Investigating the issue of substance misuse, the inquiry found no evidence of 
sustained misuse beyond Clunis’ own accounts while in states of distress (Ritchie 
et al., 1994, p.7). Acknowledging reports of the over-representation of black people 
in detention and elevated rates of Schizophrenia diagnosis, the report cautions that 
staff be less willing to accept such claims unquestioningly from patients, including 
black people, without supporting evidence (Ritchie et al., 1994, p.129). Instead of 
issues of ‘race’, the report focused on the lack of adequate community care 
available. Interestingly, the wife of the man murdered, a manger within mental health 
services herself, states her concern for Clunis given the ‘apparent lack of care that 
he received’. She continued that:  
                                                          
15 Fernando reports that ‘The Chairman of the inquiry team, Professor Herschel Prins, told me that he was 
told informally that once he left the MHUM, he would be barred from visiting Broadmoor hospital.’ 
(Fernando, 2017, p.122). Such was the denial of institutional racism and racial prejudice at the time.   
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her aim is not to ensure that dangerous or potentially dangerous mentally 
iIl people are locked up.’, but that ‘her husband will not have died in vain 
if mentally ill patients proper care… (Ritchie et al., 1994, pp.5–6).  
Through her grief, she acknowledged that the serious system-wide lack of mental 
health care provision - not Clunis’ ‘race’ or individual presentation of mental health 
issues/distress – was a key factor in her husband’s murder. 
Though pressure was mounting to address this area, commentators noted that a 
change of government was likely necessary for action to take place. Gilroy 
commented in 1987 that, due to the Conservative administration having ‘played the 
race card as part of its own populist electoral strategy’, anti-racism ‘acquired a party 
political connotation’ (Gilroy, 2013, p.177). Whilst it is true that the previous 
government had shown some interest in addressing issues of such inequalities16, 
this was very limited, sporadic and piecemeal. Change of political party was crucial 
to the inception of State interest in BAME mental health inequalities at a national 
and strategic level. The new government quickly commissioned and accepted the 
findings of both the Acheson report on health inequalities, and the MacPherson 
report which highlighted institutional racism in Britain.  
There was now also scope – politically - for action to be taken on the sorts of BAME 
mental health inequalities that had previously been established in the MHAC papers 
and the inquiries previously mentioned. And action was indeed emerging from a 
number of areas. As is evident from Appendix 17, the late 1990s/early 2000s saw a 
significant increase in research in this subject. Two national-level research project 
exploring disparities in diagnosis rates emerged (the AESOP and EMPIRIC 
projects). Also from this period was the ground breaking report ‘Breaking the circles 
of fear’ (SCMH, 2002) report cited in my literature review; this is just one example 
                                                          
16 At the national level, the NHS mental health task force published the results of a consultation – also 
referred to as the ‘regional race programme’ - regarding the experiences of BAME groups in mental health 
services, seeking out ‘what works well for them [BAME mental health service users] and what does not.’ 
(Mental Health Taskforce, 1994, p.1). Earlier, the Home Office had undertaken a review of the support 
provided for offenders with mental health issues/distress. Volume 6 of the report considered issues of 
‘race’ and gender, and examined support provided in both the criminal justice system and psychiatric 
services (Department of Health, 1992). With regards to addressing racism specifically, Fernando states that 
the MHAC reports leading the then Conservative government providing funding for the Ipamo project; a 
project to provide mental health services to black people in South London, including Brixton (Fernando, 
2017, pp.119 and 126-127.). This was not, however, expanded beyond London to my knowledge.  
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of research emerging from the voluntary field at this time. Sashidharan – a senior 
RCP member of BAME background - noted that: 
There is now a sense of urgency in tackling racism within public bodies 
such as the NHS, if the pronouncement from the government and many 
public bodies following the MacPherson report are anything to go by. For 
the first time in many years it would appear that there exists a political 
climate that allows us to acknowledge the existence of racism not just at 
the personal level but also as an institutional problem. (Sashidharan, 
2001, p.244) 
However, despite opening his article with the above sense of opportunity, the 
remaining passages highlight serious concerns that no real change would in fact 
take place. Writing two years after the MacPherson publication, he noted that 
‘perhaps predictably, the College and other professional bodies in mental health 
have so far avoided any serious discussion’ on racism in British psychiatry’ 
(Sashidharan, 2001, p.244). Shortly after this article, the president of the RCP 
acknowledged Sashidharan’s comments and put forward the RCP’s strategy to 
address racism. An Ethnic Issue Committee was set up to implement a series of 
recommendations, including commissioning an independent review of racism in 
British psychiatry; providing training in cultural sensitivity and competency; 
increasing awareness of possible discrimination and abuse in the application of 
metal health legislation; ensuring equal access to services; and ‘continuing dialogue 
with all relevant user groups, including Black and other ethnic minority user groups’ 




Appendix 5: Delivering Race Equality 
The following consists of two sections. First, I provide an overview of work 
undertaken to underpin the Delivering Race Equality (DRE) strategy/programme, 
and the controversies that surrounded the State’s actions in regards to this. I then 
outline the content of the strategy and issues encountered in its delivery. I include 
information taken from the State’s own evaluation of the programme upon its closing 
in 2009/10.  
1 Setting out to address BAME mental health issues at the national level 
Annex 3 sets out a very brief and broad overview of the social, political and 
economic context from which the UK’s first and only nationwide strategy focused 
specifically on addressing BAME inequalities in mental health to emerge; Delivering 
Race Equality (DRE) (2005). The State demonstrated considerable interest in this 
area of inequality between 1999-2001. First, setting the scene for this work was the 
National Service Framework for Mental Health, a national strategy to address the 
crisis in mental health care. It went beyond just acknowledging the existence of 
disparities for BAME groupings, such as diagnosis rates and pathways to care, by 
setting out changes to service provision to address such inequalities. These 
included ensuring greater input from people with lived experience in the design and 
implementation of services, addressing racial discrimination, the need to recruit 
more BAME staff and the inclusion of the experiences of ‘service users and carers, 
including those from black and minority ethnic communities' in performance 
assessments (Department of Health, 1999, p.74). However, it was felt by some that 
the actions articulated regarding BAME mental health inequalities were vague 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2014, p.10), and that further work was required.  
In 2001, the State commissioned a new report to inform strategy specifically 
addressing BAME mental health inequalities. Sashidharan was appointed to lead 
the research; the appointment of BAME psychiatrist to lead this work was very 
welcomed by many activists in this field. The Inside Outside report (2003) 
highlighted a series of structural and systemic changes required within statutory 
services. Additionally, it emphasised the need to empower BAME communities and 
their voluntary sector to ensure their involvement in changes to statutory services. 
The report was also explicit about the existence of institutional racism within mental 
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health services, adopting MacPherson’s definition. The report highlighted the 
possible role that the new Race Relations Act (2000) could play in addressing this: 
If all mental health organisations meet their statutory obligations as 
set out in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), and are 
consistent with the guidelines provided by the Commission for 
Racial Equality, this will go a long way towards creating the culture 
and circumstances that will allow significant progress in dealing with 
institutional racism within mental health services. (NIMHE, 2003, 
p.18) 
Controversially, instead of acting upon the recommendations of the Inside Outside 
report to develop this, the State commissioned a different academic to devise a 
consultation document to inform the Delivering Race Equality (DRE) strategy whilst 
the Inside Outside report was still being finalised. Also published in 2003, the 
consultation document was seriously critiqued for inadequate input of BAME service 
users and lack of consultation with expert practitioners in this specialism (Fernando, 
2017, p.122). The not only reinforced the disempowerment of BAME people in 
mental health contexts, (an issue that this strategy was purportedly intended to 
address), but also constituted an evasion of what many BAME experts in the field 
felt were the real issues requiring attention. Fernando explains that though ‘couched 
in similar terminology to that used in Inside Outside’, different conclusions and 
recommendations were proposed:  
The emphasis on changing statutory services so that they would be 
in line with what BME communities wanted (and empower them to 
voice their views) was shifted into an emphasis on collecting 
information.’ (Fernando, 2017, p.123). 
Important details were also altered. For example, the need for ‘community 
development’ articulated in Inside Outside (2003) became ‘community 
engagement’; one being far less resource intensive and easier to implement than 
the other. Most importantly, however, was the total omission of institutional racism. 
In fact, racism itself was only mentioned twice, both instances occurring within the 
same sentence. Given the prominence of allegations of racism (if not institutional 
racism) in research and previous reports/inquiries, I find it hard to believe this 
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omission to be unintentional. The proposed strategy simply did not address the 
issues resulting in inequalities in any meaningful way. Needless to say, the 
consultation did not meet with the warmest reception17 (Fernando et al., 2008, 
p.54).  
Compounding this was the publication in 2003 of an inquiry into the death of David 
‘Rocky’ Bennett – a young black man - whilst detained in a psychiatric ward in 1998. 
Amongst the areas investigated were practices such as diagnostic processes, the 
use of secure wards, medication and restraint. Its findings supported those in 
previous reports and inquiries (Blofeld et al., 2003, pt.2). Also adopting 
MacPherson’s definition, it – like the Inside Outside report - unequivocally 
highlighted the existence of institutional racism in Britain’s mental health system18, 
citing this as a significant factor in the death of Mr. Bennett (Blofeld et al., 2003, 
p.25). As such, recommendations included mandatory training for staff in cultural 
awareness and sensitivity, and on multiple forms of racism; and acknowledgement 
of institutional racism in mental health services at the Ministerial level (Blofeld et al., 
2003, pp.67–68). The State’s response to the three documents mentioned above 
was published together in one report in 2005. This report also included the finalised 
DRE action plan (or strategy). 
2   The final DRE programme and its content 
In 2005, the State finally published its 5-year national strategy for addressing BAME 
mental health inequalities. This publication incorporated the government response 
to the Bennett inquiry and cited both the Inside Outside report and DRE (2003) as 
key resource in its development. Despite its problematic start, publication of DRE 
(2005) did, as Lord Adebowale notes, mark ‘a sea change’ in State approaches to 
this topic, ‘in that it served notice that maintaining the status quo was no longer a 
viable option.’ (Department of Health, 2009, p.3). The aim of DRE was summarised 
by the then Secretary of State for Health as ‘equality of access, equality of 
                                                          
17 A list of ‘critical responses’ to DRE (2003) was published as an Annex in the DRE (2005) document. For an 
account of how it was received by leading professionals in the field, see Fernando (2017), p122-124. 
18 The report states that ‘…we concluded that there was evidence of incidents of institutional racism from 
time to time in the lengthy period that David Bennett was suffering from mental health problems. …They 
indicate that institutional racism has been present in the mental health services, both NHS and private, for 
many years.’ (Blofeld et al., 2003, p.25) 
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experience and equality of outcome’ (Department of Health, 2005, p.7), believed 
achievable by focus on three core ‘building blocks’: 
1. developing mental health services that were more appropriate and 
responsive to the needs of specific minority or marginalised groups; 
2. greater community engagement in planning processes, supported by newly 
recruited Community Development Workers (CDW); and 
3. improvements to information collection and dissemination, including 
enhancing the systematic collection of data disaggregated by ethnicity and 
of good practice19. 
In addition to these ‘building blocks’, 12 specific areas requiring change were 
identified and held as the ‘characteristics’ of success, (see Box 4). These sought to 
integrate the NHS Chief Executive’s, (Sir Crisp), newly launched 10-point race 
equality action plan (2004) with plans to address issues highlighted in the reports 
mentioned before. 
Whilst the characteristics in Box 4 demonstrate attention to some of the issues long 
highlighted by research and reports regarding inequalities, it is notable that the 
language used is relatively neutral, referring to ‘disproportionate’ rather than inequal. 
This signals a desire to remain impartial regarding the nature of the causes of 
specific issues, even where there was a will to refer to the totality of the issues as 
one of inequality. Having worked as a policy maker in central government, it seems 
probable to me that this be a means of balancing the concerns of multiple key 
stakeholders in an attempt to keep them all engaged in the agenda. Though I 
disagree with the approach taken, this same thinking may also explain the State’s 
response to the Bennett inquiry recommendation for ministerial acknowledgement 
of institutional racism in the mental health system: 
It is possible to hide behind the label of institutional racism – to 
confuse the act of recognising it with real action to reform services. 
If services are discriminatory, then ultimately the responsibility for 
solving the problem lies with everyone involved in planning, 
                                                          
19 For a comprehensive summary of all action points, see pages 54-58, 63-64 and 70-71 of the report.  
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managing and providing the services. (Department of Health, 2005, 
p.22) 
It ends its response: 
What matters most is implementing DRE and delivering its goals of 
equal access, equal experience and equal outcomes for BME 
patients. That is what the Government is committed to and what it, 
and the NHS, should be judged on. (Department of Health, 2005, 
p.23) 
This, for all intents and purposes, amounts to a refusal to acknowledge institutional 
racism within the mental health system. Such a refusal seems somewhat out of kilter 
given that this comes from the same government that accepted charges of 
institutional racism in the MacPherson report and undertook work to generate the 
UK’s first focused strategy in this area; the State’s knowledge of the extensive 
research and inquiries cataloguing issues resulting from a range of forms of racism; 
and the social and political context provided in above sections.  
However, Fernando (2017) points to a shift in public discourses regarding racism in 
the lead up and aftermath of the 9/11 incident in 2001 that seriously impacted 
government’s willingness to address issues of racism and racial inequalities20. Prior 
to 9/11 in 2001, a series of riots, dubbed ‘race riots’ broke out in the north of England. 
Fernando posits that though tensions were clearly already present, 9/11 acted as a 
watershed moment that provided far-right groups a platform on which to regain a 
foothold on the public stage. The 7/7 London bombings of 2005 further inflamed 
rising xenophobia, racism, and what is now recognised as Islamophobic rhetoric in 
public discourses. Given that 7/7 took place only months prior to the publication of 
DRE (2005), it is perhaps less surprising that the document falls short of laying 
charges of institutional racism at the door of the NHS, despite the mass of evidence. 
Instead, the Ministerial address states that ‘Racism or discrimination in any form 
have no place in modern society, and they certainly have no place in modern health 
                                                          
20 Fernando supports this view by providing an account of a meeting he had with the then Director of Social 
Services in 2001, following 9/11. Introducing himself as a psychiatrist, he spoke of the difficulties that NGO’s 
providing mental health support for black people were having receiving funding. The ‘spontaneous 




or social care’ (Department of Health, 2005, p.7). This omission and a lack of focus 
on racism itself was disappointing to many service users, practitioners, carers and 
campaigners (Sewell, 2018, p.207).  
The DRE strategy, however, still included a number of actions that held the promise 
of some improvements at the systemic level. Unfortunately, the DRE programme 
implementing the strategy failed to deliver a system characterised by the 12 points 
in Box 4 within the 5-year target; or in fact signs of any significant progress at the 
national systemic level, (see Box 5). The State’s evaluation documents cited overly 
ambitious aims and the wrong ‘starting point’ as significant factors in this outcome. 
A number of assumptions were highlighted as contributing to this:  
 the complexity and heterogeneity of BAME groupings had been 
misunderstood;  
Box 4: DRE action plan  
The 12 ‘Characteristics’ of the DRE action plan: 
1. less fear of mental health care and services among BAME communities 
and BAME service users;  
2. increased satisfaction with services;  
3. a reduction in the disproportionate rate of admission of people from 
BAME communities to psychiatric inpatient units;  
4. a reduction in the disproportionate rates of compulsory detention of 
BAME users in inpatient units;  
5. fewer violent incidents that are secondary to inadequate treatment of 
mental illness;  
6. a reduction in the use of seclusion in BAME groups;  
7. preventing deaths in services following physical intervention;  
8. an increase in the proportion of BAME service users who feel they have 
recovered from their illness;  
9. a reduction in the proportion of prisoners from BAME communities;  
10. a more balanced range of effective therapies such as peer support 
services, psychotherapeutic and counselling treatments, and culturally 
appropriate pharmacological interventions that are and effective;  
11. a more active role for BAME communities and BAME service users in 
the training of professionals, in the development of mental health policy, 
and in the planning and provision of services; and  
12. a workforce and organisation capable of delivering appropriate and 
responsive mental health services to BAME communities.   
(Department of Health 2005, p19) 
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 inappropriate data collected for monitoring processes;  
 the intractability of problematic attitudes both within and external to the 
mental health system underestimated; and  
 the importance of addressing discrimination and marginalisation experienced 
across the life-course and in all aspects of life misjudged (Department of 
Health, 2009, p.7; Department of Health, 2010, p.46).  
This last point was also made by the founder of the DRE ambassador project, Julie 
J Charles, quoted in the interim review as stating:  
It’s not just about the interface of mental health services and 
supporting people to access those services. People don’t have 
mental health problems in isolation, we need to look at factors like 
housing, employment and education. (Department of Health, 2009, 
pp.17–18) 
Julie is also the founder of one of the gateway organisations involved in this 
research. Whilst she had no involvement in the interviews I undertook with 
participants or the subsequent analysis21, her view is supported not only by the 
author of this report but by my own findings discussed in later chapters. Critics and 
supporters of the programme alike also cited under-resourcing as a significant 
challenge of implementation. 
Despite the failure to instigate any significant systemic improvements for BAME 
mental health service users, the evaluation reports highlight useful learning 
achieved through the programme. Considering the DRE programme to have taken 
a ‘formative approach’ in delivery (Clark, 2009, p.482), the review articulated 4 key 
lessons for future action. These would provide the different ‘starting point’ alluded 
to in the 2010 evaluation report. The first was to utilise the learning from the DRE 
programme in future initiatives; one key area being the development of appropriate 
data gathering for monitoring and improvement purposes. Though there was 
widespread recognition of significant methodological issues with many of the data 
points identified for collection to monitor progress (Aspinall, 2006), many of which 
                                                          
21 Though Julie did comment on my findings, this took place post my own analysis and served simply to 
confirm or challenge my conclusions. In this instance she commented that my findings aligned with her own 
observations and experiences. For more information regarding ways of working with gateway organisations, 
see Chapter 2. 
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had been known for decades (see Appendix 18) policy-makers proceeded with 
incorrect assumptions. The result being that the Count me in Census was generally 
regarded as inadequate and data collection for monitoring remained an area for 
significant improvement. Another learning point was to build on the work of the DRE 
programme with the voluntary sector, service users and carers to have meaningful 
involvement in the development of services, policies and strategies. In so doing, the 
hope was to encourage a 'more equitable relationship (in systemic terms) with users, 
carers, communities.' (Department of Health, 2010, p.47). 
A third lesson was to re-think the scope of staff training required to instigate cultural 
change at the organisational level. Whilst race equality training was still considered 
important, the report found that more was required to build a workforce that actively 
embraced diversity and was open to new and/or different approaches. One 
suggested means of doing this was to encourage an ‘explanatory model’ in the 
delivery of mental health services. This, it was hoped, would address power 
imbalances between the BAME service users and carers and the medical and 
support staff, enabling better interpersonal interaction and thus outcomes. Whilst 
this suggestion was no doubt welcome, it fails to convey some of the barriers 
experienced by those delivering race equality training in their roles as DRE 
community development workers (CDW). Primarily, the difficulty of delivering race 
equality training in a context where institutional or systemic racism was effectively 
denied. Sewell, writing from his experience working within the programme, reflects 
that:  
This meant that implementation focused largely on what could be done 
to help racialised communities, with little emphasis on what the system 
had to do to change itself (apart from the nationally endorsed training 
module, which was targeted at frontline staff). (Sewell, 2018, p.207) 
This is arguably reflective of a State that is unwilling to recognise the presence of 




Lastly, and of particular relevance to this thesis, was the recommendation that a 
‘single equalities’ approach be taken. By this was meant that future strategies should 
not focus solely on issues arising from ‘race’ or minority ethnicity alone, as this is 
not reflective of many people’s lived experiences. Whilst it doesn’t use the language 
Box 5: Performance of DRE programme 
Performance against the 12 Characteristics: 
1. Reduction of fear of mental health services – A survey into levels of 
satisfaction with services showed results equal to those of the white British 
population. However, evidence from community groups indicates fear is 
still present in some BAME groupings. 
2. Increased satisfaction with services - see above. 
3. Reduction in disproportionate admission rates - Little to no change 
observed. 
4. Reduction in compulsory detention rates - No change observed. However, 
the caveat is given that 'higher rates of mental illness in some BAME 
groups means that compulsory detention rates alone are not a good 
indicator of quality in mental health services'. 
5. Reduction in violent incidents – No evidence found of a disparity between 
BAME and white British inpatients regarding incidents of physical assault, 
accidents and self-harm, or of a link between ethnicity and the use of 
coercion reported by inpatients. 
6. Reduction in use of seclusion - No consistent trend of disparities between 
in the use of seclusion between BAME and white British inpatients, except 
for the 'other black' grouping. 
7. Prevention of deaths in mental health services – Numbers of deaths per 
year were too small to demonstrate trends over a 5-year period. 
8. Increased self-reported recovery rates - Research demonstrates no 
disparity between BAME and white British patients. 
9. Reduction of BAME prisoners - The proportion of the BAME population 
increased. 
10. Greater range of therapies and medication made available - BAME people 
were still less likely to gain access to therapies, even among those 
requesting them. Barriers to access cited are: mistrust of services; worries 
about confidentiality; poor information; and language barriers. 
11. A more active role for BAME communities in training, policy development, 
service planning and delivery - No comment on the success of initiatives 
overall, but examples provided. 
12. Improving workforce capability – Evaluation demonstrated variable impact 
of initiatives. 
(Summary of findings, Department of Health, 2009 and 2010)  
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of intersectionality, the report alludes to the importance of addressing issues arising 
from being intersectionally located, stating that ‘a single equalities approach 
promotes… a socially inclusive and human rights approach to mental health.’ 
(Department of Health, 2010, p.47). The link between a ‘single equalities’ approach 
and intersectionality was also noted by Sewell, when he cautions against ‘racism’ 
being forgotten as a result of this combined approach (Sewell, 2018, p.207). 
The evaluation report signalled the ending of the DRE programme. Instead, the 
lessons learnt would be incorporated into the new general strategy for mental health: 
New Horizons. As a strategy intended to mainstream mental health delivery, it also 
claimed to adopt the ‘single equalities’ approach by mainstreaming discrimination 
issues. Though the strategy was never implemented due to a change in 
government, it had intended to implement the ‘single equalities’ approach in line with 
the new Equality Act (2010). Further, it sought – at least in rhetoric – to integrate a 
more social model approach into mental health strategy (Tew, 2011, p.1) 
The Equality Act was enacted, replacing legislation such as the Race Relations Act 
(2000) and the Disability Discrimination Act (1995). This Act brought multiple pieces 
of legislation relating to discrimination together into a ‘single equality’ approach22. It 
also includes the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), which places a legal duty on 
the public sector to assure against direct and indirect discrimination as a result of 
their policies and practices. A further duty placed on the State and public services 
is to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) at the point of policy 
development to evaluate the impact that policy might have on people with ‘protected 
characteristics’ such as race and disability. However, intersectionality was not in fact 
legislated for in the introduction of the Equality Act (2010). Whilst the Act includes 
provisions for dual discrimination of the additive sort23, it does not provide for 
                                                          
22 Though here I highlight that in all but name, this report highlights the importance of considering people’s 
intersectional locations, intersectionality is not something that government at the time was willing to 
legislate for. Whilst the Equality Act includes provisions for multiple discrimination of the additive sort, it 
does not provide for intersectional experiences of discrimination.  
23 The legislation states that ‘…B cannot establish a contravention of this Act… [if ] A shows that A's 
treatment of B is not direct discrimination because of either or both of the characteristics in the 
combination.’ Essentially, ‘B’ must demonstrate direct discrimination specific to at least one of the 
protected characteristics in their intersectional experience. If this can not be done, as in the case 
highlighted by Crenshaw of the black American women seeking employment (Crenshaw, 1989), then the 
court can legally dismiss the case. Interestingly, in practice different courts take different views on this in 
the UK.  
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intersectional experiences (Equality Act, 2010, sec.14). Given that it is also in the 
Equality Act (2010) that the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) and the duty to 
conduct equality impact assessments (EIAs) is found, this omission arguably 
undermines future undertakings in policy making to take ‘single equalities’ 






Appendix 6: No Health without Mental Health (2011) 
The No Health without Mental Health is the last strategy in the UK which includes a 
strategy to address mental health inequalities, including those experienced by 
people of BAME backgrounds. Here I examine how the issue of BAME mental health 
inequality is defined in the NHMH, some of the assumptions made and approaches 
taken to the issue, and finally provide a brief overview of the actions listed for 
implementation. The NHMH strategy set out primarily to engender ‘parity of esteem 
between mental and physical health services’ (Department of Health, 2011b, p.2). It 
does, however, include a chapter specifically devoted to inequalities found in mental 
health as they pertain to people protected by the Equality Act 2010 (EA10). Here 
the strategy sets out the three ways in which mental health inequality is 
conceptualised within a policy context (Department of Health, 2011b, p.57): 
inequalities that lead to mental health issues/distress; inequalities that result from 
experiencing mental health issues/distress; and inequalities experienced in service 
provision. Highlighting how inequalities can lead to mental health issues/distress, 
the strategy draws on the experiences of many BAME groupings: 
Aspects of people’s identity and experiences of inequality interact 
with each other. For example, people from black and minority ethnic 
(BME) groups are more likely to live in deprived areas and have 
negative experiences, both as a result of their ethnic identity and 
because of their socio-economic status and living environment. 
(Department of Health, 2011b, p.56) 
The strategy takes a multi-stranded equalities approach that mirrors the EA10, 
meaning that there is a section within the chapter for issues pertaining specifically 
to each of the EA10 protected characteristics, including ‘race’ and religion. 
Indicators of BAME mental health inequality cited to delineate the scope of the issue 
as it pertains to ‘race’ are:  
 3x admission rates to psychiatric wards among some black groups; 
 increased rate of mental health issues/distress among some migrant groups, 
including the children of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees;  
 over-representation of African-Caribbean people subject to compulsory 
treatment under the Mental Health Act (MHA); and 
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 the receipt of poor and untimely support by South East Asian women.   
In relation to religion, there is recognition that there is a need for mental health 
services to better address needs arising from being religious; this is recognised as 
disproportionately impacting BAME groupings, as they are more likely to consider 
themselves religious.   
These indicators provide a sample of inequalities faced by people of BAME 
backgrounds within the context of mental health, and demonstrate consideration of 
both incidence and service outcomes. The NHMH concedes that evidence indicating 
increased incidence of mental health issues/distress is extremely complex, 
highlighting the range of mental health issues/distress experienced among BAME 
groupings and the various ways in which they can present. It also alludes to debates 
regarding data on mental health incidence and prevalence, such as those I outline 
in Chapter 3, though it later brushes such issues aside. For example, stating that 
higher levels of admissions to psychiatric wards among some BAME groupings is 
supported by ‘some research indicating that this is an illustration of need.’ 
(Department of Health, 2011b, p.59) Thus, evidence such as that indicating 
increased risk of severe mental health issues among certain BAME groupings is 
taken ‘as is’, forming the basis for policy decisions to be made.  
The strategy further recognises complexities arising from the diversity of ‘cultural 
backgrounds, socio-economic status and experiences in wider society’ (Department 
of Health, 2011b, p.59) that comprise BAME groupings. Following from the 
recommendations of the DRE programme that any further work to address this area 
of inequality must make provisions for such complexity, the strategy states on 
multiple occasions the importance of taking a multi-stranded approach and 
recognising that people can experience numerous forms of inequality that impact on 
their mental health. Despite this – and despite highlighting the plight of multiply 
disadvantaged (or intersectionally located) South Asian women - none of the 
proposed actions actually address issues of multiple disadvantage. Instead the 
strategy deals with each protected characteristic in turn without really addressing 
issues as they manifest for people who are multiply disadvantaged or 
intersectionally located. Indeed, there is no mention of intersectionality anywhere in 
the document or its accompanying Equality Impact assessment (EIA). As with the 
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EA10, this term is auspiciously absent, reflecting debates in identity politics about 
whether intersectional theory is a helpful tool in promoting equality for BAME and 
racialised peoples or not. As I examine further in my discussion chapter, this is 
deeply problematic and enables significant gaps in policy responses to remain.  
With regards to the actions set out in the strategy, very few relate specifically to 
addressing BAME mental health inequality. Those that were specified in the NHMH 
and its accompanying EIA focused primarily on better collection of data on service 
outcomes, disaggregated by ethnicity, for monitoring purposes; the reinforcement of 
new statutory requirements for public services to comply with the Public Sector 
Equality Duty (PSED); and to establish mechanisms by which to engage with local 
service user groups (Department of Health, 2011b, pp.59–60; Department of Health, 
2011a) (see Table 5). Responsibility for these falls primarily to NHS and local 
commissioning boards, GP consortia and service providers. One further specific 
action was to ensure that all NHS Trusts offered a chaplaincy service. The only 
policy targeted at central government specifically in relation to BAME inequality was 
the commitment for the then Department of Health to ‘make best use of research in 
developing effective approaches for reducing race equality in mental health’ 
(Department of Health, 2011b, p.60).  
It is notable that all issues not directly pertaining to mental health service delivery is 
simply not addressed in the context of BAME inequality. Whilst there are actions 
across government to address issues in the welfare system, housing etc – 
demonstrating a recognition of these wider determinants in mental health, there is 
nothing addressing these issues as they impact on BAME groupings. Thus the role 
of racism, intergenerational impacts of colonialism, cultural and linguistic barriers, 
xenophobia etc, in generating and exacerbating wider social inequalities that 
negatively impact on people’s mental health remain acknowledged, but unchecked 







Table 5 – Policies and actions to address BAME mental health inequality 
 
  









Increase/improve local collection and monitoring of 
data on ethnicity and culture, and use to inform 
commissioning and provision of health and social 
care. 
  Focus on outcomes that work for both individuals and 
communities.  
  Improve monitoring and evaluate the effectiveness of 
service delivery around equality needs. 
  Establish mechanisms enabling and empowering local 




board and GP 
consortia 
New statutory responsibilities for: NHS commissioning 
Board and GP consortia 
 Department for 
Health 
Use research to develop effective approaches for 












Monitor the impact of ‘cultural competency’ initiatives 
in services, and in work with community and voluntary 
organisations 
 Care Quality 
Commission, 
HealthWatch 
England and local 
branches 
Monitor numbers of people accessing independent 
mental health advocacy services and seeking support 
from ‘second opinion appointed doctors’. 






Ensure that all mental health trusts have a Chaplaincy 
service and a Spirituality Strategy. 
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Appendix 7: Correspondence from Department of Health and Social Care 
Department of Health and Social 
Care  
11 August 2020 
at 09:46 
To: "Harvey, Stephanie"  
Our ref:  
  
Dear Miss Harvey, 
  
Thank you for your correspondence of 3 June about the Independent Review of 
the Mental Health Act. I have been asked to reply and I apologise for the delayed 
response. 
The Government is committed to treating mental health with the same urgency 
as physical health. The Government also recognises the need to modernise the 
Mental Health Act 1983 to ensure it is used in a fair and just way and that 
patients are not detained any more than is absolutely necessary. 
  
That is why the Department asked Sir Simon Wessely to carry out his 
Independent Review of the Mental Health Act. The Department has welcomed 
his report and has already accepted a number of its recommendations. 
  
The Government plans for reform will make sure that people subject to the Act 
receive better care, that they have a much greater say in that care, and that they 
are treated with the dignity and respect they deserve. 
  
The Government also wants to make it easier for people with learning disabilities 
and autism to be discharged from hospital, and to improve how they are treated 
in law. 
  
The Government committed to publishing a White Paper which will set out the 
Government’s response to Sir Simon’s Review and pave the way for reform of 
the Mental Health Act 1983.   
  
The Government will publish its White Paper as soon as it is possible to do so. 
The Government will consult publicly on its proposals and will bring forward a Bill 
to amend the Act when parliamentary time allows. 
  
These reforms will be supported by improvements to crisis and community 
mental health services through the NHS Long Term Plan and its increased 
investment of at least a further £2.3billion a year by 2023/24. 
  





Ministerial Correspondence and Public Enquiries 




Appendix 8: The concept of the ‘wicked problem’ 
A recent paper of the Synergi project24 suggests that policymakers conceptualise 
BAME mental health inequality as a ‘wicked’ problem (Bhui et al., 2018, p.10). 
Though not developed further in the paper, I too feel that the concept of ‘wicked’ 
problems might aid policymakers to enrich future policy responses at the national 
level. Used as a heuristic, this concept might enable a means of defining the issue 
that better fits the diversity of perspectives and lived experiences of the population 
group being considered, aligning not only with the needs of the State’s stakeholders 
but also with a critical realist perspective. Stemming from a place that recognises 
the interconnectedness, interdependence and multiplicity of realities in the social 
world, ‘wickedness’ promotes an acceptance of complexity and epistemological 
diversity. In this way it can be viewed as a tool with which to counter more 
reductionist approaches, such as might be found in strict bio-genetic medical 
perspectives; perspectives that several participants in this research might argue 
produce the ‘cheapest kind of understanding’.   
Developed in the 1970’s to address non-linear, complex social issues in public 
policymaking, ‘wicked problems’ enabled a clear distinction to be made between 
policy issues arising from the natural sciences and those of a more social nature. 
Issues of the natural sciences were labelled ‘tame’ problems. Tame problems 
operate in ‘closed’ systems (systems without interdependencies), are easily defined 
and have solutions that are easily verifiable as correct or incorrect. In contrast, 
wicked problems operate in ‘large and interconnected networks of systems’, 
whereby ‘outputs from one become inputs to others’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, 
p.159): open systems. As a result, wicked problems are difficult to define, have 
multiple ways of being conceptualised, are subject to changes in its manifestation, 
and lack a ‘correct’ solution (see Box 2). Indeed, they are almost always 
unresolvable issues. Policymakers dealing with wicked problems must know that:  
 residing in networks of open systems means that ‘solutions’ will have 
unintended consequences and impacts beyond the issue itself; and  
                                                          
24 Synergi is an interdisciplinary research project seeking to influence policy and practice regarding BAME 
inequality relating to SMI lead by Professors Nazroo and Bhui. 
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 multiple differently situated interested parties will have their own legitimate 
conceptualisations of the issue, and accompanying ‘solutions’ (Roberts, 
2000, pp.1–2).   
The un-resolvability of such issues lead Rittel and Webber (1973) to speak of 
‘(re)solutions’, reflecting the iterative process of solution making in this context and 
the constant evolution of wicked problems. The original conceptualisation of wicked 
problems has been - correctly, in my view - critiqued for its over-simplification of 
issues in the natural sciences, creating a false dichotomy between these and those 
in the social sphere (Turnbull and Hoppe, 2019, p.318). However, I feel that the 
concept remains useful when applied as a heuristic that advocates a particular 
ontological position rather than as a means to distinguish between domains of 
‘realities’.  A position that drives collaborative approaches to policy-making (Innes 
and Booher, 2018, c.1), that honours and values different perspectives. 
Box 6: Characteristics of wicked problems and seeking their (re)solution 
1. No single definition of the problem exists, due to a lack of consensus 
regarding what ‘the problem’ actually is; interested parties compete to 
frame the issue in ways that align best with their views and preferred 
solution. 
2. The problem operates in and is shaped by networks of open systems; thus 
every wicked problem can be conceived of as a symptom of another 
similarly wicked problem.  
As a result: 
3. Problem solving is non-linear, with solutions being open ended, with 
‘better/worse’ options (as opposed to ‘correct/incorrect’). 
4. There being no point at which the policymaker can be sure they have 
resolved the problem; otherwise known as the ‘no stopping rule’.  
5. Solutions implemented will have impacts beyond the problem, due to 
operating in networks of open systems; this may lead to the nature of the 
problem itself altering. 
Additionally: 
6. The process of finding solutions is further complicated by constraints in the 
policymaking world; i.e. limited resources, political will and ramifications.  
7. The context within which policymakers and the problem operate continually 
changes, altering the nature of the problem and rendering solutions 
impossible; instead (re)solutions must be sought.  
(List uses: Rittel and Webber, 1973, pp.161–166; Roberts, 2000, p.1) 
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Appendix 9: Social models of mental health 
Social models in mental health generally refer to the various ways in which social 
processes are explored within the context of mental health. Often this involves 
applying sociological approaches, usually with the aim of challenging assumptions 
made in the traditional ‘psy’ disciplines; psychiatry, psychoanalysis and psychology. 
Key social approaches (or models) are: 
 Social causation – seeks to uncover the relationship between social 
disadvantage and mental health issues/distress; 
 Hermeneutical – often highly conceptual, this approach tends to focus on how 
‘normalcy’ is pathologized; 
 Societal reaction (or response) – focuses on sigma and discrimination in the 
context of mental health; 
 Social constructionism – holds at its core that reality is produced by human 
activity. As such, it tends to focus on the ways in which ontological beliefs 
regarding mental health are constructed (as opposed to discovered). 
 Social realism – takes an ontological stance that aspects of reality are 
independent of human activity though much of it is not. It aligns with multi-
level theories of causation, perceiving mental health issues as emerging from 
and operating within ‘open systems’. 
With the exception of social causation and models, these approaches are not 
focused on demonstrating the role of social factors in the aetiology of mental health. 
Rather, they are more concerned with how experiences and/or understandings of 
mental health are constructed or mediated by social and cultural factors. Indeed, a 
weakness within the social causation approach for scholars adhering to social 
models of mental health, is that it can in fact serve to uphold the medical model by 
adhering to diagnostic categories of mental illness and the medicalised assumptions 
that underpin them (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.9). For example, many such 
studies use diagnostic categories to choose their sample base. As such, though it 
does entail investigation of the role of social processes in mental health, which might 
challenge bio-determinism within medical approaches, it often leaves the 
phenomenon of mental ‘illness’ and diagnostic categories unproblematised. 
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The works of scholars such as Beresford and Tew have sought to take social 
approaches in mental health a step further by proposing specific social models that 
might enable concrete changes in practices. Tew suggests two social models that 
might be helpful in transforming mental health care practices that are otherwise 
based on bio-medical understandings and their accompanying models of illness and 
sick roles. The first aligns with the social causation model above, and the second 
with the societal reaction model (Tew, 2011, c.7). Using these models, Tew seeks 
to provide a ‘clearer theoretical understanding of the mechanisms whereby adverse 
social experiences may provoke journeys into mental distress’ (ibid, p.169), building 
a bridge between social and psychological theories to enable social theories to 
influence and change practice. In this way, Tew might be seen as attempting to 
address McKenzie’s request for a social model of the development of mental health 
issues/distress and their aetiologies. 
Beresford’s focus is slightly different in that, although he seeks to move away from 
the dominance of the medical model in mental health, his proposals seem more 
focused on increasing mental health service user/survivor agency and rights than 
on challenging aetiological beliefs. As such, he proposes the adoption of the 
disability social model or the creation of a social model of madness and distress 
based on the principles of the disability model. The disability social model 
distinguishes between a person’s impairment (including chronic illness and mental 
health) and the disability they experience as a result of disabling factors in the social 
sphere. Disabling factors might include societal reactions to impairments or the way 
that ableist societies privileges ‘average’ body/mind types. This model has proved 
invaluable in driving forward disabled people’s rights and challenging ableist 
discrimination. However, as Beresford himself acknowledges, many people 
experiencing mental health issues/distress reject the idea of using the social model 
of disability as they do not consider themselves disabled and/or fear becoming 
subject to additional stigma as a result of positioning themselves thus (Beresford et 
al., 2010; Beresford, 2012), a view supported by Tew (Tew, 2011, pp.103–104).  
Yet, this or a similar tool might enable people experiencing mental health 
issues/distress to fight against the loss of rights and agency that often accompanies 
becoming a mental health service user/survivor. Indeed Goodley and Lawthom 
(2005) remark on how the agendas of disability studies and critical psychology might 
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support each other to advance the rights of people with mental health 
issues/distress. Areas in which they might support each other include: aiding the 
adoption of different understandings that challenge ‘existing professional discourses 
on impairment’ (Goodley and Lawthom, 2005, p.188), primarily ‘tragedy’ models of 
impairment; recognise disabled people as having complex identities, and 
empowering these (ibid, 191-192); and supporting an approach to mental health that 
promotes activism and views people with mental health issues/distress as agents 





Appendix 10: Topic guides and interview schedule 
Topic guides, initial interviews: Core participant  
Intro 
 Introduce self, thank them, and explain purpose of research 
 Why they've been invited to be interviewed – time/experience valued 
 Explain how the interview will work and topics – OK to record? 
 Collect consent form, and discuss confidentiality and withdrawal 
Initiate conversation 
 Tell me a bit about yourself. 
 Where would you like to start a discussion about mental health? 
Mental health 
 How do you understanding mental health? 
o What do you think it is? 
o How does it affect you/people you know? 
 What impacts on your mental health/distress? How? 
Later interviews: 
 Different understandings of mental health? 
 Attitudes to mental health? 
Intersectionality: BAME, mental health, plus X 
 What other parts of your/a persons’ identity or situation impacts on 
your/their mental health? 
Later interviews: 
 Racism / Socio-economic / Class / Religion?  
 Cultural differences? 
Services 
 What are your experiences of mental health services? 
o What was good? Why? 
o What was not good? Why? 





 Cultural clashes? 
Disability and Mental Health (used in earlier interviews) 
 What do you understand disability to be? 
o How do you think mental health issues fit with this (or not)? 
Closing 
 Anything else you’d like to add?  
 A transcription/see summary or interpretation? Contact re clarifications? 
 
Topic guides, initial interviews: Staff interviews 
Intro 
 Introduce self, thank them, and explain purpose of research 
 Why they've been invited to be interviewed – time/experience valued 
 Explain how the interview will work and topics – OK to record? 
 Collect consent form, and discuss confidentiality and withdrawal 
Initiate conversation 
 Tell me a bit about your role here. 
 What brought you to work in a mental health setting? 
Mental health 
 You must hear a lot of people’s experiences of mental health issues 
o What sorts of issues to people tend to come with? 
 Do you see any issues that are specific to your BAME clients? 
 What do you think people’s understandings of mental health is? 
o Are there differences across ethnic groupings? 
Later interviews: 
 What attitudes to mental health are prevalent in X community? Why? 
Intersectionality: BAME, mental health, plus X 
 How does (identity-marker/social category mentioned by interviewee) 
together with mental health issues impact people? 
Later interviews: 




 How are services appropriate/inappropriate for the needs of your BAME 
clients? 
o And for clients with complex needs/multiple disadvantage? 
 How do you provide services differently to meet the needs of your clients? 
Later interviews: 
 Cultural clashes? 
 Diagnosis issues? 
Disability and Mental Health (used in earlier interviews) 
 How do your BAME clients understand disability? 
o In relation to mental health issues? 
 Do your clients identify with ‘disability’ and why? 
 Is the social model of disability helpful? 
Closing 
 Anything else you’d like to add?  
 A transcription/see summary or interpretation? Contact re clarifications? 
 
Interview schedule: Core participants 




2018   
Samaiya 01:35:00 audio 
recording 
Her home Data gather 
21 Aug 
2018 
Samantha 01:09:00 audio 
recording 
Her home Data gather 
23 Aug 
2018 
Satch 00:45:00 audio 
recording 
Gateway organisation Data gather 
30 Aug 
2018 
Peter 00:47:00 audio 
recording 
Gateway organisation Data gather 
25 Sept 
2018 
Satch 00:54:00 audio 
recording 
Café Data gather 
27 Sept 
2018 
Satch 00:35:00 audio 
recording 
Café – after spending 
non-research time 
together: duty of care  
Data gather 




Peter 01:50:00 audio 
recording 
Gateway organisation Data gather 



















Satch 00:30:00 audio 
recording 






Phone call – unable 
to meet in person due 






Satch 1-2hours. No 
audio recording 
Café Data gather 




Mya 01:40:00 Gateway organisation Data gather 
07 Nov 
2018 
Mahdi 01:20:00 Gateway organisation Data gather 
12 Nov 
2018 
Misc – not 
used 





Andeep ~ 40min. No 
audio recording 
Gateway organisation Data gather 
17 Dec 
2018 
Samantha ~0.5-1hour. No 
audio recording 
Phone call – 
participant’s choice 






Mahdi ~1-2hours Park Data gather 




Mahdi ~20min. No 
audio recording 






Satch 00:12:00 Café Data gather 




Mahdi ~1-2hours. No 
audio recording 
Park Data gather 




Satch ~1-2hours. No 
audio recording 
Cafe Duty of care 
21 June 
2019 
Samantha ~0.5-1hour. No 
audio recording 
Phone call – 
participant’s choice 






Samantha ~0.5-1hour. No 
audio recording 
Phone call – 
participant’s choice 






Samantha ~1-2hours. No 
audio recording 
Her home.  Data gather 




Mahdi ~40min. No 
audio recording 
Park Data gather 






Peter ~1-2hours. No 
audio recording 
Library cafe Data gather 
and reflect on 
findings 
 
To note: additional text messages and short phone calls were also had, however I 
only included these if they informed data gathered for analysis in the thesis.  
 
Interview schedule: Staff participants 



































































Lisa 01:25:00 Cafe Data gather 
06 March Julie - 
London 





















To note: Informal discussions were also had with staff when I spent days working 
from their organisations. Emerging themes were sometimes discussed.  
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Appendix 11: Ethics approval 































This project seeks to investigate the process of exclusion and 
marginalisation for adults from minority ethnic backgrounds with 
long-term mental health conditions. It will use a combination of 
one-to-one interviews, creative-practices and group discussion. 
 
Participants here can be broadly put into three groups: 
 Core participants; 
 Representatives of support organisations; 
 Community members. 
 
Core participants 
6-8 adults with long-term mental health conditions from a range of 
minority ethnicities residing in either London (Newham) or Bristol. I 
will work with these core participants on a one-to-one basis to 
explore interesting findings in depth.  
 
Where language barriers may be involved I will seek interpretation 
support for languages other than English and French. My research 
methodology however, in attempting to bridge possible 
hermeneutical gaps resulting from multiple minority statuses, 
should also support people with limited English (where as a result 
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of disability or ethnic/migrant status) – see methods section. 
 
These participants will be chosen on the basis of:  
 mutual commitment to work closely together to explore 
issues relevant to the research question,  
 ability to explore some of the themes in more depth (where 
the participant desires support from a carer/trusted person, I 
will seek commitment from the person providing support as 
well as the core participant).  
 
Participants will be made aware of their right to withdraw at any 
stage of the data collection, and information will be provided using 
clear and simple language to ensure informed consent. 
(Information sheets will be reviewed by my gateway organisations 
for clarity and ease of understanding). Where appropriate, this 




Representatives of organisations supporting adults from minority 
ethnic backgrounds with long-term mental health issues will have a 
working knowledge of the issues that the people they work with 
experience. They may additionally keep logs with data of the sort 
of issues that are reported to them. I will seek to interview 
staff/volunteers working in these organisations, and investigate any 
other sources of relevant data they may have that they are allowed 
to share with me.  
 
Community members 
This research may engage with people within my core participants’ 
communities to more fully understand sources of 
exclusion/marginalisation and inclusion processes. This will only 
be done with the agreement of my participants, and will take the 
form of open discussions (possibly using artefacts from my work 
with participants as a starting point). Though the format of this 
engagement cannot be pre-determined, (due to the need to co-
construct this with my core participants), ensuring that community 
members engaging in such discussions are informed of the 
purpose of the research and how their input will be used will be 









Mental Health conditions – the right to choose 
This research acknowledges that ‘long-term mental health 
condition’ is extremely broad and allows for severe to mild mental 
health conditions. This work is emancipatory in nature, seeking to 
give voice to a group of people who are otherwise marginalised. As 
such, it is important not to exclude those who may have more 
‘severe’ mental health conditions on the basis of a concern for their 






Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, disability 
activism and scholarship, I hold that participants (as long as they 
have capacity for informed consent) have the right to decide 
themselves whether or not they wish to participate. Approaches 
that have not been condition specific have been taken in other 
qualitative research in the disability and chronic illness fields - i.e. 
Ahmad, a leading academic in the disability/ethnic minority field in 
the UK, discusses cultural differences in understandings of 
disability - including issues of stigma – without excluding those with 
‘severe’ conditions. 
 
However I recognise that I may need to amend my practices 
according to the needs of individual participants; discussion of 
reasonable adjustments and support needs will be had in the initial 
discussion. If I require further advice regarding adjustments, there 
are a number of mental health helplines and I can also refer to my 
supervisors and gateway organisations. Additionally, those with 
more ‘severe’ mental health conditions may already have support 
networks in place – I will always offer to liaise with this network 
should the participant wish.    
 
Awareness of personal nature of discussions 
This work will require discussion of issues of a personal nature, 
and will require working with participants who may be considered 
to be vulnerable adults. 
 
All participants will be provided with an information sheet and 
consent form. They will be provided with an opportunity to discuss 
the project and any issues regarding participation with me; two 
copies per participant will be provided to sign – one for me to keep 
and one for them. (See information sheets/consent forms in Annex 
A). The consent form includes confirmation of this conversation.  
 
In line with ESRC guidelines – which provide specific guidance on 
consent from vulnerable participants - participants will be invited to 
bring someone they trust with them and/or to discuss the 
information in private with them prior to signing the consent form. 
This project will not include participants considered to lack capacity 
to give informed consent. 
 
Representatives of organisations and community members wishing 
to engage in the later stages of this project will be provided with 
information sheets. They will also be provided with my email 
address in case they have further questions. 
 
Additional support available to participants 
The Equalities National Council (ENC) will act as a gateway 
organisation for this research in Newham; I am still in the process 
of arranging a gateway organisation in Bristol. The ENC have 
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agreed to provide support throughout the project to both myself 
and participants. This may include being present when the project 
and consent/data issues are being explained.  
 
Based in the Newham itself, the ENC is well known by residents 
for providing support to disabled people from a range of ethnic 
backgrounds. They have a record of previously working with others 
(i.e. the disability charity, SCOPE) to undertake research. 
Importantly they are also a user-led organisation. I will endeavour 
to work with a user-led organisation in Bristol also, as this aligns 
with the participatory approach I will take in my research.  
 
In line with ESRC guidelines around coercion – which are more 
detailed than the AHRC and RCUK information - I will ensure that:  
 I am known to be/introduced as independent of the ENC 
though they are supporting the project, 
 decisions not to take part or withdrawal to/from participation 
won’t impact on support they may receive from the ENC or 
any other organisations involved – this will be made clear in 









In considering the handling of data I have tried to balance the need 
to present research honestly, transparently and to demonstrate 
rigour (as per the Universities UK Concordat for research integrity 
– as pointed to on the AHRC website), with the need to respect the 
privacy of my participants (as set out in the Bath Spa University 
Code of Good Practice). Data presented in written work (for 
academic purposes) will be anonymised to the greatest extent 
possible (i.e. – using pseudonyms*) without harming the integrity of 
the work itself, unless the participant expressly asks for their real 
name to be used.  
 
Engagement with wider communities where there is any risk to 
anonymity (where anonymity has been requested) will only take 
place with the express permission of my participants. 
 
I cannot guarantee that people close to participants would not be 
able to identify the origins of comments referred to within the 
research if they were to look up my thesis (or related papers), due 
to their existing knowledge of individuals.  
 
For this reason, I will take the following steps: 
1. Information and consent sheets will explicitly highlight this 
aspect of involvement at the point at which I approach 
someone to become a core participant - sheets to other 
participants will highlight my intended use of the information 
they provide. 
2. Where possible/appropriate, I will invite participants to 
review the findings, and I will include an email address in 
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the information sheet provided to all participants so that they 
can contact me at any point with concerns. 
3. All core participants (and if necessary or requested, an 
appointed/trusted person) will be engaged to review findings 
and input on the design of data collection throughout the 
research process. 
4. The personal details of participants will not be shared with 
others unless I am expressly (and in writing) asked to do so 
by the participant themselves.   
 
During the data collection process and for the period that it is held, 
I will follow the below processes to ensure data protection in line 
with the Data Protection Act 1998: 
 Pseudonyms will be used throughout the data collected, 
unless the participant expressly (and in writing) requests 
otherwise. 
 Data of a potentially sensitive nature will be held in 
encrypted documents, with password protection.  
 All printed material will be kept locked in a locked filing 
cabinet accessible only to the researcher. 
 Emails containing sensitive information will be labelled 
accordingly, i.e – Confidential, and will be stored in 
encrypted files upon termination of an exchange; email will 
only be used with consent from the participant.  
 
The wider D4D project anticipates holding exhibitions, and some 
materials from my own research project may be relevant to these. 
If this occurs, permission will be sought from participants.  
 
*Pseudonyms will be used in all the data management, including 
transcriptions, visual and research documents, due to the likely 
sensitive nature of some of the information; unless the participant 
















I have chosen methodologies and methods that allow for increased 
levels of participant involvement, seeking to empower the 
participants through this process whilst also enhancing my own 
understanding of the participants and their experiences.    
 
Central to this project will be a coproduction approach, allowing 
participants to be not just ‘research subjects’, but also to guide the 
research itself; i.e. – they will have opportunities to be involved in 
decisions on the tools we use to explore themes and gather 
information. 
 
 This project, by its very nature, is exploring the ways that norms 
and social structures shape the experiences of my participants and 
how they are understood by others. It explicitly acknowledges 
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hermeneutical difficulties that people with ‘marginal’ experiences 
may face and seeks to find means of overcoming some of these to 
more accurately communicate their perspectives/experiences.   
Therefore, it is key that participants are not only involved in 
reviewing my interpretations of the data collected, but that the 
collection of data is itself informed by them. 
 
My chosen methodologies support this: 
 A grounded theory approach allows a hypothesis to emerge 
from the initial data and subsequently evolve (without need 
of assumptions that risk being based in perspectives 
governed by norms that marginalise my participants). 
 Critical ethnography, using methods like in-depth interviews, 
enables co-production, a life history approach (which 
enables insight into how identities and beliefs are 
constructed) and acknowledges the positionality of both the 
researcher and the participant (particularly important 
acknowledgements to uphold the integrity of this work 
specifically). 
 Participatory Action Research (PAR) – this research seeks 
not only to be participatory, but also emancipatory in nature. 
Through creative practice it will seek to overcome some of 
the hermeneutical difficulties minority groups may 
experience when communicating their own positionality. 
 Intersectionality, used as both a theoretical framework and a 
tool for critical praxis, will inform both my approach in data 
collection and the way information is analysed; used 
properly, it should complement a critical ethnography 
approach and serve to empower marginalised voices 
(Collins and Bilge, 2016). 
 
Methods: 
The specifics regarding data collection methods will be co-
produced with participants. However, I will make significant use of 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews in Stage 1 of data 
collection. These will be conducted in such a way as to allow 
participants to contribute in ways that they are comfortable, 
ensuring that they are not put under any strain.  
 
In this early stage questions I will investigate in order to answer the 
central thesis question (what are the processes of exclusion and 
marginalization for my participants) include: 
 How do my participants feel this happens? 
 How do organisations working with BAME disabled people 
feel this happens? 
 What particular experiences of exclusion/marginalisation do 
my participants feel results from disability, mental ill-health, 
ethnicity, or a combination of these (and any other factors)? 
 Are there different cultural beliefs or norms that impact on 
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exclusion/marginalisation? – how do both my participants 
and organisations navigate these? 
 How do participants and organisations envisage pathways 
to inclusion being? – what would they entail? 
 
In Stage 2 I will work with core participants after the interviews to 
explore themes raised in more creative ways. I will use creative 
practice to explore the central themes with participants; this might 
include photo-elicitation and the creation of storyboards/graphic 
books (the methods employed need to be culturally appropriate 
and co-decided with participants). This recognises hermeneutical 
limitations for minority groups, and tries to help move past this by 
introducing visual/other elements into meaning-making and 
communication. 
 
In stage 3, the artefacts created will be used to begin group 
discussions with other participants. If participants are comfortable, 
I will explore using the artefacts to hold discussions with people in 
the wider community. I will use a semi or unstructured interview 
approach in these discussions, building on themes that have come 
through from the research leading up to this. This will allow me to 
explore the intersubjective elements of my research more. The 
semi and unstructured approach will allow participants to remain 
able to influence the research direction in this late stage. It also 
supports creating a level of intimacy necessary to enable greater 
depth of understanding (whilst maintaining researcher integrity and 
abiding to both the Universities UK Concordat and Bath Spa 
University’s own Code of Good Practice). 
 
Review and revise: 
In the spirit of true co-production, in line with BERA ethical 
guidelines 2011 paragraph 24, and to further ensure the integrity of 
this research by explicitly addressing my own situatedness (i.e. 
white, middle-class, hidden disability) in relation to that of my 
participants (i.e. minority ethnicity, working-class, disabled) - I will 
take the following steps: 
1. Regular review and revise points with core participants: 
review data collection methods and findings relating to a 
particular participant with them and revising where 
appropriate. This will also provide participants with 
opportunities to input into how they are represented or to 
discuss how they represent themselves in stages 2 and 3. 
2. Group discussions: where participants agree to be 
contacted in the future to discuss my findings as I write 
them up, they will be invited to do so.  
 
These measures should help me to mitigate possible mis-
interpretations resulting from my situatedness in relation to the 




*Mindful of the Research Council UK (RCUK) guidelines - the 
guidelines that the AHRC adhere to - regarding joint working, the 
agreement between myself and the gateway organisation will 
clearly define our roles, and stipulate my ownership (and final 
editing rights) of the research. It will also clearly state that they will 
not have access to any personal data without anonymization or 
consent from the participant/s, as per the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
Withdrawal from the field 
I will be working with a small number of core participants over a 
period of time, and acknowledge that attachments may form. In 
recognition of this, I will need to be mindful of withdrawal 
processes. I will ensure that de-briefing sessions explore 
representations of my findings, as well how participants feel about 
their participation in the project and how they feel no longer being 
involved may impact on them. If concerns are raised then I will 
discuss with the participant where they might seek support on a 
more on-going basis.  
 
However, this research seeks to enable participants to explore 
their own marginalisation in a way that is emancipatory and 
empower – if they have been involved in stages 2 and 3, they will 
come away with additional skills to continue expressing and 
exploring such issues themselves. If problems do occur, I will seek 
advice from my supervisors. Where appropriate, and with the 






















Project relationship to D4D 
This project is linked to the AHRC funded D4D project, led by 
Professor Levinson who is also my Director of Studies. The D4D 
project has a number of work strands exploring various aspects of 
disability and community, which explore issues of exclusion and 
inclusion to some degree. My project will complement the work of 
the wider D4D project by looking at this central theme of 
exclusion/inclusion/marginalization from an intersectional 
perspective. All of the work strands take participatory and 
emancipatory positions in all of its work, and allows room for 
creative methodologies. Though my research is a standalone 
piece, it complements the D4D project by considering one of the 
main themes from an intersectional perspective and by using 
methodologies and methods that reflect D4D work strands. 
 
One of the work streams is specifically dedicated to ethics in 
disability-related research, led by Professor Brydon-Miller (who is 
an international leader in Covenantal Ethics). The D4D project 
must itself receive ethics approval from all of the universities it is 
linked to, including Bath Spa. As an AHRC project, it must also 
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 adhere to RCUK guidelines – I refer to these guidelines in the 
above sections. All involved in the project meet at regular intervals; 
during these meetings time is set aside to discuss any ethical 
issues arising from our various projects. This support network will 
re-enforce the support provided by my supervisors.  
 
Potential Risks 
I have considered the below issues and risks that may result from 
the methods listed above. 
 
1. Perceived imbalance of power between researcher and 
participant: I am aware that labelling myself a researcher, 
attached to an establishment that carries credibility (a 
university) and with the support of a local support charity, 
there is a possibility that the participant may perceive a 
power imbalance. Though I try to mitigate against this by 
using co-production wherever possible and clearly 
explaining participants’ rights (including to withdraw) in the 
information sheet, I will have to be mindful of this. Where I 
perceive that the participant seems dis-empowered by the 
process, I will reassess my approach with them. I will also 
ensure that they are aware of the independent support they 
can receive from the gateway organisation. 
 
2. Disagreement regarding findings: Key to my approach is 
ensuring that I don’t simply re-enforce ‘white, middle-class, 
ableist’ systems and perspectives in my research. However, 
I will be using the findings and relating them to other 
research and theories in the relevant fields, and will be the 
only person with detailed knowledge of all of the data 
gathered. I recognise the potential for disagreements with 
the interpretations of participants. These instances will 
require careful and sensitive handling on my part, 
consideration of what is leading to the disagreement, and 
my accessing the expertise of supervisors (see bottom of 
section for relevant experience). Where an agreement 
cannot be made, I will consider highlighting the difference in 
perspectives, or include the information such that the 
participant’s perspective is clear (but distinct from my own). 
 
3. Risk of participant withdrawal: Core participants will be 
made aware of their right to withdraw from the project up 
until the final writing-up stage begins (anticipated Dec 
2018). Due to the possible sensitive nature of this research, 
withdrawal is a very real possibility, though the PAR 
approach seeks to limit this by empowering participants. 
However, due to this, I hope to work closely with about 6-8 
core participants, with a view to having a minimum of 4 life 
stories that I can use. Should participants do not wish me to 
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use the data or artefacts collected from them after 
submission of my thesis, I will respect such requests; there 
will be no time limit on such decisions and a means of 
contacting me beyond my doctoral period will be provided.   
 
With regards to information already published – intentions to 
publish works that include data collected from participants 
during the project period will always be discussed with 
participants. They will have opportunities to engage/review 
with the works I propose to publish prior to my doing so if 
they refer to specifics in the data gathered from them. This 
will also be the case for any works I seek to publish/produce 
with gateway or third-party organisations. Organisations I 
work with will be made aware of the possibility that 
participants withdrawing permission to use data collected 
from them. 
   
4. Anonymity and Confidentiality: In addition to that 
mentioned in the ‘participant anonymity’ section: 
 All group discussions will begin with the signing of a 
consent form that includes an agreements of mutual 
respect and confidentiality towards all in the group. 
 Anonymity will be optional for participants with 
regards to their own engagement in the project, 
though any write-ups I produce for academic 
purposes will be anonymised (unless a request is 
made in writing for otherwise).  
 If work derived from or created during this project is 
used for purposes such as a community exhibition, 
permission will be sought from participants – 
separate consent forms would collected for such 
activity.  
 Findings will be anonymised and held as such. This 
includes any visual or audio data collected. 
 
Data will be held in line with RCUK guidelines and advice will also 
be sought from the D4D data manager, who has responsibility for 
ensuring that D4D workstreams adhere to the latest recommended 
practice.  
 
5. Protecting participants from risk of exposure to harm: 
In discussing the purpose of the research with participants, I 
will ensure awareness that engaging in this research may 
mean discussing sensitive and personal topics. I will 
emphasise that if any conversation makes them uneasy 
they can ask to move to a different topic, and re-iterate that 
if they still feel uncomfortable with being involved in the 
research they can withdraw at any point up until the final 
write-up stage of the PhD. If they wish to withdraw after this 
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point, I will discuss this with my Director of Studies – 
certainly data collected from them would not be used in any 
further work other than the thesis. 
 
I will also reiterate steps I can take to protect their 
anonymity. The consent form will include confirmation that 
this conversation has been had. The co-productive 
approach and regular ‘review and revise’ process should 
empower the participant to express and change practices or 
language that they find harmful. Finally, the gateway 
organisation will provide support and advice to any 
participants wanting to speak to someone from within the 
community in confidence about issues raised.  
 
With regards to limiting the people I work with on the basis 
of mental health diagnosis due to perceived possible harm: 
Excluding people on the basis of medical advice, rather than 
including people and then ensuring that my practices are 
adjusted to meet their needs, runs counter to accepted 
practices within disability realms. Such referral to medical 
diagnosis would be seen to uphold the medical model of 
disability and is arguably unethical within this subject area. 
 
 
6. Risk of exposing myself to harm: Initially I will work from 
the gateway organisation and I will take their advice with 
regards to safe areas to work and meeting places. I will 
ensure that I meet with participants in public places, at least 
in initial stages. I will also take the precautionary step of 
getting a phone specifically for use with participants, and will 
inform family/friends of my location/s. Again, the gateway 
organisation can provide me with a support network within 
the community should issues of safety or harm arise. I have 
a good network within the disability sector in London should 
I need advice with regards to issues arising due to mental 
health (my own or that of participants).  
 
Additionally, in my previous career I received training and 
hands on experience working with vulnerable adults. I was 
the manager of a frontline service in charge of security, 
customer service and MAPPA cases (cases where the 
person’s rights to work are restricted due to convictions). I 
was trained in handling difficult situations/discussions and 
received practical experience, such as calming someone 
threatening to commit suicide, supporting women escaping 
pimps in our office and having one-to-one conversations 
with people with serious convictions about their conduct. I 
have also line-managed multiple people over the years with 
mental health conditions, complex needs and/or difficult 
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home lives. Lastly, I have further experience relating to 












1. Doctoral thesis. 
2. The D4D website (D4D is the research project that my 
studentship is attached to, led by Prof. Martin Levinson), 
and potentially through the D4D final publication. 
 
I will also aim to share findings though: 
3. Publication of articles in relevant journals, chapters or blogs. 
4. Presenting papers on my research at conferences or 
workshops. 
5. Discussing my research in any teaching I may undertake, or 
in spaces provided by the Graduate College (i.e. Bath Spa 
research roundtables). 
6. Pre-agreed presentations of my work with the Office for 
Disability Issues. 
 
Additionally, opportunities to further share this work may include: 
7. Publications co-authored with the gateway organisation and 
other disability lobbyists to influence policy (this only a 
possibility – no formal agreement has yet been made.)  
8. A public creative event, depending on the methods used to 












My place as a PhD student is AHRC funded, and it is attached to 
the D4D project.  
 
The costs of the research as currently designed will be minimal. I 
may seek some funding available through the BSU researcher 
































Ethical Review of Research Projects – Checklist  
 
Supervising Tutor/ Director of Studies Approval level required (Y/N) 
a) proposals using human participants for research Y  
b) proposals for research that intends to use undergraduate students 
as participants  
 N  
School Ethics Sub-Committee approval required 
c) procedures involving any risk to a participant’s health (for example    
intrusive physiological or psychological procedures) 
N 
d) research involving the donation of bodily material, organs and the 
recently deceased 
 N 
e) proposals which involve financial payments or payments in kind to 
participants above reimbursement of expenses 
 N 
f) proposals wishing to use children under the age of 16 or those over 
16 who are unable to give informed consent (e.g. people with 
learning disabilities; see Mental Capacity Act 2005) as participants  
Y  
g) research proposals to be carried out by persons unconnected with 
the University, but wishing to use staff and/or students as 
participants 
 N 
h) proposals which investigate existing working or professional 
practices at the researcher’s own place of work (including staff 
surveys) 
   N 




j) proposals which require participants to take part in the study without 
their knowledge and consent at the time 
 
 N 
k) research involving prisoners and young offenders 
 
Y    
University Ethics Sub-Committee approval required 
l) research involving access to records of personal or sensitive 
confidential information, including genetic or other biological 





surveys, questionnaires and any research, the nature of which 
might be offensive, distressing or deeply personal for the particular 
target group 
 
Y    
  
 
Document checklist for submission 
 


















Supervising Tutor/Director of Studies/Director of Research use only: 
 
Comments on the 
ethical issues raised by 








All research with vulnerable groups 
requires very careful consideration, 
going beyond the standard guidelines. 
Key questions are whether the 
research will be of genuine value to the 
potential participants and their 
communities, and whether the research 
proposed has predicted potential 
difficulties, considered strategies to 










possible to protect those involved. 
 
The candidate has gone to great 
lengths to address the above. She will 
be supported by the experienced D4D 
research team, many of whom have 
carried out extensive research with 
disabled people.    
There is a danger, as noted in the 2011 
Specialist Research Ethics Guidance 
Paper Sheffield University, (‘DOING 
RESEARCH WITH PEOPLE WITH 
LEARNING DISABILITIES’) that 
important research, of potential value to 
participants, will not be carried out due 
to apprehensions about risk. As noted 
by Barnes (2009), it is crucial to include 
the participants as far as possible in co-
constructing the research environment, 
and I feel that the candidate has 
demonstrated awareness and 








I am satisfied that the ethical issues 
raised by the proposed research 
project have been addressed and give 
approval for the project to go ahead 
 
Or:   











School Ethics Sub-Committee Use Only: 
 
Comments on the ethical 
issues raised by the 
proposed research and 






I am satisfied that the ethical issues raised 
by the proposed research project have been 
addressed and give approval for the project 
to go ahead  
 
CONDITIONAL PASS 1. The ethical issues raised by the proposed 
research project have not been adequately 
addressed and require re-submission to the 
IfE Ethics Sub-Committee.  The following 
adjustments need to be made: 
 
REFERRAL The ethical issues raised by the proposed 
research project require referral to the 













Signature and Date: 
(Chair of School level 
committee)                                                                    
 16th December 2017 
 
Signature and Date: 
(Dean of School) 
 









University Ethics Sub-Committee Use Only: 
 
Comments on the ethical 
issues raised by the 
proposed research and 






I am satisfied that the ethical issues raised 
by the proposed research project have been 
addressed and give approval for the project 




2. The ethical issues raised by the proposed 
research project have not been adequately 




Signature and Date: 
(Chair of University 




Note: This sign-off is to confirm the audit 
trail that shows sign-off was achieved on the 
18th June 2018 under the previous Ethical 
Review processes in the School of 
Education. This is because signed 
documentation from reviewers was not 
received and they have now left BSU.  
 
 






Appendix 12: Sample consent forms 
 
Sample information sheet 
 
 
‘Meeting in the margins’: exploring  
differences between lived experience, policy and theory. 
 
Why have I been contacted?  
You have been contacted as a family member or friend of a person living with a 
long-term mental health condition, who is also from a minority ethnic background. 
You are invited to take part in a research project called ‘Meeting in the margins’, 
which is exploring how people can become excluded or marginalized. This would 
involve being interviewed by a researcher.  
 
If you wish to continue being involved in the project, you may be invited to 
participate in the second stage of the research. This second stage will involve 
using more creative methods to explore some of the themes we discussed in the 
interview.  
 
Who is doing this research? 
I, Stephanie Harvey, am a PhD student in Disability and Cultural Studies at Bath 
Spa university. My PhD research is a stand-alone project with links to a larger 
research project called D4D, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council. For more information about D4D, see http://d4d.org.uk/. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
‘Meeting in the margins’ looks at how people with long-term mental health 
conditions from different minority cultural backgrounds can become marginalized. 
This research will consider differences between life experiences and the ways that 
mental health, disability and other things are talked about.  
 
The aim is to find ways of building understanding across different sections of 
society about people’s experiences of marginalization, by better understanding 
how differences between lived experience, policy and theory contribute to the 
process of marginalization. This could help policy-makers, service providers, 
community leaders and others to improve inclusion.  
 
How will we do the research and how long will it take? 
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This research will be a Participatory Action Research project. This means that the 
research looks to have a positive impact and that participants will play an active 
role in how the research moves forward. Participants will work with me (the 
researcher) to decide on how I gather information and will have a say in how this 
information is interpreted. It may also take a Critical Ethnographic approach, which 
means that it would consider how people’s experiences are impacted by social 
structures. 
 
I will start this research by having one-to-one interviews. These will take between 
1-2 hours, depending on your availability. If you then wish to continue working with 
me, we will discuss the next stage and what your availability will be. The project 
will stop collecting information around summer 2019, however you do not need to 
remain involved for this period if you do not wish to. 
 
What is the commitment if I become a participant? 
If you decide to become a participant in this research, you are agreeing to 
exploring your experiences of inclusion and exclusion and how particular elements 
of your identity play a part in these experiences. You are also agreeing to have 
your anonymised information used in my PhD research write-up and associated 
academic papers/presentations. Though I cannot guarantee your anonymity if 
people close to you read publications I make, you will have the opportunity to 
review papers I wish to publish before I submit them until my PhD is complete. 
 
If you have any questions about participating in this research, staff at the 
Equalities National Council (ENC) will offer independent advice or information 
about working with me. This organisation is helping me with my research because 
they think the topic is important, but I do not work for the ENC. If you decide not to 
participate in this research, your decision will not impact on the support you get 
from the ENC or any other organisation.  
 
What are the potential benefits and harms of taking part in this research? 
This research hopes to use your experiences to challenge the ways that policy and 
theory thinks about ‘mental health’ and ‘disability’. It will take your experiences as 
the starting point, so as to produce research that makes the voices of participants 
heard. I hope that this research will be an empowering experience where you have 
the opportunity to explore what has contributed to your experiences of 
marginalisation and to have your voice heard.  
 
Please note that we may discuss very personal topics. The researcher may 
encourage exploration of these issues, but will never force you to disclose more 
than you are comfortable with. If you wish to be anonymised in this research, the 
researcher will do all they can to maintain this. However, extracts of discussions 
will be included in the research produced. There is a risk that people who know 
you well could identify you if they read the research papers.  
 
To ensure that you are comfortable with what I include in the research, you will be 
invited to review what is written about the information you have provided. If you 
wish, the researcher will work with you to ensure that you are happy with how 
information you have given is interpreted. If you do request your real name to be 
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used in this research, we will carefully consider the extracts used in the research if 
they include information about people you are close to, and only use them if 
important to reflecting on the point you are making. 
 
If I agree to be involved, can I change my mind? 
You will be able to withdraw at any point during the data collection phase of the 
research. Once I begin to write-up the findings, you will be invited to review the 
information related to you and comment if you have provided your email address 
in the consent form allowing me to contact you.  
 
If you later decide that you do not want me to use data collected from yourself in 
any papers, then you have the right to request that I do not use your data in any 
work after completion of the PhD. You can also request that your information is 
only used for specific parts of the research. Such requests should be made to 
. 
 
How will the data be recorded? 
I will take written notes and, with your permission, make audio recordings of some 
discussions. If photos are taken, this will always be with your permission. 
Additionally, we may use a range of other creative ways of exploring themes. All 
personal details will be anonymised, unless you specifically opt to be named. You 
also have the right to be provided with copies of the information I gather from you 
should you wish. If you feel that some of the information is incorrect, you can ask 
the researcher for it to be corrected. 
 
How will I handle, store and protect the data I collect? 
Any information you provide to me as part of the research would be in complete 
confidence.  I am legally and ethically obliged to comply with the Data Protection 
Act 2018: 
• The data I collect through the course of my research will be anonymised - 
this means that your name or any personal identifiers will not be attached to 
the data we collect and store, unless you have requested to be named. You 
may prefer to choose a pseudonym – i.e. you make up a name for this 
project to protect your identity.  
• The data we collect will be stored safely in a locked filing cabinet or 
password protected files on a password protected computer by Stephanie 
Harvey. This information will be retained for the duration of the PhD and in 
an anonymised form following this (unless you have specifically requested 
your data to be deleted).  
• You will not be identified personally in any reports or other written outputs, 
unless you have requested to be named. 
• You can withdraw from the research at any time before the writing up 
stages, (likely to begin May 2019) with no need to explain why. 
 
Interview tapes, photographs, transcripts or other forms of note-taking, will be held in 
confidence. They will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third 
parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). 
However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so 
323 
 
that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below so that I 
am able to contact you at a later date).Your data will be held in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act. 
 
Will my confidentiality always be maintained? 
The information that we collect will be held confidentially by myself, as outlined 
above. I may discuss the information you provide with my supervisors, but this will 
be done with respect for confidentiality. However, if you tell me information related 
to your immediate safety or the safety of another person, I may need to discuss 
this with relevant parties. I will always seek to first discuss this with yourself and 
come to a mutual agreement about how we will proceed. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research? 
This research will inform my PhD thesis and be used in academic papers and 
presentations. I will share my final findings with other researchers in the D4D 
project, on the D4D website and possibly in a D4D book. I will also share the final 
research outcomes with disability charities and activists, government policy-
makers and in universities to try to influence their work. In all these situations the 
information provided will be anonymised and pseudonyms used, unless requested 
otherwise by yourself. 
I do not want restrict this work to written outputs, and intend to use some of the 
findings for more creative practices. This will depend on how you, as a participant, 
and I decide to explore this topic and the way in which you are comfortable with 
me using the information you provide.  
What do I do if I want to take part? 
If you wish to take part please contact: 
Stephanie Harvey and fill in the consent form below. The consent form can either 
be emailed to the address below or printed and brought with you at your next 




If you do not wish to take part, you do not need to do anything.  




The researcher, Stephanie Harvey, will respect the RCUK (Research Councils UK) 
guidelines for transparency of data and will follow ethical guidelines as proposed 
by the AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Council). All research has to be 
approved by an independent research ethics committee.    
 
This research has been approved by the Bath Spa University Research Ethics 
Committee for the Institute for Education. For more information about expected 




and-ethics/   
 
 
If you have any complaints: 
In the first instance you may wish to raise any complaints with the researcher to 
seek resolution, or with any relevant support organisations. 
 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of Stephanie Harvey, or other details 
you do not wish to discuss with her or the Equalities National Council, please 
contact: 





Core participant consent form 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project, and that I 
have had an opportunity to raise any questions or concerns with the researcher. 
 
I understand that: 
there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I 
do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage; 
I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information 
about me until the final write-up stage of the PhD thesis or of any related 
papers; 
After the PhD is complete, I have the right to request that my information is 
not used in further papers, or for my information to be deleted; 
any information which I give will be used for this research project and for 
academic purposes, which may include publications or conference or 
seminar presentations; 
some of the information I provide may be shared (in an anonymized form) 
with the researcher’s supervisors and researchers working in the D4D 
project; 
all information I give will be treated as confidential; 
the researcher(s) will make every effort to preserve my anonymity, if that is 
my preference. 
 
I also understand that, by signing this I am legally agreeing to keep the identities of 
all other participants and any comments they make confidential, unless given 




 ………............................……………..  
(Signature of participant)    (Date) 
 
 
………………………………………………           
...…………………………………..…… 
(Printed name of participant) (Email address of participant if they 
have requested further information) 
 
 
………………………………………………          
……………………………………..…… 
(Printed name of appointee, if appropriate)  (Date) 
 
 
............................………………..   ............................……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)    (Printed name of researcher) 
 





Staff consent forms 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project, and that I 
have had an opportunity to raise any questions or concerns with the researcher. 
 
I understand that: 
there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I 
do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage; 
I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information 
about me until the final write-up stage of the PhD thesis or of any related 
papers; 
After the PhD is complete, I have the right to request that my information is 
not used in further papers, or for my information to be deleted; 
any information which I give will be used for this research project and for 
academic purposes, which may include publications or conference or 
seminar presentations; 
some of the information I provide may be shared (in an anonymized form) 
with the researcher’s supervisors and researchers working in the D4D 
project; 
all information I give will be treated as confidential; 
the researcher(s) will make every effort to preserve my anonymity, if that is 
my preference. 
 
I also understand that, by signing this I am legally agreeing to keep the identities of 
all other participants and any comments they make confidential, unless given 




 ………............................……………..  
(Signature of participant)    (Date) 
 
 
………………………………………………           
...…………………………………..…… 
(Printed name of participant) (Email address of participant if they 




............................………………..   ............................……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)    (Printed name of researcher) 
 







Gateway organisations: roles and responsibilities agreement 
 
Role of the Gateway organization 
During data collection  
Gateway organizations will support the researcher in recruiting participants. This 
might include approaching people they support who they think might be interested 
in participating, or allowing the researcher to publicize the work through their 
networks. All participants will be made aware that this research is separate from 
the gateway organization, and that they will not have support from the organization 
taken away from them if they do not wish to participate in the research any longer.   
 
If the gateway organization is able to support the research by providing a safe 
space to conduct interviews, then this will form part of the agreement between 
them and the researcher. The researcher does NOT expect costs of this research 
to be met by the gateway organization. 
 
Staff from gateway organizations will also be invited to participate in the research 
by being interviewed. This will be voluntary and with approval from the correct 
level within the organization.    
 
During write-ups 
In the final stage of the project, or if the researcher writes papers for publication 
during the course of the project, the gateway organization will be invited to review 
the documents. However, involvement in this will be at the discretion of the 
organization individually in recognition of workloads. 
 
Responsibilities 
The gateway organization will:  
 Come to an agreement with the researcher regarding the level of support they will 
provide, and ensure that this agreement is respected.  
 Ensure that they do not breach confidentiality regarding participants involved in the 
research, even if they helped to recruit them. 
 Ensure that their conduct with regards to this research is aligned with the 
governing principles of co-production with participants and an emancipatory 
approach. 
 They speak directly to the researcher if they have any concerns they have with the 
research (without breaching their own responsibility for confidentiality towards 
participants) in the first instance, with a view to resolving potential difficulties. 
 
Role of the researcher 
The researcher will conduct this research in accordance with best practice in 
research, adhering to AHRC, University UK and Research Council UK guidelines. 
The researcher will conduct the research via interviews in the first instance, and 
then using more creative methods co-produced with participants. The researcher 
will conduct analysis of the data collected, and keep participants and organisations 
informed on the work. The researcher will also seek to meet any costs occurring 
as a result of the work and undertake the administrative and logistical tasks 




The researcher will hold all the data collected during this research securely. Data 
collected will be owned by the researcher and the participant it was collected from; 
the gateway organisation will not have rights over this data due to confidentiality 
between the researcher and the participant.  
 
Responsibilities 
The researcher will:  
 Come to an agreement with the organization regarding the level of support they 
will provide, and ensure that she does not place additional support requests on 
them without first agreeing these.  
 Ensure that she does not breach confidentiality regarding participants involved in 
the research and the data collected from them, including that of the staff at the 
organization. 
 Ensure that her conduct with regards to this research is aligned with the governing 
principles of co-production with participants and an emancipatory approach, and 
that she behaves in a way that respects the ethos of the gateway organization. 
 She speaks directly to an appointed person within the organization if she has any 
concerns with regards the organization’s involvement in the research in the first 
instance, with a view to resolving potential difficulties. 
 Ensure that she is mindful of the potential impact of this work on participants and 
behaves so as to produce no harmful impacts on those involved in the research. 
 
 
Agreement of Gateway organizations 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project, and the role 
and responsibilities involved. I also confirm that I have had an opportunity to raise 
any questions or concerns with the researcher.  
 
I understand that: 
I may withdraw from the research at any stage should I wish; 
I will maintain the confidentiality of participants and the researcher; and 
I will conduct my role in the research with integrity, supporting the overall 




 ………............................……………..  









............................………………..   
 ............................……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)    (Printed name of researcher) 
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Appendix 13: Staff demographics and extended extract on ‘professionalism’ 
Table 6: Demographics of staff interviewed 
Name Role Ethnicity/Migrant 
status 
Religion MH  
declared 
Gender 




British, black / 2nd-
3rd generation 
N/A No Female 
James NHS care co-
ordinator 
British, black 
Caribbean / 2nd 
generation 
Christian Yes – 
Depression 
Male 
Kamila Therapist British, Pakistani / 
2nd generation 
Muslim No Female 
Ruth Former NHS 
senior mental 
health nurse 
Ghanaian / 1st 
generation 







Nigerian / 1st 
generation 







N/A No Female 
Marcia Therapist black West Indian 
/ unsure 










Lisa NHS senior 
health link 
worker 
British, black / 
2nd-3rd generation 




Stéphanie: I remember when we were at one of the team meetings, umm, N. is very 
passionate about this actually isn't she, because she feels that people get 
misdiagnosed umm when actually part of it is cultural differences. 
James: Yeah. 
Stéphanie: Is that something [that you / 
James: Most definitely. 
Stéphanie: think plays] in? 
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James: I have to be a different person in my work place. Most of the people in my 
NHS, nothing against the NHS, I love It to bits, umm, but when you work in a 
particular sort of assessment, you have to become the norm, there's protocol and 
policies you have to follow and even a code of behaviour, so I can never go in there 
and start doing things I would like to do, like going yes mate / you've got to hold 
yourself back. 
Stéphanie: Yes. 
James: And / it's about professionalism, which I consider / specialists sometimes 
can be a middle class white order and / got to work within these constructs, umm, 
and again with mental health as well. I've seen some people of a BME description 
come across and it's almost like it's being attributed to satisfy their definition and to 
fit in to a construct or an idea they have of a particular social group. And it's wrong.  
It's wrong because you know some people / I'm not saying all, but some clients, are 
not necessarily diagnosed correctly, but at the same time, you have to take on board 
that some are, because they are not medicated and they need particular medication 
to help them cope in life, so I don't do on-way traffic, I do two-way traffic. I look at 
some of the issues which we face as people and some of the faults and barriers that 
we present to other people as well. I think you have to be fair as well. So it's a 
combination of a lot of things, yes. 
Extract 2 
James: But what I'm saying at the end of the day is that sometimes people take 
other people’s culture and then they beat you up with it, if you do not conform to 
something which you don't always understand, or you don't always particularly want 
to be a part of. It doesn't mean you are a bad person, umm / I've / I have to be very 
careful with my mouth, with my particular views, I have to like / I have to think 100 
times before I open my mouth, because if I say something like that, I know what the 
consequences would be. Where if I represent myself like this, I know what the 
consequences would be and I think what's happened now we get a lot of umm BME 
group in particular they try and form they own sub-culture, not to do anything 
untoward, but they want to feel comfortable talking and expressing who they are and 
having their own values and belief systems. 
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Stéphanie: Without having to do that mediation 
James: Oh, yeah, and because there's always a consequence, consequence, 
always a consequence. You / what happens then you will get more BME people 
working in a mainstream organisation, be more professional, than their white 
counterparts, because they know there will be basically consequences, it will just 
say something, do something, which is not of the norm.  It, it, it’s /  
Stéphanie: Do you think people are more on the lookout and less willing to excuse 
it as just a sort of interesting part of that person? 
James: If it's BME people / there's a report called a Snowy Peaks Report, you have 





Appendix 14: Top themes from round 1 
Table 7: Top themes from round 1 of analysis 
# Themes from Top 3 exercise Partici
pant 
Interview Present, but not top 
theme. 
Notes 
1 Difficulties meeting expectations 
& requirements (socially and 
service provision) 
1 1.180705; 2.180821; 3.180823; 
7.181107 
  
2 Appropriateness & Adequacy of 
services/support  





  This may in part be due to 
how I'm accessing my 
participants  
3 Psychological & Behavioural 
responses to difficulties meeting 




4 Beliefs of causes of and what MH 
is 
2 2.180821;  4.180830; 7.181107   
5 Problems caused by term 'Mental 
Illness' 
2 2.180821 4.180830; 7.181107 seems to accept it.  
6 Role of power dynamics in 
disempowerment 
3 3.1800823 4.180830; 7.181107   
7 Difficulties in relationships 
between professional/support 
staff and participant 
3 3.180823 1.180705;4.180830; 4.180830 also had positive 
comments. 
8 Sustaining the system/status quo 
over people's wellbeing 
4 4.18083 3.180823;7.181107; Might fit 11, but is more about 
'efficiency' over effectiveness. 
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9 Use of medication 4 4.18083 2.180821;7.181107; This could also fit into 2 and 7.  
10 Insecurity of support 
retraumatises 
7 7.181107 3.180823;    
11 High level politics creating 
dehumanising mechanisms 




Appendix 15: Extended extract with Peter 
Peter: I think there is a place for both. Because it creates a balance. Umm, because 
with the best intentions in the world you know, we can… the subliminal factor kicks 
in.  
Stéphanie: Yep.  
Peter: And you can find (.) Oh what was I thinking of? But / But people going to lean 
towards what’s more beneficial to themselves. 
Stéphanie: Oh is this consensus bias? Is that the word you were looking for? 
Peter: Pardon me? 
Stéphanie: Consensus? 
Peter: No (.) not quite, no (.) 
Stéphanie: Sorry.  
Peter: That’s alright. Um, yes so I think both working alongside each other creates 
a balance, but I do believe that the (.) actual sufferers in all this have to play a big 
role.  
Stéphanie: Stéphanie: Hmm. ((Reflective)) 
Peter: It has, they must have a much greater degree of input than there has been 
so far. Maybe even more so than the other side. Because they’ve had the practical 
experience. And unless you’ve had that, you will always be missing something, you 
know.  
Stéphanie: Um. ((Agreement)) 
Context: The researcher is a young white woman of mixed cultural background, 
but a British accent. The participant is an older black man who migrated to the UK 
in childhood. Both have some experience of mental health issues/distress.  
The topic of the research they are engaged in is the experiences of mental health 
issues/distress of people from BAME backgrounds. They are speaking of the 
nature of research in marginalised context, and what can be learnt through reading 
and what has to be lived. 
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Peter: It becomes theory.  
Stéphanie: Uhum. Uhum. ((Agreement)) 
Peter: It’s as opposed to maybe around the actual thing. The factual side of it. And, 
I think there isn’t enough of that. 
Stéphanie: Yeah. ((Encouraging to continue)) 
Peter: This is what I mean about people sort of going off intellectualising. And they 
feel they - as a result of their research or, trials or whatever - they have the full 
picture. (.) But, excluding those with the actual knowledge and experience and so 
on and whatever, is a big mistake. 
Stéphanie: Do you think people, em, you’ll never know what it is to be, exactly to be 
someone else right. We can’t do that.  
Peter: Um. Um. ((Agreement)) 
Stéphanie: But, do you not feel that (.) through speaking to other people who have 
had these experiences or doing a lot of reading that is coming directly from people 
with these experiences, you can gain some of that knowledge? Or is it still (.) or is 
that knowledge only valid if you are the person who has directly experienced it? 
Peter: You can only gain a percentage of that. You cannot gain the full of it. You’re 
experience (.) is completely different to you gaining the knowledge and listening to 
someone talking about it. Or watching someone going through it or whatever.  
Stéphanie: Uhum, uhum. ((Encouraging to continue)) 
Peter: It’s like a man trying to tell a woman he fully understands childbirth. You know 
the process  
Stéphanie: Um hum, you’ve heard the screams.  
Peter: Exactly! OK. 
Both: ((laugh)) 
Peter: And you’ve seen all the effects of it and so on, but the actual experience (.) 
you do not have and you cannot have. And that is the difference. There is too much 
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of this thing where people believe they can just ‘research’, and observe, and 
whatever and so on and they’ve got the full package. (.) It is impossible.  
Stéphanie: Yep. 
Peter: The experience, is the key.  
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Peter: Because, um (.) there’s many things in this world that some people will get a 
full understanding of, as a result of actually experiencing and some won’t. And it’s 
the same nonsense that’s been used where women are concerned. Developing 
various things for women. Men sit there and think, OK, we know it all. And they’ll do 
a bit of research amongst the women and so on and they’ll take the lead and (.) Why 
not let the women do it? 
Stéphanie: Uhum, uhum. ((Reflective)) 
Peter: They’re going to be the end users. They’re the ones it’s for. They’re the ones 
with the need. So they should take a lead role. The men could come on board with 
whatever else they have to contribute, but the women should take the lead role in 
such a matter. And in anything out there, that’s my opinion, the people with the 
actual experience should take the lead role. 
Stéphanie: It’s a really interesting one. I sort of want to ask you a d-d-difficult 
question. 
Peter: OK. 
Stéphanie: How do you feel about me doing this research topic then? 
Peter: The same applies. The same applies. Umm, the research can take you so 
far.  
Stéphanie: Hmm. 
Peter: And you can gain a lot of knowledge.  
Stéphanie: Yep. 
Peter: But the experience (.) is another.  
337 
 
Stéphanie: No I / I absolutely agree with you actually. Not even contending that. Um. 
But I’m asking this, partly uh, partly just because I’m interested. And also because, 
actually it’s interesting for me in writing up the ethics part of what I’ve got to do. Umm 
I think I said to you that I do want my project to be as collaborative as I can make it, 
em, which is why I’ve tried to do things like ask you where you wanted to start, but 
there’s still this, at the end of the day I’m still sort of directing things, and, umm, I 
can’t think of words! Brain freeze! 
Both: ((laugh)) 
Stéphanie: And so I guess I wondered whether you had an opinion about me just 
even conducting this research. Whether I’ve got legitimacy in doing it or not. So I’ve 
had experience of mental health services, and my Mum’s French, but I’m still, you 
know, a White European person. And although for me I know that my interest is in 
cross-cultural things, some of the aspects of my research very clearly are going to 
be around, minority ethnicity. And racism comes into it, you know.  
Peter: Ummm. Um. ((Encouraging to continue)) 
Stéphanie: Do you think then, that I just shouldn’t be exploring those issues? Or / 
and I’m not going to take anything personally. I literally just find this interesting / Or 
do you think it’s about how I then write about it that’s important? 
Peter: Ummm, yeah, I think the way you write about it is extremely important. Umm, 
because I was talking about the human factor before.  
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Peter: And / It applies to all of us. Even if we are not aware that it’s present. 
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Peter: And those human factors are the little things sometimes that are not thought 
about or looked at. And that can kick in at any point and can prejudice an outcome 
and so on. Umm, but that’s a human thing. It’s very difficult I think for most people 
to sort of, remain objective in certain situations. Not that it isn’t possible, but it can 
be I believe quite difficult, and it very much depends on the individual.  
Stéphanie: And I suppose it’s about / this is my view, but I wonder if you hold it / is 
it then more about not making a claim to know what the experience is if you’ve not 
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had it yourself, but rather to make the claim that this is what you’ve heard, or this is 
what you’ve read about? Is that the difference that you’re talking about? 
Peter: Yeah. ‘This is what I’ve learnt, as a result of’. Because you’re dealing with 
people, with the experience. Say you’ve learnt from their experience and their 
explanations and so on, you see. A lot of people take these things and claim to be 
the expert, when all they have is one side of the coin.  
Stéphanie: But then again I suppose they’re an expert of that side of the coin.  
Peter: But if you haven’t got the both sides, then you haven’t got the full picture.  
Stéphanie: Does anyone really ever have every side of everything?  
Peter: Possibly not, but what I’m getting at is, it comes back to what I was saying 
with women. 
Stéphanie: Uhum ((Encouraging to continue)) 
Peter: Women know their bodies. They know their needs. And, if something is to be 
designed for a specific need of the female, and the female gets involved because 
they know precisely what they’re looking for and what would be the best fit for, then 
obviously you’re going to get something much better suited to satisfy that need than 
if I, a man, were to come and talk to you and investigate it, and try to create that 






Appendix 16: Transcription formatting 
Adapted from (Atkinson and Heritage, 1999) 
[ ]   Placed around speech, this indicates overlapping talk 
(.) Pause longer than expected at the end of a sentence or for a coma, 
sometimes taking place mid-sentence. 
_  Underlining where emphasis was placed on a word or phrase 
.hh  An expressive inhale  
hh  An expressive exhale 
(word)  Uncertainty on the transcriber/researcher’s part of the word spoken 
( )   Something said, but not understood by transcriber/researcher 
(()) Researcher’s description of events, or alternative name to protect 
confidentiality 
/  Change in the construct of direction of a sentence 





Appendix 17: Exploring epidemiological trends in more detail 
 
In the following section, I do not attempt to provide any form of meta-analysis of 
quantitative data or precise figures but focus instead on general trends observed 
over the previous 25 years25. As Leff so aptly put it, ‘The rate of illness is quite simply 
a vulgar fraction’ (Leff, 1999, p.41), and this thesis does not require such problematic 
quantification of general trends. It is also worth noting from the outset the dearth of 
information regarding rates of CMD across BAME populations26 (Fryers et al., 2004, 
p.s13; Weich and McManus, 2002, p.25). This is perhaps due to the more 
problematic nature of collecting data, as people experiencing CMD are less likely to 
encounter mental health services that people experiencing psychosis. Many people 
experiencing mild to moderate CMD may only encounter their general practitioner 
(GP) with regards to such issues, making traditional sources of data (such as 
hospital admissions) inappropriate for such studies. Caveats concluded, the 
secondary literature provides a complex picture with significant heterogeneity 
across ethnic groups and their risk rates across diagnostic categories (Bhugra and 
Bahl, 1999; Fernando et al., 1998; Lester and Glasby, 2006, p.188; Nazroo and Iley, 
2011; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.56; Synergi, 2017). Key trends, observed over 
several decades are highlighted on p.52. The following provides a more detailed 
overview of these trends and those signalled in Tables 2 and 3. 
Undoubtably the most researched trend is the significantly elevated risk of diagnosis 
of psychosis – particularly Schizophrenia – among the UK’s black population, with 
the highest number of studies focusing on the UK’s African-Caribbean population. 
Secondary literature often quotes risk levels of 3 to 5 times above that of the 
white/white British reference population. Though an influential study in the 1970’s 
placed diagnosis rates as higher than most studies conducted subsequently 
(Rwegellera, 1977), research concerning black African and African-Caribbean 
groups have consistently supported this trend since the early to mid-1960’s (Bhugra 
                                                          
25 It is in the late 1990’s that studies in this area appear using improved, though still flawed, population and 
ethnicity data from national surveys such as the Census. It is also around the early 2000’s that research 
from two major studies – EMPIRIC and AESOP, both looking at rates of mental health issues/distress among 
BAME people – began to publish their findings.   
26 Having conducted a population-based study to determine CMD trends across BAME population groups, 
Shah states that ‘The common mental disorders in ethnic minority populations in the UK have been subject 
to very little study.’ (Fryers et al., 2004, p.s13) 
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et al., 1997; Cooper, 2005; Fearon et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 1988; Halvorsrud et 
al., 2019; Hemsi, 1967; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1981; McKenzie and Murray, 
1999; Morgan et al., 2009; Qassem et al., 2015; Wessely et al., 1991). Men – 
especially young men – are often reported as at particular risk of diagnosis (Cabinet 
Office, 2017; Fearon et al., 2006; Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.83). Qassem et al. (2015, 
1060) noted that black people under the age of 45 were at significantly higher risk 
of diagnosis than white people of the same age. Several papers also demonstrate 
significantly higher risk for those who are British-born (Cantor-Graae and Selten, 
2005; Harrison et al., 1988, p.643)27. 
Studies considering prevalence28 have shown considerably lower risk of diagnosis 
rates for this population group than the studies highlighted above. Using the three 
community-based prevalence studies available to them, Qassem et al. (2015, 1062) 
found that though Black populations were still found to have increased risk of 
diagnosis psychosis in comparison to the white population, all three studies showed 
a significant reduction in the disparity when compared to risk calculated using 
incidence data. Whilst risk of diagnosis of psychosis in several prevalence studies 
remain statistically significantly elevated in comparison to the reference group (King 
et al., 2005; Qassem et al., 2015), the substantial discrepancy between rates in 
incidence and prevalence studies does pose some interesting questions. Some 
scholars view this as supportive of hypothesis suggesting that inequalities relating 
racism, cross-cultural issues in diagnostic practices and pathways into mental health 
services are inflating risk of diagnosis for this population grouping. This is further 
supported by trends found in prevalence studies when considering intersectionally 
located sub-groups. For example, Nazroo and Iley (2011) suggest that risk of 
diagnosis of psychosis for ‘men; young men; and non-migrant men; was no greater 
than that for equivalent white people’, adding later that ‘the higher rate found for 
Caribbean people in the community surveys was entirely driven by the higher rate 
found for Caribbean women’ (Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.83). An earlier study 
suggests that elevated risk rates for African-Caribbean women is predominantly 
experienced among those women under the age of 30 (Bhugra et al., 1997, p.796).  
                                                          
27 Studies concerned with this issue often focus on the African-Caribbean population more than on the 
Black population over-all. 
28 Particularly community-based studies considering prevalence. 
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With regards to risk of CMD, drawing from the little commentary available, some 
elevation in risk rates of depression among Black populations29 is reported (Cabinet 
Office, 2017, p.49; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.55; Shah, 2004). However, research 
is far from providing a clear and consistent picture. In the 1990’s, Fernando 
highlighted the under-representation of Black people in hospital admissions once 
admissions on the basis of psychosis had been excluded (Fernando et al., 1998, 
p.121). This might be interpreted as either under-diagnosis or lesser risk of CMD. 
Rogers and Pilgrim (2014) report lower risk of diagnosis of anxiety among African-
Caribbean people compared to white reference groups. This view is supported by 
studies such as that conducted in by Lloyd and St Louis in 1999, which found 
experiences of poor concentration, forgetfulness and anxiety30 to be less frequently 
reported by black people (Lloyd and St Louis, 1999, p.65), and findings from a large-
scale study conducted as part of the wider national-level EMPIRIC research project 
(Weich et al., 2004). However, a review of population-based studies in 2004 also 
found prevalence of CMD to be higher among black people31, with a particular 
emphasis on increased risk of depression (Fryers et al., 2004, p.s12).  A recent 
government-led report found black women to be at a higher risk of both depression 
and anxiety than all other ethnic groups (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.49). An NHS 
document also reported that increasing suicide rates among young African-
Caribbean people, warning that ‘self-harm should be of more concern than the 
perceived danger to others from people with schizophrenia’ (NIMHE, 2004, p.12). 
Further, several older studies suggest that East African women are at a particularly 
high risk of suicide (Bhal, 1999, p.11; Soni Raleigh, 1996, p.55).  
Historically the Asian32 grouping have not been found to demonstrate the 
significantly increased risk of diagnosis for psychosis that Black populations have 
(Fearon et al., 2006; Halpern, 1993, p.602; Leff, 1999; Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.83; 
Selten et al., 2007). This perhaps contributes to a lesser focus on this group within 
SMI-related diagnostic categories, which Bhugra et al. (1997) suggests is a missed 
opportunity in terms of better determining possible aetiological explanations for 
                                                          
29 With the primary focus of sources being once more on African-Caribbean populations. 
30 Within the context of this study, these were among a range of ‘symptoms’ that might indicate the 
presence of some form of CMD. 
31 Specifically African-Caribbean and African groups. 
32Older studies tend to refer to ‘Asian’. Studies from the late 1990’s refer more often to South Asian, 
separating this out into Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani where possible.  
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disparities across ethnic groups. Noting substantial differences in the cultures and 
religious practices of the ethnic groups implicated, they nevertheless suggest that 
these results are somewhat unexpected given that both groups migrated to the UK 
around the same time and experience widespread racism. There is also suggestion 
of differences across national groups within the Asian category. King et al. placed 
Pakistani and Indian populations at high risk of psychosis, whilst the UK’s 
Bangladeshi populations demonstrated low risk in the EMPIRIC study (King et al., 
2005, p.377). This contrasts with more recent findings from the Synergi project33 
which, though suggestive of increased risk of diagnosis of Schizophrenia for the 
Asian grouping generally, highlights particularly high risk rates among the 
Bangladeshi population (Synergi, 2017, p.2).  
In 2019, Halvorsrud et al. found that risk of diagnosis of Schizophrenia for the South 
Asian grouping was approximately equal to the white/white British population until 
the inclusion of two more recent studies. These studies increased risk rates such 
that they were statistically significantly elevated in comparison to the reference 
group, with the exception of risk among the UK’s Chinese population whose risk 
level remained low. This systematic review also found the South Asian grouping 
experienced statistically significantly increased risk of affective psychosis. Looking 
at intersectional locations within this population group, older Asian women seem to 
experience an elevated risk of Schizophrenia comparative to white women and 
Asian people differently located. Though risk of diagnosis for the Asian grouping 
overall was lower than for the African-Caribbean population, this trend reversed 
when looking only at women over 30 in each population group (Bhugra et al., 1997, 
p.796).  
Studies focusing on CMD diagnoses among Asian populations suggest significant 
heterogeneity within this ethnic category, which perhaps contributes to a lack of 
consistency in findings across studies. Rogers and Pilgrim (2014) report diagnosed 
levels of anxiety in this group to be overall equal to white reference populations. 
However, as they acknowledge, when disaggregated by nationality levels of 
diagnosed depression tend to be as follows: Pakistani population experiencing 
equal levels to the reference population, with the Indian population experiencing 
                                                          




lower rates and the Bangladeshi community experiencing much lower rates (Weich 
and McManus, 2002, p.25). In contrast, Shah (2004) holds that there is no indication 
of lower risk for any BAME group, including the Asian grouping, reporting instead 
high risk rates for phobias among Asian groups (Fryers et al., 2004, p.s12). Within 
this ethnicity grouping, there is once more indications of higher risk of distress 
among certain intersectionally located women. Whilst Weich and McManus (2002) 
report lower rates of depression among Pakistani women34, Bhal highlights high 
rates of suicide among Indian women; particularly young first-generation migrant 
women (Bhal, 1999, p.11). Interestingly, particularly given Bhal’s findings and trends 
regarding psychosis and older Asian women, the recent Race Disparity Audit found 
the Asian grouping to experience significantly higher rates of CMD diagnosis among 
Asian women compared to white British women. In contrast, rates among men were 
slightly lower than white British men and significantly lower than white British women 
(Cabinet Office, 2017, p.49).  
Relatively little attention has been paid to white ‘other’ and ‘mixed ethnicity’ groups. 
Studies considering the experiences of migrants sometimes highlights issues 
among the white ‘other’ group, particularly those of Irish-born people. However, such 
studies often do not include or fail to distinguish between 1st and 2nd generation 
migrants, thus missing opportunities potentially to examine risk rates and 
experiences of a wider pool of people fitting either the white ‘other’ or mixed ethnicity 
category. Studies considering risk of psychosis among migrants generally report 
increased levels across migrant groups and migrant generations (Brugha et al., 
2004; Cantor-Graae and Selten, 2005; Cooper, 2005; Fawcett and Karban, 2005; 
Selten et al., 2007). With regards to white migrants, Nazroo and Iley report that risk 
of diagnosis of psychosis among white people was historically found to be 
significantly higher among those who were not British born (Nazroo and Iley, 2011, 
p.84). This is consistent with more recent findings that those in the white ‘other’ 
group have a statistically significantly elevated risk of diagnosis of psychosis 
(Fearon et al., 2006; Halvorsrud et al., 2019) and earlier findings of Irish-born men 
experiencing high risk of Schizophrenia diagnosis (Cochrane and Bal, 1988). 
Though there is evidence of continued elevated levels for Irish-born people, recent 
                                                          




findings from the Synergi project suggest that risk of diagnosis of Schizophrenia 
might be significantly higher among the Polish population than either the Irish or 
white ‘other’ categories (Synergi, 2017, p.2). Research on second generation 
migrants tends to focus on 2nd generation African-Caribbean people as opposed to 
white ‘other’ or people of mixed heritage, (though such studies may indeed include 
a significant number of people of mixed ethnicity). As previously noted, significantly 
higher risk rates of psychosis have been reported with regards to 2nd generation 
migrants (Cantor-Graae and Selten, 2005; Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.83). If these 
studies do indeed include people of mixed ethnicity, such findings are consistent 
with more recent studies highlighting statistically significantly elevated levels of 
psychosis found in the chronically under-researched mixed ethnicity group 
(Halvorsrud et al., 2019; Synergi, 2017, p.2). 
With regards to CMD, Weich et al. reported finding the highest rates of depression 
and anxiety among non-British white people (Weich et al., 2004); in particular Irish 
participants (Weich and McManus, 2002, p.25). This is somewhat inconsistent with 
the findings of both the Synergi project and the Race Disparity Audit. The Synergi 
(2017) report suggested that the highest risk of mood disorder diagnosis sat with 
people of mixed heritage, though levels were also elevated for people in the white 
‘other’ category. This is broadly consistent with an early paper from the AESOP 
research project which found high risk of diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder 
among people of mixed heritage (Lloyd et al., 2005). Breaking results down by 
gender, the Race Disparity Audit found men and women identifying as white ‘other’ 
to experience less CMD than their white British counterparts. In contrast, women in 
the ‘mixed’ category were found to experience significantly elevated rates of CMD 
diagnosis compared to their white counterparts, whilst ‘mixed’ ethnicity men 
demonstrated lower risk rates (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.49). Other studies indicate 
specific issues for the Irish group. Shah highlights higher rates of anxiety among 
Irish-born people (Fryers et al., 2004, p.s12), whilst Peate notes studies indicating 
elevated levels of depression, self-harm and suicide in Irish men comparative to 




Appendix 18: Methodological issues in epidemiological research 
The issues described below relate primarily to epidemiological studies considering 
risk of diagnosis (and illness/distress), though some also impact on research 
regarding experiences of mental health services. Historically, research regarding 
BAME mental health inequalities focused on quantifying differences of incidence or 
prevalence35 of particular mental health issues/distress across ethnic groupings 
prevalent in the UK population. Issues inhibiting the building of an accurate and 
comprehensive picture include:  
 data is often problematic to gather and can include significant inaccuracies;  
 data lacks sufficient detail to highlight heterogeneity in broad ethnic 
groupings; and 
 reliance on quantitative data combined with the two previous issues, plus the 
problematic nature of core concepts, makes the causal relations between 
aetiological factors difficult to determine.  
Difficulties gathering data of sufficient reliability and accuracy arguably biased the 
field, particularly in the early days of research, forcing the use of incidence rates as 
a proxy for ‘illness’. Incidence is usually calculated using hospital admissions data. 
An alternative is to calculate prevalence, which requires wider sources of 
information so as to include people living in the community. Whilst admissions data 
is more readily accessible than population data, it is not unproblematic. Issues 
include ethnicity not being systematically recorded (Cochrane and Bal, 1988, p.364), 
and people with pre-existing diagnoses being recorded multiple times if they present 
at different hospitals (Nazroo and Iley, 2011, p.90). Such data may also be biased 
by variation in health-seeking behaviours or pathways to care across ethnic 
groupings (Halvorsrud et al., 2019, p.1319; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, pp.56–7). 
The significance of such issues were brought to the fore in a paper contrasting the 
results of three community-based studies estimating prevalence of psychosis to an 
aggregate of results found using incidence rates. It found that, though both types of 
study found increased risk of psychosis amongst black African and African-
Caribbean populations in comparison to the white population, all three prevalence 
                                                          
35 Incidence generally refers to the number of first-time diagnoses made in a given time period, whereas 
prevalence counts the total number of people with a given diagnosis at a given point or time period.  
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studies showed a significant reduction in the disparity when compared to risk 
calculated using incidence data (Qassem et al., 2015, p.1062). Some scholars view 
this finding as supportive of hypotheses suggesting that inequalities resulting from 
racism, cross-cultural issues in diagnostic practices and pathways into mental health 
services are inflating risk of diagnosis for particular BAME groupings. Nazroo, for 
example, points to this ‘inconsistency in estimates of risk between clinical incidence 
studies and community survey studies’ (Nazroo, 2015, p.1065) as highlighting the 
potential for misleading results in studies that do not adequately problematise the 
use of hospital admissions (or similar) data as a proxy to data on actual diagnosis 
or presentations of mental health issues/distress. This is further supported by trends 
found in prevalence studies when considering intersectionally located sub-groups 
(see Appendix 17). Improvements in data collection have been made. For example: 
more informed epidemiological work has displaced some old 
assumptions36… We are now faced with a more complex picture in 
relation to the relative impact of racism and social exclusion, with 
socioeconomic factors predominating the latter. (Rogers and Pilgrim, 
2014, p.53) 
One such improvement has been the greater disaggregation of population data by 
ethnicity37, enabling exploration of variations in trends occurring within or across 
broad ethnic groupings. For example, studies using Census data prior to 1991 often 
actually calculated trends among migrant groups; British-born people of minority 
ethnicity would be missed as previous Census’ asked for country of origin, not 
ethnicity (Census, 2015). Additionally, heterogeneity within broad groupings – i.e. 
‘South Asian’ – are increasingly reported. Yet such data still often struggles to 
provide the intersectional detail that might lead to the sorts of granular 
understandings required to really grasp important ‘within group’ trends.  
  
                                                          
36 I take ‘old assumptions’ to refer to a reliance on bio-genetic explanations. 
37 E.g the 1991 Census introduced questions regarding people’s ethnicity and health for the first time. 
Subsequent Census’ have increased the number of options available for people to tick regarding their 
ethnicity (Census, 2015). This enabled more detailed consideration of health and minority ethnicity status 




Appendix 19: Alternative understandings - somatisation 
Western medicine has a very particular way of conceptualising mental health that is 
not shared by all cultures across the globe, despite the Global Mental Health 
agenda. Some of the easiest differences in understandings of mental health result 
from alternative beliefs in the causes of mental health issues/distress. For example, 
the belief among some cultures that ‘madness’ is caused by spirit or demon 
possession. Within western societies exists the concept of spirits and demons, even 
if the idea of demon possession is shunned by western medical practices. More 
complex to translate across cultures are the different ways in which cultures 
conceptualise disease, illness and/or distress. This is particularly so when the 
cultures across which translation is being sought have fundamentally different 
worldviews, particularly around the idea of the ‘self’ or the body/mind/spirit.  
Such differences may even make consideration of different aetiological beliefs 
difficult if the person seeking to understand does not have a sense of the worldview 
from which such beliefs stem. For example, a person brought up and educated in 
western traditions may struggle to understand Traditional Chinese Medicine’s (TCM) 
practice of identifying a ‘pattern of disharmony’ (Kaptchuk, 2000, p.4) within a 
person when seeking to heal an individual presenting with certain symptoms. This 
is because illness in this TCM’s ‘worldview’ is perceived of as reflecting disharmony 
of or imbalance within the whole body. The body here should be understood as 
including the mind, as the body and mind are generally understood as one, not 
dichotomously as in western biomedicine. This differs significantly from the way we 
conceive of mental health in the traditional western approaches significantly. 
Arguably, in cultures where the mind and body are not conceived of independently, 
the concept of ‘mental health’ itself may seem nonsensical. For the person brought 
up in western approaches, it may seem illogical to treat the whole body for an illness 
they believe to be firmly located within the mind. As Kleinman notes, whilst disease 
is often influenced by culture (i.e. – impacting the aetiology or course of disease), 
illness is always culturally mediated38. Kleinman demonstrates this idea through an 
                                                          
38 Kleinman writes that ‘Disease can be thought of as malfunctioning or maladaptation of biological or 
psychological processes. Illness is the personal, interpersonal, and cultural reaction to disease. Although 
social and cultural factors may or may not influence the aetiology, pathophysiology, and course of disease, 
they always influence illness.’ (Kleinman, 1977, p.9) 
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exploration of theories of somatisation. A still contentious area, I too will spend some 
time on this phenomena as it provides a useful illustrations of some of the difficulties 
in working cross-culturally with regards to mental health issues/distress.  
Somatisation, then, generally refers to the presentation and experience of mental 
health issues/distress through physical symptoms. This phenomenon is usually 
associated with people originating from Asia (Patel and Shaw, 2009, p.19). 
Examples of somatisation include that which might be categorised as ‘depression’ 
in Western psychiatry being experienced and expressed as physical pressure on 
the heart and chest area, a ‘falling’ of the heart or ‘thinking-too-much-in the heart’ 
(Kleinman, 1977; Fenton and Sadiq‐Sangster, 1996, pp.71–77). It has been noted 
that though people presenting with pressure on the heart might point to social and 
familial stressors as causal factors, they insist that they experience physical 
ailments and that it is there that requires treatment rather than any emotional issues. 
Such presentations have been observed in numerous diasporic Asian communities 
in the UK (Arshad and Johal, 1999; Patel and Shaw, 2009; Fenton and Sadiq‐
Sangster, 1996; Bhatt et al., 1989).   
Controversy, however, surrounds theories of somatisation. Disputes might arise 
from the multiple ways in which the phenomenon referred to as somatisation is 
interpreted. For example, it might be regarded as any of the suggestions below:  
(a) a non-recognition of mental illness, so that ailments are always 
presented as somatic, (b) a non-recognition of the link between 
physical ailments and emotional states, (c) a presentation of ailments 
as somatic despite some recognition of mental distress, and (d) simply 
a non-presentation of mental symptoms to bio-medical doctors. 
(Fenton and Sadiq‐Sangster, 1996, p.71) 
Different theories lend themselves more or less to universalism or relativism 
regarding disease and illness categories. Disputes between causal theories become 
controversial in this context due to concerns of ‘cultural imperialism’ and generally 
involve scholars disagreeing over the degree to which mental health can be 
understood as universal or culturally relative (Ryder et al., 2002, pp.3–5). For 
example, interpreting certain phenomenon experienced within specific cultures as 
simply a different presentation of the same ‘disease’, involves applying a 
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universalism that denies ontological difference though it allows for epistemic 
difference. The inherent danger, for ‘relativists’, is that such translations lead to a 
form of cultural imperialism that favours one epistemological framework (here, 
Western psychiatry) over others. Alternative frameworks might include different 
understandings of the mind-body relationship, where they are understood as ‘one’ 
rather than in a dichotomous relationship, enabling more embodied experiences of 
emotional and psychological distress (Fenton and Sadiq‐Sangster, 1996, p.69; 
Ryder et al., 2002, p.11). Another example might be understandings of the self that 
are more relational than the individualistic approaches to the self-provided in 
Western ‘psy’ disciplines. Fenton and Sadiq-Sangster (1996) suggest that such 
differences might explain why Punjabi women in Bristol experiencing ‘thinking-too-
much-illness’, sleeplessness and sorrow (symptoms often linked with depression in 
Western societies) were less likely to express ‘statements of low self-regard’ – a 
symptom common to British people with diagnoses of depression.   
Fears of such cultural imperialism in global mental health research expressed by 
scholars today stem perhaps from the approaches taken by scholars working in Asia 
in the 1950’s/60’s. They observed that patients tended to speak of physical ailments 
whilst displaying symptoms of distress or relaying causal factors that would lead to 
diagnoses of mental health illness in Western medicine. As such, an explanatory 
model was developed that posited such behaviours as the somatisation of emotional 
and mental distress. This generally took a deficit model approach, suggesting that 
‘Asians’ relative lack of psychological mindedness and a putative deficiency of 
psychological descriptive terms in Asian languages.’ (Lin and Cheung, 1999, p.776). 
There is indeed a lack of comparative terms across some languages when it comes 
to mental health. For example, there is no direct translation for ‘anxiety’ or 
‘depression’ in multiple Asian languages. However, it should be noted that 
terminology such as ‘depression’ did not always exist in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin-
based languages of Western societies either (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014, p.65). 
Rather, it emerged from the advancement of highly culturally-mediated disciplines 
concerned with mental health issues/distress. In this way, Rogers and Pilgrim (2014) 
suggest that such disparities may in fact highlight weaknesses within Western 
epistemologies rather than deficits in other cultural understandings.  
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Additionally, research also indicates that Asian people are indeed very aware of 
their emotional or psychological states. However, these states might not be 
interpreted as mental illness (or madness) in themselves, even if they are 
acknowledged as a form of illness (i.e. ‘thinking-illness’), as linked to physical 
ailments, and as causal factors in the development of mental illness (Fenton and 
Sadiq‐Sangster, 1996, p.76). This might result from the existence of beliefs about 
non-medical illness that are not present in British culture, or indicate a cultural 
difference between some Asian cultures and Western psychiatry with regards to the 
point at which distress is pathologized. Alternatively – or additionally - cultural norms 
might lead people from some Asian groupings to be more reticent in sharing such 
experiences (particularly in healthcare settings) than people from Western societies 
might be. For example, stigma regarding mental illness or public displays of emotion 
might encourage a reticence to discuss emotional states (Lin and Cheung, 1999, 
p.776).  
Leading the way for such challenges to the early formulation of the somatisation 
thesis was the work of Kleinman. Whilst acknowledging the presence of somatised 
experiences of emotional and mental distress, he positions this not as resulting from 
epistemological deficit but as ontological difference resulting from cultural 
difference. He suggests that earlier explanations failed to adequately account for 
the fundamental way in which culture mediates the ‘form and meaning’ of 
sicknesses; in particular chronic sicknesses where concepts of illness form and 
inform experiences of ‘disease’ (Kleinman, 1977, p.9). Illustrating how somatisation 
presents, he writes that: 
Patients frequently use physical complaints as a legitimated metaphor 
to indirectly express personal and interpersonal problems. Such 
terms… link popular beliefs about body states and illness with 
psychosocial experiences and social relations. (Kleinman, 1977, p.6) 
Somatised presentations of distress in a culture that does not segregate the mind 
from the body should be understood not as a denial of emotional and mental distress 
(which would be to promote ‘category fallacy’, see p60), but a different experience 
of it as a result of cultural mediations. Additionally, it enables a distancing from highly 
stigmatised views of mental illness. Thus, somatised presentations of distress might 
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provide ‘culturally sanctioned ‘idioms of distress’’ (Lin and Cheung, 1999, p.776). In 
this way, they enable people to take up a ‘medical sick role’ without attracting 
significant stigma. Akin to the Parsonian sick role39 hypothesised in Western 
societies, this ‘releases patients from responsibilities and obligations… and affords 
them care’ without tarring them and their families with the stigma and serious 
consequences that can arise from admission of mental health issues/distress 
(Kleinman, 1977, p.6). 
Fernando (2010), in providing a broad overarching view of the ways that different 
worldviews impact on the resulting variety in understandings of mental health 
issues/distress and illness globally, highlights one major dividing factor between 
‘western’ and many non-western approaches.  These relate to whether or not the 
culture holds to holistic or non-holistic understandings of the individual or not. 
Situating western approaches to mental health as non-holistic, Fernando highlights 
that ‘holism instils an ideology that enables people to experience external and 
internal experiences as one and the same; subjective and objective at the same 
time.’ (Fernando, 2010, pp.41–42) Thus, traditionally western non-holistic 
approaches that understand ill health as resulting from an external or internal cause 
may not align with the experience of distress people from more holistic traditions 
have. Additionally, Fernando highlights that cultures with more holistic 
conceptualisations of illness and distress generally promote:  
a sense of health as a harmonious balance between various forces in 
the person and the social context as opposed to seeing health as 
individualised sense of wellbeing. (Fernando, 2010, p.42)  
Unfortunately, I am unable to explore in this thesis the numerous different ways in 
which mental health issues/distress and illness are conceptualised globally in 
different cultures. However an awareness that these different beliefs exist, that they 
                                                          
39 The Parsonian ‘sick role’ articulates a conceptualisation of the role that capitalist societies, such as the UK 
and USA, expects people deemed ‘ill’ to play during their period of illness. This role consists broadly of 
several rights and their accompanying duties for the ill person. The rights consist of an exemption from 
holding blame for their present ‘incapacitated’ state, an exemption from ‘ordinary daily obligations and 
expectations’ (Parsons, 1975, p.262) and a right to be provided with access to healthcare (Varul, 2010, 
pp.76–77). Accompanying duties, then, consist of a duty to recognise the undesirability of this 
‘incapacitated’ illness state. This gives rise to obligations regarding retreating from everyday life (Varul, 
2010, p.77) and seeking to get well; wherein lies the duty which consists, ‘if the case is sufficiently severe, of 
seeking help from some kind of institutionalized health service agency.' (Parsons, 1975, p.262). 
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must be understood within the context of the cultures from which they emerge and 
hold integrity within that context is important when considering possible issues 
contributing to BAME mental health inequalities in the UK. Additionally, it is 
important when considering the understandings that some of participants in this 
research articulate. Whilst differences in approaches to this topic might be 
particularly evident amongst the beliefs of those who migrated to the UK, all 
participants have been exposed to multiple cultures in one form or another such that 
their worldviews stretch beyond simply traditional western perspectives. It is for 
reasons such as this that scholars from transcultural and critical mental health 
perspectives caution against a blanket approach in the implementation of the Global 








Appendix 20: Testimonies of lived experiences of mental health 
issues/distress 
This section of the chapter explores both the accounts that participants gave of their 
own lived experiences of mental health issues/distress. I then continue by exploring 
various supportive factors in participants’ lives or actions that help them to manage 
and cope these experiences.  It is perhaps in this section that we see in greatest 
clarity the moments of helplessness and disempowerment that appear at times in 
most participants’ testimonies. However, these are also indications of resilience, the 
importance of maintaining agency and the will to resist – aspects of most 
participants’ accounts that resonate often.   
1   Lived accounts of experiencing mental health issues/distress 
Not all participants speak in detail about their personal experiences of mental health 
issues/distress. Mya and Peter tend to focus more often on generalised beliefs than 
providing detailed personal experiences. However, with regards to personal 
experiences, Peter indicates that having a ‘depressive mood’ while Mya speaks of 
her ‘diagnosis of anxiety’. Though Mya indicates ‘having some symptoms that aren’t 
(.) you know, are not anxiety symptoms’ and might ‘lead me to be getting a different 
diagnosis’, she does not expand on this. Both express having internal battles to cope 
with past or present phenomenon. For example, Peter speaks of times when he ‘just 
sort of struggled, struggled along’, where he had to ‘dig in and try to, fight back’, 
sometimes making ‘headway and sometimes not’. Mya’s battle is expressed more 
in terms of feeling ‘this huge pressure to fit yourself into the box of ‘normal’.’ Both 
also highlight difficulties dealing with everyday tasks that they would be able to 
undertake were it not for their mental health issues/distress. For example, Peter 
indicates being unable to work at present and having difficulties with concentration. 
For example, when I originally asked if he’d like to read my write-up of our 
discussions, he stated that ‘it’s a bit of a challenge when it comes to, sort of reading 
length of things because, currently I’m experiencing mental (.)’. Mya’s description 
focuses more on her inability to work at present, stating ‘I am unwell at the moment 
and I can’t cope with work’. This is set within the context that she thinks most people, 
including herself, desire to have purpose, employment and to be helpful in society. 
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Therefore, deviation from this is one way that she experiences her mental health as 
impacting on her life. 
Samaiya - who seems to experience milder mental health issues than several other 
participants - often speaks of the relationship between her physical health, learning 
disabilities and mental health issues. In describing the challenges Samaiya faces, 
her sister explains that ‘some days you know her hip is hurting a lot so she will find 
it harder, or she’s mentally not there or she’s feeling depressed she doesn’t feel like 
doing anything.’. Samaiya agrees, stating ‘Yeah, I feel like sometimes just lying 
down and not doing anything. I just feel like that’. The combination of her mental 
and physical health issues, together with challenges related to her learning 
difficulties, leave her feeling tired and in need of ‘resting’. Whilst she talks of 
immersing herself in family life to lift her spirits, ‘showing’ that she is okay, she 
confides that ‘Inside I take everything’, adding: 
Sometimes I feel like I'm not gaining things in my life. What I wanted to 
do things which I haven't achieved and now I see people studying and 
doing things, I think to myself I wish I was (.) you know going back to that, 
my studies and doing again, you know, but you will never come back. 
That’s it. 
A sense of helplessness imbues her descriptions of her current situation and 
situatedness. By this I mean that her intersectional location at the axis of mental and 
physical health and learning difficulties appears to fuel a sense of helplessness 
regarding her own capabilities and ability to realise her aspirations. This seems to 
both trigger her depression and is a large part of her actual experience of mental 
health issues.  
Andeep reports having had depression many years ago following the death of his 
father. When speaking of his present mental health, Andeep contradicts himself 
regularly, stating one moment that he does not have depression and the next that 
he might. This made discussion of his present experiences with mental health 
issues/distress difficult. However he explained that in the past he also experienced 
nervousness such that his hands would tremble. He also spoke of having drunk a 
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lot in the past, inferring alcohol dependency.  Unfortunately, Andeep provided no 
further detail as he states that it was too difficult to think about that time.  
Satch, Samantha and Mahdi report experiences that indicate more acute mental 
health issues/distress than other participants though only Mahdi readily accepts a 
diagnostic label (which is of PTSD). However, all three have made multiple suicide 
attempts. In fact, Satch ‘tried dying’ twice over the period of this research and 
alluded to one attempt previous in his life. The first time during this research was 
only 5 days prior to our second meeting. Satch states ‘That’s twice I’ve tried dying. 
You see that is mental health’, continuing ‘You know, when you’re pissed off and 
you just wanna go to sleep and not wake up.’ In the same discussion Satch 
describes other experiential phenomena, such as it being ‘hard for me to even, keep 
me, what I’m saying, I keep getting mixed up and, I’m so fatigued.’ A second attempt 
at dying took place only a few months later, leading to hospitalisation.  
Samantha reports having attempted suicide three times previously. Mahdi does not 
stipulate the number of attempts he has made, but shows me a scar on his neck 
having ‘recently had, this suicide attempt attack. I cutted my neck.’ Though he does 
not feel suicidal at the time of our first interview, Mahdi is conscious that such action 
could be easily triggered again, reporting still having self-harming tendencies. He 
states ‘When I’m upset I’m up so, anger and I feel like it’s better I die’. In a later 
discussion he describes having suicidal thoughts following his wife recently leaving 
him, deciding however that he has been through too much else in his life to let this 
trigger another suicide attempt. Though Mya mentioned having had suicidal 
thoughts, she expressed feeling that acting on these would be a sin, quickly 
clarifying that she does not, however, think that people who take their own life are 
bad people. 
Both Mahdi and Samantha describe experiencing hallucinations. Samantha was 
hospitalised on a number of occasions during this research and reports having been 
put in induced comas as part of her treatment40. One hallucination during 
                                                          
40 While Samantha was in hospital we had several phone calls where she mentioned having been put in 
induced comas. When we finally met in person for the second time she explained that at least one of the 
induced comas she had was the result of a serious bowel infection and being pumped full of anti-biotics. 
Samantha: Field notes 190808. 
357 
 
hospitalisation involved an extremely emaciated person was walking towards her. 
This person was soon joined by more and more extremely gaunt people until a whole 
crowd was coming towards her. She also describes hallucinations experienced 
while at home, a common one being that someone is lurking behind her. She states 
that these are scary for her. Mahdi’s experiences seem to be an ongoing part of his 
mental illness, encompassing both visual and auditory hallucinations. As the 
participant who described psychosomatic experiences in the greatest detail, he 
explains that ‘even at home I have problem in my head. Like, I see it, I hear noises 
sometimes like (.) uh, screams.’ Mahdi speaks of these often in the context of 
panicking and paranoia, where accounts of hallucinations blend with experiences 
where he ‘got paranoid’ or has vivid nightmares. Recounting a particular incident 
whereby he thought his neighbours were colluding to have him deported – he was 
still awaiting the outcome of his asylum claim - Mahdi states that upon hearing 
ambulance sirens:  
I was panicking. I was like / I was seeing people who died before, ghost, 
kind of ghosts. Or maybe it’s all in my brain. I was thinking that somebody 
went just inside the kitchen, and I would have get up and check, but there 
is no-one. And I used to go to the toilet the same, and (.) and sometime 
when I / well I have most of the time nightmares. The nightmare is only 
the, the only thing I can remember is the, the, the night my parents killed, 
got killed and that blood and, the things that I have there 
Though other participants do not speak of nightmares as Mahdi does, several do 
speak of difficulties sleeping such that it either impacted on their ability to cope or is 
something they actively had to manage. For example, Satch smokes marijuana at 
night to aid his sleeping, watching nature or history documentaries when he wakes 
early in the morning due to physical pain. Peter mentions listening to a radio 
broadcast over the phone from people he respects, such as ‘a proper qualified 
doctor’ who is also a ‘holistic practitioner and he’s moved away from the 
pharmaceutical stuff because he / it didn’t make any sense to him.’ Peter does not 
mention what causes his sleep issues.  
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Fear, also, is present in several participants’ testimonies. Both Mahdi and Samantha 
speak of feeling that people are behind or around them in a menacing way, such 
that they feel ‘paranoid’ in their day-to-day lives: 
Samantha: I've got anxiety. I don't like someone walking behind me. It 
freaks me out. I need a person to be in front of me so I can see them. 
Stephanie: Yeah, yeah. (.) You can see if they're [turning towards you 
Samantha: You can see, if they're coming] towards me. But sometimes 
you find me going like that ((flinching)). When I went into a shared house, 
I'd be (.) I'd be in the kitchen, and I'm looking that way and I can sense 
that there's someone behind me and I'm going like that ((flinching)). 
---- 
Mahdi: I’m not really good with the crowded places. The crowded places 
make me paranoid and I feel like someone is going to attack me, or 
everybody is staring at me. I feel uncomfortable and I start / for example, 
when I walk in the street and a ((footfall)) somewhere I (.) keep turning 
my back. I am scared. I keep turning and, it’s a bit weird and society and 
the public that somebody / just sometime it does affect me that why / and 
two minutes this guy’s watching a couple of times back. 
Stephanie: Yeah, they’re wondering why you’re so 
Mahdi: Yeah, yeah, why I’m looking back, back like, while I’m walking. 
But I, I’m kind of scared all the time like someone’s going to attack me 
from back or something. 
In Mahdi’s testimony, fear present and explicit in the way that he describes 
experiences of mental health. These fears often linked to being refused asylum in 
the UK and being sent back to Afghanistan where he had been tortured for 7 years 
by the Taliban, and are lived on a daily basis. Samantha does not tell me the triggers 
for these experiences, though she separately mentions experiencing domestic 
violence at the hands of her ex-husband. Both Samantha and Mahdi interpret such 
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experiences as linked to internalised fears rather than the presence of any real 
external threat being present. Hence Mahdi’s description of being ‘paranoid’ and 
Samantha’s linking such behaviour to ‘anxiety’. As such, they are aware that their 
behaviour in these situations are likely to be interpreted by ‘society and the public’ 
as ‘weird’. Mya also alludes to anxiety-driven fear of strangers when she states that 
‘partly cos of my mental health position I don’t like really going out in the evenings 
and things like that, I don’t feel safe.’  
Whilst he does not speak of hallucinations, Peter does speak of paranoia, though 
very differently to Mahdi. Peter is deeply sceptical of mental health labels that result 
from people being deemed ‘paranoid’. He implies that often people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are ‘treated as almost you’re paranoid’ if they ‘see 
certain things taking place’ that don’t conform to the dominant view in society. He 
continues that ‘It’s as though you should just accept, conform and get on with it’, 
otherwise you risk being seen as buying into ‘Conspiracy theory’ and/or being 
‘paranoid’. This can lead to ‘some people, people are being decided, people are 
sectioned and so on, when sometimes it’s not necessary’. Though Peter does not 
specify having personally been accused of being paranoid, such experiences are 
implied when he situates himself as a non-conformist and, in later discussions, 
describes noticing racist microaggressions directed at him that others (particularly 
non-racialised people) do not perceive. Giving an example of a micro-aggression he 
has experienced, he states that ‘this is where I think a lot of people, are accused of 
being paranoid.’ Peter feels that reports of micro-aggressions are often viewed by 
those not experiencing it as ‘paranoia’. This is particularly the case where the racism 
is not overt, such as with many micro-aggressions motivated by racial prejudice 
rather than racism.  
Whilst all participants mention being anxious and/or describe situations where 
anxious feelings and behaviours surface, none give such detail about the 
psychological (including psychosomatic) impact of this on their everyday life as 
Mahdi. For example, in addition to the above exert about walking in the street, Mahdi 
describes physical responses to distress, stating ‘when I get very (.) very upset, my 
body shakes, and my, my, all of my body shakes and I start sweating, my heart 
beats gets short (.) so fast, and I start like, my teeth, grinding my teeth.’ Mahdi later 
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explains that ‘I don’t notice sometime but some, some people who knows me, they 
say they do some, they say ‘you do sometimes weird things’, like (.) like, doing my 
fingers ((flicking)) or just staying like this, like this, like this ((rigid ticks))’. These 
descriptions are generally provided in a matter of fact way. Additionally, like Satch 
and Peter41, Mahdi also describes concentration issues:  
sometime I’m thinking about something else, and I jump I talking about 
something / I don’t, I can’t really focus on something. I have problems / I 
have memories problem that, I, I put something at home and I forget it 
very soon. And I have to search for it hours. 
He later explains ‘all my brain I can feel noise like very bad like for one hour, two 
hour’. This leads him to feel that he is ‘not very stable mentally’ at the moment, 
experiencing a ‘mood problem that I have on off on off’. Mahdi also speaks of his 
need for his wife to help him with tasks at home, later evidencing this claim with 
examples such as ‘my nails are too long, mostly I don’t go to haircut and this stuff. 
This is all my wife. It’s not / This person you’re looking is made by my wife.’ After 
separating with his wife, Mahdi comments that he does try to push himself to have 
productive days, but admits that at times it has taken a friend to tell him to get his 
hair cut before he tends to himself. 
Satch does not speak of his behaviours and responses to difficult situations in the 
context of psychosomatic experiences or symptoms.  However, he does display 
signs of significant anxiety over the period that he is acutely distressed - continually 
returning to subjects he is concerned about, being visibly frustrated and at one point 
asking me for help with paperwork for various appointments as he feels 
overwhelmed. Satch is aware that his behaviour is sometimes different to other 
people’s, reporting that he can become ‘feral’ when he does not receive the support 
he requires. Use of the word feral connotes, to me, an awareness by Satch that he 
can sometimes stray beyond sanctioned ways of behaving in our society. However, 
this does not translate into a view that such responses are ‘symptoms’ of a health 
issue. Rather he views it as a  natural response in the context of repeatedly facing 
                                                          
41 Though Peter only alluded to concentration issues. 
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adversity and not having been equipped as a child with the skills required to handle 
such situations. 
2   Individualised coping mechanisms 
      2.1   Taking action 
Other coping mechanisms discussed are highly specific to the participants identities, 
preferences and hobbies. For example, Mahdi speaks on a number of occasions of 
going on walks in parks: ‘At the evening time I go to the park because it’s not 
crowded this park. I go walk. So, I walk a lot at the night so I’m tired, I can go to bed.’ 
Walking in quiet places helps to dispel some of his energy. In later discussions 
Mahdi cites the significant positive impact that being surrounded by nature has on 
him. Satch refers to a range of mechanisms he employs to cope with the anxiety he 
feels around the security of his housing and financial situation. For example, it is 
extremely important to him that he ‘put all me / as much spare money as I can be in 
a month ahead in water bills, £30 in the electric and £30 in the gas’. Satch expresses 
that at one point he ‘was behind on bills and everything, and that all worries me’. 
Satch is aware of the additional strain that being without electricity and gas would 
cause him, and does all in his power to avoid such a situation from occurring. Peter 
speaks of proactively seeking alternative approaches to medicine to manage the 
health issues and distress that he experiences. This includes researching alternative 
medicines and understanding the role of nutrition and deficiencies in health issues.  
In contrast, Andeep, Samantha and Samaiya speak of finding ways to distract 
themselves. Samaiya speaks of looking after her nieces and nephews as helping 
her. For Andeep, distractions include keeping his living space clean and doing the 
cooking. He remarked that if he stopped to think about everything, he would quickly 
feel overwhelmed. He noted that physical work helps him to manage his nerves, 
later adding that he wants to work outside or his home as he doesn’t want to get 
lazy. Getting lazier, he states, makes a person become more ill and turns them into 
Zombies. However, whilst recognising this and his desire for a job, he is also 
conscious that there is a balance to be struck, noting that he is unsure he has the 
stamina to work and care for his mother at the moment. Work was a central coping 
mechanism for Samantha, who speaks of having immersed herself in work before 
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her physical health declined: ‘Work was a distraction. I would just leave all my 
problems at home’. She reflects that it was ‘the only way, like, for me (.) to try and 
reduce all of this stuff, I put myself into work.’; ‘all of this stuff’ being the stress and 
depression she felt. She describes ensuring she was trained on all areas of her job 
to ensure she would always be busy. Staying busy for Samantha means ‘my brain 
is not working, its concentrating on that’ - meaning work - instead of the things 
causing her distress. Drawing a comparison with the situation she found herself in 
at the time of our first discussion, she states ‘I'm literally mental right now. Because 
I'm not doing anything.’ Feeling that ‘my body is controlling me. I can’t control it.’, 
her declining physical health does not allow her to engage in the coping mechanisms 
she has previously turned to, such as high-energy exercise like Zumba or tennis.  
       2.2   Mechanisms harmful to the self 
Some coping mechanisms employed are more harmful to the self and might be 
perceived also as evidence of their mental health issues/distress. Andeep, Satch 
and Samantha experience(d) significant substance misuse issues. Whilst Andeep 
only mentions this in passing, stating that he used to talk a lot when he was drinking 
– inferring alcohol abuse, if not dependency. Satch and Samantha provide more 
detail, speaking of this primarily as a coping mechanism rather than as part of their 
experience of distress itself. For example, Samantha states that she ‘started 
drinking very heavily (.) just to lock everything else’, expanding that ‘I’d lock myself 
in. Then alcohol and cigarettes.’ She explains that she does not drink every day, but 
that when she does, she drinks until all the available alcohol is finished or she 
passes out. Speaking to Samantha nearly a year later at a time when she has been 
sober for roughly 4 or 5 weeks, she states ‘I don’t know if I’ve stopped or not, all I 
know is life is getting greater.’ She explains that, though she is pleased not to be 
drinking at present, she has not made an active decision to stop. Rather, there has 
been a ‘fight between Samantha and Samantha’s body’ whereby her body – which 
rejects the alcohol and the harm it is causing – is winning as it will not allow her to 
swallow any alcohol. Samantha also cautions that it is wrong to think of people who 
drink excessively as having ‘given up’ on life. She explains that in part she drank to 
be how others wanted her to be, i.e. ‘happier’. Drinking served a double role; first, it 
helped her to find oblivion at times when she needed to ‘lock everything’ away from 
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the world. Secondly, it helped her to meet the expectations of those around her to 
behave a particular way when she did socialise.  
Though Satch’s introduction to drugs began in his teen years and are intricately 
linked to becoming involved in a particular subculture (the Northern Soul music 
scene), he links addiction and drug-use in his later adult years to coping with 
distress. For example, Satch speaks of times when ‘you feel sorry for yourself really 
bad’ and ‘instead of being angry, I was just sad.’, stating ‘that’s why, you know, I 
smoke chemicals.’ In a separate discussion, Satch reflects ‘I think I did it a lot, to try 
and, soothe me mind at certain times, certain dates.’, giving the example ‘Christmas, 
is a horrible time for me.’  Satch reports having been an addict for 35 years, using 
drugs ranging from smoking marijuana to injecting heroine. He has now been in 
recovery for approximately 15 years, describing himself as ‘an old man and still an 
addict, but I’m not using needles anymore, or buying heroin and crack. I just, I ain’t 
got the time for that anymore.’ Instead he primarily uses prescription methadone 
and smokes marijuana. Whether or not Satch views substance misuse as simply a 
coping mechanism, or as a presentation of mental health in itself, fluctuates. In one 
discussion he angrily declares ‘They’re forever trying to label me mentally ill and it 
makes me feel bad.’, being more comfortable with the label ‘addict’. However, on a 
separate occasion he states that he views addiction as one of three strands of 
mental health. Interestingly, the first statement was made shortly after his first 
attempt at dying, whilst the second came at a time when he felt more settled and 
secure. I have not included Mahdi’s self-harming here, as Mahdi frames this only as 








































































(Marley and Jones, 2010) 
[Lyrics redacted from the digital version of this thesis for copyright reasons]
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Appendix 22: Staff extended extracts - issues of diagnosis 
There are four extracts included here: 
1. Ruth: Misdiagnosis of self 
2. Ruth: Misdiagnosis of son 
3. Ruth: Religious woman 
4. Marcia 
 
1 Ruth: Misdiagnosis of self 
Ruth: And my own experience was like, with something that I would never wish on 
anybody. I was talking, seeing a neurologist and I'm saying to her that ‘listen, I'm 
not’. She wouldn't, she didn't even have time to take my history. Because she had 
patients waiting, and I could see she was getting frustrated and anxious and she 
wanted to go straight to the back. And she was telling me ‘but I can't see anything 
on the screen’, she went in ‘I can't see in the records’  she was very sharp with me 
and I thought ‘Oh my god,’ I was getting flashbacks from all the patients I have 
treated, you know, what happened to them. And so in the end, her conclusion is ‘I 
think you need to go men.. be referred to the mental health team, and you'll be put 
on medications, and observed and’  yeah, she, she, she actually 
Stéphanie: Woah 
Ruth: ‘I'm going to recommend this to your GP, because I think you are mentally, 
you have some mental definitely / it's nothing to do with, um, neurology. It's nothing 
to do with’. So she did refer me. She couldn't refer me directly, she would have done 
that. So I went to my GP. Um, cos I was initially dealing with one GP, and I went to 
a second GP and I said to him / the second one was more understanding, though 
he also didn't really understand what was happening to me. Guess what. To cut a 
long story short, I had a fall from a ladder a few years back... nasty fall, and I also 
suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome I don't know if you know, as well as Raynaud’s 
disease. 
Stéphanie: I don't know Reynolds 
Ruth: Reynaud’s disease my fingers go into spasms and turns colour, especially 
when the weather is cold. and it's so painful because no circulation. And I was typing 
volumes of work with that condition, and I have bi / bilateral carpal tunnel. I had, with 
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the fall I had surgery cos I had, I've been operated. I went back to work only to find 
a pile of work waiting for me, like I said. And recommendations made by 
occupational health, the trust would not adhere to it because it was too many, they 
can't accommodate. So they said to me ‘ sorry’. So I was working under very 
unhealthy conditions, and getting home at midnight. 
Stéphanie: Ohhh! 
Ruth: So, unknowingly I was causing more nerve damage. 
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Ruth: So, basically, finally, after fighting and pushing I refused, they were giving me 
medications to completely knock me off. And to knock me in my sleep completely. 
And my heart, what happens in my sleep, when I tell you the symptoms, when I 
know I said  ‘no I'm going to die, I’m dying in my sleep’. I think when I mentioned 
that phrase, ‘oh she's, some is wrong with her’, cos I'm saying my heart is beating, 
pounding, so fast. And, and so this ‘oh she is agitated, very anxiety depressed’, and 
then, they're saying, it's like ‘you have a depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. 
All sorts of things’. I was right all the time, guess what? It was only through 
continuous persistency (.) I spoke to some of my colleagues, I said ‘ this is what is 
happening. I can't believe that they were saying ‘ Fight it Ruth. You've got to believe 
that if you were that ill we would have known’. But then I was getting depressed, 
because of / not, not even so much because of the illness, but nobody believes you 
everybody. So 
Stéphanie: Have a low credibility, targeted 
Ruth: Exactly. It's only when I had um, in neuro / I met a neuro physicist who, to 
carry out nerve damage test and he says ‘oh my goodness, you seem to um, you 
must have had nerve damage for a very long time because it's really worse. I had 
to have surgery,  but they couldn't correct all the nerve damage. When you look at 
my hands, my fingers are all / I couldn't straighten. It's not straight. 
Stéphanie: Oh, yeah (.) 
Ruth: And it comes from the, the surgery was, it wasn't very successful. So I had to 
live with, when the nerve pain comes its incredible. To be told ‘no, it's not / until they 
369 
 
saw the results from the neuro / and he was an NHS, he was a top specialist. He 
wrote his report. Suddenly it turns out that I had severe obstructive sleep apnoea. If 
you read up about it, it's frightening. To have severe (.) So when I finally, they agreed 
to have a sleep test carried out, I think they thought it was going to come out ‘ok, 
let's just give her a sleep test’. They were shocked by the results. I was stopping 
breathing every few seconds, continuously. And what was happening is umm, I was 
making sounds like someone guts spin like in the (.) you know when people are 
about to die there is a kind of noise 
Stéphanie: Yeah 
Ruth: Actually my son, he was only young, he recorded my, my breathing. It's 
frightening when you hear it. And, there was no oxygen. They carried out oxygen 
test, oxygen wasn't getting to my brain, so I was confused. That was the confusion. 
I didn't know where I was 
Stéphanie: That is actually part of starting to die 
Ruth: God 
Stéphanie: So your description [was correct 
Ruth: I could have had] a stroke. Easily a stroke. Everything I was describing, 
because she said to me ‘you can't have sleep apnoea and be conscious of it’. No, 
you can. I knew because I wake up with panting as if ( ), I could wake up so many 
times I was telling her. she said ‘no, it's anxiety’. Oh, god. 
Stéphanie: But why do you think (.)? 
Ruth: I had / because she just wouldn't, she was tired. When I, when she saw me it 
was around 1:30. I think she, she hadn't had a break, I don't know. And I could see 
she had so many patients. She appeared already restless (.) with, and, and I was 
sort of challenging. She was / all she wanted was to tell me ‘ No, I think that, I can 
see the results blah blah blah. The blood test you've had is normal’. They didn't carry 
out vitamin D. It turns out that I was severely vitamin D deficiency. That also causes 
confusion, easily. 
Stéphanie: That's quite a basic test to do as well. 
370 
 
Ruth: And I was complaining of my limbs. And I have, I've always had, I don't know 
if you know about hypermobility? 
Stéphanie: Ummm, a little bit. 
Ruth: Hyper / hypermobility, that's a syndrome. Hypermobility people, you have 
extra ((indicating flexibility)). Some / do not come with pains and problems, but 
others do. Like mine, from childhood I was very sporty, a tomboy. But each time I 
engaged in sports I’m in so much pain and I bruise easily. All these factors, I, uh, 
and yet nobody, you know and I'm telling them ‘ Doctor, doctor, do you want to hear. 
it's a (.)’, look I'll tell you again, I wouldn't wish it on my worst enemy. 
Stéphanie: I just wonder why (.)? 
Ruth: What happened, I / I’ve never / I know it happens to people, but I never 
thought. I thought, ok, I'm a nurse, and seeking help from the NHS from doctors, I'm 
thinking they would give me at least some 
Stéphanie: Credib[ility 
Ruth: You know], exactly. But, oh my god 
Stéphanie: Why do you think it was that they didn't give you credibility? 
Ruth: I, other, other doctors did, because I saw in the end, in the end I saw so many 
other specialists. But, the most insulting part, I, I also met others who couldn't be 
bothered. All that they want, she / she had um, this particular neurologist, I think she 
comes from / I'm not sure what part of Eastern Europe but she had a strong accent 
as well, and she seemed to think she knows me. And I actually told her ‘But you are 
not listening’, and I think she got angry. Cos it's like ‘ why are you ( )’. She seems to 
know / uhh, I don't know. Again, thinking everything is mental health if, if this person 
has confusion, if they are even forgetting their door / um, their keys outside, leaving 
food / I was burning food cooking and I can't remember I was cooking. So those are 
acute confusion mast, should have raised warning signals that this person ‘Why are 
they so acutely confused?’. But then she said anxiety, severe anxiety and 
depression can also cause, you know, confusion. It's true. Cos when someone is 
severely depressed they can't be bothered, they, they can't (.) you know  
Stéphanie: Yeah, yeah. 
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Ruth: And I'm saying ‘I'm not that clinically depressed’. And she rolled up, I’m telling 
you / I, I just / it's, it's a horrific. I had to fight continuously. And then they diagnosed 
me with fibromyalgia, they said fibromyalgia. 
2   Ruth: Misdiagnosis of son 
Ruth: Umm, another bad experience I had, my son, and I didn't know I had a genetic 
condition in terms of hypermobility, cos my son was experiencing similar ones. And 
we went to, uh, I would take him to be assessed because of all the pain he was 
talking about. Took him to another, uh, we were referred to another NHS hospital. 
He met with the physio. The physio concludes that he may have mental health. 
Why? Because in the course of the assessment, I said I had I mentioned about 
fibromyalgia. Fibromyalgia is another [thing 
 Stéphanie: Yup, I know] [it 
Ruth: which if] you mention it (.) 
 Stéphanie: Very contentious 
Ruth:  Ahh, it's all in the, yeah, very contentious in the head. I mentioned that I had 
that, and she suddenly ‘Oh, I think your son needs to be seen by the mental health 
team’. What, and I said ‘what’, I said ‘I'm a (.)’, I said ‘No. He doesn't have a mental 
health problem’. I said ‘I'm a mental health nurse’, and she said ‘ Yes but, (.)’, she 
didn't believe ( ). She has no clue about hypermobility joint, the joint disorder. 
Because, there are people with hypermobility joint who can do things. When I was 
little I was called rubber skin, because my skin could stretch 
Stéphanie: [Really ((laugh))  
Ruth: the other part.] And I thought it was fun. And then I always used to have pain, 
excruciating pain, when, you know. But I didn't understand, I didn't connect. In those 
days I was told I had rheumatism. Rheumatism is what / ok, I have rheumatism. I 
didn't think much of it. And my son is very sporty, so you can imagine. and we go 
and the physio, she tried to refer without thinking ‘well I think he's at high risk’. so 
he, maybe my son was imagining. I said ‘this is a boy who is very sporty. I just need 
him to have a proper’. So in the end she tried to refer us to a mental health team, 
you wouldn't believe it! And she couldn't because it has to go via the GP. Cos now, 
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you have to, because I don't, it's a hospital outside of the catchment (.) you know 
referrals normally. So basically what happened is, um, she then, what she did was 
um referred me to see, referred myself to see a rheumatologist. Reluctantly, 
because I insisted on it. And when I met with the rheumatologist, who thank 
goodness, oh my god, he looked at the physiotherapists report and she was there 
in the consultancy room. This was a few months after. And he looked at me, looked 
at my husband and everything. He said ‘this boy doesn't need (.)’. I'm telling you! 
He said ‘ What he needs is A, B and C and D. Yes the parents, the mother has, this 
is, ah, is a genetic disorder, sort of.’ But it's more to do, every, cos when, when, you 
could easily, he also falls because of this. And he used to run, used to play football, 
play matches all over. He was involved in, you can imagine. And she thinks he's 
talking about pain and everything because, it's all in his head. The mum has 
fibromyalgia. 
Stéphanie: So it must be in the head. 
Ruth: So it must be in the head. And I can just imagine the number of people, you 
know, who are, if you can't express yourself, what you can't assert yourself. Now 
imagine when I was very confused. …I couldn't (.) Oh. I would still be on very strong 
medications. Because I did take the medications when they threatened me (.) with 
if you don't take it, we will discharge you from the services, and / When they just 
discharge me from the services what happens then is that PIP I’m getting and 
everything will stop. Because they will say ‘You refused treatment.’ This is the letter. 
Oh yeah, that’s what happens. It has knock on effects 
3 Ruth: Religious woman 
Ruth: I worked, um, years ago with, in a different hospital with um, a psychiatrist 
who very experienced. and he, a black psychiatrist, and (.) we had a ward round 
um. And the ward run, this particular ward run involved a new patient who had been 
admitted over the weekend, brought in by the police and apparently she was, she 
was threatening people in the marketplace, shouting hell and brimstone. She wasn't 
wearing any shoes. No, nothing, barefoot. Wearing a long gown, and she wasn't 
taking any ( ) because people around ‘oh, there's something wrong with her’. The 
police came saw it. ‘Ahhhhhh, she may be mentally ill, someone having a relapse’. 
She was arrested, taken to A&E, initially to be assessed initially. ‘Ah, nah nah nah. 
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She has to be, go under mental  health ( )’, because she was fighting and saying ‘ 
I'm not mental. I'm not (.)’, you know, because she was resisting back. she was a 
Nigerian, a black um sort of woman in her early 40s. So then everybody assumed 
‘Wow, this is someone probably with schizophrenia or something’. And she’s 
shouting hell, and was mentioning hell and ( ) burning fire and things. So when this 
specialist consultant in the ward round, the woman was brought in. He was into her 
ward round; she was put under his care as one of his patients cos we work by 
catchment areas. So the area where she lived, the address ( ) with this particular 
consultant. And thank god it was him. In the ward round medical interview, the 
woman, and she was 
((External interruption)) 
And then he began interviewing her, and she was speaking pigeon English. She 
couldn't speak / I don't know if you know pigeon English ( ). And he understands, he 
speaks pigeon English fluently, he can speak anything. he turned to us and said ‘ 
this woman is not mental’. He said ‘what happens is she belongs to a particular um 
religious sect who, they wear, they believe, they wear white gowns. I don't know if 
you've ever seen 
Stéphanie: [No 
Ruth: normally (.) And] ( ) on their sabbath ( ), they don't wear shoes. They believe 
in, I don't know if you know the story of ‘Moses and the burning bush’ where Moses 
was asked to take off his daily ( ), interpret that. So they believe if you are doing 
anything for God or going before God’s presents, you need to remove your sandals 
or shoes. 
Stéphanie: Oh ok. 
Ruth: So she was supposedly prophetess in the sect. 
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Ruth: And she believes the world is coming to an end so she needs to warn 
everybody. Doing her bit for God,  by going to the market place as the best place to 
draw everyone's attention and to warn them that the world is coming to an end. there 




Stéphanie: So it might not have been the best conversion plan ever, but it certainly 
wasn't mental [health 
Ruth: but she couldn't], she in English 
Both: ((laugh)) 
Stéphanie: Probably didn't do her much good. 
Ruth: So, when the police were called, she began fighting every ‘You will go to 
hell’,  you know, so the ( ) was complete. And the more, the police were arguing with 
her, the more she was insisting, telling them ‘God will (.) give you (.) you know, you 
would, for fighting against, you want to destroy his prophet warning you of the 
danger to come’. Gosh. So, ((laugh)), she 
((External interruption.)) 
Ruth: Now, it was a blessing that this particular consultant understood the culture. 
He knew of that religious sect, it's dominant in certain parts of Africa. And he was 
also a consultant who believes in um spirituality and mental health. 
4 Marcia 
Stéphanie: Do you think that sort of / some of these negatives from imperialism and 
classism are reflected in the way that we approach mental health diagnosis? 
Marcia: Yes. Straight. 
Stéphanie: No question. 
Marcia: No, no question, definitely. Umm I know and therefore there's not that 
exchange listening because it really is quite interesting and with that there was a 
client who was complaining that umm she could actually hear voices and she was 
from a different culture at certain times and she was regarded as being delusional 
but when you broke it down you discovered that the neighbours would come in at a 
certain time and they will start making a lot of noise and also there's another client 
in terms of what has been as seeing blood coming through the wall and she was 
regarded as being delusional, well, there was, because umm someone would 
actually self-harm and / 
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Stéphanie: Oh my gosh! 
Marcia: Yes and it was coming through the wall when they self-harm in the 
bathroom, it was eventually  
Stéphanie: Yes, seeping through. 
Marcia: Yes. So the Council had to go in and do something because / to the building 
because it's health and safety, yes. 
Stéphanie: Yes, but why did these people end up in mental health services then if 
the / how did that happen? 
Marcia: Well it's hard to understand but when the individual would go and complain 
it was just seen as oh you know how could this possibly happen without it being 
investigated, so whereas you would spend more time to kind of break it down and 
possibly go and visit, but as a support worker, you arrange / you have that 
communication with the support worker and the investigation and come back / and 
do you know, this really is taking place, she's not going mad. I was working with 
again an Iranian individual and he had been given the diagnosis of OCD but the 
condition he was living in in terms of he was living over a chicken shop, you know, 
takeaway shop, there was rats, he couldn't sleep in his bed at night, because he 
was saying he couldn't sleep. He would be washing frequently and then when I really 
kind of broke it all down, because the building was infested with vermin and he was 
washing regular, he wouldn't eat anything in the building, he would have to clean 
and / I would do that, also. 
Stéphanie: Yes, it's hygiene. 
Marcia: That's right so you have to sort that out, it's like a social umm support, and 
then look at is this OCD, is the problem still there. 
Stéphanie: Why do you think people are so quick to jump to a mental health 
diagnosis? 
Marcia: Possibly because umm being able to describe fully what was going on or 





Appendix 23: Staff extended extracts - engaging with State support services 





1 John O 
I’ve got people with severe osteoarthritis. I’ve got people with / There’s a woman 
that has got a skin problem and because of that problem she kind of has to come 
out, to come be with people. So she’s anxious as wherever she is going, she is so 
concerned about what people are saying and that put her into a depression and you 
can see that now, it is the depression that is the main. It’s taken it from the physical 
now to the mental. So because people who are afraid of / ‘oh my benefit is being 
stopped’ / They are very unsure that they couldn’t get money. So even though they 
have that physical disability that is actually the primary focus of the illness. They 
tend to now become so severe, anxiously severe and depressed because of those 
difficulties. Maybe because of the financial aspect of it. Maybe  because of the worry 
that I don’t know if this will get better. So all of this coupled together to give them 
mental problems.    
2 Zara 
Zara: Yes.  It's basically / if you / there's certain umm / obviously he's on ESA, but 
to get support you have to be on PIP, if you don't have the care element from PIP, 
there's certain things that people won't do. In the / 
Stéphanie: In the so[cial care 
Zara: the social care] / because that's where the funding comes from.   
Stéphanie: No, that is / but I didn't realise because / I didn't realise they were that 
linked because / 
Zara: Yes, basically it's like say for example if umm regarding to home help, we can 
get in contact with the Council to do the home help, but some of the elements of 
stuff that he needs help with, they won't assist, if it makes sense, in a way where 
umm they want someone that they / you to help them, they like lower / how can I put 
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it / like links, like in a case of (25:39) a way where if you are not high level of support, 
then they will jump in.  If you want a lower help of support then they will signpost 
you to / alright, say, for example, for him, they would be like yes you need to get 
meals on wheels, you can't afford meals on wheels, he's not on enough income to 
get meals on wheels, which would be beneficial for him to have, but he can't afford 
to pay that out of the money that he's on, that's got to last him for two weeks.   
Stéphanie: And it's just not taken in to account peoples sort of socio-economic / 
Zara: No, they are not taken in to account.  Everything at the moment I find within 
the settings, since I've got back here, is everything is about money.  If you don't 
have it there's nothing that no one can do for you and it is hard to watch because 
there's only a certain amount of hours, same as what I have, to help and support 
someone.  I'm based here so I don't do home visits, like for example, J or C, they 
do home visits, I don't do home visits.  Everyone has to come to me here because 
this is where I'm based. 
Stéphanie: Yes. 
Zara: So it's hard to see like umm / there's only a certain amount you can do, there's 
only a certain amount of funding you can get for someone and that funding also 
sadly comes to an end, so what do you do with that person, again, but then not step 
over boundaries, sometimes you get in to a place where it was like / 
Stéphanie: Dependency. 
Zara: It's like / but then you will find that now what the problem is is that you've now 
enabled someone to get dependent on one organisation as where we're meant to 
be multi-organisations working together as one, but now you've made this person 
become dependent on one organisation, which for me sometimes is very very 
stressful or straining or frustrating at times, yes, very frustrating, due to the fact that 
there's only limited powers I have as well if someone maybe from AWP or something 
else got more involved, sometimes that little title scares the DWP, just maybe a little 
bit more for them to move and do a little bit / 
Stéphanie: Do something. 
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Zara: Do something a little bit more.  So I think those are definitely reasons in behind 
why people can marginalise and basically scapegoat as well in a way where, if you 
don't have the right umm / if you don't speak a certain language, if you don't have a 
certain power behind you, you can be left out of society on your own, because a lot 
of the people I work with, as well, they get frustrated with say for example DWP, 
they get frustrated and they start hitting them with fire, but then they never what they 
want and then they get banned from services and all that kind of stuff because of 
they are coming across aggressive.  But they are aggressive because they are 
frustrated.  No one's speaking to them.  It's even down to umm / umm / a guy that I 
was working with, the same guy I was working with, he phoned DWP and wanted to 
know why his money has been cut.  They spoke to him in a certain language, he 
didn't understand what are you even saying, so it then got to me that I had to then 
phone, then I explained to him the reason behind and all it was down to was a 
miscommunication in the way where he was asked questions he didn't really 
understand. 
Stéphanie: So it's also there's an assumption that people have a certain level of / 
Zara: Understanding / 
Stéphanie: And education? 
Zara: Education level, definitely, educational level, but also there's an expectation 
that when you come there you are supposed to immediately know exactly the 
system and know exactly what it is that you need to do, as where, some of the 
questions I find that they do ask, someone / a lot of men, as well, it's true, a lot of 
men, their pride will overcome and they are asking simple questions as can you 
bathe yourself, just because of the pride of them not saying / they don't want to say 
/ they don't want to say yes, no, I can't bathe myself, they will say yes, but by saying 
a certain answer to a certain question, you are giving them that your level of support 
is less and I think that's what a lot of / say, for example, a lot of questions that DWP 
do ask I think they are talking to as complete strangers, not someone / that support 
worker that kind of knows them or they feel comfortable with it, this is a total stranger 




Appendix 24: Staff extended extracts - Satch’s ban from services 
Lisa 
Stéphanie: ‘cos you mentioned as well, when we were in X, that someone that you 
worked with had, they were into, I think they were going into rehab services, and 
they felt the need to alter the way that they looked. 
Lisa: That was Satch, that was Satch. 
Stéphanie: Yeah… 
Lisa: That was Satch, he (.) twice he did that. I’ve seen him, I’ve been with him when 
he’s gone into rehab twice so the first time he was going to a unit, and he cut his 
hair, and uh I said ‘Why’d you do that?’ He said ‘I don’t want any problems.’ he said 
((laugh)) ‘I just want this to go smoothly, I don’t want to get into any confrontations 
with anybody. It’s going to look less scary.’ You know. And he did it again when he 
went, second time when he went and um, when I was supporting him he went and 
did it again. So he’s very conscious of, how he, looks and also, I think all of that’s 
based on his experiences as well. ‘Cos he’s somebody that’s been banned from a 
lot of services a lot of times.  
Stéphanie: Yeah, he was saying, he was saying to me that he, he used to be hard 
to work with is what he would say.  
Lisa: I don’t think he was. I would never find him hard to work with. I was, me and 
him were laughing in the week, I was reminiscing and saying ‘Satch do you 
remember that time you went into BDP and uh you got banned for looking through 
the window because one of the workers felt intimidated?’ [laugh] Wasn’t even doing 
anything. 
Both: ((laugh)) 
Lisa: He looking in through the (window) 
Stéphanie: Seriously (.)? 
Lisa: Yeah ((laughing)), and they banned him because one of the workers felt 
intimidated.  
Stéphanie: That’s ridiculous. 
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Lisa: And (.) and I had to go with him to a meeting. Made a complaint and I went 
with him to the meeting with the manager, and one of the managers was saying 
‘well, you know, it’s people’s perceptions isn’t it, and if she felt intimidated then that 
is valid.’ So I said, ‘well what is that based on? What is that / What is that’ 
Stéphanie: I’m mean that’s essentially saying that people’s unconscious biases are 
valid. 
Lisa: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So yeah, we (.) we challenged it. We didn’t get anywhere, 
he was still banned. But interestingly, even though he was deemed to be dangerous 
at the time, one of the other workers from the organisation was meeting him on a 
park bench to do sessions with him. ((laugh)) On their own.  
Both: ((laugh)) 
Lisa: So 
Stéphanie: Yeah that’s not 
Lisa: Yeah. 
Stéphanie: consistent. 
Lisa: Yeah, so (.) yeah he’s been, he’s had lots of issues because um, it’s not 
because he’s difficult to work with. It’s because of how he’s looked, and, and people 
get scared easily by him. Yeah.  
Stéphanie: I just, I don’t whether it’s, you know, I know he’s been very ill and so he’s 
lost a lot of weight and all of this / it surprises me that / but, 
Lisa: No he’s never been huge, he’s never been kind of bulky or anything. He’s 
always been slim. But people have always felt intimidated, that he’s dangerous.  
Stéphanie: ‘Cos he doesn’t walk around in a / aggressive way 
Lisa: No, he doesn’t. He doesn’t.  
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Lisa: Yeah. I mean he can be quite mouthy when he’s upset. When he’s upset he 
can be quite, um, he can shout at people. But (.) you kind of know his history, you 
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kind of know that, that means he’s distressed about something, you know. And it’s 
usually, if he feels that, you’re trying to avoid helping him, you know 
Stéphanie: Yeah. 
Lisa: Yeah, and now that he’s older, and he’s finding things even more difficult, he 
is going to find things even more difficult, to get services. 
((section of conversation omitted)) 
Stéphanie: And do you feel that there’s something there as well that plays in with 
the whole race aspect as well? 
Lisa: Yeah definitely, definitely. I think it just makes people think ‘oh this, this person 
could, you know, be dangerous because he’s black’ ((laugh)) 
Stéphanie: Yeah, yeah. 
Lisa: Yeah, being black and agitated and being white and agitated is two different 




Appendix 25: Staff extended extracts - problematic service delivery 
There are four extracts included here: 
1. Ruth 




1   Ruth 
Extract 1 
Ruth: I remember one Christmas day, um, umm I went to visit a patient because she 
had nobody. and I'm saying ‘It's Christmas, I can't leave her’ and I cooked a meal 
and everything and went to / And then, at that time there weren't strong restrictions 
on professional, you know, these boundaries we've got to keep. So you can go to 
visit a patient and, yeah, I took her all those meals. And later on I was told ‘Oh no 
you can't do that. You've got to keep boundaries (.)’ And she was a little old lady, 
she died soon after. And I said ((sigh)) ‘What's wrong with being kind? or generous 
to someone?’ I was always having problems anyway in my work. 
Stéphanie: What was the reasoning that was given to you, for not, not being allowed 
to do these things? 
Ruth: Oh, I have, we were told that we've got to keep very strict professional 
boundaries. So for instance. / Exactly. Because time was one of the factors. And 
two, there is no time to get, to stay, no! Keep them, if they've got family, let the family 
do that kind of thing. And I said ‘Well, what about the cases were there's no family?’ 
‘Then refer them to, to organisations. refer them to that organizations, refer’, cos we 
had organisations who had befriended. But now they're befriending list became 6 
months. 
Extract 2 
Ruth: my conscience won't let me rest. I'm thinking ‘Oh, but I could have done this 
to help this person. I could have done that. I could have done that.’ And then I'm told 
‘You are not the (.) leave. Get out of it’ ((bangs table)) You know and things like that. 
I would (.) oh gosh. 
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Stéphanie: Goes against, your own 
Ruth: But it did.. I wa / I leave, I would have an / And then I'm told ‘You should learn 
to detach. You get too much involved, emotionally.’ You know, you understand. 
Because sometimes, sometimes I'd be fighting in meetings about someone, an 
individual, ‘You are too sensitive to that. you can't do this, we don't have resources.’ 
You know, you kept being told such things. Constantly. 
Stéphanie: But did you find it, because, I'm sure there was the argument from some 
of the management that they are trying to protect you for getting emotionally drained. 
Ruth: They did. They did. They did say. 
Stéphanie: But did you find it more emotionally draining. 
Ruth: It is.  
Stéphanie: To try to be [detached than to 
Ruth: It is. Gosh. It is. It is.] 
Stéphanie: try to behave the way that you did? 
Ruth: I have cried. I've gone to, even funerals for patients I’m seeing, but I want to 
go. But I'm see / I had patients who are so attached to, you know, there is a, but I'm 
saying ‘There is no-one to do his shopping.’ ‘ You are not healthcare. You are a 
nurse for goodness sake, don't do (.)’ ((animated)). I said ‘But I'm going in my break 
hour to shop. What’s (.)!’ You know, so I was having / it's not just me. I had a few 
colleagues who were like that. and all of us who were like that, we ended up leaving 
with trauma. Because we weren’t 
Stéphanie: For not being able to do that? 
Ruth: Yes. We were just broken. So broken. All the, oh gosh. Some of the social 
workers, very experienced and they are saying ‘No! This is not right.’ You know. All 





2   John M 
[John works in a project specifically focused on bringing services together to work 
better for people with complex needs who are involved with multiple services] 
Extract 1 
John M: I just get so pissed off with it, so there isn't any other words that I'm going 
to use about it, the obviousness of the situation can be really overcome if we are 
just using these terms now the system flex, flex in the system, just a tad, you know, 
we're not asking for much, you can see the treatment's there, everyone's in 
agreement the treatment / everyone says the treatment is going to be fine, but we 
can't start it until we leave prison and back in to the community and that's happened 
to quite a few of me guys. Yes, another one as well, had exactly the same thing, 
umm, wanted to be prescribed umm pre-cabs ( ) for his mental health because this 
is what he believes to work and it helps him you know be abstinent from you know 
heroin while he's out as well, we'll do two jobs in one, but because pre-cabs are 
quite a commodity in prison, wouldn't do it, had to wait until on the out, again, I mean, 
I suppose it's weighing up the balances, anyway, I don't know / 
Stéphanie: But I guess that's the difficulty isn’t it when you've got a system that is, 
for want of a better word, churning so many people through it's not able then to be 
responsive to any one single person's needs, unless they are very uncomplicated / 
John M: Yes. I mean I think people do get / like a blasé approach to it really / it's him 
again, or it's her again, or you know we've tried this, or we've done that, or not 
responsive, what's the point, or / Whatever / it's just like / and then the guys pick it 
up really quite quickly, they are no mugs, they just like well if you can't be bothered, 
I ain't, what do you want me to do you know and then we just fulfil the circle and 
then we just kick these people out, just to return maybe six weeks, maybe less, its 
been half hour the quickest one, again. 
Stéphanie: Half an hour? 
John M: Didn’t get down the road, no. 
Stéphanie: What happened? 
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John M: Well he got his release money, went in to the Off Licence, got extremely 
drunk, and he said I can't remember what happened, but he got re-arrested, so 
broke his licence agreement, was back in. 
Extract 2 
John M: You know it's just like what we want to do is you know is build bigger 
prisons. There's one in Cardiff, was it / was it / 1,000 people, 2,000 in mates that 
they want to provide support for. 
Stéphanie: But they are shutting down a lot of / well / women's prisons they are 
shutting down aren't they? 
John M: Super prisons that they want. 
Stéphanie: Oh brilliant. 
John M: Oh, what joy, yes. That's going / 
Stéphanie: Centralise everything. 
John M: It's going to make life so much nicer for every inmate isn't it. 
Stéphanie: Uh-huh and further distance the families to come and visit. 
John M: Yes, and all the rest of it, and then / it's just / the economics of it are not 
great in for people coming home, maybe G4's going to earn a few bob out of it, I'm 
sure they will, but yes, it's not / it's not conducive to / and I go back to you know the 
social side of it and our civic responsibility, it's just not there, not there. 
Stéphanie: It's not the driving force. 
John M: No, not at all, you know, we don’t want cohesive societies because that 
means that we have a collective voice which they / which is quite dangerous isn’t it. 
Stéphanie: Yes. Yes, yes, yes. 
John M: If we have a collective voice / we should do what the French do, swear, you 
know what I mean. 
((Section of conversation omitted)) 
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John M: It is just / just money-based capitalism, it's / it works for the elite, nobody 
else.  Yes.  I'm waiting for this sort of like what is it / like / umm / drop down economy 
where it sort of filters down from the top down, yes, I'm looking like / it's like pennies 
from heaven, shall I tip my umbrella up, stand and wait for this to happen, it's just 
like /  
Stéphanie: Ain't happening. 
John M: Course it ain't happening. No interest in you know filtering this shit down to 
us at all. 
3   Marcia 
Marcia: I've been over the years it may be a lot of cynicism, which makes me 
question my longevity within mental health. 
Stéphanie: Really? 
Marcia: Yes, yes, yes. 
Stéphanie: Cynicism for what specifically? 
Marcia: In, in, in terms of well / how much good am I doing any longer, umm, is there 
too much cynicism in terms of what I'm wanting for clients and the ability to deliver 
that service, because it's constantly changing and like I was saying, in terms of the 
prescription 12 session, six session,  
Stéphanie: It’s inadequate. 
Marcia: It's inadequate, yes. 
Stéphanie: Yes. I very much agree with you on that. 
Marcia: Being part of that machine, do I want to be part of it? 
Stéphanie: Does it play on your conscience? 
Marcia: Umm it does, it really does, it does and sometimes my / because you're 
under that pressure to deliver within a certain space of time, am I now adapting 
certain behaviours in let’s get this treatment done and dusted and / 




Stéphanie: to you? 
Marcia: That values that you started out with. 
Stéphanie: Like the person / looking at the person as a whole? and giving them the 
time and / 
Marcia: Yes, that's right. What's needed here? What's needed there? Umm. Is it just 
the therapy or is there more practical things that need to be interventions that need 
to be in place before you could even deliver the therapy? 
Stéphanie: Do you end up supporting them with some of that or / 
Marcia: In the past I used to, umm, because I suppose the service / umm / that I 
used to work for, but also the changes within the requirement of different funding 
streams, yes. So if I / I was based as a / I used to deliver therapy within a client's 
home, so that gave me more flexibility to see them as a whole, what is it they were 
needing and even when I used to put in to place because of a multi-disciplinary 
team, a much larger team than X so you are able to say to someone that's sat next 
to you, oh, I had this client, blah de blah, oh, try this, try that, when you feed back in 
to the larger service they / she's done everything, so what's left for me to do, so / 
Stéphanie: Were they grateful for that or? 
Marcia: Umm / I think eventually they could actually see that it was helpful because 
that person's not coming back within the service. But umm I suppose that when they 
come to do their review, when they are looking at well what do they / someone's 
work / I've encroached on someone else's 
Stéphanie: Oh. 
Marcia: Yes.   
Stéphanie: So they weren't really looking at what was best for the person, so much 
as you're messing with our system? 
Marcia: That's it, but that's how the system kind of developed. There is / it's all 




Marcia: How the funding is 
4   Kamilla 
Kamilla: Yes. I definitely feel like there's a gap, so like where you say a lot is being 
done, where is it being done? Because I guess in like mainstream society, I can see 
that a lot is being done, but then if I look at / my culture, for example, so I'm Pakistani, 
so if I think about the Pakistani community, there’s not really much done or I don't 
feel like there's being much done. And yes / even somebody / like I know somebody 
here who umm / like whose, whose Mum has schizophrenia but she, she's home all 
the time and he looks after her and he doesn’t really have anyone to talk to about 
how difficult it is and things like that, so yes, which is very sad, because obviously 
then people are dealing with this stuff in isolation, yes. 
Stéphanie: So if you were aware that there's stuff going on in the mainstream to sort 
of raise awareness, how is it that that isn't getting through to the communities, 
because / I suppose the people that are trying to do the awareness raising 
campaigns and things are using mainstream distribution networks. 
Kamilla: Yes, yes. Yes. I think the / it would mean just reaching people, I don't know, 
it's maybe / it comes from both directions actually so obviously the people who are 
doing the awareness raising obviously speak a particular language, using particular 
resources and stuff, that are targeting certain people, or getting through to certain 
people, but not to everyone. There's a large community that maybe they see these 
things, like a poster in the window or something, like something on the side of a bus 
or something, but it probably just goes over their head because they don't associate 





Appendix 26: Staff extended extracts - distrust in communities 
There are four extracts included here: 
1. Jean 
2. James 
1   Jean 
Stéphanie: And in the Caribbean community then you were saying that everyone's 
worried about other people knowing and talking about their business. 
Jean: Yes. 
Stéphanie: Is that because there is a tighter community feel or / 
Jean: It's incestuous, alright, but it's not tight, so it's not / it's very / the Caribbean 
community, like I say, I'm Caribbean, we've got very much / it's umm / I can only talk 
about the ((name omitted)) Caribbean community, it's umm / it's not a tight knit as 
in unity stand together, it's a very much a what's he doing, or oh if he can do that, 
then my daughter can do that, so it's a bit of this old crab in a bucket, we all often 
describe ourselves as crabs in a bucket. If you put some crabs in a bucket they will 
stand on each other's head to get out and actually that's pretty much it.  We tend to 
be looking around, we trust no one, we trust no one. 
Stéphanie: Where does that come from? 
Jean: It's / I think it's / there is something.  We are not driven, like some other minority 
groups, in terms of I expect you to be a doctor or a lawyer. We are more driven in 
that keep the negative away from our family, so don't want to be linked with crime, 
don't want to be linked with mental health and if there is it has to be kept because it 
would be seen as embarrassing and all of that. So, yes, we're very different in how 
we / when I say "we", Caribbean's, yes, we're not / and you know I can talk about 
some communities that you know I know that from a child as young, within their 
head, they're talking being a doctor and a lawyer and that's what's expected of them, 
etc., and I don't / and I think that's good, you know, they've got a great / but it's not 
on the whole what you / especially in the days, back in the days, you used to find 
with the Caribbean community work, work, you know, our aspirations weren't like 
that, it was you get a job, you work and just stay out of jail. 
Stéphanie: Do you think that's linked to sort of colonial history? 
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Jean: Yes, I do, absolutely, absolutely. Yes, definitely, and I think that umm you 
know my, my parents, both are still alive, and it was the / your head down, and you 
just worked, you just worked.   
2   James 
James: because within Caribbean / this is based on my experience again, mistrust, 
umm, you / there will be things like from a colloquial language side, ‘you go and chat 
my business’, umm, ‘you'll have a vendetta against me’, ‘you're talking to that 
person’, that person ‘I don't trust you, suspicious’. A lot of mental health issues is 
based on what the professionals would class as paranoia and often paranoia I think 
can be stressed as a basis of being let down and how you think someone is reading 
you, that's a big issue we have, I think, amongst our race people is when / I think / 
‘you're probably thinking negative of me’, ‘you're probably doing this and that’, 
because we're so used of the discrimination or people thinking ill of us and it's all 





Appendix 27: Poem by Tiana McLean, June 2020 
Written by a nine year old girl and shared online by her Grandmother, this poem 
calls for racial equality (Booth, 2020). I found it posted on Bristol’s Black Lives Matter 





































[Lyrics redacted from the digital version of this thesis for copyright reasons] 




Appendix 28: Published conference abstract 
NNDR 2019 Symposium 
Exclusionary Aspects of Claiming Disability Rights 
Alex James Miller Tate, Stephanie Harvey, Adi Goldiner 
In post-industrial welfare states, legislation protecting the rights of disabled people 
is normally perceived as enabling inclusion and reinforcing equal citizenship. Thus, 
laws prohibiting discrimination based on disability, securing access to public 
accommodations, raising disability benefits, or funding healthcare services have 
been typically supported by the disability community and its allies. The UNCRPD 
has further augmented efforts to protect disability rights in national laws. However, 
the potential embedded in legislation to provide such inclusion and equality is 
often missed. 
Importantly, the manner in which rights provisions are delivered may not support 
the actualization of rights for all. For example, claiming disability rights involves 
identifying as disabled, a process which in actuality may require subjecting oneself 
to procedures, interventions and stigma that people would like to avoid.  
This symposium explores possible deterrents to claiming rights as a disabled 
person, resulting from exclusionary features characterizing the process of claiming 
these rights. Specifically, all three papers will consider deterrents for specific 
groups of people who, by the UNCRPD definition of disability, are entitled to claim 
disability rights but have particular reasons to be cautious in doing so. Firstly, Dr. 
Alex Miller Tate critically explores practices that arguably bring about the 
'testimonial smothering' of mental health service users in the UK. Next, Ms. 
Stephanie Harvey considers how a person’s intersectional location can create 
barriers to claiming disability rights and what this might mean for public policy 
approaches. Finally, Ms. Adi Goldiner discusses the interrelationship between 
popular perceptions of disability and the possibility of claiming disability rights; 
specifically, the effect that perceiving disability as a 'personal tragedy' may have 
on people's willingness to claim disability rights. 
Speakers bring with them expertise from a range of disciplines and prior careers 
both in the UK and in Israel to inform the discussion. The symposium should be of 
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interest to those working to improve the efficacy of statutes and practices aimed at 
increasing disabled people's ability to actualize their rights. 
De facto Detention and Testimonial Smothering in Psychiatry 
Alex James Miller Tate 
Teaching Associate and Research Assistant 
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham 
 
De facto detention in mental health (MH) services involves a range of practices. One 
example is that of clinicians overtly or covertly threatening service users with 
involuntary detention should they fail to ‘voluntarily’ proceed with an in-patient stay. 
Another is of ‘voluntary’ in-patients being restrained or held behind locked doors, 
despite their strict right to discharge themselves from the service. There is evidence 
that the practice is relatively widespread across UK MH services, despite it clearly 
bypassing service users’ formal legal protections (CQC 2014; 2016). This is in 
addition to the fact that in all forms it clearly constitutes an especially morally 
objectionable form of coerced cooperation; the service user’s autonomy is violated 
and their cooperation forced by threatening a stigmatising and possibly violent 
outcome should they fail to cooperate. All of this proceeds without the service user 
gaining any benefit of the additional (though flimsy) legal protections being held 
under section can confer. 
I further argue that we can expect this practice (in addition to other morally and 
clinically undesirable effects) to bring about the testimonial smothering of service 
users; roughly, the unjust suppression of their testimony (Dotson 2011). This means 
that not only the immediate victims of de facto detention are harmed by it. Rather, it 
creates an environment where all or many service users are justifiably concerned 
about the enormous risk to their person associated with disclosing certain 
information. This not only unduly suppresses their ability to safely speak of their 
experiences, but also impoverishes clinical knowledge of service users’ needs. I 
argue that this injustice is sufficient to warrant the significant weakening of the 
clinical power in UK MH services that gives rise to these abuses. 
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'The cheapest kind of understanding': intersectional marginalisation in 
disability rights? 
Stephanie Harvey 
PhD candidate with the D4D research project and Associate Lecturer, Bath Spa 
University 
 
Introduction to the research question: Taking findings from a wider research 
project, this paper considers barriers to claiming disability rights for people located 
at the intersections or disability and minority ethnicity in the UK. It explores this 
with a view to what public policy approaches may need to consider if the UK is to 
provide substantive equality for a diverse disabled population.  
I consider the difficulties encountered by one particular participant. Focusing on 
conversations immediately surrounding an attempted suicide, the participant’s 
testimony illustrates barriers to claiming disability rights experienced and 
articulated to me by many other participants in my research. In seeking to 
understand why factors such as a short-term ban from a support organisation 
contributed so significantly to this participant’s acute distress, I draw from 
intersectional theory (Crenshaw 1991, Collins and Bilge 2011). 
Methods: A case study approach explores the experiences of a man with physical 
disabilities who experiences long-term mental distress, is from a mixed heritage 
background and intersects multiple other marginalised groups in UK society. 
During a series of in-depth ethnographic conversations, he recounted his 
experiences of securing the support he requires. His testimony is further 
contextualised using interviews with staff working for organisations supporting him, 
many of whom are of minority ethnicity themselves.  
Results: The man provided both narrative descriptions of previous experiences 
accessing services and shared current difficulties and anxieties. Overriding 
themes emerged regarding:  
1. difficulties meeting the expectations/requirements of mainstream services; 
and 
2. disparities between service provision and his needs. 
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Whilst these themes hold relevance for many disabled people, the particulars 
highlight barriers resulting specifically from certain intersectional experiences in 
the UK. 
Brief discussion and implications: Disabled people with intersectional experiences, 
whether due to ‘race’/ethnicity or other identity markers, face additional barriers to 
claiming disability rights in the UK. Discussing his experiences of the healthcare 
system, the participant stated ‘I've always been offered the... you know, the, the 
cheapest kind of... understanding.’ This sentence encompasses feelings of being 
provided with inadequate services, a lack of understanding on multiple levels from 
service providers and a sense of being devalued.  
These themes appear repeatedly in the researcher’s wider study and in existing 
academic and grey literature (Bécares and Nazroo, 2013; Jivraj and Nazroo, 2014; 
Ahmad and Bradby, 2008; ENC and SCOPE, 2012; EHRC, 2017; Griffiths, 2018). 
I argue that sufficient cause for concern exists to require (re)consideration of the 
systemic issues at play and posits that addressing such issues in the UK would 
require revisions to policy approaches. 
 
Claiming Disability Rights with a Sense of Dignity and Pride 
Adi Goldiner 
PhD Candidate, Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London 
 
People perceive the nature of disability and the grounding of disability rights in 
different ways. Some think of disability as 'harm', and thus believe that disability 
rights are based on disabled people's interest in being compensated for their 'loss 
and suffering'. Call this the 'personal tragedy' grounding of disability rights. Others 
view disability as 'mere-difference', namely a trait with no inherent implications 
about a person's well-being, and thus believe that disability rights are grounded on 
disabled people's interest in being free from discrimination, oppression and social 
expectations to (at least aspire to) be 'normal'. Call this the 'affirmative' grounding 
of disability rights. 
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Although disability rights may be based on either grounding, practically, people's 
perception of the concept of disability and the grounding of disability rights can 
have significant implications on them claiming their legal rights as disabled people. 
In particular, those who embrace the 'personal tragedy' grounding of disability 
rights are less likely to claim such rights. Firstly, disabled people who do not 
conceive their impairments as tragic may plausibly find identifying as disabled as 
degrading, for the latter is closely connected with the view that disabled people 
deserve pity. Secondly, disabled people who conceive their impairments as tragic 
may also be less cautious in identifying as such, but they are not likely to gain the 
benefit of empowerment that claiming rights typically confers on right holders. 
By contrast, people who embrace the 'affirmative' grounding of disability rights are 
more likely to claim disability rights. This grounding allows disabled people to self-
identify in any way they like, even when their self-perception defies certain social 
expectations about how disabled people should act and feel. Moreover, the 
'affirmative' grounding allows people to claim rights with a sense of dignity and 
pride, thereby right holders gain the additional benefit of empowerment embedded 
in claiming rights. 
Enacting disability rights is typically deemed as a means to fighting stigma and 
prejudice against disabled people. But this paper shows that the full realization of 
the potential embedded within those rights is contingent upon people's views about 
disability. If people's views are aligned with the tragedy grounding of disability rights, 
they are less likely to claim disability rights. By contrast, the affirmative grounding of 
disability rights enables claiming of disability rights with a sense of dignity and pride. 
This paper concludes that promoting affirmative grounding of disability rights is vital 


































                                                          
